# DAs – Russia Relations – CPWW – Michigan Summer Debate Institutes 2022

# Notes

## How to Use this File

#### This file presents multiple different scenarios for Russian influence being good around the globe. Each DA argues that the plan’s increase in NATO cohesion/strength/unity trades off with the motivations behind [x] country/region relations with Russia which is bad.

#### The best way to use this file is to pick a region and use that section of the file for execution of the DA. There are *7 unique* relations scenarios for you to choose from. The “generic link” at the top of the file can be used with all of the scenarios.

## Acknowledgments/Contact Information

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# Generic Relations

## Top Level

### 1NC – Generic Link

#### Russia’s relations across the globe are driven by a desire to prevent NATO cohesion and strength – the plan’s implementation saps motivation for sustaining influence

John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,\*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, \*\* is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “8 The outlook”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22

The pattern of recent years indicates that **in this situation, Moscow is more likely to increase activities abroad to make its presence felt**. **It has playgrounds close to home** – **in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine as well as further afield in Libya and Syria**. Russia may also take another step closer to China at a time when tensions in US–China relations are increasing. In short, the scope for the collision of interests with western countries, including Germany, looks set to increase rather than decrease. Such an outcome is more likely because the Russian leadership appears undeterred by greater confrontation. There are four reasons for this. First, confrontation helps sustain the narrative at home that ‘the West’ is working to cut Russian down to size as part of a neocontainment policy, forcing Russia into a ‘besieged fortress’ posture. This putative external danger to Russia allows the leadership to take measures to protect itself against the real threat to its security – its own people. **Second, more confrontation increases the Kremlin’s appetite for fishing in troubled waters, whether in areas vacated by the USA such as Syria, or in western countries themselves by interfering in their democratic processes to increase their societal divisions**. This is part of the strategy to protect the Russian system by shaping the external environment to its benefit. Third, confrontation offers opportunities to expose the weaknesses of the EU and NATO and deepen estrangement between the USA and its European allies. Divisions within the EU on the issue of Russia offer potentially rich opportunities to Russian diplomacy. Fourth, Moscow recognises that confrontation intimidates European governments, encouraging them to find ways of talking more to Moscow rather than creating the means to deter its aggressive behaviour. Germany’s failure to invest in maintaining adequate defence forces after the end of the Cold War says much about its lack of a strategic mindset. It succumbed to a sense of a new peaceful era reinforced by the enlargement of NATO, which relieved Germans of the burden of being a frontier state as they had been for fortyfive years as a divided nation on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In this seemingly benign environment, there was less obvious need for US security guarantees and Germany’s armed forces needed to focus primarily on out-of-area crisis management to the detriment of collective defence. This had profound implications for the size, structure, equipment and training of the Bundeswehr. In 2007, a senior British officer likened the Bundeswehr’s capabilities to those of ‘an aggressive camping organisation’.5 **Since 2014, a defence planning process has been in place to rebuild the armed forces’ collective defence and deterrence capabilities**. This will reach not completion until 2032, leaving a significant gap during which a key vulnerability is visible. During the Cold War, the US military had the ability to deploy forces to two major theatres at the same time and had enough reserves to deal with a simultaneous minor crisis. It can now only respond to one major crisis and one smaller emergency. **Should the US have to deal with a major crisis in the Asia-Pacific region, European members of NATO at present would struggle alongside a smaller US force to maintain Europe’s defences if tested**. The German government’s strategic assessments after the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 were clear about the need to reinvest in defence but its leaders did not want to take this message to the public because it would be unpopular. Policymakers still use coded language to make the point. In a speech in October 2020, Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer spoke compellingly of Germany needing to be a ‘strategic giver’ rather than remaining a ‘taker’. It meant becoming a ‘hard, powerpolitical factor’.6 However, there was no mention of paying for this capability. Her message instead focused on the importance of preserving the transatlantic link significantly weakened over the past two decades, and particularly under the Trump presidency. **The crisis of liberal democracy symbolised by Trump’s election in 2016 and the rise of populist forces in several western countries have been grist to the Kremlin’s mill**. For this reason, Russia’s leaders feel that history is on their side. Putin boldly stated in 2019 that liberalism had outlived its purpose.7 **Russia’s overconfidence derives partly from the fact that it has worked out how to target western weaknesses without provoking serious retaliation**. Western countries have signally failed to study Russia’s vulnerabilities in the same way and apply pressure to them as part of a strategy to defend their interests. Behind its claims that it wishes to adapt the international system to new realities, Moscow has a backward-looking agenda. It seeks refuge in the past with its nostalgia for the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.8 When it talks of a new security order, it has in mind an old one. Ahead of the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Putin even proposed a summit of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to discuss global security issues. This, of course, did not include Germany, the country with the largest population in Europe and the fourth-largest economy in the world. **The Russian leadership remains obsessed with the extent of US influence in international affairs as if Russia were an equal, and despite clear signs that Washington is returning to a new form of isolationism, demonstrated by its reduced interest in the Middle East**. These paranoias continue to fuel the traditional goal of weakening the transatlantic link and returning Europe to its natural state in which Russia can exert greater political influence over the continent. In this respect, Trump’s disregard for NATO, his contempt for the EU and his tendency to treat Germany as an enemy rather than an ally made him Moscow’s accomplice in weakening transatlantic relations**. His assault on Germany for its low level of defence spending and the hostility of his administration to Nord Stream 2 were a deeply unnerving experience for German policymakers that look set to recede to some extent under the presidency of Joe Biden**. However, even if the atmosphere improves, a return to the pre-Trump status quo in Germany’s relations with the USA looks unlikely because too much has changed in the meantime.

#### \*\*INSERT SPECIFIC RELATIONS SCENARIO\*\*

### 2NC – Generic Link

#### Russia’s drive to establish global relations is only facilitated by decohesion of US and NATO policy

John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,\*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, \*\* is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “Introduction”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22

The premise of this book is that Russia in its current condition and configuration poses a serious threat to the stability of Europe. **Russia’s authoritarian system is weak at home and yet strong enough to be a revanchist power, one able to fill power vacuums created by the USA and its allies in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Central America**. Turning its back on Europe, Russia has moved closer to China, apparently ready to accept being its junior partner in the absence of allies to counter-balance Chinese influence. **The focus of Russia’s leadership is on survival**. It sees the restoration and upholding of Russia’s international status as essential to the process of securing its rule, prioritising it over the need to equip Russia for a new economic and political age dominated by climate change, digitalisation and other disruptive forces. The rise of Asia, the disorientation of the USA and its allies as well as the tarnishing of western values and the fractures in western societies all offer short-term gains for a Russian leadership fearful of reform at home but confident of its strength abroad. This has encouraged an ill-conceived policy of aggression towards Ukraine that could easily have triggered a wider European conflict in 2014 when it annexed Crimea and deliberately destabilised south-eastern Ukraine. In the process, Russia has needlessly made an enemy of a people with which it shares a strong cultural affinity, consolidating Ukraine as a political nation that no longer sees its future in close alliance with Russia. **The ‘return’ of Crimea to Russia is meagre compensation for forcing Ukraine on to a pro-western path of development and seriously aggravating relations with the EU and NATO**. Moscow’s flat-footed reaction to revolution in Belarus in the summer of 2020 pointed again to poor decision-making and limited crisis management capabilities. The Lukashenka regime had been living on borrowed time for years beforehand and danger was looming. Further misjudgements of this kind are likely to increase rather than decrease as the Russian system closes further in on itself in pursuit of greater resilience to outside threats.

# Central Europe-Russia Relations

## 1NC – Central Europe Relations

### 1NC – Russian Probing Scenario

#### Central Europe-US relations are on the brink now which leaves the room for Russian influence

David Hutt ‘21, is a political journalist based between France and the Czech Republic, reporting on European political affairs and EU-Asian relations, “In Central Europe, Biden Can Build on Trump’s Record”, World Politics Review, 2/17/21, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29428/in-central-europe-biden-can-build-on-trump-s-record

Today, **the United States’ relations with Central Europe are at an inflection point**. Much of the recent media coverage in the region has focused on how Washington’s influence might wane if President Joe Biden picks a fight with the governments of Hungary and Poland, **whose leaders had cultivated close ties with** Biden’s predecessor, Donald **Trump**. On the campaign trail, Biden bemoaned the recent trajectory of democratic decline and the erosion of checks and balances on executive power in those countries. Meanwhile, **illiberal leaders like** Hungary’s Viktor **Orban and** Poland’s Jaroslaw **Kaczynski are suspicious of Biden’s pledges to make human rights and the rule of law key pillars of U.S. foreign policy, viewing such efforts as affronts to their sovereignty**. As the Atlantic Council’s Petr Tuma noted in December, some observers in Central and Eastern Europe also fear that after a period of “intensified cooperation” under Trump, America could revert back to the era of President Barack Obama, “when many believed Washington (initially) sacrificed the region’s interests in the name of a reset with Moscow.” **In reality, though, Biden has given no sign of any such attempt at a reset, signaling he will take a tough approach toward Russia**. And even as Biden seeks to reorient U.S. foreign policy away from his predecessor’s approach, **the Trump administration has actually left a solid foundation of trust and cooperation for Biden to build upon in Central Europe**. Since 2017, all of the leaders from the “Visegrad Four”—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland—have visited Washington, while Trump’s secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, toured each of their capitals. U**.S. trade with the region is up across the board, and** Washington has signed new security pacts with Poland and Hungary. And all except Budapest have backed Washington’s pressure campaign against the controversial Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. During his first weeks in office, Biden has focused more on reassuring Western European partners, holding calls with the leaders of Germany, France and the United Kingdom, as well the NATO secretary general. **But having served as the main interlocutor for Central and Eastern Europe as vice president under Obama, Biden knows well the region’s strategic importance**. Its natural aversion to Russian influence tends to suit U.S. interests. And China, America’s main strategic competitor, has built up its investment and influence in the region, backed by a powerful section of the Central European political elite. **Improving relations with the region won’t require a great deal of heavy lifting from Biden’s administration**—a rare benefit as it faces numerous intractable problems across the world. **In fact, in many policy areas, Biden can largely pick up where the Trump administration left off**.

#### Renewed focus on European cohesion for NATO undermines Russian influence in Central Europe – continued attempts to exclude Russia leads to violent probing to re-establish influence

Anatol Lieven ’22, is a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Russia Belongs at the Center of Europe”, Foreign Policy, 2/10/22, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/10/russia-europe-ukraine-west-security-council/

**The Western attempt to expel Russia from Europe has failed**. That there was such an attempt was always implicit in the strategy of seeking to admit every European country but Russia into NATO and the European Union. In this context, the NATO slogan “A Europe Whole and Free” is an explicit statement that Russia is not part of Europe.

**But** as French President Emmanuel Macron has reminded us, **Russia is part of Europe and is simply too big, too powerful, and too invested in its immediate neighborhood to be excluded from the European security order**. A continued strategy along these lines will lead to repeated Russian attempts to force its way back in. At best, this will lead to repeated and very damaging crises; at worst, to war.

A structure needs to be created that can defend the interests of NATO and the EU while at the same time accommodating vital Russian interests and preserving peace. The solution lies in a modernized version of what was once called the “Concert of Europe.”

**The current security order has reached its limit**. Until 2007-2008, the expansion of the EU and NATO appeared to have proceeded flawlessly, with the admission of all the former Soviet satellites in Central Europe and the Balkans, as well as the Baltic states. Russia was unhappy with NATO expansion but did not actively oppose it. Then, however, both NATO and the EU received decisive checks, through their own overreach.

At the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, in 2008, the United States and its allies, though denied an immediate Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia because of the opposition of France and Germany, procured a promise of those countries’ eventual membership. Seen from Moscow, this created the prospect that NATO would include countries with territorial disputes (and in the case of Georgia, frozen conflicts) with Russia; that (as in the Baltic states) NATO would give cover to moves to harm the position of local Russian minorities; and that NATO would expel Russia from its naval base at Sevastopol and from the southern Caucasus.

Later that year, the Russo-Georgian War should have sounded the death knell of further NATO expansion, for it demonstrated beyond doubt both the acute dangers of territorial disputes in the former USSR and that in the last resort Russia would fight to defend its vital interests in the region, and the West would not fight. **This is being demonstrated again today by the repeated and categorical statements from Washington and Brussels that there is no question of sending troops to defend Ukraine; and if NATO will not fight for Ukraine, then it cannot admit Ukraine as an ally**. It is as simple as that.

**The rise of China is the other factor that makes the exclusion of Russia unviable**. For this project was developed at a time when Russia was at its weakest in almost 400 years and when China’s colossal growth had only just begun. This allowed the West possibilities that today have diminished enormously, if as seems likely China is prepared to strengthen Russia against Western economic sanctions.

The EU too has reached the limit of its expansion eastward. On the one hand, there is Ukraine’s size (44 million people), corruption, political dysfunction, and poverty (GDP per capita that’s one-third of Russia’s). Perhaps more importantly, EU expansion to eastern Europe no longer looks like the unconditional success story that it did a decade ago.

Romania, Bulgaria, and other states remain deeply corrupt and in many ways still ex-communist. **Poland and Hungary have developed dominant strains of chauvinist and quasi-authoritarian populism that place them at odds with what were supposed to be the core values of the EU**—**and that in some respects bring them closer ideologically to the regime of** Russian President Vladimir **Putin**. After this experience, there is no chance that the EU will admit a country like Ukraine in any foreseeable future.

**An acknowledgment of these obvious truths** (which are acknowledged in private by the overwhelming majority of Western officials and experts) **should open the way to thinking about a new European security architecture that would incorporate NATO and the EU while reducing the hostility between these organizations and Russia**. We should aim at the creation of this new system as part of the solution to the present crisis, and in order to avoid new ones.

#### Attempts by Russia to re-gain influence in Central Europe result in hybrid war that undermines the entire alliance – turns and outweighs the aff

Tamás MAGYARICS ‘19, Professor, Department of American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University; Senior Research Fellow, American Studies Research Institute, National University of Public Service, “How to Revitalise the U.S.– Eastern European Relations”, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade - Budapest, Foreign Policy Review, 2019, https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FPR\_2019\_online\_final.pdf

**Despite Russian conventional threats along the eastern borders of NATO,** Moscow has deployed a wide range of non-traditional weapons in its grand strategy to regain some of its influence in Central and Eastern Europe, to undermine the unity of the European Union, and to drive a wedge between the U.S. and her NATO allies in Europe. **In fact, a conventional, or a nuclear, military confrontation does not seem to be likely in the foreseeable future**. Therefore, NATO/U.S. had better prepare for such challenges posed by Russia as hybrid warfare and cyber warfare. **Intelligence, economic, or financial penetration into the Central and Eastern European NATO members** (at times with the help of front organisations), **disinformation campaigns are imminent and real threats to the national security of the countries targeted, and to the cohesion of NATO alliance as well**. Hybrid warfare has already been used by Moscow against Ukraine in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and the experiences gained in these conflicts are bound to be carefully studied by the Russian strategists as to their potential application in future conflicts in the neighbourhood. What is a ’clear and present danger’ for the U.S. and its allies in NATO is Russia’s cyber warfare which was used influencing the U.S. presidential elections in 2016, possibly the French and German parliamentary elections in the past few years, and definitely deployed against Estonia and Latvia in the Baltics (The Straits Times, 2017), as well as against international organisations, such as, for instance, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Brunsden, 2018). **The wide range of Russian cyber warfare activity is, without question, one of the most pressing chellenges NATO, and especially its Central and Eastern European members are facing**. Given the immense Russian capabilities in this area, it is stating the obvious, that the individual members of NATO cannot successfully defend themselves; it is their existential interest to work together with the other members of the Atlantic Community, first and foremost with the U.S. Moreover, cybersecurity threats to the Europeans (and the U.S.) are not only posed by Russia. The debate over the role of the Chinese Huawei in establishing the 5G mobile network in Europe, or in some countries in Europe, relates in reality to national security in a broader sense.

## 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox

### 2NC – UQ

#### Central European countries are leaning towards Russia – assumes Ukraine.

Economist ’22 [Economist; British weekly newspaper published that focuses on current affairs, international business, politics, technology, and culture; 2-5-2022, updated 2-9-2022; "As Russia menaces Ukraine, eastern European countries grow nervous"; The Economist; https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/02/05/as-russia-menaces-ukraine-eastern-european-countries-grow-nervous; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]

The municipal offices in the Estonian city of Narva are just a snowball’s throw from Russia. From her window Katri Raik, the mayor, can watch cars and lorries trickling through a border checkpoint. More than 80% of Narva’s residents are ethnic Russians, a legacy of the centuries during which Narva was part first of the Russian empire and then of the Soviet Union. Ethnic Russians, nearly a quarter of the population, have grown more integrated since Estonia became independent 30 years ago. Yet most send their children to Russian-language schools and rely on Russian media. “Yesterday someone on the city council said ‘U nikh v Estonii tak [That’s how it is over there in Estonia],’” says Ms Raik.

A former interior minister, Ms Raik was elected in December pledging to bridge the gap. A new Estonian-language school will open in September. The regional economy is now oriented towards the West. But Russia’s military build-up on the Ukrainian border is reminding Narva of where it sits. Opinion is divided along familiar lines. In several conversations, ethnic Estonians saw Russia as the aggressor, whereas ethnic Russians tended to think the risk of war exaggerated or to blame NATO. “We each know what the other thinks, so we simply don’t talk about it,” says Ms Raik.

Across eastern Europe, the threat of war in Ukraine evokes long-standing fears. Most countries, Estonia included, are nato members and face no immediate risk of incursion. But Russian and Soviet expansionism has shaped their politics for centuries. These days many eastern Europeans are at odds with the Kremlin over energy supplies or Russian-financed corruption. Others have friendlier relations, helped by trade, Russian-speaking minorities or politicians who get on with Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president. But even in such places, the crisis in Ukraine is causing problems.

The Baltic countries, which were Soviet territory until 1991, are the strongest voices for deterrence and harsh sanctions. “Interdependence means you can hurt the one who is dependent on you,” says Kaja Kallas, Estonia’s prime minister, whose mother’s family was deported to Siberia under Stalin. Her government is trying to send weapons to Ukraine, but Germany has been blocking the passing-on of German-made equipment. On January 27th Latvia’s defence minister called the German stance “immoral and hypocritical”.

Last summer, when Mr Putin wrote an essay claiming that Ukraine was not a legitimate nation, it rang alarms in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, because he had made similar arguments about them in the 2000s. Defence planners in these countries consider Russia an existential threat.

In Romania and Bulgaria, things are more complex. Both are NATO members. But their politics are plagued by corruption, some of it tied to Russia. They have not always been enthusiastic about American policies that link anti-corruption efforts to regional security. Romanian politicians have clamoured for years for NATO to upgrade its presence, though Bulgarian ones downplay new deployments to avoid provoking voters with Russian sympathies. Still, both countries were furious when Russia demanded on January 21st that NATO pull allied forces out of their territory. On February 2nd Joe Biden instead announced the deployment of an additional 3,000 troops to the region

It is in central Europe that attitudes towards Russia are most ambivalent. Viktor Orban, Hungary’s populist prime minister, is friendly with Mr Putin and visited him in Moscow on February 1st. He has imitated Mr Putin’s model of government by taking control of his country’s media and judiciary. He has also bought Russian nuclear power plants, struck deals for Russian gas that circumvent Ukraine and persistently called for relaxing EU sanctions. Milos Zeman, the Czech Republic’s president, is cosy with Mr Putin, too. But Petr Fiala, the new Czech prime minister, is solidly in step with NATO and the EU.

Poland’s government also has some affinity with Mr Putin’s. It is conservative, religious and nationalist, and is fighting with the EU over its efforts to turn judges into political pawns. Yet it is the most fiercely anti-Russian government in Europe. The Russian empire ruled much of Poland throughout the 19th century and tried to Russify its population. In the second world war Stalin carved Poland up with Hitler and executed much of its elite. Many Poles see Russia as a country that tried to eliminate them as a nation.

Eastern European countries will pay a price for isolating Russia, especially in energy. In October Moldova was forced to strike an expensive gas deal with Gazprom, and rising electricity bills nearly toppled Ms Kallas’s government in January. But only for the Baltic countries is Russia among the top five export markets. In no country is direct investment from Russia more than a tenth that from the EU, though in some pockets it plays a significant role.

In Narva, for instance, about 30% of the firms in the city’s industrial zone are owned by Russians, reckons Vadim Orlov, the zone’s director. Russian business~~men~~ [owners] want factories in a country governed by the rule of law. Why should Estonia back sanctions that could make things harder for its own Russian-owned businesses?

One reason is that Russia likes to use sanctions too. Ms Kallas mentions 2007, when it retaliated for the removal of a memorial to Soviet soldiers in Tallinn by cutting off fuel supplies. Dumitru Alaiba, a Moldovan MP, recalls 2014, when Russia hit his country with an embargo after it signed an association agreement with the EU. “[We] have learned that dealing with Russia has risks,” says Ms Kallas. If the region’s ties to Russia are further weakened, Mr Putin will have himself to blame.

#### Central Europe has Soviet ties difficult for Ukraine to overcome.

Tuzhanskyi ’22 [Dmytro; director of the Institute for Central European Strategy (Ukraine), Think Visegrad Fellow 2020 and IVLP alum; 1-25-2022; "Putin wants the West to repeat the tragedy of Central Europe"; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/putin-wants-west-repeat-tragedy-central-europe-opinion-1672807; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]

A string of recent high level negotiations between the West and Russia are not as fruitless as they are deemed by their participants and political commentators.

It's true that no agreement on any of the key issues has been reached during the negotiations held in Geneva, Brussels and Vienna, and 100,000 Russian soldiers are still located along the Ukrainian border. No agreement save for one may turn out to be the most important.

From the ultimatums issued by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the counter-stance of the West (U.S., NATO and the European Union as one voice), one may infer that both parties realize that Ukraine is now part of the West.

Neither Russia nor the West may be ready for this. Even Ukraine is not ready, despite striving for such a reality more than others. But that doesn't change anything. Ukraine is no longer an "in-between," buffer or gray-zone state as had been the case until 2014.

This new truth will not be changed by the fact that the West currently is not ready to offer Ukraine EU or NATO membership in the foreseeable future, with or without a new Russian military invasion.

Beginning from 2014, the large-scale war waged by Russia on Ukraine has not ceased, claiming 14,000 Ukrainians. This grueling war has not impacted the civilizational choice of Ukraine toward the West. On the contrary, it has been entrenched in society as never before.

In November 2021, 58 percent of Ukrainians said they supported Ukraine joining NATO. In 2014, that figure was 51 percent. Moreover, 59 percent of Ukrainians do not think that Russia will abandon its aggressive policy toward Ukraine provided Kyiv give up on its intention of joining the EU and NATO.

Putin's intentions of receiving premature guarantees of NATO's non-enlargement are yet another proof of Ukraine belonging to the West. However, he is undertaking attempts to reject and change the reality against Ukrainian's will, relying on (paradoxical as it may sound) the West.

Thus, the historic moment of this situation lies in the question about whether the West will abandon its own member, as has already been the case once.

In 1983, the world famous Czech-French writer Milan Kundera described such a precedent as "a kidnapped West or the tragedy of Central Europe."

What he had in mind was power-sharing in the wake of World War II, when countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which had always been associating themselves with the West in historical, cultural and political terms, were "kidnapped" from the West, finding themselves in the East, in the Soviet sphere of influence. Here Kundera also emphasized the fact that this took place with the silent acquiescence of Western countries themselves, which did not look at Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary as part of the West. This was evident during anti-Soviet uprisings in 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Prague, which were quelled by the Soviet troops' invasion of these two countries.

For the past eight years since the Revolution of Dignity happened in Ukraine, Russia occupied Crimea and Donbas. The entire world has had the opportunity to watch the same symbolic drama unfold in Europe, which was previously described by Kundera.

Ukraine now is the place where the civilizational border of the West and Europe runs.

Moreover, in the Russian drafts of agreements with NATO and the U.S., the Kremlin put Ukraine in the same boat with Central European states, which joined the Alliance after 1997. Putin wants the region to be NATO-free regardless of the membership status of any given country. He recently highlighted the "historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians."

The Kremlin insisted that the United States promised Moscow that NATO will never enlarge to the East—an agreement that was never made by the U.S. or any other nation.

Fortunately, unlike 1945, 1956 or 1968, the West does not remain silent today and has not ditched Ukraine with acquiescence, yet. The current and possibly new sanctions, readiness to negotiate with Russia at any level and in any format combined with the supply of weapons to Ukraine corroborates this point.

However, these efforts are insufficient.

"If Ukraine is to survive as an independent state, it will have to become part of Central Europe rather than Eurasia, and if it is to be a part of Central Europe, then it will have to partake fully of Central Europe's links to NATO and the European Union," wrote Zbigniew Brzezinski in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard, about the new world order.

It doesn't mean that today the West is obliged to fight Russia because of Ukraine. However, so as not to repeat the hideous tragedy of Central Europe, the West should help Ukraine to not only prepare for defense, but also to be resilient.

And such resilience now can be brought about by what Brzezinski said—Ukraine's deeper economic, infrastructural and political ties to the West, particularly Central Europe.

In practical terms this has been already reaffirmed by the gas reverse deliveries in Ukraine from Slovakia and Hungary, trade with Poland, the export to which in 2020 exceeded that to Russia with this advantage being still maintained and by the successful operations in Ukraine of such companies as the Hungarian-owned OTP and WizzAir and the Polish-owned PZU Group and LOT.

Not only Ukraine is in need of these ties. They may provide an incentive for such projects as the Three Seas Initiative and the Bucharest Nine, which would help rethink the relations between the old and new West, adding value to the latter, in particular to Poland and Romania.

All of these steps make for a multilateral democracy in action and division of labor that are supposed to cement the Transatlantic community, in particular its Eastern flank, which in recent years has turned into a springboard for Russia and China in a new great power competition with the West and U.S. in particular. In other words, the entire West needs ties within Central Europe.

The consent to Putin's ultimatums is not part of realpolitik for the sake of peace and security in Europe. It would be treason.

Should Putin's ultimatum be complied with, the West will effectively betray its allies along the whole Eastern flank all the way from the Black Sea to the Nordic countries. That is why the true realpolitik for the West currently is to keep its word to Ukraine and not allow the new tragedy of Central Europe to be repeated.

### 2NC – UQ – AT: Ukraine

#### **The schism between Ukraine and Hungary has deepened due to controversies with ethnic minority rights and energy policy.**

Van Ginkel & Tárnok ’21 [Michael; fellow at the Budapest Fellowship Program at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and Trade, focusing on Black Sea Security and its Impact on Eastern and Central Europe; Balázs; Hungarian jurist from Slovakia and a researcher at the Europe Strategy Research Institute at the Ludovika-University; 12-18-2021; "Reconciling the Hungarian-Ukrainian Schism"; Real Clear Defense; https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/12/18/reconciling\_the\_hungarian-ukrainian\_schism\_808516.html; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL 😊]

Ethnic Minority Rights

Ukraine's multiethnic composition has recently led to a resurgence in identity politics. Since its independence, Ukraine has protected the fundamental rights of ethnic minorities within its borders, including the right to be educated in mother tongues. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and continued Russian support for non-state actors in Donbas triggered a change in policy. Since the Kremlin justified infringing on Ukrainian territorial sovereignty by citing Russian ethnic and linguistic ties to the local population, Kyiv decided to increase national resiliency by disincentivizing Russian language use in Ukraine.

In 2017, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the new Law on Education, reducing traditional rights of ethnic minorities to be educated in their native language. Two years later, the new State Language Law limited the use of minority languages in the spheres of public life—only private communications and religious events were exempted. Although Kyiv's new policies are directed at its Russian speaking population, all ethnic minorities have been heavily impacted, including Bulgarians, Hungarians, Poles, and Romanians. The kin-states of these minorities all protested against the new language regime. The strongest reaction came from Hungary, which has decided to block top-level political talks between NATO and Kyiv. Budapest has pledged to resume its full support for Ukraine's ambitions towards Western integration once minority rights are restored.

Hungary’s reaction was foreseeable. Just like other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary has a special bond to ethnic Hungarians living beyond its borders. As a result of the border changes after the two world wars, today 2 million ethnic Hungarians live in the neighboring countries, including some 150,000 ethnic Hungarians in Western Ukraine. The well-being of these communities has always been important for Hungary. This is not only the priority of the current government but also a constitutional obligation dating back to the country’s independence.

Moreover, in the Basic Treaty between Hungary and Ukraine, which entered into force in 1993, both parties declared that they would ensure the necessary opportunities for ethnic minorities to learn their native language and to study in their native language at all levels of the educational system. Ukraine breached this agreement when it introduced new language laws that infringed upon these established rights of ethnic minorities, including Hungarians.

Energy Policy

A divergence of interests in the energy sector has only deepened the divide between Ukraine and Hungary. Ukraine’s extensive gas pipeline system, which has an annual transit capacity of 146 billion cubic meters (bcm), historically provided 40 percent of Europe’s gas import needs. By transiting hydrocarbons from Russia to Europe, Ukraine collects upwards of $3 billion a year in transit fees. The funds proved especially crucial for Ukraine after the economic deprivations caused by Russian transgressions in Crimea and Donbas.

The alternative routes offered by pipelines in the Black and Baltic Sea have severely diminished the amount Ukraine can collect in transit fees. An agreement signed in 2019 has ensured at least 40 bcm of Russian gas will flow annually through Ukraine's Druzhba pipeline until 2024, but European investments in these alternative routes continue to threaten Ukraine's fiscal security. Upon the completion of the new NordStream II project, the baltic route alone is projected to deliver a combined 110 bcm of Russian gas to Europe via Germany annually.

Russia’s willingness to use gas reliance for political leverage has underscored the importance of energy diversification in European countries like Hungary. Russia's refusal to transit gas through Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 elicited concerns that Russia may make similar unilateral decisions in the future, especially with hostilities in Eastern Ukraine still ongoing. Hungary’s current energy dependency on Russia, which supplies 80 percent of the country’s imported gas, places the country in a particularly precarious position.

While Hungary has attempted to diversify its energy sector by investing in nuclear reactors and Liquid natural gas (LNG), gas imports still cover the remaining 30 percent of the country’s energy needs. In September 2021, Hungary signed a contentious new gas deal that secures an annual 4.5 bcm of Russian gas imports over the next 15 years. By negotiating directly with Russian gas company Gazprom, Hungary has both enhanced its business relationship with its most important energy supplier and, by rerouting through Serbia and Austria, increased the reliability of transit by circumventing the hostilities in Ukraine.

Conclusion

The current geopolitical situation in Europe, largely orchestrated by Russia, places significant strain on the Ukrainian-Hungarian bilateral relationship. Both countries have attempted to enhance their national and economic security through controversial policy initiatives, including language laws in Ukraine and the new energy deal in Hungary. This schism between Hungary and Ukraine has strong relevance to the U.S., given Biden's foreign policy objectives.

#### Central Europe doesn’t have a choice – it’s reliant on Russian gas.

Bloomberg 7-12 [Bloomberg News; American-based pay television network focussing on business and capital market programming, owned by Bloomberg L.P.; 7-12-2022; "Analysis"; Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/how-europe-became-so-dependent-on-putin-for-its-gas/2022/07/11/8c5cbe8c-0122-11ed-8beb-2b4e481b1500\_story.html; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL😊]

5. Which other countries are exposed?

Land-locked nations in eastern and central Europe are more vulnerable to Russian gas disruption as they have fewer alternative options compared with western and southern European nations. Russian supplies accounted for about 40% of Italy’s demand in 2021, but that country has been scouring the globe for replacements and has secured new agreements with suppliers, particularly in North Africa. Some smaller gas buyers like Finland, which has also been deprived of Russian gas, are planning to use floating LNG terminals. Poland, which generates most of its electricity from coal, invested in a new gas pipeline from Norway, set to start flows in October, while Bulgaria plans to increase Azeri gas imports in 2022 with the opening of a spur from Greece, a country that can also supply LNG.

6. What role does Ukraine play?

About a third of Russian gas flowing to Europe normally passes through Ukraine. Supplies via the country have been curbed since May 11 after a transit point was put out of service amid fighting in the eastern part of the country. Prior to the cuts, Ukraine had been expecting to earn at least $7 billion from transit fees under a five-year transit deal in December 2019.

7. How has Russia disrupted the market before?

In 2006 and 2009, disputes with Ukraine over pricing and siphoning of gas led to cutoffs of Russian supplies transiting through the country. The second shutdown lasted almost two weeks in the dead of winter. Slovakia and some Balkan countries had to ration gas, shut factories and cut power supplies. Since then, the most vulnerable countries have raced to lay pipelines, connect grids and build terminals to import LNG shipped from as far as Qatar and the U.S.

### 2NC – UQ – AT: Sanctions

#### Central European sanctions are watered down – ambivalence, opacity, hidden owners, and historical ties to Russia.

Gosling et al. 5-25 [Tim; Prague-based journalist who has covered the Central European region for several years; Claudia Ciobanu; journalist for a decade, starting out at the Romanian national daily, Cotidianul, before moving to cover Central and Eastern Europe as a freelancer for various international outlets, won the first prize in the 2018 Balkan Fellowship for Journalistic excellence, finalist in the Reporting Europe and One World Media awards; Edit Inotai; Hungarian journalist, previously Berlin correspondent for Népszabadság and is now its Foreign Affairs editor; Nicholas Watson; award-winning journalist, he has worked for almost 30 years in Asia, the US and Europe, writing for publications such as the Financial Times, Politico Europe, TheStreet.com, Axios, International Herald Tribune TV and Knight-Ridder News, co-founder and managing editor of Business New Europe; 5-25-2022; "Holes Remain in a Tightening Net of Russia Sanctions"; Balkan Insight; https://balkaninsight.com/2022/05/25/central-europe-reveals-holes-in-tightening-net-of-russia-sanctions/; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL 😊] \*\*images and captions omitted

A combination of ambivalence, lack of transparency, legislative barriers and hidden owners are undermining Central Europe’s imposition of sanctions on Russian entities and individuals. In April, Russian activist Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation published a list of over 6,000 bribe takers and warmongers who, it accuses, have enabled Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. The EU’s sanctions list falls far short of this, identifying only 80 entities and 1,093 individuals subject to asset freezes and travel bans, though experts cast doubt on whether sanctions are being fully applied even on these fewer targets. Central Europe is illustrative of the difficulties in applying sanctions to Russian companies and individuals. Behind the lurid headlines about the seizure of mega-yachts and opulent mansions belonging to Russia’s elite, who are conservatively estimated to hold assets abroad worth over $1 trillion, there is a much more complicated picture in which a combination of ambivalence, lack of transparency, legislative barriers and hidden owners is conspiring to water down the sanctions’ effectiveness. At the state level, while all EU countries have unanimously approved the five rounds sanctions against these Russian/Belarusian entities and individuals, they have done so with varying degrees of enthusiasm. At one end of the sanctions-support spectrum you have Poland, which has been one of the strongest advocates for tough EU sanctions against Russia. In April, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki even urged the imposition of sanctions against all members of the Kremlin’s parliamentary party United Russia. Given that at the end of 2021 United Russia had more than 2.3 million registered members, such a move would go far beyond even the Navalny list. At the other end of the spectrum is Hungary, whose Russia-friendly prime minister is holding up the latest, sixth round of EU sanctions, principally over the vexed issue of banning Russian oil imports. The Budapest government’s general attitude towards the EU sanctions can be characterised as ambivalent at best. It expressed reservations when the European Commission included Moshe Kantor, president of the European Jewish Congress, and Herman Gref, CEO of Sberbank, on its sanctions list, but went along with it. But Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill, who is included on the sixth sanctions list for his vocal support for Putin’s war, was a step too far in Orban’s view. “We do not support the inclusion of religious leaders on the sanctions list, as this goes against freedom of religion,” the prime minister said in his weekly radio address on May 6. In between Poland and Hungary are the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both of which are run by Western-oriented, EU-sanction supporting governments, who have to deal with prominent domestic pro-Russian forces ranged against them. In Czechia, this includes President Milos Zeman and his overtly pro-Russian entourage in Prague Castle; in Slovakia, it is the two-time former prime minister Robert Fico and his SMER-SD party, around which various extremist pro-Russian parties coalesce. Present and accounted for Of course, Central European governments can only apply sanctions to that which is actually present in their country. One reason why the British sanctions on Russian companies and individuals make such attention-grabbing headlines around the world is because for so many years the UK was, in the words of Transparency International, a “global hub for money laundering”. Perhaps the most vivid example of Hungary’s contradictory stance over the sanctions is the continued presence of the Russian-based International Investment Bank – a multilateral development institution which has had its headquarters in Budapest since 2019. Considered by many to be little more than a “spy bank” beyond the remit of Hungarian regulators, Orban’s government granted it full diplomatic immunity, which allows staff to enter Hungary freely – and therefore the wider EU – potentially undermining sanctions. Yet despite the overt friendliness shown towards Russia by Orban and his governing Fidesz party, Hungary has not actually been a particularly favourite playground of Russian oligarchs, and the presence of Russian companies is – at least on paper – fairly negligible. Besides the Hungarian subsidiary of nuclear holding Rosatom – responsible for the extension of the Paks 2 nuclear power plant, a project that the Hungarian government is still insisting, somewhat optimistically, will go ahead – only a few Russian companies officially have operations in Hungary. Steelmaker Dunaferr, a renowned industrial company dating back to the communist era, is directly owned by the Cyprus-based Steelhold Ltd. Steelhold belongs to Industrial Union of Donbas, one of the biggest holdings in eastern Ukraine, but is basically controlled by Russian stakeholders. Last year, speculation grew that the company would be taken over by Russia’s Metalloinvest, owned by Alisher Usmanov, the sixth richest Russian, now also on the EU sanctions list, but the deal never materialised. As such, Steelhold is still 50 per cent owned by the Russian state development institution VEB, which is on the EU sanctions list. It is not clear how the sanctions will impact on the company’s operations; officially, it will only say it “faces some supply problems”. Dunaferr has around 3,300 employees, but a long-running feud between its Russian and Ukrainian owners has led to a management vacuum. Another interesting case is that of the rail business and industrial site Dunakeszi Jarmujavito, which is 50 per cent owned by Transmashholding, the largest manufacturer of rolling stock in Russia. The other 50 per cent of Dunakeszi, which has a major contract to modernise and produce carriages for the Hungarian state rail company, is held by the Hungarian entrepreneur Kristof Szalay-Bobrovniczky, who has just been appointed Orban’s next defence minister. Transmashholding is not on the sanctions list, but the president of the company, Andrei Bokarev, had to resign at the end of April after he was put on the British sanctions list, though he’s still absent from the EU list. Even so, the arrangement means that a defence minister of a NATO country is in a close business relationship with a Russian company that builds materiel for Russia’s war machine in Ukraine. When it comes to favourite places for well-to-do Russians in Europe to visit, the spa town of Heviz, some 200 kilometres west of Budapest, is high on the list. Featuring a huge thermal lake, Heviz has been a popular meeting place for the Russian intelligence services. In 2017, Austrian ex-colonel Martin Möller was reported to have handed over classified NATO documents to Russian spies in Heviz – one of several rendezvous points in Central Europe chosen by Möller, which also included Bratislava and Štrbské pleso in the High Tatras. The five-star Lotus Therme Hotel & Spa in Heviz is Russian owned, but by individuals who have been living in Hungary for decades with no obvious connections to the Putin regime. The spa town has also been a favourite destination for Russian tourists, with many owning real estate. There’s even a Russian Orthodox Church being built in Heviz, with hefty Hungarian government support. Image: EC Likewise, Poland has been of limited interest to Russians due to longstanding antipathy in the country to their presence, to the extent that the Warsaw government felt moved to unilaterally modify its national legislation to create room for its own sanction targets. This led to the announcement in April that a further 50 individuals and companies from Russia and Belarus would be subject to measures, which include a ban on entry to Poland and participation in public tenders as well as a freezing of assets. Those found guilty of breaking the sanctions are subject to fines of up to 5 billion euros. “The Polish sanctions list is a supplement to the EU list,” Interior Minister Mariusz Kaminski explained. “It applies to Russian entities and oligarchs with real interests in our country.” The list also includes companies linked to the Belarusian regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko as well as companies previously involved in the import of Russian coal into Poland. The Russian state gas company Gazprom also appears on Poland’s list, which is believed to have been the spark that led to Russia cutting of gas supplies to Poland in late April. A much bigger playground for Russian interests has been the Czech Republic. As one expert who monitors Russian-speaking organised crime once told BIRN, looking at the private school rosters shows it has been the preferred destination for the ‘second’ families of rich Russians – a mix of oligarchs and “criminal entrepreneurs” – for the past two decades. Yet following the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats in 2021 after the revelation that Russian intelligence officers were in all likelihood behind the explosion of a munitions depot in the southeast of Czechia and now the war in Ukraine, a suspiciously large number of luxury properties are finding their way on to the Czech market, priced to sell, say real estate professionals. The Czechs are “dealing with the assets of several persons and dozens of entities on the EU sanctions lists in the aggregate amount of hundreds of millions of Czech koruna,” a spokesperson for the Finance Ministry told BIRN. Asked to specify some of the assets affected, the spokesperson noted that the Finance Ministry acted in mid-April against the West End Hotel in the spa town of Marianske Lazne. The resort is owned by Dmitry Pumpyansky, whose main business is producing pipes for Russia’s oil and gas industries. The action taken against Pumpyansky means that while the hotel can continue to operate, it cannot be sold or distribute profit to Pumpyansky. A hotel of a similar name in nearby Karlovy Vary, owned by Vladimir Yevtushenko of the telecommunications and banking conglomerate Sistema, is also in the crosshairs. Other targets include a member of the Russian State Duma and the wife of another. As well as real estate, frozen assets include bank accounts and company shares. However, dealing with some assets is proving more challenging. Skoda JS, for instance, is owned by Gazprom (which is not yet on the EU sanctions list). Yet Skoda JS’s vital role maintaining and servicing Czechia’s two nuclear power plants means that the Czech state-controlled energy group CEZ has no choice but to continue cooperating with it. The Ministry of Industry and Trade admits that Russian ownership of what is a key strategic partner for Czechia’s energy security is a significant risk. “The fact that Skoda JS has Russian owners can be clearly seen as a mistake,” a spokesman told the local press. In private, officials say that a solution is being sought, which could include either a purchase by CEZ via expropriation or the imposition of an administrator. However, both routes require new legislation, a further stumbling block to the effective imposition of sanctions. The vandalized facade of one of the villas belonging to Russian state TV host Vladimir Soloviev on the shores of Lake Como, Italy, 06 April 2022. EPA-EFE/MATTEO BAZZI Law & order As one of Ukraine’s most proactive supporters, whose relations with Moscow were already in the deep freeze, it’s no surprise that the Czech Republic has enthusiastically leapt to impose sanctions. Yet current Czech legislation only allows the government to act on EU or United Nations sanctions. Prague has no option to enforce sanctions based on the US list, for instance, or even to select its own targets like Poland is doing. “The government would like to extend the current EU sanctions lists to include certain individuals and entities,” said the Finance Ministry spokesman. “This process is also underway, but requires close cooperation with intelligence services and other security services.” “Currently, there exists no real legal tool with which the Czech Republic could sanction a foreign entity on the basis of domestic demand. This is why we are preparing our own Magnitsky Act,” Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky said in late March, referring to the US legislation of 2016 that authorises its government to sanction foreign officials worldwide who are deemed to be human rights offenders, freeze their assets and ban them from entering the US. The Czech government is also working on legislation that would allow it to cut off companies from public money and tenders. Meanwhile, implementation of the sanctions can be messy and confused. The Polish Interior Ministry appeared loath to provide further details to BIRN as to the manner in which EU or Polish sanctions on Russian entities and individuals since the war have been implemented, restricting itself to stressing the country had imposed supplementary sanctions to the EU ones. However, the local media are beginning to report on a series of issues with the implementation of sanctions on the Polish list. For example, Gazeta Wyborcza reported that one company, Maga Foods, was added to the Polish list because it was owned by Mikhail Fridman, yet it is now actually in the control of a Dutch businessman after the latter purchased Fridman’s shares in March. The company, a food producer, is now struggling to survive. Paradoxically, one unintended consequence of the sanctions is that Ukrainian employees of the firm – about half of the 200-strong workforce – are suffering. “The whole situation is absurd,” Piotr Pawinski, president of the company, told Gazeta Wyborcza. “They wanted to punish Fridman, but ended up depriving our Ukrainian employees of a livelihood – and they had been sending most of their incomes to their families back home.” Experts agree that effective sanctions require greater transparency and enforcement. Yet the region falls short on both. Lack of transparency has been a feature of the region for decades and too little was done to address it. This failure is a significant complicating factor in implementing sanctions, because all too often it’s impossible to identify who owns what.

### 2NC – Link – T/L

#### Improving on Central Europe’s security and defense realignments with NATO exacerbates holes in trust between the West and Russia.

Freire ’12 [Maria Raquel; researcher at the Centre for Social Studies and professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra, Ph.D. at the University of Kent; 2012; "Russia at the Borders of Central Europe: Changing Dynamics in Foreign Policy Relations"; SpringerLink; https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137283450\_7; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]

7.3.2 Security and defence realignments: building fences or fostering cooperative approaches?

The Russian Federation’s relations with NATO have been difficult, particularly in the light of the Alliance’s open door policy (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007; Kramer 2009; Romaniuk 2010; Shea 2010). For the Russian Federation this policy is understood as an establishment of a virtual wall that reproduces the dynamics of exclusion that characterized the Cold War, but now further to the East. Despite statements about shared values, transparency and confidence-building measures, along with the establishment of institutional mechanisms for cooperation, such as the NATO–Russia Council (2002), trust between NATO and Russia has been hard to achieve.

In fact, the Russian Federation Military Doctrine of 201015 is harsh in its wording, as it identifies the Atlantic Alliance’s enlargement policy as the main external threat to Russian interests. But the Russian Federation’s presence at the Lisbon Summit of the Alliance (November 2010) marked a new stage in the relations after a period of much difficulty, with the war in Georgia in the summer of 2008 representing the height of the tension. The summit included discussions on missile defence and energy issues and, correspondingly, the US proposal for a missile defence shield involving two Central European countries – Poland and the Czech Republic. This project raised serious concerns in the Russian Federation about the enactment of an encirclement policy that, despite some statements to the contrary, was understood in Russia as being driven against it. The announcement of the project was not without consequences for the EU–Russian Federation relations either (Seaboyer and Thränert 2006).

In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2007, Vladimir Putin stated that the issue of missile defence was not just Russian–American, but that it involved ‘the interests of all European countries, including those in NATO’ (Putin 2007). Despite the assurance from the United States that the project was not directed against the Russian Federation, the Russian position was one of antagonism. According to President Barack Obama,

[W]e’ve also repeatedly made clear to Russia that its concerns about our previous missile defense programs were entirely unfounded. Our clear and consistent focus has been the threat posed by Iran’s ballistic missile program, and that continues to be our focus and the basis of the program that we’re announcing today. (Obama 2009)

President Obama’s revision of the project with the announcement in September 2009 of the withdrawal from the original plan that envisaged stationing radar and missile sites in the Czech Republic and Poland generated various reactions. The Russian Federation understood it as a victory for itself. Poland and the Czech Republic, however, understood the move as signalling a US disinvestment from European security. In Fawn’s view, ‘[t]he danger is that Russia’s creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region could over time lead to a de facto neutralization of the region’ (Fawn 2010: 90). This means that the Central European states considered that the reset policy in the US–Russia relations (Krastev 2011; Lucas 2011; Kupchan 2011) might lead to a policy of ‘benign neglect’ (Larrabee 2010: 45), which would leave them more vulnerable to the Russian Federation’s influence independently of their integration into the EU and NATO.

#### Ukraine is our brink, not a thumper – additional military provocations in Central Europe anger Russia.

Carpenter ’22 [Ted Galen; a senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of 12 books on international affairs; 2-28-2022; "Many predicted Nato expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored"; The Guardian; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]

Russia’s military offensive against Ukraine is an act of aggression that will make already worrisome tensions between Nato and Moscow even more dangerous. The west’s new cold war with Russia has turned hot. Vladimir Putin bears primary responsibility for this latest development, but Nato’s arrogant, tone‐​deaf policy toward Russia over the past quarter‐​century deserves a large share as well. Analysts committed to a US foreign policy of realism and restraint have warned for more than a quarter‐​century that continuing to expand the most powerful military alliance in history toward another major power would not end well. The war in Ukraine provides definitive confirmation that it did not.

Thinking through the Ukraine crisis – the causes

“It would be extraordinarily difficult to expand Nato eastward without that action’s being viewed by Russia as unfriendly. Even the most modest schemes would bring the alliance to the borders of the old Soviet Union. Some of the more ambitious versions would have the alliance virtually surround the Russian Federation itself.” I wrote those words in 1994, in my book Beyond Nato: Staying Out of Europe’s Wars, at a time when expansion proposals merely constituted occasional speculation in foreign policy seminars in New York and Washington. I added that expansion “would constitute a needless provocation of Russia”.

What was not publicly known at the time was that Bill Clinton’s administration had already made the fateful decision the previous year to push for including some former Warsaw Pact countries in Nato. The administration would soon propose inviting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to become members, and the US Senate approved adding those countries to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1998. It would be the first of several waves of membership expansion.

Even that first stage provoked Russian opposition and anger. In her memoir, Madeleine Albright, Clinton’s secretary of state, concedes that “[Russian president Boris] Yeltsin and his country~~men~~ [individuals] were strongly opposed to enlargement, seeing it as a strategy for exploiting their vulnerability and moving Europe’s dividing line to the east, leaving them isolated.”

Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state, similarly described the Russian attitude. “Many Russians see Nato as a vestige of the cold war, inherently directed against their country. They point out that they have disbanded the Warsaw Pact, their military alliance, and ask why the west should not do the same.” It was an excellent question, and neither the Clinton administration nor its successors provided even a remotely convincing answer.

George Kennan, the intellectual father of America’s containment policy during the cold war, perceptively warned in a May 1998 New York Times interview about what the Senate’s ratification of Nato’s first round of expansion would set in motion. “I think it is the beginning of a new cold war,” Kennan stated. ”I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else.”

He was right, but US and Nato leaders proceeded with new rounds of expansion, including the provocative step of adding the three Baltic republics. Those countries not only had been part of the Soviet Union, but they had also been part of Russia’s empire during the Czarist era. That wave of expansion now had Nato perched on the border of the Russian Federation.

Moscow’s patience with Nato’s ever more intrusive behavior was wearing thin. The last reasonably friendly warning from Russia that the alliance needed to back off came in March 2007, when Putin addressed the annual Munich security conference. “Nato has put its frontline forces on our borders,” Putin complained. Nato expansion “represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?”

In his memoir, Duty, Robert M Gates, who served as secretary of defense in the administrations of both George W Bush and Barack Obama, stated his belief that “the relationship with Russia had been badly mismanaged after [George HW] Bush left office in 1993”. Among other missteps, “US agreements with the Romanian and Bulgarian governments to rotate troops through bases in those countries was a needless provocation.” In an implicit rebuke to the younger Bush, Gates asserted that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into Nato was truly overreaching”. That move, he contended, was a case of “recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests”.

The following year, the Kremlin demonstrated that its discontent with Nato’s continuing incursions into Russia’s security zone had moved beyond verbal objections. Moscow exploited a foolish provocation by Georgia’s pro‐​western government to launch a military offensive that brought Russian troops to the outskirts of the capital. Thereafter, Russia permanently detached two secessionist‐​minded Georgian regions and put them under effective Russian control.

Western (especially US) leaders continued to blow through red warning light after a red warning light, however. The Obama administration’s shockingly arrogant meddling in Ukraine’s internal political affairs in 2013 and 2014 to help demonstrators overthrow Ukraine’s elected, pro‐​Russia president was the single most brazen provocation, and it caused tensions to spike. Moscow immediately responded by seizing and annexing Crimea, and a new cold war was underway with a vengeance.

#### The only area where NATO can revitalize the relationship with Central Europe is security cooperation

Tamás MAGYARICS ‘19, Professor, Department of American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University; Senior Research Fellow, American Studies Research Institute, National University of Public Service, “How to Revitalise the U.S.– Eastern European Relations”, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade - Budapest, Foreign Policy Review, 2019, https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FPR\_2019\_online\_final.pdf

**The** single most important area **where U.S. and Central European interests meet is security cooperation**. Ironically, one of the challenges posed to this shared interest is coming from Western Europe, more specifically from the advocates of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a European security policy without U.S. input. In 2000, a 60,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was announced within the ESDP (McCray, 2014). These attempts met almost universal rejection in the U.S.; both Democratic and Republican politicians warned against any ’duplication’ of the existing structures. **Then Secretary of Defence William Cohen went as far as saying that ”if the EU created a defence capability outside of NATO, the alliance would become ’a relic of the past’”.** Later U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns branded the effort as ’one of the greatest t dangers to the transatlantic community’” (Carpenter, 2018). Washington, instead, lobbied for a military response force within NATO, and put pressure primarily on the new members of NATO in Central and Eastern Europe, which were – on the whole - receptive to the U.S. concerns because they strongly believed that the only country that was able to provide hard security guarantees for them was the U.S. **The underlying issue is a struggle between Western European leaders, such as Emmanuel Macron, and the U.S. about the future role that America might or should play in Europe**. Washington is vary of a federalised Europe with an independent defence and security capability because the present disagreements between the U.S. and the EU might degenerate into open hostilities, which – in turn – would weaken American positions in the world. **NATO is the only official institution that makes the U.S. ’a European power,’ and it obviously enhances America’s opportunities to counter the Russian and Chinese influence in Europe, and even elsewhere**. Moreover, the U.S. can legitimately press within NATO its allies to assume a larger share of the burdens of the Atlantic Community and thus, at least theoretically, it offers an opportunity for Washington to concentrate larger forces to combat the newly emerging military challenges elsewhere in the world, first and foremost in the Asia-Pacific region - the Obama administration’s ’pivot to Asia’ was intended to address this issue by shifting naval assets from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean - (Thompson, 2012). From a Central European point of view, a relatively strong American military, political and economic presence in Europe can be a sort of counterbalance to the centralising tendencies of the so-called core countries of Europe - which would mean, in essence, further loss of national sovereignty over a number of areas. **Therefore, the countries of ’new Europe’ have tended to support the U.S. even if they had misgivings about the latter’s policies, and a similar pattern is likely to remain in place in the foreeseable future too**.

### 2NC – Link – Security Cooperation Key

#### Defense cooperation is the core tie between the West and Central Europe

David Hutt ‘21, is a political journalist based between France and the Czech Republic, reporting on European political affairs and EU-Asian relations, “In Central Europe, Biden Can Build on Trump’s Record”, World Politics Review, 2/17/21, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29428/in-central-europe-biden-can-build-on-trump-s-record

**Another potential area of cooperation is defense, mainly aimed at countering Russia’s activities**. This is a field that Biden has ample experience with, having served as vice president in 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and began ramping up military activities in eastern Ukraine. Biden was one of the architects of what was then called the European Reassurance Initiative, a push to bolster the U.S. security presence in Europe in response to Russia’s aggression, including by stationing around 4,500 American troops in Poland on a rotational basis. That number is set to rise to 5,500 under a bilateral agreement that was finalized during the final months of the Trump administration. While Biden announced last week that he is reversing Trump’s decision to move 12,000 troops out of Germany—some of which were slated to redeploy elsewhere in Europe, including Poland—**he is unlikely to alter the defense pacts Trump signed with Poland and with Hungary, nor is he expected to interfere with planned sales of U.S. military equipment to those countries**. Ultimately, Biden’s tougher views on Moscow will endear him toward the Central European states, especially Poland. The four states are among the most passionate members of the NATO defense pact, **which Biden has called “the most effective political-military alliance in modern history,” whereas Trump disparaged it as “obsolete.**”

#### Security cooperation initiatives are what Central European states seek to revitalize the relationship

John M. Grondelski ’21, is deputy director of the Office of Central European Affairs, “Office of Central European Affairs”, State Magazine, January 2021, https://statemag.lab.prod.getusinfo.com/2021/01/0121office/

In the recent past a planned trip to a Central European country by a Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) deputy assistant secretary was fairly big news within EUR’s Office of Central European Affairs (CE). **However, the pace has picked up considerably in the past few years, with visits becoming more common**. **In the last six months alone, the United States has received the Polish president at the White House**; Secretary of State Mike **Pompeo traveled to Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia and has received his Romanian, Slovak, and Slovene counterparts in Washington; and three different under secretaries of state have touched down in multiple Central European capitals**. These visits and events have kept the CE staff busy and active as they continue to plan and conduct bilateral relations within 10 diverse European states. CE focuses their mission on seven of Europe’s youngest democracies (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and three neutrals (Austria, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland). **America’s primary geopolitical adversaries**—**Russia and China**—**continue to compete for influence in Central Europe**. **Russia still aspires to maintain spheres of influence in its former Soviet empire by occupying parts of neighboring Ukraine, actively instrumentalizing disinformation and malign influence in the area**. Communist **China has returned as well, using relationships dating back to 1949 to pursue its malign influence via opaque investment among other means**. Chinese discount pricing appeals in a region that has made huge economic strides in the 30 years since the collapse of communism, but that still has a long way to go to reach Western European levels of development. Having suffered from ostensible “liberation” by the Soviet Red Army, Central European countries actively seek partnership with the United States. **Positive popular attitudes there towards the United States are among the highest in Europe**. Governmental attitudes generally follow with sustained U.S. engagement. “**Some Central European countries have presented themselves as ‘bridges between East and West**,’” explained EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Boyse, who oversees CE. “**We’ve had to remind some Allies they are not ‘bridges,’ because in 1989 they freely and eagerly chose to rejoin the West. For the most part, that message has stuck with governments**, even if we still see ‘old think’ in parts of the population.” CE’s eight desk officers translate that message into action every day. Security cooperation is a top priority for most Central European countries. **It takes many forms, like increased U.S. presence along NATO’s Eastern Flank and upgrading military cooperation by replacing legacy Soviet gear with state-of-the-art NATO interoperable equipment**. Poland is buying 32 F-35 multirole combat aircraft, while Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania are modernizing with F-16 fighter aircraft. Military purchases also enable Allies to meet their commitments in burden sharing, undertaken at the Wales and Warsaw NATO Summits. **The United States has recently signed new Defense Cooperation Agreements with Poland and Hungary and 10-year Defense Cooperation Roadmaps with Romania and Bulgaria**. **Military cooperation also includes Central Europe’s neutrals**. Austria is a Partnership for Peace member, and many state National Guard forces are competing to become its state partner. Two U.S. companies are competing to modernize Switzerland’s air force with U.S. fighter jets.

#### DCA’s that extend NATO defense guarantees determine relations

Benjamin BASKA ’19, M.A. Student at Corvinus University of Budapest , “The U.S. and the Eastern European Defence Cooperation Agreements: Impacts, Geopolitics and the Hungarian Case”, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade - Budapest, Foreign Policy Review, 2019, https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FPR\_2019\_online\_final.pdf

Agreements on defence cooperation have a wider regional impact, where an adversarial power might perceive the DCA as an element of an aggressive posture by the signatory states. **While DCAs could increase tensions with the power to the East of NATO’s border, at the same time, they have a more cohesive effect between the parties**. Brandon J. Kinne (2019) hypothesises that when states favour ties to “partners of partners”, it results in a phenomenon that he refers to as the triadic closure. In terms of DCA networks, Kinne highlighted that this would mean that country A and B are more likely to cooperate with each other if they both sign a DCA with a common country C. Of course, this would require a high degree of trust between countries A and B in order to push for a closer defence cooperation. This is where the EDI comes into play as well. **As a tool to reassure allies by the increasing US presence in these countries, it enables the US to indirectly increase military cooperation among countries, and to upgrade strategic airfields or forward basing infrastructure in these countries**. It is also important to mention that the DCAs are directly connected to the geographical and geopolitical position of a country. As it was mentioned before, **these countries form an imaginary line of defence that is strengthened by their NATO membership and the bilateral agreement signed with the US. Since the Trump administration is a vocal advocate of increasing the share of defencerelated contribution by allies, the DCAs could be an indirect tool to nudge them in the right direction**. At the same time, it also means an increase in the US presence in Central and Eastern Europe that could be perceived as a threat to Russia. With more countries signing DCAs in the neighbourhood, the growing number of concerned states would also mean that eventually the upsetting peace and stability would increase in a region. Conclusion The aim of this analysis was to highlight the important aspects of DCAs in Central and Eastern Europe, and to introduce the uniqueness of the HungarianUS agreement. Firstly, it aimed to interpret and highlight the subtle differences between the DCAs of the selected countries while it did seek to point out why sovereignty was a focal point in each of these negotiations. Secondly, it revealed the possible implications DCAs could have on the receiving states’ sovereignty and on the geopolitics of the region. Generally, there was no single framework under which these agreements could be placed since they lacked uniformity in their scope and purpose in a global context. **However, the Baltic and Eastern European DCAs were commonly grounded on a thematic setting, by the creation of a legal framework for stationing US troops in the countries’ territory and for setting the stage for more detailed agreements**. **The similarity of the agreements stemmed from the objective that was here to set the framework for defence- and security-related bilateral cooperations**. In all the examined agreements, the focal points, around which the debates revolved, were the movement and access, the criminal jurisdiction, the ownership, or in the Hungarian case, the tax exemptions. These are the essential variables that define the purpose of the treaty from different aspects. Each variable effects the sovereignty of the receiving states and could impose limitations on the sending states. At the same time, these variables introduce measures that dismantle bureaucratic roadblocks which could hinder future cooperation among the parties. The difference in the level of details between the Baltic and the Central European DCAs is more striking. The former ones are more general with less details regarding the taxation, the environmental safety or the administrative procedures, while the latter ones put a heavy emphasis on these issues, and even specify the administrative procedures, the military exercises and permits or licenses. While these elusive differences are not easy to spot, a single adjective or phrase can inherently reflect what the receiving states prioritise on and regard important in case of foreign forces in their territory. With the conflict of right of jurisdiction on one’s own territory and the law of flag, the agreements challenge the receiving states’ sovereignty. Furthermore, these agreements are based more on the absolute than the relative gains. **Both parties benefit from the cooperation separately in different ways**. The US is able to enhance its military presence along the borders of Eastern Europe and to create a logistical network from the Baltic to the Black Sea, while sending a message of reassurance to its NATO allies in the region. **The other parties also gain concerning their security in defence, including defence modernisation, cooperation through investments from the US, and through the increased number of trainings and exercises**. The defensive posture of these countries is also strengthened. **The increasing number of military exercises enable the harmonisation of European and US military standards and systems paving the way for a greater cooperation and deployment efficiency, as synchronisation and interoperability are becoming crucial factors**.

#### They are more sensitive about defense commitments than ever before

Tamás MAGYARICS ‘19, Professor, Department of American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University; Senior Research Fellow, American Studies Research Institute, National University of Public Service, “How to Revitalise the U.S.– Eastern European Relations”, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade - Budapest, Foreign Policy Review, 2019, https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FPR\_2019\_online\_final.pdf

**The ’new’ Eastern and Central European members of the Atlantic Community put more trust into American security guarantees than the ’old’ members for two reasons: one is a perceived lack of capabilities of the latter, the other one is the rather mixed historical experiences with their Western neighbors, especially with Germany, when it comes down to the existential threat provided by Russia** (formerly the Soviet Union). In parallel with the Eastern and Central Europeans’ continued reliance on U.S. deterrence against Russia’s repeated attempts to regain, at least, some of its influence in the region, a number of Western European countries have been capitalising on having an entended strategic depth against potential Russian threats, and have shown skepticism and reluctance to follow the U.S. lead in a number of issues (for instance, regarding U.S. policies towards Iraq in 2002-2003, see CNN, 2003.)

#### Empirics prove that divergences in relations only happen when the US disregards Central and Eastern European security alliances

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It is a market dream to publish a book that would define several months of frequent discussions in the transatlantic area. One of the authors with a great sense for timing is apparently Robert Kagan, whose fairly simplistic metaphors became widely discussed during the first major post-Cold War transatlantic dispute surrounding the beginning of the war in Iraq.10 **Kagan’s ideas did not only influence scholars and analysts but determined a context in which** Donald **Rumsfeld could express his idea about the new/old Europe division**. Although these discussions have been fortunately deeply buried11, **it should be understood that the idea of the new Europe is the American geopolitical mirror image to the Central European Alanticist conception**. Ironically, this perspective has appeared to be reflected by the current American administration that tends to view the Baltic and Central European states as accomplices of the former Bush’s administration. This became quite apparent from the US treatment of the former Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski’s candidacy for the post of NATO Secretary-General. One of the senior Obama administration officials reportedly commented on his endeavor expressing a belief that “Radek Sikorski now wishes that he had chosen Brookings over AEI.”12 The signs of symbolic diplomacy could be also recognized in other Obama’s moves**. For the official commemoration of the outbreak of World War II organized in Gdansk** on September 1st **the administration selected William Perry, a former secretary of defense, who became known in Central Europe as the** staunch opponent of the Polish NATO membership. Finally, president Obama’s long awaited and perhaps postponed announcement about the future of the third pillar of the American missile defense came on September 17th, which is the date of the Soviet invasion to Poland in 1939.13 **No matter how suspicious one wants to be, these events reveal a substantial lack of interest at best.** It has been already mentioned that from a broader perspective all Central European countries have a tendency to emphasize the importance of the transatlantic link. **Indeed, for a substantial part of political elites as well as intelligentsia the interests of the US have served as a sufficient legitimization for their own countries’ foreign political attitudes and decisions**. Nevertheless, the Alanticist positions differ in various countries. The following lines will analyze the Czech and Polish reactions on the two recently important themes of the transatlantic cooperation. The first will be the Iraqi issue that has already been mentioned in a context of the new/old Europe split. Then, the other topic will concern the American plan to build the components of the third pillar of the ballistic missile defense in the Czech Republic and Poland.

## 2NC Impact Toolbox

### 2NC – Ext Russia Probing

#### Cohesion kills Europe by emboldening Russian aggression

Zuesse 6/21 (Eric Zuesse, “The War America Is Waging Against Europe,” Modern Diplomacy, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/06/21/the-war-america-is-waging-against-europe/>, 6/21/2022)//sposten

Europe is more dependent upon Russia for the fuels that heat it in winter, cool it in summer, heat its water year-round, and energize its factories, than is any other part of the world, but heavy pressures from Washington have driven its leaders — most of them (other than Ursula von der Leyen, Robert Habeck, and Annalena Baerbock) very reluctantly — to slash imports of Russian fuels, and to cut them drastically in October, and then eliminate them almost totally soon after that, in December, when the coldest weather will set in. Cutting those fuel-supplies will cause fuel-prices in Europe to soar. This will be nothing less than the planned immiseration of the peoples of Europe, and it has been planned in Washington, and is being carried out by its vassal-heads-of-state in Europe.

All of this is being done in order to punish Russia. Washington is obsessed with its hatred of Russia, and has been ever since 25 July 1945.

Washington’s obsession for regime-change in Russia (i.e., for Washington to control Russia like it does the rest of Europe) will produce an economic crash in Europe, before this year is out.

The inevitability now of that economic crash is the clear message which Jorge Vilches documents in great detail at the Saker Blog, on June 18th, under the headline “No fuels for Europe”, citing as his sources, and linking through to, the Wall Street Journal, Trading Economics, the Washington Post, Lathan & Watkins law firm, Bloomberg News, Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, the Guardian, CNBC, Fast Company, OilPrice dot com, S&P, and other well-known sources, which might not be telling the truth about some other things, but are reporting truthfully about this. The Vilches article leaves little room for doubt that Europe’s leaders have sealed death-warrants for their nations’ economies by complying with Washington’s demands to do what Washington requires them to do in order to defeat Russia. Whether Washington will defeat Russia or not, this is going to destroy Europe. Here is how and why:

It wasn’t mere bravado when Russia’s RT News headlined on June 19th “EU warned of years of high gas prices ahead”, and opened: “Gas prices in the EU will remain high for several more years, Russia’s vice-premier and former energy minister, Aleksander Novak said on Friday, warning of serious problems across Europe when the autumn-winter period starts.”

This is clearly to be a suffering by the peoples of Europe that’s brought on by the U.S.-stooge leaders of Europe, who follow orders from Washington, far more than they serve the basic needs of their own people — even of the people who had voted for them.

Europe has been, not only since the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, but ever since 1945 in its western parts, U.S. vassal-nations. The only significant differences among the main political parties in Europe are the extents to which they adhere to their instructions from Washington.

Europeans will now be experiencing intensifying impoverishment in order for their imperial masters in Washington to be able to turn the screws even tighter against Russia, which they hate so much for not buckling to the empire (as the rest of Europe has done).

This action against Russia is allegedly being carried out because ‘Putin started the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022.’ But that’s a rabid lie. Obama started the war in Ukraine, in February 2014, to replace Ukraine’s democratically elected and neutralist President, by a rabidly anti-Russian regime that would then quickly proceed to eliminate the people in the parts of Ukraine that had voted overwhelmingly for the Ukrainian leader whom Obama had overthrown (Obama wanted the new, anti-Russian, regime, to be permanent, ‘democratically’ permanent). The coup worked. (The subsequent ethnic cleansing was only partially successful.)

The neoconservative (U.S.-imperialist) American regime did that — transformed Ukraine into Russia’s enemy, on Russia’s very borders. For example: During 2003-2009, only around 20% of Ukrainians had wanted NATO membership, while around 55% opposed it. In 2010, Gallup found that whereas 17% of Ukrainians considered NATO to mean “protection of your country,” 40% said it’s “a threat to your country.” Ukrainians predominantly saw NATO as an enemy, not a friend. But after Obama’s February 2014 Ukrainian coup, “Ukraine’s NATO membership would get 53.4% of the votes, one third of Ukrainians (33.6%) would oppose it.” However, afterward, the support averaged around 45% — still over twice as high as had been the case prior to the coup.

Putin, prior to 24 February 2022, had done all he could, short of invading Obama’s Ukraine, in order to reverse what Obama had done. This was a matter of Russia’s essential national security, in order to prevent U.S. missiles from ultimately becoming placed on Russia’s border, within only a five-minute flying-distance away from hitting Moscow.

The war in Ukraine certainly didn’t start in February 2022. Overtly, it started in February 2014. But, actually, it had started by no later than June 2011, as being in the planning stages by the Obama regime. That’s when what might be WW III started to be planned. We wouldn’t even know about this if Julian Assange had not told us about it.

Cutting-off Russia’s essential fuel-supplies to Europe is merely a continuation of that war, which was already being planned by Obama in Washington, by no later than June 2011. Obama even said in 2014 that Europe is “dispensable.” That’s the attitude of an imperialist, toward a colony (or group of colonies). It’s the attitude of America’s rulers, toward their stooge-regimes. The peoples of Europe are now paying the prices for that, and those prices will be sky-high, as the weather turns cold. Of course, those leaders will be blaming Putin (for what they themselves actually did).

### 2NC – Yes Russian Hostility

#### Increasing Central Europe’s cooperation with NATO foments hostility from Russia.

Freire ’12 [Maria Raquel; researcher at the Centre for Social Studies and professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra, Ph.D. at the University of Kent; 2012; "Russia at the Borders of Central Europe: Changing Dynamics in Foreign Policy Relations"; SpringerLink; https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137283450\_7; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]

7.1 Introduction Since 1989, Central Europe1 has seen substantial reforms, which included its countries’ membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which signalled a posture on its part in which they distanced themselves from decades of subordination to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in the Russian Federation, a strong regime has been consolidating in order to reassert the Russian Federation’s status in a post-Soviet context. This process, of course, includes the redefinition of the official Russian politics towards its (new) neighbourhood, including Central Europe. Looking at the interconnections that resulted from post-Cold War developments, the foreign policy changes that have taken place in Central Europe and the Russian Federation have allowed for the distinct dynamics that this chapter seeks to explore. It starts by setting down the evolving context of Russian foreign policy. It looks at the definition of Russia’s multi-vectoral2 and pragmatic policy and the strengthening of the multipolar international order as two factors that constitute the main axis for understanding the projection of Russia’s goals in its neighbouring areas. The analysis of the Russian Federation’s relations with Central European states is then pursued in the broader framing of the integration processes of these countries in NATO and the EU, and the Russian Federation’s own shaping of relations with these multilateral organizations. The analysis follows the identification of three factors that are central to the understanding of the Russian Federation’s policies towards Central Europe: the course of political reform and institutional capacity building; the redefinition of security and defence alignments after the end of the Warsaw Pact and the Cold War rivalry; and energy security as an essential factor in the redefinition of relations. These factors highlight different approaches to common issues, suggesting the need for a careful management of challenges and opportunities, as will be analysed later in the chapter. The chapter argues that, despite difficulties at both the level of the EU–Russian Federation and NATO–Russia relations and the bilateral level of Russia’s relations with Central European countries, the current state of affairs points to an increased trend in cooperation between the Russian Federation and Central Europe. It should be noted, however, that this cooperative trend does not do away with the Cold War rhetoric, which is still very much present (as will be shown below); traditional ‘issues’ still play a considerable role in the shaping and making of policies and actions both in the Russian Federation and in Central European states. 7.2 Russian Federation foreign policy: multi-vectoral and pragmatic The first post-Cold War decade allowed for a clarification of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy objectives which resulted from various adjustments that the process of transition from Soviet times demanded. In the proWestern context of the period after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin proclaimed the Russian Federation as a natural ally of Europe and pursued Russia’s integration into European institutions on the basis of the belief, as expressed by the first Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, that there were ‘neither potential adversaries nor military threats to Russian interests’ in Europe (Thorun 2009: 29). This posture also implied an inward-driven approach towards the domestic transition process in which relations with the former satellites to the West were not prioritized. ‘The story of relations between Russia and the East-Central European countries in the nineties was the story of Russia’s departure from the region’ (Póti 2007: 118). During the second term of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, in the face of the Central European states’ integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, the Russian Federation’s policy has evolved from one of ‘indifference’ to one of ‘engagement’. Many concerns were voiced in the Russian Federation regarding the impact of expanding NATO towards its borders, including concerns about the status and protection of borders in the face of an alliance that, according to Russian sources, had transformed itself from a defensive into an offensive alliance (Yugoslavia in 1995 and 1999) (Karaganov 2011: 7; Krastev et al. 2009: 57). Also, there was the predicted economic impact that the membership of the Central European countries in the EU was expected to have on the Russian economy, which would consist of a decrease in trade indicators along with new formalities that would have implications for the openness of the Central European markets to Russian products.3 Arguably, though, the NATO enlargement is a much more delicate issue for Russian foreign policymakers.

## AFF Answers

### 2AC – UQ

#### Central Europe is taking hardline stances against Russia’s advances in Ukraine – turns the DA.

Tůma ’22 [Petr; visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council's Europe Center, a Czech career diplomat with an expertise on Europe, Middle East and transatlantic relations, previously worked at the Czech Embassy in Washington, DC, posted as a Deputy Chief of the Czech Embassy in war-torn Syria and held the same position in Ramallah; 3-30-2022; "Central Europe leads the way in backing Ukraine. Here’s its game plan for what’s next."; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/central-europe-leads-the-way-in-backing-ukraine-heres-its-game-plan-for-whats-next/; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]

As the West scrambles to maintain its united front against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) member states of Central and Eastern Europe have led the way as some of the continent’s loudest moral voices, sending arms and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while receiving streams of refugees.

But while neighboring Poland has perhaps been most visible—hosting both US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris in recent weeks while absorbing more than two million refugees—geography isn’t the only factor that determines who is a frontline state.

Take the Czech Republic, for example: Though nestled in the heart of Europe and away from the EU’s eastern border, its new government—together with the three Baltic countries, Poland, and the United Kingdom—spearheaded weapons delivery for Ukrainians when most EU member states were still hesitating. It is also now home to around 200,000 Ukrainian refugees.

So when Prime Minister Petr Fiala—along with his Polish and Slovenian counterparts, Mateusz Morawiecki and Janez Janša, respectively—traveled to Kyiv earlier this month to visit Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, it wasn’t just a powerful symbolic gesture. It was also a reflection of the region’s growing clout as a bridge between Brussels and Kyiv.

I spoke to Tomáš Pojar, Fiala’s chief foreign-affairs adviser, who accompanied the delegation to Kyiv. Below are six major takeaways I distilled from our conversation—which can be also read as a guideline for Europe’s next steps for engagement toward Ukraine.

Europe’s most important task is to continue providing Ukraine with military support, especially anti-tank and -aircraft weapons. Quantity and time matter here, and the coming weeks are likely to be decisive in the war. Ukrainians are committed, but can’t defeat the Russian military without Western support. Moscow needs to understand that Europe stands firmly behind Ukraine, ready to provide what is needed to wreck Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plans. If Ukraine is properly equipped with more anti-aircraft weaponry, it can even create something akin to its own version of a no-fly zone (without, of course, achieving NATO-aided air superiority). Indeed, something similar is already happening in parts of the country’s airspace, where Russian planes and helicopters dare not enter. Military support is critical to any prospects for meaningful negotiation; if Putin sees the West hesitating, he is likely to press his advantage on the battlefield for quite some time.

Europe must also continue pushing for stronger sanctions against the Kremlin, as efforts thus far seem to be quite effective. There are many options still available to the EU—not least in the field of energy—but as some member states call for restraint, the immediate task is to close loopholes, such as those facilitating sanctions evasion through third-party entities. And if needed, a sixth or even seventh sanctions package should be on the table. The key is to remember that continuing to do business with Russia enables the Kremlin to finance its war, thus creating a further burden that Europe will need to carry in the future—from accepting more refugees to paying for the stabilization and reconstruction of a devastated Ukraine.

Ukraine needs a plan to rebuild. Beyond the immediate humanitarian needs of the Ukrainian people, Europe must already start thinking about postwar reconstruction. Even if we still don’t have a clear picture of the final scale of the wreckage (or even the final geographic extent of the country), an aid package on the scale of the Marshall Plan will likely be needed. At their summit in Brussels, European leaders discussed an EU recovery fund for Ukraine similar to one set up in 2020 amid the pandemic. The EU should organize a donor conference with NATO and partners from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. France, as the head of the European Council through the end of June, should start laying the groundwork now, to be continued by the Czech Republic when it takes over the rotating presidency later this year. The success of the reconstruction could, in turn, showcase the value of liberal democracy—especially if a new Iron Curtain falls across Europe.

Kyiv must attain a meaningful framework for cooperation with the West, even though Ukraine’s entry into NATO seems unlikely. By now, it’s clear that Ukraine deserves EU candidacy; yet accession is a long process with many political and administrative hoops to jump through. While Ukrainians must understand that there are no shortcuts, Kyiv should still get something soon. That’s why the European Union needs to invent a fast-track special partnership for Ukraine as part of the bloc’s overall reinvention for the post-post-Cold War period. But this new format needs to be credible: The effects of a protracted EU accession process are already on display in the Western Balkans, where countries have started searching for alternative patrons while backsliding on their reforms.

Europe should offer asylum and humanitarian protection to Russian soldiers ready to surrender. Today, those who don’t want to fight their Ukrainian neighbors face three awful options: death, captivity in Ukraine, or a harsh prison sentence in Russia. Europe needs to offer an alternative, something similar to temporary humanitarian asylum. Such proposals would be more appealing to young soldiers than to officers, and even in the best-case scenario, the number who would avail themselves of the opportunity won’t be in the thousands. But even hundreds matter: It represents a powerful humanitarian gesture—a hand extended to a demoralized Russian military.

The positive impact of the three prime ministers’ trip to Kyiv underscores the importance of having a diplomatic presence on the ground. Any EU member states that withdrew their diplomatic corps from Ukraine should consider sending them back to Kyiv. This is not just a gesture of solidarity: I was stationed in war-torn Syria when Damascus was shelled daily between 2013-2015, and while diplomatic work was difficult, it was still possible—and very much worthwhile. The picture we got on the ground was different and far more nuanced from the mediated images the rest of the world was getting. In Syria, the West left for good political reasons; in Ukraine, it should return as soon as possible.

Is the East the new West?

As Ivan Kravstev and Stephen Holmes noted in their 2019 book The Light that Failed, Eastern Europe had been mostly imitating the West since 1989. In the post-Cold War period, the chief aim in the East was to become—politically, economically, and socially—the new West. It was a mostly one-way stream of influence.

But now that’s partly changing. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are becoming more relevant and inspiring, as their once-hardline stance on Russia is becoming increasingly mainstream.

Consider—in parallel to the Czech takeaways from Kyiv—Morawiecki’s recently published ten-point plan to “save” Ukraine. He focuses mainly on restrictive measures against Russia and proposes concrete steps that can be implemented almost immediately. They include, among other options, cutting off all Russian banks from SWIFT, blocking Russian ships from EU ports, suspending visas for all Russians, and a total ban on the export of technologies that can be used for war.

#### Ukraine has forced Central Europe to move with caution due to Russia’s aggression – they’re not moving closer to Russia.

Wigura & Kuisz ’22 [Karolina; sociologist and historian of ideas; Jaroslaw; a political analyst who is writing a book about Poland’s illiberal turn; 3-25-2022; "America Thinks the War Is About Ukraine. Russia’s Neighbors Disagree."; NYTimes; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/opinion/nato-russia-poland-europe.html; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]

WARSAW — The symbolism was striking. On March 12, two weeks into Russia’s brutal bombardment of Ukraine, the leaders of France and Germany held a joint call with President Vladimir Putin. Just days later, three prime ministers from post-Communist Europe — Polish, Czech and Slovenian — traveled to Kyiv by train, despite the danger.

This divergence exposed a sharp divide in how Eastern and Western NATO member states view the war in Ukraine. For Western countries, not least the United States, the conflict is a disaster for the people of Ukraine — but one whose biggest danger is that it might spill over the Ukrainian border, setting off a global conflict.

For Central and Eastern European countries, it’s rather different. These neighbors of Russia tend to see the war not as a singular event but as a process. To these post-Soviet states, the invasion of Ukraine appears as a next step in a whole series of Russia’s nightmarish assaults on other countries, dating back to the ruthless attacks on Chechnya and the war with Georgia. To them, it seems foolhardy to assume Mr. Putin will stop at Ukraine. The danger is pressing and immediate.

While the West believes it must prevent World War III, the East thinks that, whatever the name given to the conflict, the war against liberal democratic values, institutions and lifestyles has already started. Both positions have merit. But Mr. Biden’s visit to Poland on Friday, a day after an emergency NATO summit, is a vital opportunity to forge a common understanding. Both sides, West and East, must present a united front against Russian aggression. The alternative is disarray and destruction.

At the root of the divide is history. Across centuries, Central and Eastern Europe have experienced the chilling effects of Russian imperialism. From czarist Russia to the Soviet Union, many countries through the region had their independence stamped out, their societies oppressed and their cultures marginalized. The trauma caused by the cyclical loss of territory and statehood is one of the most important elements of collective identity across the region.

Many Central and Eastern Europeans share an anxious sense of themselves, a nervous sovereignty. Their independence, restored with such great effort after 1989, could easily be lost again, as the 20th century proved all too painfully. In the tragic fate of Ukraine, and earlier of Chechnya and Georgia, they see not only their own traumatic past but also their possible future. “We will be next” is the phrase on many lips.

In this febrile atmosphere, NATO’s cautious steps look to many Central and Eastern Europeans like an echo of the phony war of 1939, when France and Britain undertook only limited military actions and did not save their eastern ally, Poland. At that time, too, horrible stories from bombed Warsaw and other cities filled the media. Yet the allies were determined not to be drawn in too deeply. Their military inaction temporarily delayed the spread of the war across the globe, but did not stop it.

#### NATO’s stationed permanent forces in Poland – prefer the Defense Secretary’s confirmation.

Strozewski 6-29 [Zoe; correspondent at Newsweek, citing Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III; 6-29-2022; "U.S. establishing permanent troops in Poland amid fears of NATO-Russia war"; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/us-establishing-permanent-troops-poland-amid-fears-nato-russia-war-1720384; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]

The U.S. will station its first permanent forces on NATO's Eastern flank, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III announced Wednesday, as fears mount over a potential war between Russia and the 30-member alliance.

In a Twitter thread detailing several new commitments from U.S. President Joe Biden to bolster security in Europe, Austin said that the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, an Army garrison headquarters and a field support battalion will be stationed in Poland, which shares a border with non-NATO member Russia.

"These forces – the first permanent U.S. forces on NATO's Eastern Flank – will improve our command and control capabilities, interoperability with NATO, and management of prepositioned equipment," the Defense Department said in an accompanying fact sheet. "This action builds on the central role Poland has played in supporting NATO's combat credible deterrence and defense posture.”

Officials such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov have issued warnings in recent months against NATO expansion or perceived threats from the alliance that they say could endanger Russia's security, even as their own country continues its monthslong assault on Ukraine.

The new European security commitments from Biden that Austin announced on Wednesday, as well as NATO's invitation for Sweden and Finland to join its ranks, might further fuel Russia's ire and feelings of vulnerability against the alliance.

Putin has cited the prospect of NATO expansion as one of his reasons for justifying the war in Ukraine, though the move seemed to backfire when Sweden and Finland announced their intention to join the alliance after Russia's invasion. Russia has also warned against any direct NATO involvement in the war, and taken issue with the weapons and supplies some member countries have funneled into Ukraine.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a self-exiled Russian oligarch and Kremlin critic, warned during an interview with the France-headquartered television network Euronews last month that Putin could eventually wage war on NATO if Ukraine does not win the current war. Even Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in a video address to NATO's summit in Madrid this week that Putin's aggression could spread beyond Ukraine's borders and into a NATO country within a year.

Despite the prospect of Russian aggression, some of NATO's recent actions indicate that the alliance is not shying from bolstering its own strength and assisting Ukraine.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Monday that the number of NATO troops on high readiness will increase more than sevenfold, the largest boost since the Cold War. He also said that NATO members will agree on a "strengthened assistance package" for Ukraine that includes anti-drone systems and secure communication.

### 2AC – China Thumper

#### China’s refusal to condemn Ukraine has accelerated Central Europe’s shift away from Russia.

McCarthy 6-30 [Simone; correspondent for China for CNN Digital Worldwide; 6-30-2022; "Europe sees China through a Russian lens, and Beijing is not happy"; CNN; https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/china/china-nato-g7-russia-ukraine-intl-hnk-mic/index.html; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL😊]

China’s concerns have been clear this week, as its Foreign Ministry pushed back on the NATO designation in regular scheduled press briefings. “China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs or export ideology, still less engage in long-arm jurisdiction, economic coercion or unilateral sanctions. How could China be labeled a ‘systemic challenge’?” ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said on Tuesday. “We solemnly urge NATO to immediately stop spreading false and provocative statements against China,” he said, adding that NATO should “stop seeking to disrupt Asia and the whole world after it has disrupted Europe.” But that rhetoric – blaming NATO for “disruption” in Europe – is part of what is driving a shift in European perspectives, analysts say, as Beijing has refused to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, including the killing of civilians, while actively blaming the US and NATO for provoking Moscow. China “very quickly and very clearly lined itself up – at least in words, not so much in deeds – with Russia,” while transatlantic partners came together against Russia and in support of Ukraine in the wake of the invasion, said Pepijn Bergsen, a research fellow in the Europe Program at the Chatham House think tank in London. The contrast between the two has helped drive an emerging “democracies versus autocracies” narrative in Europe, he said, adding that internal politics also play a role. “In Eastern and Central Europe, where Russia is regarded as by far the number one security threat, relations (with China) had already been starting to fray, but the fact that China so clearly lined up with Russia has accelerated a shift,” Bergsen said. China, for its part, appears to have underestimated the extent to which its stance would reverberate through its relationship with Europe, one that was already on shaky ground following European concerns over alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong and China’s economic targeting of Lithuania over the Baltic nation’s relations with Taiwan.

### 2AC – Cyber Thumper

#### NATO has already increased cybersecurity defense with Ukraine – thumps the DA.

Hakmeh & Naylor 3-7 [Joyce; a senior research fellow for the International Security Programme at Chatham House; Esther; a research analyst at the International Security Programme; 3-7-2022; "How the tech community has rallied to Ukraine’s cyber-defence"; Guardian; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/07/tech-community-rallied-ukraine-cyber-defence-eu-nato; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]

In response to the Russian threat, there have been unprecedented efforts by private and government entities – and even individuals – to support Ukraine’s cyber resilience.

Responding to cyber-attacks and building national cyber resilience has never been – and will never be – the sole responsibility of governments. It requires a whole-of-society approach grounded in international cooperation efforts. For the first time since its inception, the EU rapid cyber response team, with capabilities to detect and respond to a variety of threats, and headed by Lithuania, was deployed to help defend against cyber-attacks targeting Ukraine. The Romanian national cybersecurity agency and a cybersecurity company called Bitdefender launched a public-private partnership to provide pro bono technical support and threat intelligence to Ukraine’s government, businesses and citizens for “as long as it is necessary”. NATO, which has been working for a number of years with Ukraine to increase its cyber defences, signed an agreement a few weeks before the invasion aimed at enhancing cyber cooperation with Ukraine.

The tech community leveraged its resources and knowledge to expose cyber-attacks and threats, and limit their spread. Shortly after WhisperGate, Microsoft shared technical analysis on the tools and techniques used in the attack and recommendations for those affected, and it continues to do so. The Slovakia-based cybersecurity firm ESET exposed the nefarious component of the HermeticWiper malware attacks in February, a malware designed with a component aimed at “wiping” the data out of systems. This timely technical analysis provided vital information to security experts and governments about the technical steps that should be put in place to mitigate and protect against hacks.

At the same time, efforts within Ukraine started to materialise. In what has been referred to as an unprecedented effort in the midst of an armed conflict, a whole “IT army” of volunteers was assembled in response to a request by the minister of digital transformation to support the country’s cyber-defence efforts, with reports of some even operating from within bomb shelters.

The solidarity shown so far is unprecedented and a testament to the benefits and potential of collective action across sectors and communities. As the war continues, this solidarity will become even more important.

### 2AC – Ukraine Thumper

#### Ukraine is a turning point – Central Europe is using solidarity against Russia to distance themselves.

Brix 2-24 [Emil; the Director of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien – Vienna School of International Studies since 2017. After joining the Austrian diplomatic service in 1982, Mr. Brix worked as political secretary for the parliamentary group of the Austrian People’s Party. In 1986, he was appointed Head of Cabinet at the Ministry of Science and Research. From 1990 until 1995, he served as Austrian Consul General in Cracow, Poland. Subsequently, he was Director of the Austrian Cultural Institute in London, a position he held for four years. In 2002, Mr. Brix was appointed Director-General of Foreign Cultural Policy at the Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria. After serving five years as the Austrian Ambassador to the UK from 2010-15, he became Austrian Ambassador to the Russian Federation in 2015. He is deputy chairman of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe and member of the governing board of the Austrian Research Association. He holds a PhD from the University of Vienna and was awarded by the University of Drohobytsch, Ukraine and by the University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania. He is an alumnus of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien and published numerous books and articles on Austrian and European history of the 19th and 20th century; 2-24-2022; "Interview with Ambassador Emil Brix"; Central European Network for Teaching and Research in Academic Liaison; https://central-network.eu/news-events/interview-with-ambassador-emil-brix/; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL😊]

Ambassador Brix, February 24, 2022 marked a change in Europe's relations with Russia. Before that, there was a period of economic integration and a hope for peaceful, prosperous neighbourly relations. This hope seems to have been destroyed. How do you see the further development of Europe's relations with Russia?

February 24 was a decisive turning point in the relations between Europe and Russia. The reason for this was that it marked the destruction of the hope that through close cooperation – between universities, civil society, but also economic partners – we could achieve a reasonable relationship between Russia and Europe. The war of aggression is proof that one side does not want that. Therefore, we have to assume that a rather impenetrable new wall is being created here in Europe between Russia and the rest of Europe. And this also raises the question: what does this mean for Central Europe, for those states that are relatively recent members of the European Union, that have had decades of experience with communism, with the Soviet Union? To what extent have these countries now become a region in Europe that can, on the one hand, help us to understand what's going on; and on the other hand, actually help us defend what European values are?

Apart from Central and Eastern Europe, you were also stationed in Russia as a diplomat, so can you assess what this ultimately means for Russia too?

The war is a decisive turning point for the Russian side as well. It is to be expected that the result of this war will be a weak, isolated Russia – both politically and economically, but also in terms of cultural and scientific links. It is true that many people are trying to maintain contacts as far as possible – and rightly so, as far as they are not politically driven – but this will only be partially successful, and we can expect to see even stronger nationalism on the Russian side. The leadership in the Kremlin in Moscow has decided to stake everything on this approach: isolation, military strength and strong control of its own population. Apparently, it accepts that this will bring disadvantages for the Russian population as a whole.

What is driving Russia, and are official Russia and the Russian population on the same page?

For years now, only the official depiction of what drives Russia and what its interests are has existed. Everything that we understand by the term “civil society” has been systematically dismantled and banned in recent years. If you ask me what arguments the official leadership uses, they see the West as an ideological enemy that no longer upholds anything that remains in terms of traditional values. And official Russia casts itself as the preserver of traditional values – family, religion, gender roles – and this is currently supported by a majority of the Russian population; the polls are quite clear on that. But this strong focus on a 'different civilization', a different worldview, is certainly not undisputed in Russia. Too much has happened since the Soviet Union in terms of modernization, opening up, and scientific contacts. Many people have emigrated in the wake of February 24, but many are still there. In order to avoid putting themselves in danger, they have to stand back and wait a bit to see what can be done publicly. However, we have opportunities to continue to work together on both sides here. Science and culture in particular are predestined to do this. In the long term, we need this contact – for historical, cultural, geographical and human reasons.

Does this mean that calls to break off academic relations and expel Russian cultural workers are actually the wrong way to go, and these channels should remain open?

We should maintain contacts on the cultural and scientific level as much as possible. However, certainly not with those who have been in solidarity with the Kremlin's policy explicitly and for a long time. I am very much in favour of us taking a clear position here. That is actually what everyone in Europe has done. Even we at the Diplomatic Academy have suspended official contact with the leading Russian academy. Nevertheless, we did not send the Russian students home.

Europe has shown itself to be quick and surprisingly united in its support of Ukraine. However, there are fault lines too now; there is disagreement even among the Visegrád states. Do you see the danger of a split due to these fault lines?

I would put it positively: it is actually a miracle that we have so far managed to get far-reaching sanctions packages against Russia, against this war, off the ground with relatively little discussion. It's a real miracle that we've managed to get arms financing through a resolution in the European Union. So there's a lot of positives here. I think that perceptions of Poland, for example, which have been very negative in recent years, are changing as we see how they deal with refugees from Ukraine. Or think about Lithuania. They were the first European state that not only recognized the energy dependence on Russian oil and gas, but also did something about it by building an LNG terminal in 2014 to provide exactly this alternative to Russian gas, and today they are a role model with that. And it’s a Central European state that has done this, not one of the rich Western European states. That means there are very many positive contributions that Central European states are making in this dangerous situation.

At the same time, however, we also have Central European states that tend to put on the brakes – and in some cases only because of economic considerations.

In a state of emergency, as this war is for a region like Central Europe, it is very understandable that you look at your national situation first. In Austria, we say that security of supply is the most important thing as far as energy issues are concerned. The Hungarians say that national patriotic unity must not be endangered and that we have to look after our minorities in Ukraine. So each of the Central European countries is directly affected, and most of them are more affected than Portugal, Spain or France. This means you have to understand that the situation is really different. I don't think that the political climate of opinion at the moment sees the Central European region as having a destructive role. On the contrary, I believe that people are now beginning to understand what the historical experience of these Central Europeans, who for decades were largely under the Soviet yoke, actually means. Because this didn’t just mean that they had to orient themselves symbolically towards the East, but that they had to orient themselves with pipelines and other energy supplies towards this direction and make themselves dependent. After all, this was not a voluntary decision in many states. And I think it is a positive contribution to European solidarity that these Central European states now have to engage much more intensively with the question of how they stand between the West and the East.

Does that mean that this situation also offers an opportunity?

Absolutely, it also offers an opportunity. I'm calling my presentation in the upcoming panel discussion, 'Is Russia again the tragedy of Central Europe?' because this title is from an essay by Milan Kundera from 1984. In this essay, he describes how dangerous Russia can be, but in the end it's not about Russia at all. It's about the fact that on the European side, nobody is willing to stand up for European values anymore; that the Central Europeans talk about Europe, especially the dissidents before the end of the Soviet Union, while in (editor’s note: Western) Europe these European values are no longer talked about.

# EU-Russia Relations

## 1NC – EU Relations

### 1NC – Famine Scenario

#### Negotiations are in progress between Europe and Russia to alleviate rising world hunger---now is key because there will be nowhere to store crops or retrieve current stores

Stevis-Gridneff and Schwirtz 7/13 (Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Brussels bureau chief for The New York Times, covering the European Union. She joined The Times after covering East Africa and previously Europe for The Wall Street Journal; and Michael Schwirtz, investigative reporter with the International desk. With The Times since 2006, he previously covered the countries of the former Soviet Union from Moscow and was a lead reporter on a team that won the 2020 Pulitzer Prize for articles about Russian intelligence operations; "After Ukraine-Russia Meeting, U.N. Sees ‘a Ray of Hope’ to Free Grain", 7-13-2022, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/13/world/europe/ukraine-grain-negotiations.html, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

BRUSSELS — Russian and Ukrainian negotiators met on Wednesday in an increasingly desperate effort to release huge stores of grain blocked by Russian warships, yielding what the United Nations secretary general called “a ray of hope” but no formal agreement that could alleviate rising world hunger.

Wednesday’s meeting, held in Istanbul with U.N. representatives and military officials from Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, had raised hopes for a breakthrough. It ended with progress, the U.N. official said, but no comprehensive deal.

“This was a first meeting, the progress was extremely encouraging. We hope that the next steps will allow us to come to a formal agreement,” said António Guterres, the secretary general, speaking to reporters in New York after the one-and-a-half hour meeting ended.

“We still need a lot of good will by all parties,” he said, adding, “More technical work will now be needed to materialize today’s progress, but the momentum is clear.”

Hulusi Akar, the Turkish defense minister who hosted the talks, said that Ukrainian and Russian negotiators would meet again in Istanbul next week, and that a coordination center with representatives from both sides would be set up there.

Officials have tried for months to break the impasse over Ukrainian grain without triggering an escalation in the war or a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO. In interviews, more than half a dozen officials directly involved or briefed on the plans cited obstacles to an agreement that ranged from the mundane to the downright “Mission Impossible.”

Grain Routes Out of Ukraine

Proposed alternatives, such as moving the grain overland or through the Danube River, have been deemed too slow, cumbersome and small-scale, given that more than 22 million tons of grain are trapped in Odesa and other Black Sea ports blockaded by Russian warships.

Failing to move the grain from ports and silos could begin to hamper the summer harvest, leaving farmers no place to store fresh crops.

The war in Ukraine is already adding to a global food crisis that has sent the prices of vital commodities like wheat and barley to historic highs.

The most immediate and consequential fallout is looming famine in the Horn of Africa, where years of drought have devastated communities in Somalia and parts of neighboring countries. Ukraine, the world’s fourth-largest exporter of grains, is a key source for that region.

#### Military actions against Russia directly trade off with negotiations

Strupczewski 22 (Jan Strupczewski; "No more EU sanctions on Russia needed, negotiations better option -Hungary", 6-23-2022, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/no-more-eu-sanctions-russia-needed-negotiations-better-option-hungary-2022-06-23/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

BRUSSELS, June 23 (Reuters) - The European Union should stop adding sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine and instead push for a ceasefire and the start of negotiations, a senior aide to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said on Thursday.

Speaking on the sidelines of a summit of EU leaders which granted Ukraine the status of a candidate to become a member of the EU, the aide said the more sanctions the EU adopted the more they hurt the bloc, while Russia survived.

"At the end of the day Europe will be on the losing side of this war because of the economic problems. Our recommendation would be that we should stop the sanction process," Balazs Orban, not related to the prime minister, told Reuters in an interview.

Hungary is one of the most pro-Russian EU countries, heavily dependent on Russian gas and oil. Russia is also building a nuclear reactor for Hungary. Budapest had held up the latest package of sanctions against Moscow that included a ban on Russian oil imports until it negotiated an exemption for itself.

"Right now what we experience is that the more sanctions we accept, the worse shape we are in. And the Russians? Yes, it hurts them as well, but they survive. And what is even worse, they proceed in Ukraine," Balazs Orban said.

Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, the 27-nation European Union has agreed on six packages of sanctions that include asset freezes and visa bans on Russian oligarchs and officials, export controls, freezing central bank assets, disconnecting banks from the SWIFT messaging system and a ban on imports of Russian coal and oil.

But some officials argue that individual oligarchs can live without some of their yachts or Western villas, have probably already moved liquid assets outside the EU and export controls might be circumvented by China and others.

The freeze on the Russian central bank reserves is made less painful by the billions of dollars Russia gets every day for its oil and gas still flowing to Europe, they say. Once the EU stops buying Russian oil next year, the crude can be sold and shipped by tankers to China or India, some officials say.

Others argue the sanctions are working, but it will take time before their full impact on the Russian economy shows.

Orban, however, said the EU should change its tactics.

"We reached a point when we realise that we followed the strategy for four months, we have some achievements, but if it continues like this, according to reasonable thinking, it will end up in a bad way for Europe. So we have to think about something. Negotiations, ceasefire, peace. Diplomacy. That's our solution," Orban said.

#### Food insecurity from the war spills into the overall stability of the Horn of Africa

Adams 7/15 (Mubarak Adams, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana; “THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINE WAR THREATENS GLOBAL PEACE: AN EXAMINATION,” Research Gate, 7/15/2022)//sposten

Food insecurity in Africa As the war in Ukraine affects global food security; nevertheless, Africa is the worst impacted. Globally, Russia and Ukraine are key commodity producers; but, as a result of the war, global commodity prices have skyrocketed, notably for oil and natural gas. Russia and Ukraine account for up to 30% of world wheat exports (Ashby & Mutah, 2022). The war has increased food shortages, blocked global wheat supply, and forced the price raise of food, particularly in African nations that rely on Russia and Ukraine, this should serve as a wake-up call (IMF,2022; World Bank, 2022; Ashby & Mutah, 2022). The contribution of these two nations to agriculture is enormous; nevertheless, the conflict has reduced worldwide fertilizer supplies, resulting in low yields (WTO, 2022). Sacko and Mayaki (2022), declare that Russia and Ukraine, both known as the world's breadbasket, are important actors in the sale of wheat and sunflower to Africa. North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia), Nigeria in West Africa, Ethiopia and Sudan in East Africa, and South Africa account for 80 percent of wheat imports. Wheat consumption in Africa is expected to reach 76.5 million tonnes by 2025, with 48.3 million tonnes, or 63.4 percent, imported from outside the continent. According to (UN, 2022; Ashby, and Mutah, 2022), Africa bought $4 billion in agricultural items from Russia and $3 billion from Ukraine, respectively. Due to the fighting, over 20 million people in the Sahel and West African regions lack access to adequate food (UN, 2022; Ashby & Mutah, 2022). Ashby and Mutah (2022), avow that some African nations, notably Senegal, Cameroon, Kenya, and Ghana, rely substantially on importing phosphorus and potassium fertilizer from Russia. However, as a result of the heavy economic sanctions imposed on Russia, Russia's capacity to sell fertilizer abroad has plummeted. In this view, the World Trade Organization (2022), avers that 35 African nations buy food, and 22 import fertilizer from Ukraine, Russia, or both. Some people rely significantly on both nations for critical necessities like wheat. Because of the war, Ukraine's ports remain closed, preventing existing grain supplies from being exported, and in the absence of a quick truce that allows farmers to return to fields, the interruption to spring planting will drastically reduce future production. Africa and the Middle East are the most susceptible regions since they rely on Ukraine and/or Russia for more than half of their cereal requirements (WTO, 2022). Ellyatt (2022), also asserts that with the conflict in Ukraine, global food security is jeopardized. Russia and Ukraine export more than 60 percent of the world's sunflower oil production. Because these two countries produce over 70 percent of global agricultural commodities, any disruption in supply affects pricing. Sub-Saharan Africa is caught in the crossfire of this conflict because the region's governments are yet to deal with the shocks of the destruction of Covid-19 (Ibid). According to records, 85 percent of the region's grains, primarily wheat, are imported from Europe, with one-third coming from Russia and Ukraine. The result is that tensions in the region will rise as food prices soar high (Ibid).

**Instability causes global war**

**Glick 7**, Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.carolineglick.com/e/2007/12/condis-african-holiday.php?pf=yes

The Horn of **Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars,** which rage continuously, **can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes** from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, **can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between** competing regional actors and **global powers.**

#### Conflicts in Africa empirically spill up due to political tensions

Agyemfra et. Al 11 (Francis Asiedu Agyemfra, Brigadier General (Rtd), former Chief of Staff and serving as Ghana’sambassador to the Republic of Liberia; Colin Essamuah, educated at Mfantsipim School, Ghana, the University of Ghana and the Johns Hopkins University in the USA, national service at the Department of History at the University of Ghana; Gifty Anin-Botwe, retired Commissioner of Police, Master’s degree in governance and leadership; Ken Ahorsu, research fellow and a lecturer in Conflict resolution and Peace Studies at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy; Erasmus Ndemole Migyikra, founder and a member of the West Africa Centre for Peace Studies, MA in Peace and Conflict Studies, LLM in International Crime and Justice (International Criminal Law), LLM in International Human Rights, and Humanitarian Law, Post Graduate Diploma in Law (GDL), LLB and Diploma in Social Administration; James J. Hentz, Professor and Chair of the Department of International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military Institute, PhD from the University of Pennsylvania; “Reflections on Security I;” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ghana/10502.pdf; November 2011)//sposten

After the initial wave of military coups, political disturbances, including revolutions and violent secessionist attempts, leading to national insecurity and instability, have known no end in Africa. It is a matter of great regret that, because of these negative developments, Africa has become notorious for military interventions and political upheavals that have rocked the peace and developments of our respective countries. Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo stand out today as African countries which have become epicentres of instability and scars on the conscience of the whole world.

## 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox

### 2NC – UQ

#### Peace is possible BUT it requires a suspension of action that may escalate the conflict

Jakob **Augstein**, 7-14-20**22**, "A European Call for an end to the Ukraine War," Just World Educational, https://justworldeducational.org/2022/07/a-european-call-for-an-end-to-the-ukraine-war/

Europe faces the task of restoring and securing peace on the continent. This requires the development of a strategy to end the Russian war in Ukraine as soon as possible. Ukraine has been able to defend itself against Russia’s brutal war of aggression for three and a half months now, partially thanks to massive economic sanctions and military support from Europe and the United States. However, the longer this support continues, the less clear it becomes which goals are being pursued with it. A Ukrainian victory with the recapture of all occupied territories, including the Donezk and Luhansk oblasts and Crimea, is considered unrealistic by most military experts, given Russia’s military superiority and ability to further escalate militarily. All western countries that provide military support to Ukraine must therefore ask themselves what their precise goal is and whether (and for how long) arms deliveries continue to be the right course of action. Continuing the war with the aim of Ukraine’s complete victory over Russia means that thousands more victims will die for a purpose that does not seem realistic. Moreover, the consequences of the war are no longer limited to Ukraine. Its continuation is causing massive humanitarian, economic, and environmental distress around the world. Rapidly rising prices, energy and food shortages have already led to unrest in many countries. Fertilizer shortages will have a global impact if the war lasts beyond the fall. High casualty rates, many deaths from hunger and disease and destabilization of the global situation are to be expected. Warnings of these dramatic consequences are also being issued at the international political level (G7, UN). All western countries must stand united against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and further revanchist claims. However, prolonging the war in Ukraine is not the solution. The current developments surrounding rail transit to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Putin’s announcement to deliver nuclear-capable missile systems to Belarus, show that the danger of escalation is increasing. The western countries must do anything they can to ensure that the war parties reach a negotiated settlement as soon as possible. This alone can prevent years of a war of attrition with its fatal local and global consequences, as well as a military escalation that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations does not mean a surrender of Ukraine, as is sometimes assumed. A dictated peace by Putin is not an option. The international community must do everything it can to create conditions under which negotiations are possible at all. This includes a declaration that the Western actors have no interest in continuing the war and will adjust their strategies accordingly. It also entails a willingness to secure the terms of a truce as well as the results of peace negotiations internationally, which may require a high level of commitment. The longer the war continues, the more international pressure will be necessary to get both sides back into negotiations. The West must make every effort to persuade the governments of Russia and Ukraine to suspend combat actions. Economic sanctions and military support have to be integrated into a political strategy aimed at gradual de-escalation until a ceasefire is fully implemented. So far, there has not been a joint and concentrated effort by the international community, the major Western players in particular, to seek negotiations. As long as this is not the case, it cannot be assumed that an understanding is impossible and that Putin in particular does not want to negotiate. In a deadlocked conflict, it is a standard practice that war parties have maximum demands or explicitly reject peace talks. The course of the negotiation attempts so far has shown some initial willingness on both sides to come to an understanding by a flexible approach to the attainment of their goals. At this point, only a major diplomatic offensive can lead out of the current impasse. The opening of negotiations is not a justification for war crimes. We share the desire for justice. Negotiations, however, are first and foremost a necessary means to prevent further suffering in Ukraine and adverse consequences of the war around the world. Considering the threat of humanitarian catastrophes and the manifest risks of escalation, stability must be restored as quickly as possible. Only a suspension of combat actions will create the time and opportunity necessary to do this. The supreme importance of this goal demands that we rise to the challenge and do everything in our power to make an early ceasefire and the start of peace negotiations possible – and refrain from doing anything that contradicts this goal.

#### Progress is possible, we’re already seeing it but its key that we don’t escalate

Matina **Stevis** – Gridneff **and** Michael **Schwirtz**, 7-13-20**22**, “After Ukraine – Russia Meeting, U.N sees ‘a Ray of Hope’ to Free Grain, [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/13/world/europe/ukraine - grain negotiations.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/13/world/europe/ukraine%20-%20grain%20negotiations.html)

BRUSSELS — Russian and Ukrainian negotiators met on Wednesday in an increasingly desperate effort to release huge stores of grain blocked by Russian warships, yielding what the United Nations secretary general called “a ray of hope” but no formal agreement that could alleviate rising world hunger. Wednesday’s meeting, held in Istanbul with U.N. representatives and military officials from Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, had raised hopes for a breakthrough. It ended with progress, the U.N. official said, but no comprehensive deal. “This was a first meeting, the progress was extremely encouraging. We hope that the next steps will allow us to come to a formal agreement,” said António Guterres, the secretary general, speaking to reporters in New York after the one-and-a-half hour meeting ended. “We still need a lot of good will by all parties,” he said, adding, “More technical work will now be needed to materialize today’s progress, but the momentum is clear.” Hulusi Akar, the Turkish defense minister who hosted the talks, said that Ukrainian and Russian negotiators would meet again in Istanbul next week, and that a coordination center with representatives from both sides would be set up there. Officials have tried for months to break the impasse over Ukrainian grain without triggering an escalation in the war or a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO. In interviews, more than half a dozen officials directly involved or briefed on the plans cited obstacles to an agreement that ranged from the mundane to the downright “Mission Impossible.” Proposed alternatives, such as moving the grain overland or through the Danube River, have been deemed too slow, cumbersome and small-scale, given that more than 22 million tons of grain are trapped in Odesa and other Black Sea ports blockaded by Russian warships. Failing to move the grain from ports and silos could begin to hamper the summer harvest, leaving farmers no place to store fresh crops. The war in Ukraine is already adding to a global food crisis that has sent the prices of vital commodities like wheat and barley to historic highs. The most immediate and consequential fallout is [looming famine in the Horn of Africa](https://web.archive.org/web/20220714021231/https:/www.nytimes.com/2022/06/11/world/africa/somalia-drought-hunger.html), where years of drought have devastated communities in Somalia and parts of neighboring countries. Ukraine, the world’s fourth-largest exporter of grains, is a key source for that region. Efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement have been hampered by problems that include mines in the Black Sea, arranging at-sea inspections of the cargo, and convincing the Kremlin that it has an interest in resolving the blockade. While officials were discussing the grain crisis in Istanbul, Ukraine’s military began to punch back on the battlefield in eastern Ukraine, striking bases and ammunition depots deep within Russian-occupied territory with the help of new, more powerful weapons provided by the West. Early Wednesday morning, a fireball lit up the sky over Luhansk, the capital of a Russian-held province in eastern Ukraine. Russian media reported that Ukraine’s military had hit an antiaircraft battery. That followed the destruction of six ammunition warehouses on Tuesday in Russian-controlled territories in southern and eastern Ukraine, according to Serhii Bratchuk, the spokesman for Odesa’s military administration. The strategy by Ukrainian forces was still in its early days, and it was not yet clear whether it was allowing them to disrupt Russian artillery attacks and offensive operations. Some Ukrainian officials argued that the Russians were being forced to move supply hubs farther from the front, a claim that could not be verified.

#### Negotiations are key, it’s the only reliable method for stability

Charles A. **Kupchan**, 6-15-**22** https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/06/15/negotiating-to-end-the-ukraine-war-isnt-appeasement-00039798

As the war in Ukraine grinds through its fourth month, defiant Ukrainians continue to bloody Russian’s invasion force. The United States and its allies are backstopping Ukraine’s staunch defense of its territory through a steady inflow of weapons. The goal, as President Joe Biden put it in a recent essay in the [New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/31/opinion/biden-ukraine-strategy.html), is “to work to strengthen Ukraine and support its efforts to achieve a negotiated end to the conflict.” A negotiated end to the conflict is the right goal — and one that needs to arrive sooner rather than later. Ukraine likely lacks the combat power to expel Russia from all of its territory, and the momentum on the battlefield is shifting in Russia’s favor. The longer this conflict continues, the greater the death and destruction, the more severe the disruptions to the global economy and the food supply, and the higher the risk of escalation to full-scale war between Russia and NATO. Transatlantic unity is starting to fray, with France, Germany, Italy and other allies uneasy about the prospect of a prolonged war — especially against the backdrop of rising inflation. But if Biden is serious about facilitating negotiations, he needs to do a better job of laying the political groundwork and shaping a narrative that prioritizes arriving at a diplomatic endgame. There is still too much [hawkish rhetoric in Washington](https://twitter.com/benjaminwittes/status/1532340021440696320), with U.S. arms flowing to Ukraine “so that it can,” in the [words of Secretary of State Antony Blinken](https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-18/), “repel Russian aggression and fully defend its independence and sovereignty.” Meanwhile, [Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy insists](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/03/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-100-days.html), not surprisingly, that “victory will be ours” and [urges Ukrainians](https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3429421-zelensky-while-invaders-are-on-our-soil-we-must-beat-them-as-best-we-can.html) to “defend every meter of our land.” And Biden, even as he makes mention of the need for diplomacy, has so far been unwilling to caution Kyiv against those aims, instead affirming “I will not pressure the Ukrainian government — in private or public — to make any territorial concessions.” “We’re not going to tell the Ukrainians how to negotiate, what to negotiate and when to negotiate,” Colin Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy, [reiterated this week](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/14/world/europe/us-will-not-push-ukraine-to-reach-a-cease-fire-a-top-pentagon-official-says.html?searchResultPosition=2). “They’re going to set those terms for themselves.” But Washington has not only a right to discuss war aims with Kyiv, but also an obligation. This conflict arguably represents the most dangerous geopolitical moment since the Cuban missile crisis. A hot war is raging between a nuclear-armed Russia and a NATO-armed Ukraine, with NATO territory abutting the conflict zone. This war could define the strategic and economic contours of the 21st century, possibly opening an era of militarized rivalry between the world’s liberal democracies and an autocratic bloc anchored by Russia and China. These stakes necessitate direct U.S. engagement in determining when and how this war ends. Instead of offering arms with no strings attached — effectively leaving strategy up to the Ukrainians — Washington needs to launch a forthright discussion about war termination with allies, with Kyiv, and ultimately, with Moscow. To prepare the ground for that pivot, the Biden administration should stop making claims that could tie its own hands at the negotiating table. Biden insists that the West must “make it clear that might does not make right.” Otherwise, “it will send a message to other would-be aggressors that they too can seize territory and subjugate other countries. It will put the survival of other peaceful democracies at risk. And it could mark the end of the rules-based international order.” Really? Russia has illegally held Crimea and occupied a chunk of Donbas since 2014. But the rules-based international order has not come to an end; indeed, it has performed admirably in punishing Russia for its new round of aggression against Ukraine. Washington should avoid painting itself into a corner by predicting catastrophe if Russia remains in control of a slice of Ukraine when the fighting stops. Such forecasts make compromise more difficult — and risk magnifying the geopolitical impact of whatever territorial gains Russia may salvage. The claim that Vladimir Putin will end his trouble-making only if he is decisively defeated in Ukraine is another fallacious argument that distorts debate and stands in the way of diplomacy. Writing in The Atlantic, [Anne Applebaum](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/why-ukraine-must-defeat-putin-russia/629940/) calls for the “humiliation” of Putin and insists that “the defeat, sidelining, or removal of Putin is the only outcome that offers any long-term stability in Ukraine and the rest of Europe.” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin [wants to weaken Russia](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/) “to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” But this is wishful thinking, not strategic sobriety. Putin is poised to remain in power for the foreseeable future. He will be a troublemaker no matter how this war ends; flexing his geopolitical muscle and burnishing his nationalist credentials are the primary sources of his domestic legitimacy. Furthermore, humiliating Putin is risky business; he could well be more reckless with his back up against the wall than if he can claim victory by taking another bite out of Ukraine. The West has learned to live with and contain Putin for the past two decades — and will likely continue to have to do so into the next. Finally, Biden needs to start weaning mainstream debate away from the false equation of diplomacy with appeasement. When Henry Kissinger recently proposed in Davos that Ukraine may need to make territorial concessions to end the war, [Zelenskyy retorted](https://www.democracynow.org/2022/5/26/headlines/ukraines_zelensky_blasts_henry_kissinger_over_proposal_to_appease_russia): “It seems that Mr. Kissinger’s calendar is not 2022, but 1938, and he thought he was talking to an audience not in Davos, but in Munich of that time.” Biden himself asserts that “It would be wrong and contrary to well-settled principles” to counsel Ukraine on potential concessions at the negotiating table. But strategic prudence should not be mistaken for appeasement. It is in Ukraine’s own self-interest to avoid a conflict that festers for years and instead negotiate a ceasefire and follow-on process aimed at concluding a territorial settlement. The United States, its NATO allies, Russia, and the rest of the world have an interest in securing this same outcome — precisely why it is now time for Biden to set the negotiating table.

#### EU Russia relations key to end the Ukraine war

Menon 22 (Rajan Menon is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of International Relations at the Powell School, City College of New York, and a nonresident fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He is the author, most recently, of The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention, June 29, 2022, “How Will the War in Ukraine End?”, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/ukraine-russia-war-end/)

Before the war, Putin pushed for a neutral Ukraine that would foreswear all military alliances. No dice, said both Ukraine and NATO. That alliance’s decision, at its 2008 Bucharest summit, to open the door to that country (and Georgia) was irrevocable. A month after the Russian invasion began, Zelensky put neutrality on the table, but it was too late. Putin had already opted to achieve his aims on the battlefield and was confident he could. Still, Russia and Ukraine have now been fighting for more than three months. Both have suffered heavy losses and each knows that the war could drag on for years at a staggering cost without either achieving its aims. The Russian president does control additional chunks of Ukrainian territory, but he may hope to find some way of easing Western sanctions and also avoiding being wholly dependent on China. These circumstances might revive the neutrality option. Russia would retain its land corridor to Crimea, even if with some concessions to Ukraine. It would receive a guarantee that the water canals flowing southward to that peninsula from the city of Kherson, which would revert to Ukrainian control, would never again be blocked. Russia would not annex the “republics” it created in the Donbas in 2014 and would withdraw from some of the additional land it’s seized there. Ukraine would be free to receive arms and military training from any country, but foreign troops and bases would be banned from its territory. Such a settlement would require significant Ukrainian sacrifices, which is why **candidate membership in the European Union** (EU) and, more importantly, a fast track to full membership—one of that country’s key aspirations—as well as substantial long-term Western aid for economic reconstruction **would be a necessary part of any deal**. Expediting its membership would be a heavy lift for the EU and such an aid package would be costly to the Europeans and Americans, so they’d have to decide how much they were willing to offer to end Europe’s biggest conflict since World War II.

#### Peace is the best option

Carment and Belo 22 (David Carment and Dani Belo; "The war in Ukraine shows it’s time for a new way to ensure security in Europe", 6-16-2022, Carleton Newsroom, https://newsroom.carleton.ca/story/ukraine-war-ensure-european-security/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

The ongoing political and military standoff between Russia and the United States is the most recent indicator that Europe’s security and economic architecture must be transformed to harmonize European and Russian strategic interests.

In other words, the path toward ending the war in Ukraine requires focusing on the security priorities of those who have the most to gain from a diplomatic solution — European nations, not the U.S. Peaceful co-existence is dependent upon successful negotiations among European capitals and Moscow.

The war in Ukraine did not start on Feb. 24, 2022, but has been ongoing since 2014. Between 2014 and 2022, more than 15,000 people have died, creating a humanitarian disaster for Ukraine and its eastern Donbas region.

The protracted conflict has been riddled with missed opportunities for diplomatic action, confrontation and limited strategic thinking.

European diplomacy efforts

On June 16, 2022, European leaders Emmanuel Macron of France, Germany’s Olaf Scholz and Italy’s Mario Draghi visited Kyiv separately from U.S Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. This demonstrates Europeans have the capacity to carry out diplomacy independently from Washington.

Unfortunately, pursuing action through a defensive alliance like NATO, rather than focusing on conflict prevention and resolution through collective security arrangements — via the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations and the European Union — has weakened the potential for a negotiated or mediated settlement.

Security organizations that might be in a position to support a diplomatic process, however, have now become increasingly vulnerable amid the war. The OSCE, for example, no longer has any real presence in monitoring the conflict because its representatives have been targeted, rather than viewed as intermediaries.

We believe a key step toward peace in Ukraine is for Kyiv to relinquish its ambition to join NATO while securing membership within the EU. This decision would move the conflict away from one based on military confrontation and towards building Ukraine’s political and economic resilience within Europe.

Kyiv has been granted EU candidate status, putting it on a path toward membership with the union, but its NATO membership bid has largely fallen by the wayside.

Donbas, Crimea

In return for EU membership, Ukraine should be prepared to negotiate a lasting settlement to address the status of Donbas, Crimea and other territories as Russia’s occupation of them becomes solidified though annexation.

Both Luhansk and Donetsk were the focus of a decree issued by Russian President Vladimir Putin three days before invading Ukraine that recognized the contested separate status of these two oblasts. As the war grinds on, Russia is taking de facto political and economic control of these zones.

At the same time, the conditions needed to reintegrate the Russian-occupied territories back into a highly centralized Ukrainian state don’t exist at this time. Therefore, at a minimum, decentralization must be part of the negotiation process, as stipulated in the Minsk Agreement of February 2015 aimed at stopping the fighting in the region.

Committing to de-escalation

The EU and the OSCE are in better positions to support Ukraine’s decentralization since they have the ability to monitor and strengthen minority rights among candidate and member states where political, cultural and linguistic rights have been weakened.

When choosing between compromise or continued war, Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will need to take tangible, measurable steps towards de-escalation.

This would include an agreement to establish a ceasefire zone. A ceasefire could mean further efforts to reduce tensions, including a withdrawal of forces where possible, an increase in the number of crossing points across buffer zones and lines of contact, eliminating land mines and returning people to their homelands.

Beyond this important first step, both sides must be prepared to agree on the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, where minority rights are respected and enforced.

EU must play big role for European Security

Some experts have argued that Ukrainian sovereignty should be upheld by the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States), plus the European Union and Turkey.

This is a tall order, given that Moscow perceives the U.S. as a key player in supporting a proxy war in Ukraine. That’s why the EU and the OSCE acting as intermediaries is crucial.

A second step on the agenda must be negotiating the special status of territories currently under Russian control, including Donbas and Crimea. Disputed claims over Crimea should include resolutions about shared resources, common commercial interests and the security of the Russian fleet at Sevastopol.

A third step is to uphold safe and free access and mobility throughout the Black Sea, unimpeded by mines, blockades and embargoes.

Normalizing relations between Russia and Ukraine would bring regional stability through freedom of movement of people and goods. Without the local population seeing immediate tangible benefits, the protracted conflict will continue to erode any confidence they might have in any lasting settlement.

A resolution template for European Security

In reaching these goals, the so-called Steinmeier formula — the foundation of the Minsk II protocols — offers negotiators a template for the process.

A gradual reduction in tensions is possible if parties take a systematic approach that focuses on where there is likely to be agreement, including the aforementioned ceasefire and creation of buffer zones, before moving on to thornier issues like fixed borders.

Unfortunately, since the onset of the conflict in February, the West’s diplomatic channels with Moscow have been reduced to a few phone calls between Macron, Scholz and Putin. The hardened positions of both sides has prevented any robust agreements on humanitarian corridors.

To avoid a frozen conflict — in which the fighting has ended but no peace treaty is in place — sanctions on Russia will need to be lifted according to its contribution to a constructive and lasting outcome.

Ukraine, on the other hand, must be convinced that a prolonged war will only diminish the prospects for long-term economic and political stability, with the likelihood of EU membership diminishing rapidly over time.

### 2NC – Grain UQ

#### Talks are ongoing over food

Crawford 7/21 (Alan Crawford; "Ukraine Latest: Russian Annexation Plans; Currency Devalued", 7-21-2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-21/ukraine-latest-russian-gas-resumes-but-italy-raises-more-risks, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Russia Says Grain Export Talks Happening Via Video (2:31 p.m.)

Talks on resuming Ukrainian grain exports are being held via video, with hopes of reaching an agreement in the near future, Interfax reported, citing Andrey Rudenko, Russia’s deputy foreign minister.

Separately, Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s chief of staff, says technical negotiations are under way but are “difficult.” The aim is to produce document to regulate shipments from Ukraine’s ports, he said in a television interview.

#### Negotiations are complicated but ongoing

AFP 7/20 ("The complex negotiations to get grain out of Ukraine", 7-20-2022, France 24, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220720-the-complex-negotiations-to-get-grain-out-of-ukraine, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Crucial negotiations

Negotiations have intensified since the beginning of June, with Turkey acting as mediator between Russia and Ukraine, which together account for around 30 percent of global trade in crops.

The talks are crucial insofar as no other country has come forward so far able to make up for the shortfall on the market of initially 25 million tonnes of Ukraine grain. And prices for agricultural commodities were already high before Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, notably as a result of the post-Covid economic recovery.

The war has sparked a surge in the price of grains such as wheat and corn to levels unsustainable for countries dependent on their import, such as Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia.

In recent weeks, prices have progressively receded again on the prospect of the upcoming harvest, fears of recession and the progress made in the negotiations regarding the sea corridors.

Negotiations have accelerated in recent days: Turkey said an agreement in principle had been reached on creating a protected sea corridor.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said "progress" had been made in discussions before telling reporters that any deal hinged on the West's willingness to yield some ground.

"We will facilitate the export of Ukrainian grain, but we are proceeding from the fact that all restrictions related to possible deliveries for the export of Russian grain will be lifted," he said.

However, market experts say that no sanctions directly target Russian agricultural goods, but are nonetheless penalised by sanctions on the country's banking sector.

- What is Turkey's role? -

"There's only a handful of countries -- Turkey is one, Qatar is another -- that's able to kind of speak to almost everybody and avoid major blowback," said Colin Clarke, director of research at the US-based Soufan Group.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has "proven that he can do it and that's why he's been a trusted broker not only by the Russians, but I think begrudgingly NATO countries -- that's the best that they have," the expert said.

Turkey had "a strong hand to play here", Clarke continued.

"Erdogan gets to play the hero, he gets to tell everybody that he's working to solve the global food crisis, but we know that Turkey is doing a lot to obstruct negotiations in other areas.

"They've got their concerns, and their priorities don't always align with the priorities of the international community, the priorities of NATO, or even the priorities of their allies."

What sort of deal?

As much as 90 percent of Ukrainian exports of wheat, corn and sunflower were transported by sea, mostly from the port of Odessa, which accounts for 60 percent of all port activity in the country.

Any agreement to resume large-scale shipping will have several stages: the de-mining of the ports that Ukrainians mined; the loading of the ships, which could be put under the supervision of the UN; the inspection of the shipments; and the escorting of the boats, as demanded by Russia to ensure that the cargoes do not include weapons, said Edward de Saint-Denis, trader at Plantureux and Associates.

Diplomatic sources say however that complete de-mining is not necessary as safe transit routes remain in the measures meant to protect coastal areas from invasion.

A number of other points remain very controversial: if Moscow manages to control -- and even seize -- boats, will the checks be carried out in Ukrainian or international waters? Which vessels will be authorised to transport the shipments and what will the nationality of their crews be?

"Russians don't want Ukrainians and vice versa," de Saint-Denis said.

At one point, Turkey suggested using its fleet, but a compromise could be reached to use "flags of convenience", according to one market observer.

What are the consequences?

"In the very short term, agreement would bring down prices, but in terms of the flow of grain shipments, nothing would change immediately," said Edward de Saint-Denis.

"One or two months would be needed to de-mine the ports," the expert said.

And the loading areas would have to be renovated, notably in Odessa where part of the port administration was damaged in the fighting, he said.

Despite the various possible obstacles, agricultural market analyst, Gautier Le Molgat said that it was now "in everyone's interests that maritime traffic resumes on the Black Sea: first and foremost for the Ukrainians, but also for the Russians, who have an exceptional harvest to export".

#### Grain deal is possible but depends on continued US and EU cooperation---Turkey is optimistic

AFP 7/21 ("Turkey Says 'Optimistic' Russia Can Agree To Grain Deal", 7-21-2022, Barron’s, https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-says-optimistic-russia-can-agree-to-grain-deal-01658392207?tesla=y, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Turkey's foreign minister said Thursday he was "optimistic" a deal could be reached soon that addressed Russian concerns and allowed Ukrainian grain to flow across the Black Sea.

Mevlut Cavusoglu's comments came less than a day after Russian President Vladimir Putin set an unexpected new condition for resuming the blocked deliveries.

Up to 25 million tonnes of wheat and other grain have been blocked in Ukrainian ports by Russian warships and landmines Kyiv has laid to avert a feared amphibious assault.

The crisis has sent global food prices soaring and pushed millions of people in the world's poorest countries to the edge of starvation.

The first direct talks between the warring sides' military delegations since March -- attended in Istanbul last week by Turkish and UN officials -- came up with an initial draft for resolving the impasse.

The sides were meant to have met again this week for the possible signature of a formal agreement.

But no talks had been confirmed by Thursday and new demands from Moscow put the prospects of an imminent deal in doubt.

"We have hope for grain," Cavusoglu said in a televised interview. "We hope to give good news in the coming days."

Russian President Vladimir Putin said Tuesday that he expected any agreement to also address his own country's blocked grain exports.

The five-month war is being fought across one of Europe's most fertile regions by two of the world's biggest producers of grain.

Almost all of the grain is usually shipped out of the region across the Black Sea.

Cavusoglu acknowledged Putin's concerns.

"When we resolve this issue, not only will the export path for grain and sunflower oil from Ukraine be opened, but also for products from Russia," he said.

"Even if these Russian products are not affected by sanctions, there are blockages concerning maritime transport, insurance and the banking system," he said.

"The United States and the EU have given promises to lift these," he said. "I am optimistic."

NATO member Turkey has enjoyed good working relations with both Moscow and Kyiv throughout the conflict.

#### Negotiations are ‘advanced’ but fragile

**FCN 7/21** ("Grain negotiations ‘advanced’ but fragile: Kuleba", 7/21/2022, First Channel News, https://www.1lurer.am/en/2022/07/20/Grain-negotiations-%E2%80%98advanced%E2%80%99-but-fragile-Kuleba/764117, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Negotiations on the resumption of the export of Ukrainian grain, which was blocked in the ports of the Black Sea by the Russia, have reached an advanced stage, but everything can break at any moment. This was stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmitry Kuleba in broadcast telethon.

Kuleba stressed that the negotiations are very difficult.

“They are being conducted on a very serious vertical: from the UN Secretary General to technical experts sitting and working out the details. There is a clear instruction from the president: all the details must be worked out in such a way as to eliminate any threat to Ukraine from the sea. And all this is very difficult,” the minister explained.

He noted that everything that has already been agreed upon can fail at any moment, and recalled the rule of diplomacy – nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

“Everything can break at any moment, but now we are really at a very advanced stage, and we hope that Russia will behave responsibly and sign under the obligations that are provided for in the draft of this agreement,” the Foreign Minister said.

### 2NC – Link – T/L

#### Every second is critical for negotiations---aggressive actions make Putin less likely to come to an agreement

Telesur 22 (Telesur; "Putin: Delay in Negotiations With Ukraine Poses High Risk", 7-7-2022, TeleSUR, https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Putin-Delay-in-Negotiations-With-Ukraine-Poses-High-Risk-20220707-0029.html, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

"We do not refuse peace negotiations, but those who refuse should know that the more time they waste, the more difficult it will be for them to negotiate with us," Putin said.

The Russian president made such a warning at a meeting with the leaders of the State Duma and the heads of party factions.

As for Russian proposals to establish an equal security system in Europe, Putin said they were turned down, along with initiatives for joint work on the missile defense problem.

Putin added that Russian warnings against NATO expansion have also fallen on deaf ears.

On this occasion, Putin also denounced that the West, led by the United States, has carried out extreme aggression toward Russia for decades.

According to the President, the West is condemned to fail in its attempts to impose a new order in the world.

#### Any military activities trade off with negotiations to resolve the war in Ukraine

Falk 7/11 (Richard Falk, member of the TRANSCEND Network, Albert G. Milbank **Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University**, Chair of Global Law, Faculty of Law, at Queen Mary University London, **Research Associate** the Orfalea Center of Global Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and **Fellow** of the Tellus Institute. He directed the project on Global Climate Change, Human Security, and Democracy at UCSB and formerly served as **director the North American group in the World Order Models Project**. Between 2008 and 2014, Falk served as **UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights** in Occupied Palestine. His memoir, Public Intellectual: The Life of a Citizen Pilgrim was published in March 2021 and received an **award from Global Policy Institute** at Loyala Marymount University as ‘the best book of 2021.’ He has been **nominated frequently for the Nobel Peace Prize** since 2009; "A European Call for an End to the Ukraine War", 7/11/2022, TRANSCEND Media Service, https://www.transcend.org/tms/2022/07/a-european-call-for-an-end-to-the-ukraine-war/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

Europe faces the task of restoring and securing peace on the continent. This requires the development of a strategy to end the Russian war in Ukraine as soon as possible.

Ukraine has been able to defend itself against Russia’s brutal war of aggression for three and a half months now, partially thanks to massive economic sanctions and military support from Europe and the United States. However, the longer this support continues, the less clear it becomes which goals are being pursued with it. A Ukrainian victory with the recapture of all occupied territories, including the Donezk and Luhansk Oblasts and Crimea, is considered unrealistic by most military experts, given Russia’s military superiority and ability to further escalate militarily.

All western countries that provide military support to Ukraine must therefore ask themselves what their precise goal is and whether (and for how long) arms deliveries continue to be the right course of action. Continuing the war with the aim of Ukraine’s complete victory over Russia means that thousands more victims will die for a purpose that does not seem realistic.

Moreover, the consequences of the war are no longer limited to Ukraine. Its continuation is causing massive humanitarian, economic, and environmental distress around the world. Rapidly rising prices, energy and food shortages have already led to unrest in many countries. Fertilizer shortages will have a global impact if the war lasts beyond the fall. High casualty rates, many deaths from hunger and disease and destabilization of the global situation are to be expected. Warnings of these dramatic consequences are also being issued at the international political level (G7, UN).

All western countries must stand united against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and further revanchist claims. However, prolonging the war in Ukraine is not the solution. The current developments surrounding rail transit to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Putin’s announcement to deliver nuclear-capable missile systems to Belarus, show that the danger of escalation is increasing. The western countries must do anything they can to ensure that the war parties reach a negotiated settlement as soon as possible. This alone can prevent years of a war of attrition with its fatal local and global consequences, as well as a military escalation that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

Negotiations does not mean a surrender of Ukraine, as is sometimes assumed. A dictated peace by Putin is not an option. The international community must do everything it can to create conditions under which negotiations are possible at all. This includes a declaration that the Western actors have no interest in continuing the war and will adjust their strategies accordingly. It also entails a willingness to secure the terms of a truce as well as the results of peace negotiations internationally, which may require a high level of commitment. The longer the war continues, the more international pressure will be necessary to get both sides back into negotiations. The West must make every effort to persuade the governments of Russia and Ukraine to suspend combat actions. Economic sanctions and military support have to be integrated into a political strategy aimed at gradual de-escalation until a ceasefire is fully implemented.

So far, there has not been a joint and concentrated effort by the international community, the major Western players in particular, to seek negotiations. As long as this is not the case, it cannot be assumed that an understanding is impossible and that Putin in particular does not want to negotiate. In a deadlocked conflict, it is a standard practice that war parties have maximum demands or explicitly reject peace talks. The course of the negotiation attempts so far has shown some initial willingness on both sides to come to an understanding by a flexible approach to the attainment of their goals. At this point, only a major diplomatic offensive can lead out of the current impasse.

The opening of negotiations is not a justification for war crimes. We share the desire for justice. Negotiations, however, are first and foremost a necessary means to prevent further suffering in Ukraine and adverse consequences of the war around the world. Considering the threat of humanitarian catastrophes and the manifest risks of escalation, stability must be restored as quickly as possible. Only a suspension of combat actions will create the time and opportunity necessary to do this. The supreme importance of this goal demands that we rise to the challenge and do everything in our power to make an early ceasefire and the start of peace negotiations possible – and refrain from doing anything that contradicts this goal.

#### All-out diplomacy is critical to solve the Ukraine war---otherwise, Russia will fight to the bitter end, prolonging the war as long as possible---plus, military engagement draws-in China

Harris 7/14 (Scott Harris; \*interview with Melvin Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and former CIA and State Department analyst\*; "The Urgency of Pursuing Diplomacy to End the Ukraine War", 7-14-2022, BTL, https://btlonline.org/the-urgency-of-pursuing-diplomacy-to-end-the-ukraine-war/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

So your recent article lays out some of concerns that you have regarding the current situation in Ukraine affecting you know issues across the globe. And I was just reading a dispatch from the G20 meeting in Indonesia and I'll just quote from it. Briefly G20 foreign ministers called for an end to the war in Ukraine and grain blockade on Friday as Russia's top diplomat. Walked out of a meeting and denounced the West for frenzied criticism and squandering a chance to tackle global economic problems. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its impact on food security and energy dominated the meetings at the G20 summit on the island of Bali in Indonesia. And the meeting ended with no joint statement and no announcements of any agreements being reached. Anyway, it looks like not much progress was reached there and not a good sign for ending the war in Ukraine. That there is really not even any discussion between. The US and Russia at this point about where this conflict may head. Now, maybe you can summarize your concerns about where the war in Ukraine may be headed and the different direction you'd like to see U.S. policy at least attempt to find a diplomatic solution here. Yeah yeah I have a lot of concerns. Or in day I don't know about 138. There's a certain sameness about these days. The Russians continue to make incremental advances. Very small advances but extremely costly for Ukraine for its people, for its infrastructure, for its it's villages, it's towns. The Russians are busy fast tracking citizenship to Ukrainians living in eastern Ukraine, and the Donuts, and they show no sign of backing down. And at the same time, Zelensky still feels he's winning and can win the war and you have too many American officials who are at least agreeing with that publicly. I don't know what they genuinely believe. I can't believe they think that. Ukraine can actually win this war and take back significant amounts of territory as well. So the nuclear background is something that's always concerned me because the Soviets fought a war or losing war in Afghanistan and never raised the issue of nuclear weapons. We fought losing wars in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the idea of nuclear weapons never came up. Putin raises it as a threat from time to time. We seem to believe he wouldn't do it, but who knows what Putin will do when his back is against the wall? Given the fact that he's already conducted the war with such? Brutality and senselessness that it's hard to say what he'll do and unlike Khrushchev, who had to face a. A politbureau in the wake of the disastrous decision to put missiles in Cuba. Putin faces no possible counter, let alone opposition, and no one who's probably arguing a different point of view. And and when you mentioned the G20 meeting, I I just think it's wrong for Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, who doesn't really impress me. In fact, you wonder where has the State Department been during the Biden administration? What is the role of diplomacy? Or are we still active in the diplomatic arena? Uh, he went out of his way to make it clear that he had nothing to say to Lavrov and there was no. Point in meeting with him, you know, Lavrov is the foreign minister. But he he's not a power center in the in the Moscow Arena. But he is a voice that probably could reach Putin on some level, and the lines of communication I think need to be kept open. Uh, I know the Pentagon has gone out of its way to keep lines open to their Russian counterparts in the defence ministry. And there have been a couple talks, not many, and I think they're they're probably inadequate, but we have deconfliction zones in Syria between Russian and American forces. Uh, I think we have to talk about confidence building between Russians and Americans. In Ukraine, because as far as Putin is concerned, I think he believes now he's fighting not only Ukraine, he's fighting the West and he's fighting the United States. That's why I refer to what we're doing as a special military operation. This is what Putin calls his war in Ukraine. A special military operation, and he does that to downplay the notion that there's going to be any need for a draft or mass mobilization or extensive measures to get more citizens involved in this war he's trying. To have it both ways, guns and butter the same thing that Lyndon Johnson thought he could do in Vietnam, which. Became a failure and we're just continuing to send more arms, more sophisticated arms, and now the high mobility artillery rocket system. These himars we're going to send four more. They have a range of 40 to 50 miles and it will be possible for Ukraine to hit targets. Inside of Russia and there have been a couple targets hit inside of Russia. Russia has not called any attention to that. Because I don't think they've decided what they're going to do about it, it does raise the stakes and how this war is going to. Be thought but. I think back to really the 2nd 30 years war, which is how I define World War One and World War Two. Because when you think about it from 1914 to 1945 with this brief. Interruption in the 20s. There was a world. War going on. How long is this Ukraine war going to last? What are the implications now? You mentioned food. We could add energy to that list because. 'cause I'm seeing signs of war fatigue in Europe, and I certainly think we're going to see more signs in the coming winter as gas and oil deliveries get interrupted and the Germany German economy. Has some real problems with not fulfilling its energy needs, so there's more unwinding that can take place. None of it is good. None of this. Healthy and at the same time we're doing this, we're going out of our way to antagonize both Russia and China. And now the Pentagon and their military appropriations that they send up to the hill are talking about the need to fund A2 front war. But do they really believe they can take on Russia and China at the same time? I played war games when I was at CIA and the National War College that involved Taiwan. And we didn't win one of them. China always was the winner in a war game that involved Taiwan, and at some point we're going to have to discuss. Are we really going to defend Taiwan militarily? UH, is Taiwan part of our national security posture? Do we need to defend Taiwan? But if so, I think the best way to defend Taiwan is to improve our relationship with China to make sure China sees some good coming out of a bilateral relationship with the United States right now. Beijing must think Jinping must think he has nothing to lose in worsening relations with the United States because Biden has really followed Trump policy with regard to China. You know the tariffs are still in place, even though it would relieve some inflationary pressure if he drops some of them. Uh, so the the entire international picture, the international arena. I think is really fraught when you think of the consequences of a war that could easily get out of hand, and then when you think that we've taken this opportunity to expand NATO to bring into Scandinavian countries, Finland and Sweden, which will double the length of the. Border between NATO states. And Russia then it allows Putin to make the case that he needs Ukraine as a buffer zone because he can tell his own people. And I think there are already signs that he has told his people and. They don't need real. Convincing that it was that buffer zone that saved them against Napoleon in the 19th century. And certainly save them against Hitler in the 20th century. So So what we've done with our actions is given Putin a. A car. Was to fight this war that. Will be attractive to the Russian people. And the one thing I learned in. Terms of dealing with Russians over the years both at CIA and at the National War College. If there's one area of superiority that the Russians contend, it's they feel they can make greater sacrifices than other people. They don't believe themselves to be materialistic the way we are or the European states are. They can deal with setbacks. They can deal with failures. They certainly did it in World War Two and. Over 25 million Russians died. In a war. Which was overwhelmingly fought on the Eastern Front. When you think of where most of the German army. Uh was located and where most of the German fatalities and casualties took place, so I don't. I don't think time is on our side I, I think Putin can play a long game. He's indicated that he can, and he seems to believe this, and I guess I take him at his word and and we don't have. Any new way of looking at the problem? Whenever there's an issue that needs to be addressed, what we do is send up another military appropriations to the hill. The last one was for $8 billion more. Actually, $400 million in this increment to raise the total value of our arms transfers just in recent months to $8 billion over $50 billion. Overall. When you think of military aid and economic aid and infrastructure aid, so it's a it's a very. We're speaking with Mel Goodman this evening on counterpoint. Mel is a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and a former CIA analyst, and we're talking about his recent article on Counterpunch that you can read yourself, titled Moscow's War in Ukraine versus Washington special military operation. There has been some concern expressed about how the Biden administration is fighting this war in Ukraine and what its goal. Those are and. We had Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin say a couple of months ago. That the Biden. Administration's goal was to number 1 degrade Russian military capacity and their economy. If that's still in play now, what's the danger of that goal? If if that indeed is where? If that is indeed what the priority is of this administration, when it comes to the conflict in Ukraine. Well, I still think there are a lot of people in the administration who believe that, and if they had their druthers would say it. But Austin was called on the carpet for saying it. Apparently he did get a personal phone call from President Biden saying that that was. A totally gratuitous statement that you made. Don't make it again, and Austin hasn't. But I know from my contacts with general officers over the years and I, 18 years of the war college. There there are a lot of high-ranking officers who grow up from their training from their experience from their exposure internationally. Thinking that Russia must be denied any military capability to conduct this kind of military operation. So I think what Austin was saying was sort of conventional wisdom. Within the military, don't allow Russia to come out of this war with the ability to. Fight another war in any area. In other words, Russia would not even be in a position to defend itself, and Russia is a country that is surrounded by adversarial interests. This is this is part of of Russian self belief about their own history. In their own national security situation, they envy our geostrategic. A superiority over them surrounded by oceans east and West and friendly neighbors North and South. They don't have that. They have a sensitive military border on the southern front and they refer to that as their sensitive border because they go back in history that Genghis Khan and various. Muslim and insurgencies on the border that created problems for Soviet and Russian interests and then when you think of the Caucasus, the fighting that takes place in the caucuses where actually Russia had to become a peacemaker between Armenia and Azerbaijan and it got very little credit for that several months ago. And then when you think of East Europe and the Warsaw Pact, the Warsaw Pact, I think, was not so much a way of opposing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was a way of putting troops into Eastern Europe to ensure the loyalty of East Europeans who, with the exception of Bulgarians, detested Russia. And now Putin has made himself such a pariah, that even the Bulgarians have joined with their other East European neighbors, in being opposed to Russian interests. So to me we're playing right into. Russia beliefs about itself and the threat to national security that the United States represents by expanding NATO by creating a military headquarters, meaning permanent forces now will be in Poland by increasing the number of naval combatants in Rota, Spain. By increasing the squadrons of F. 35's in England. I mentioned Sweden and Finland coming into NATO. Onshore Russia was counting on Erdogan, Turkish President Erdogan to put up more of a fight to keep the Scandinavian countries out because of the Kurdish issue. But actually Biden handled that very well and heard on caved in very quickly. In fact, Putin in terms of his assumptions about the the West, the West is generally hung together. K now. More tightly and for a longer period of time than I think he anticipated. Well, we've run out of time now. Thank you so much for the work you do in analyzing current crises and for joining us tonight. And people can find your articles at counterpunch.org. Is that right? With that counter comment counterpunch.org on the national security columnist there and I tend to write once a week. Thank you ma'am.

#### US-NATO-Russia relations are zero-sum because of a lack of trust---win-wins are impossible

* Ukraine invasion is more uniqueness for the loss of trust

NATO 15 ("Zero-Sum? Russia, Power Politics, and the post-Cold War Era,” 3/20/2015, NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\_118347.htm, DOA: 7-8-2022)//sposten

JENS STOLTENBERG: We have suspended all practical cooperation with Russia as a result of what we saw in Ukraine last spring. We continue to have open channels for political contact, but let me just address in a way the fundamental question you asked in the beginning, whether this is a zero-sum or a win-win situation? I can recall when I was a student, and also later when I worked in the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics and I worked on economic theory and game theory, and there we learned about cooperative games and win-win situations, and non-cooperative games and zero-sum outfalls or outcomes. The main message then was that it all depends on the rules. If you have the right rules and you have a minimum trust, then you are able to move from a zero-sum situation to a win-win.

The problem now is that we don't have the rules, or actually we have the rules, but they are not respected. Therefore we don’t have the trust and that's the reason why we are moving from a win-win situation toward something which is more and more like a zero-sum, a game, and we cannot go back again to the win-win situation without enforcing respect for rules. Because that's a pre-condition for trust, and trust and respect for rules is a pre-condition for win-win. This actually undermines both arms control, it undermines economic cooperation, trade, and it undermines security in Europe. So when NATO is so focussed on the respect for basic rules, like respecting the border of your neighbour – it's not a very advanced, it's not, how to say, difficult rule, it's to see the border and to respect it. Then we focus on that because that's so fundamental for the idea of coming back to a situation where we can have a win-win situation over a zero-sum situation.

DAVID IGNATIUS: Victoria, let me ask you for a final comment here and then I'm going to actually take the first question from the audience for you as well, so thoughts that you have on either the, to me, very worrisome unravelling of arms control, in particular in the INF dimension and then we'll turn to the audience.

VICTORIA NULAND: I agree with Jens that you can't have win-wins without trust. We all want win-wins, that's what we've devoted our professional lives to, that's what we need for our populations, but without trust you can't do it and you're not going to have trust if you don’t have truth. So when you have a country denying that it has troops in another country's territory, there's no trust. When you have a country denying that it is testing a new missile that may not be compliant with INF, it's hard to have trust. Our president has wanted to do not lest arms control, but more arms control. He has wanted to cut strategic weapons further. I was sent out to Europe as his negotiator to try to do a daughter of CFE, to do a brand new conventional treaty. We couldn’t get it done because Russia refused to talk about its forces that were stationed in Georgia, Moldova against the will of those governments. So we would love to do more, but it requires trust, truth, addressing the situation as it is.

## 2NC Impact Toolbox

### 2NC – Ext Famine Impact

#### Ukraine food imports key to sustainable development in Africa

Eziakonwa 22 (Ahunna Eziakonwa, Director, UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa and UN Assistant Secretary General; "Averting an African food crisis caused by the war in Ukraine", 5-16-2022, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/05/averting-an-african-food-crisis-in-the-wake-of-the-ukraine-war/>, World Economic Forum, DOA: 7-19-2022)//sposten

In Nigeria in the late 1960s, one million people died of starvation during the Biafran war. A decade and a half later, food shortages and hunger in Ethiopia triggered by a natural disaster cost the lives of 1 million Africans.

Today, a fresh disaster — the war in Ukraine — threatens to plunge the continent into yet another episode of famine and deprivation.

Fourteen African countries depend on Russia and Ukraine for more than half of their wheat imports, while almost half the continent depends on imports for more than a third of their wheat. Apart from the looming supply constraints, this crisis has already pushed food grain prices up by more than 25% in a matter of weeks. Some countries are bracing for supply shortfalls.

Millions in danger

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and its devastating socio-economic impact across Africa, the crisis in Ukraine threatens to place an inordinate burden on African households — many of which were already struggling to put food on the table. Wandile Sihlobo, Chief Economist at the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa, anticipates critical short-term supply and pricing effects — a food crisis — unless the conflict is resolved expeditiously.

Higher food prices mean that fewer African households will be able to afford a single decent daily meal. Malnourishment will rise. Africa’s food-insecure households will be left much further behind. Their consumption rates will fall, savings will be depleted, debt will increase, and assets will be liquidated.

In short, in a food crisis, millions will be in danger of malnutrition and deepened poverty.

Some African countries, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa, have domestic price controls and export restrictions in place. Benin has instituted an export ban. Others — such as Malawi, Zambia, and Uganda — offer cash subsidies to vulnerable groups. But with the sharp rise in fuel and energy prices, another consequence of the situation in Ukraine, very few African countries will have the fiscal space to sustain such policies, even if they wished to pursue them.

Food crisis and human security

Food insecurity in Africa is not just a socioeconomic issue. It is also a matter of human security.

Rather than wars and insurgencies, riots and protests now account for over half of violent events in Africa, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED). Recent violent protests sparked by domestic price increases in Sierra Leone illustrate how inflationary pressures can easily foment instability. Recall, too, how the Arab revolts in the early 2010s sparked protests across North Africa.

High food prices typically hit the most vulnerable households hardest, making them “multidimensionally poor,” meaning they lack not just income but also access to electricity, cooking fuel, and basic social services. Shrinking budgets will cause households to dispose of their assets, eroding their ability to cushion themselves against future shocks. These indirect effects of the food crisis will constrain economic activity, widen inequalities, and could trigger social tensions and unrest.

The impacts of the war in Ukraine on food security in Africa raise three pertinent questions: Why is the continent with 60% of the world’s arable land unable to feed itself? Why is it difficult for African regions with food surpluses to supply those with deficits? And how did Africa go from a relatively self-sufficient food producer in the 1970s to an overly dependent food importer by 2022?

Answering these questions will help chart a way forward to sustained and sustainable food security across the continent.

That food insecurity and food crisis have dire socio-economic and security implications for Africa’s people, households, businesses, and governments are clear — and these could have profound regional and global consequences.

Now is not the time for a retreat of development efforts in Africa or a diversion of resources from the continent. Strategic investments in development and food security at this critical juncture will lay the foundation for sustainability and self-sufficiency.

Preserving multilateralism for development

If Africa is to withstand this global shock, the international community’s immediate efforts should include enhanced bilateral assistance, innovative multilateral initiatives including a swift re-channeling of IMF Special Drawing Rights, and support for domestic resource mobilization.

The war in Ukraine cannot be allowed to weaken multilateralism, and development assistance must not become a policy tool.

Consistent support from development partners is needed to put African countries back on track towards shared global development aspirations. Declining multilateralism would unravel decades of significant development progress and roll back gains made in fighting COVID-19 globally. This is why the development community must redouble its efforts to provide adequate and timely support across the continent.

An upcoming opportunity is the 8th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD8) scheduled for August this year, where African leaders and their counterparts from Japan will come together to strengthen partnerships and cooperation, with Africa in the driver’s seat. For nearly 30 years, the TICAD platform has recognized that for Africa to achieve sustainable development, the continent has to find homegrown solutions to its challenges.

Among the cornerstones of Africa-Japan relations is an emphasis on supporting African countries in their efforts to reduce their dependency on food imports and thus avert a future food crisis. Furthermore, Japan-funded projects acknowledge that further investment in technology and the promotion of innovative approaches to entrepreneurship will position Africa’s youth to help spur an African food production revolution.

A starting point should be establishing policy frameworks and a regulatory environment that promote agriculture and remove the perennial credit, land tenure, market, and technology barriers that have beleaguered food production and marketing for decades. Opportunities presented by the African Continental Free Trade Area arrangement must also be seized, to scale up production and benefit from expanded regional markets.

African countries should, once again, be regional bread baskets and powerhouses of sustainable and self-sufficient economic development.

#### Otherwise, poverty in Africa spurs deforestation

Erickson-Davis 22 (Morgan Erickson-Davis, Senior Editor, Mongabay; "What is the link between rising deforestation and poverty in Nigeria," World Economic Forum, 3-31-2022, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/03/deforestation-on-the-rise-as-poverty-soars-in-nigeria/, DOA: 7-19-2022)//sposten

Established in 1936 and situated just 200 kilometers (125 miles) from the sprawling megacity of Lagos, Akure-Ofosu Forest Reserve has long been a sanctuary for Nigeria’s diverse and dwindling wildlife. Species such as red-capped mangabeys (Cercocebus torquatus), putty-nosed monkeys (Cercopithecus nictitans) and perhaps even endangered Nigeria-Cameroon chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes ellioti), roam its woodlands. Together with neighboring Owo, Ohosu and Idanre forest reserves, Akure-Ofosu protects one of the largest remaining tracts of forest in the country.

Or rather, it used to. Between 2002 and 2020 Akure-Ofosu lost 44% of its primary forest, according to satellite data from the University of Maryland (UMD) visualized on Global Forest Watch. Preliminary data from UMD indicate forest loss continued at a quick pace in 2021, and has only increased so far in 2022.

Satellite data from the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) suggest fire may have been the driving force behind much of Akure-Ofosu’s most recent spate of forest loss. NASA data show a spike in fire activity in the reserve in late January that burned around 5,000 hectares of land – higher than in years past, according to analysis from Global Forest Watch.

Previous reporting by Mongabay contributor Orji Sunday revealed fire and associated deforestation in Akure-Ofosu was being driven by logging and farming, which, in turn, is driven by the country’s high rates of poverty.

“The cocoa farms in the reserves are growing,” local farmer Omotunde Kayode told Mongabay in 2020. “There are no jobs in the cities. So many graduates, tired of the job hunts are taking over the reserves — the forest has many graduates.”

Nigeria’s population has exploded in the last century, from 36.7 million in 1950 to 158.3 million in 2010, according to data from the United Nations. But sources said job creation has not kept pace, forcing people to choose between forests and their families.

“Forest conservation can never flourish in poverty,” primatologist and professor Babafemi Ogunjemite told Mongabay in 2020. “The margin of the poverty level is so high that anyone can sacrifice anything for food — including the forest.”

Ogunjemite, a professor at the Federal University of Technology in Akure, Nigeria, studies Nigeria-Cameroon chimpanzees. He said that he believes there may still be chimpanzees in Akure-Ofosu, but that there likely won’t be for much longer if deforestation continues as it has.

Ogunjemite said that in addition to habitat loss, poaching is also a huge threat to Akure-Ofosu’s chimpanzees and other wildlife.

“The situation of the animals in the reserve is critical,” Ogunjemite told Mongabay.

Enforcement of forest protection has reportedly gone by the wayside, with sources claiming government complicity in Akure-Ofosu’s deforestation. Kayode said “de-reservation” began decades ago when authorities started letting farmers stake claim to portions of the reserve.

“I felt the government [lose] hope of taking control of the reserve from farmers at some point,” a government official told Mongabay in 2020 on the condition of anonymity. “So they decided to formalize and monetize reserve lands.”

The official said farmers who moved into the reserve illegally are allowed to keep their plots if they pay an annual fee of 10,000 naira ($26) per plot.

“The government calls us temporary occupants,” Kayode said, “and we [have] all the freedom to use the reserves so long as the fees are renewed when due.”

The poverty rate in Nigeria, already high, only appears to be rising. According to a 2022 report from the World Bank, 4 in 10 Nigerians – about 80 million people – were living in poverty in 2019, with the COVID-19 pandemic pushing another 5 million people below the poverty line by 2022.

Balancing the needs of people with protection of the environment is a challenging and widespread issue, said conservation biologist Elizabeth Greengrass.

“In many of these forest reserves, there are very few things people (surrounding communities) can do to survive except hunt, farm or log the protected forests,” Greengrass told Mongabay in 2020. “So many communities in Nigeria are heavily dependent on the forest. It is creating serious problems for conservation not just in Nigeria but most parts of Africa.”

But Greengrass said livelihoods and conservation don’t have to be contradictory, saying it’s possible for rural economic development and conservation goals to go hand-in-hand to “create jobs and absorb those whose livelihoods had always come from the forest.”

#### Africa’s forests are the “lungs of the world”---best internal link to climate change

Fleshman 08 (Michael Fleshman; "Saving Africa’s forests, the ‘lungs of the world’", January 2008, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2008/saving-africa%E2%80%99s-forests-%E2%80%98lungs-world%E2%80%99, DOA: 7-19-2022)//sposten

It is difficult to imagine that such vast ancient woodlands are at risk of extinction. But they are disappearing at an alarming rate. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), indigenous (also known as “old-growth”) forests in Africa are being cut down at a rate of more than 4 mn hectares per year — twice the world’s deforestation average. According to the FAO, losses totalled more than 10 per cent of the continent’s total forest cover between 1980 and 1995 alone.

Saving Africa’s forests from the chainsaw and axe of encroaching humanity is essential to the health and productivity of much of the continent’s economy, experts point out. They cite the forests’ roles as watersheds, defences against soil erosion and regulators of local weather conditions.

Trees trap ‘greenhouse gases’

But the fate of the forests could also spell the difference between success and failure in the race against global warming. Trees, the dominant inhabitants of the diverse and complex ecological systems called forests, are among the world’s largest and most efficient living storehouses of carbon monoxide, the “greenhouse gas” most responsible for the earth’s temperature rise and changes in the planet’s climate (see Africa Renewal July 2007).

Through a chemical process known as photosynthesis, trees and many other plants absorb carbon from the air and combine it with sunlight to generate the energy they need for life. Trees convert the carbon gas into solid form, store it in their trunks, branches and leaves, and release oxygen back into the atmosphere. Because they take carbon from the atmosphere and produce oxygen, forests are often referred to as “the lungs of the world.” Carbon dioxide is generated primarily by the burning of oil, coal, natural gas and other “fossil” fuels for industry, power generation and transportation.

Preserving Africa’s surviving tropical forests and planting new trees to replace those lost to deforestation could help reduce the severity of climate change by absorbing more carbon from the air, and ease the local impact of climate change by regulating local weather conditions.

But an even greater argument for protecting the forests is the role of deforestation in causing global warming. According to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), between 20 and 25 per cent of all annual carbon dioxide emissions are caused by the practice of burning forests to clear the land for farming — more than is caused by the entire world transportation sector. Burning trees and brush releases the stored carbon back into the atmosphere.

Poor forest management policies — including unrestricted logging, excessive harvesting of firewood and medicinal plants, and road construction — contribute to the problem, as do drought, flooding, forest fires and other natural disasters. The collection of wood for heating and cooking and for making charcoal is a particular problem in Africa, since wood supplies about 70 per cent of domestic energy needs, a significantly higher percentage than in the rest of the world.

Estimates of the total amount of carbon stored in the forests vary greatly. One estimate, based on research by the UN-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), put the total at about 1,000 bn tonnes, or about 166 years’ worth of current global carbon emissions. Africa contains about 15 per cent of the world’s remaining forests and is second only to South America in the amount of the dense tropical forests that are the most effective in removing carbon from the atmosphere. The vast forests of the DRC alone are estimated to contain as much as 8 per cent of all the carbon stored in the earth’s vegetation.

The conversion of forest land to agriculture, both subsistence and commercial, is by far the most common and most destructive cause of deforestation in Africa and other tropical regions. As demand for farmland grows in response to population pressures, millions of hectares of tropical forests are being put to the torch in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

“It is generally accepted,” the FAO noted in a 2000 report on sustainable forestry in Africa, “that the key to arresting deforestation and to implementing sustainable forest development lies in improved technologies for food production.”

Improving the productivity of African agriculture is a top priority for African governments and features prominently in the continent’s development agenda, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). But transforming the poorly financed and long-neglected agricultural sector is a costly, difficult and long-term goal (see Africa Renewal July 2006). Reform therefore appears unlikely to progress quickly enough to prevent further severe losses to the continent’s woodlands.

In the meantime, improving governments’ ability to manage their forest resources, expanding reforestation programmes and changing public perceptions and economic calculations about the value of existing forests could be the key to the survival of Africa’s deep woods.

Forests and people

The challenges are formidable. Humanity has long appreciated forests for the energy, food and medicine they provide, and as a source of wood products for construction and other purposes. But the role of forests in supporting agriculture, preserving biodiversity, protecting water supplies and moderating the impact of climate change are less well understood. The UN estimated that in 2000 some 1.6 billion people around the world, including many of the world’s poorest, derived at least part of their food, income or medical needs directly from the forest. Of those, some 70 million indigenous people depend on the forests for much of their livelihoods.

Africa’s rural poor are particularly dependent on its forests. Although forest products, primarily unfinished logs, account for only about 2 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s exports, forests generate an average of 6 per cent of the region’s gross domestic product — triple the world average. Eighteen African countries, including Cameroon and Ghana, are among the 24 countries worldwide that rely on forests for 10 per cent or more of their economies.

Although environmentalists and advocacy groups have brought international attention to unsustainable, and often illegal, logging in Central and West Africa, about half of all the wood extracted from Africa’s forests is used domestically as fuel. Despite the enormous losses to deforestation, the region is a net importer of processed wood products.

The perception of indigenous forests as a reservoir of unused land and a safety net for bad times is understandable, UNEP forestry expert Christian Lambrechts told Africa Renewal. “People have to rely on the forest to gain access to specific products they can’t buy on the market,” he says. “They have no cash. They can’t go to the chemist. They have to go to the forest to extract medicinal plants.”

Such “subsistence” exploitation of the forests is inevitable in areas of high poverty and causes no damage when done sustainably, Mr. Lambrechts notes. But when large numbers of people are forced to use forests for food and fuel, “it has a local impact on the degradation of the forests.”

### 2NC – Automobiles Impact

#### War disrupts automobile sector supply chains

Adams 7/15 (Mubarak Adams, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana; “THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINE WAR THREATENS GLOBAL PEACE: AN EXAMINATION,” Research Gate, 7/15/2022)//sposten

Russian-Ukraine war: Impact on the Automobile sector According to Ruta (20220), disruptions in global and regional supply chains have resulted in input shortages and price increases. Ukraine is a major provider of inputs such as car ignition wires, neon gas for semiconductors, and iron ore for steel mills. Companies that manufacture transportation equipment, machinery, electronics, and food goods rely heavily on Russian metals, chemicals, fertilizers, and other commodities. According to the World Trade Organization (2022), Russia is one of the world's leading exporters of palladium and rhodium, which are critical inputs in the production of catalytic converters in the automobile industry and semiconductor manufacturing. Semiconductor manufacturing is also influenced by several factors.

#### Key to smooth AV transition

Caporal et. Al 21 (Jack Caporal, Former Fellow, Scholl Chair in International Business; William O’Neil, Intern, Scholl Chair in International Business; Sean Arrieta-Kenna, Intern, Scholl Chair in International Business; "Bridging the Divide: Autonomous Vehicles and the Automobile Industry", 4-14-2021, No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/bridging-divide-autonomous-vehicles-and-automobile-industry, DOA: 7-19-2022)//sposten

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AUTO MANUFACTURING CLUSTERS: BATTERIES, CHIPS, AND FACTORY UPGRADES

Motor vehicle production in the United States has created clusters of economic activity. Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) assembly plants and those that make core parts attract and support suppliers—from tier one suppliers that produce significant components like suspensions and chassis to tier two and tier three suppliers that produce less complex components. Local universities can play a pivotal role as talent pipelines, innovation centers, and testing locations for AV research and development of smart vehicles. Key examples of this include the Ohio State University's Center for Automotive Research and the University of Michigan's Mcity, which each collaborates with industry partners in Detroit and Columbus to target resources toward the exploration and testing of advanced automotive technologies and the cultivation of a highly skilled and engaged future workforce. These clusters have generated three benefits: intra-industry benefits like access to specialized workers and a pool of supporting goods and services; inter-industry spillovers stemming from the spread of knowledge across industries; and spinoffs, or new firms created by former employees from the industry.

Automakers expect that within five years, electric vehicles will cost the same amount to produce as internal combustion vehicles. Industry trends suggest that the vast majority of level four and five autonomous vehicles will be battery-powered electric vehicles.1 Given the right regulatory environment, electrified AVs would likely quickly achieve scale. Widespread adoption of EVs is generally considered a natural step toward widespread AV deployment. The EV architecture provides the power, voltage, and energy storage required by AVs that internal combustion engine vehicles cannot. Estimates of the power requirements for AVs vary widely—from 200 watts to over 2,000 watts—based on variables like chip design, algorithm efficiency, and types and volume of sensors used. There is concern that the amount of power required for autonomous functions would reduce vehicle range. However, models suggest that power demand from autonomous functions can be mitigated and eventually offset by designing more aerodynamic vehicles, lighter vehicles, and improving route efficiency via automation.

Utilities will need to invest in improving grid capacity and the ability to meet higher energy demand to serve electric vehicles and ultimately AVs. Required investments to manage the EV transition will vary by region. In some states, overall capacity is less of a concern compared to the ability to meet rapid demand spikes—for instance, in the evening when commuters return home from work and charge their vehicles. Charging during off-peak hours for electricity use would ease the transition. Utilities could also incentivize customers to charge at certain hours or locations to smooth demand spikes. Further, energy demand in the United States has hardly grown over the past 10 years while capacity has grown by roughly 12 gigawatts (about 1 percent of the 1,100 gigawatts of total installed generation capacity in the United States in 2020) a year, roughly enough capacity to service six million new EVs, according to the Department of Energy. The EV transition will occur over decades, not years. This suggests that the current pace of energy production expansion is sufficient to meet demand required by the transition to EVs and ultimately AVs.

The impending shift to EVs and AVs has generated two primary concerns with regard to the U.S. workforce. First, EVs, being less mechanically complex than internal combustion vehicles and composed of more modular parts, will require less labor and fewer workers to build, and core components will be imported. The long-term trajectory of automotive production clusters in the Midwest and Southeast is only starting to take shape amid the accelerating transition to EVs and AVs. Second, there is a risk that the technology required for large scale deployment of EVs and AVs will be manufactured outside the United States. Shortages of semiconductors owed to chokepoints in global supply chains slowed automobile production in early 2021. China now has the edge in lithium-ion battery manufacturing and maintains dominant positions throughout the supply chain, from raw material refining to component manufacturing.

However, the right policy environment and effective use of existing advantages and relationships within the U.S. automotive industry should, in turn, create an opportunity for a manufacturing renaissance in the United States that brings with it new jobs in the industry. Further, the transition to AVs composing the majority of the U.S. automotive fleet will take decades, particularly for level five autonomous vehicles. This gradual transition will smooth disruptions to the workforce and provide time for the labor pipeline to adjust to the new automotive supply chain.

Investment in domestic capacity to produce EVs, and eventually AVs, appears poised for a breakout, and early signs suggest that automakers will improve existing facilities to produce EVs and AVs, keeping the anchors of automotive production clusters in place. The United States is home to some of the top global early-stage battery research and research into the technology that underlies autonomous vehicles. However, the United States does not offer the same level of support to those industries as offered by other countries, such as China and, to a lesser extent, the European Union.

That is likely to change. The Biden administration has made clear it intends to use an array of government levers to juice battery production in the United States and catalyze major manufacturing revitalization. Political pressure is growing to employ measures that will encourage domestic production of semiconductors. Government policy will also likely encourage U.S. manufacturing and the use of U.S. labor in developing and producing EVs and AVs. While the current regulatory environment for AVs does not provide a path to large-scale manufacturing and deployment, the Trump administration laid the groundwork for AV development and manufacturing to create U.S. jobs. The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement requires that 75 percent of a passenger vehicle’s value originate in North America for it to receive duty-free treatment, and that 75 percent of “core parts,” including advanced batteries, originate in North America.

The Biden administration is poised to take further steps to ensure key EV, and by extension AV, parts are made in the United States. The president’s executive order will undertake a review of supply chains in key industries and focus on advanced batteries, semiconductors, and rare earth minerals, all building blocks of electric and autonomous vehicles. Additionally, Biden lorplans to replace the government’s 600,000 vehicle fleet with EVs, generating significant predictable demand over the coming years. In 2019, the government owned less than 3,000 EVs.

If adopted, a combination of government incentives and regulatory changes to encourage EV and AV adoption—including through investments in underlying technologies and infrastructure such as critical minerals, semiconductors, and other next generation technology—is estimated to create over 220,000 U.S. jobs and support another 425,000 over one to five years, according to a study from Keybridge Public Policy Economics. The study assumes four sets of incentives are provided for the manufacturing and purchase of EVs along with the buildout of charging infrastructure; three programs to support the creation of critical mineral supply chains outside of China’s control; a domestic semiconductor and telecommunications manufacturing package; and the modernization of federal regulations to support AV adoption.

While powertrain simplicity in EVs may result in fewer labor requirements for production, production will drive new employment opportunities in advanced manufacturing, including battery assembly, electric motors, advanced driving systems, and semiconductors. To that end, automakers have already announced billions of dollars’ worth of upgrades to existing manufacturing facilities, and parts suppliers estimate thousands of dollars’ worth of new opportunities around electrification and automation.

To maintain and improve the workforce, pipeline automakers, other industry actors, government stakeholders, and education and training institutions continue to cooperate on curriculum development, internship and apprenticeship opportunities, and other paths to reskilling and upskilling. New components and systems, including advanced driver assist systems below full level five automation, will require upskilling workers throughout the supply chain—from engineering and design to software development to those on the factory floor and in repair shops.

EVs and AVs will require infrastructure investment to meet their full potential. A massive buildout of charging stations and upgrades to the electrical grid will be necessary as EV sales continue to grow, creating thousands of jobs. Finally, cities and states will invest in smart infrastructure to improve vehicle connectivity, which will not only create jobs but create long-term economic and environmental benefits as a result of reduced congestion, travel time, and more efficient movement of goods and people. These factors will encourage industry to continue to tap into U.S. manufacturing and the U.S. workforce as the EV and AV transitions unfold.

#### AVs key to a new wave of creative jobs

Jajal 18 (Tannya D. Jajal; "Trusting Autonomous Vehicles: The Tech Behind The Hype", 5-27-2018, Medium, https://tjajal.medium.com/on-trusting-autonomous-vehicles-the-tech-behind-the-hype-c06b8aae8822, DOA: 7-19-2022)//sposten

Societal Benefits of AVs

When we consider a future in which every car on the road is connected and driving is fully automated via the cloud, it’s easy to jump to the dystopian conclusion that driverless cars will put close to 5 million truckers, cabbies and other drivers out of work. The immediate threat to jobs is a reality that we need to confront. One solution to the job loss from automation is Universal Basic Income.

However, in the long run, AVs could be profoundly beneficial to society in various ways. To offset the several jobs that the driverless world will destroy, it will create many new, exciting ones. These new jobs are likely to involve more human interaction or creativity. For instance, new companies will emerge that provide customer service for AVs or that analyze and process the large amounts of data extracted from AVs. Similarly, as more companies enter the AV industry, jobs will open up to design, innovate, program and further automate vehicles for the future.

**Job-shift key to tech-mastery**

**Pistrui, 18** (Joseph Pistrui, co-founded **Kinetic Thinking**, a learning and development framework to provide educational experiences for managers to develop as kinetic thinkers, worked for academic institutions such as **IE Business School** and IE University, **Duke Corporate Education**, **London School of Economics and Political Science**, **Bocconi University**, **IESE Business School**, and **Corvinus University of Budapest**; "The Future of Human Work Is Imagination, Creativity, and Strategy", **Harvard Business Review**, 1-18-2018, https://hbr.org/2018/01/the-future-of-human-work-is-imagination-creativity-and-strategy, DOA: 7-19-2022)//sposten

It seems beyond debate: Technology is going to replace jobs, or, more precisely, the people holding those jobs. Few industries, if any, will be untouched.

Knowledge workers will not escape. Recently, the CEO of Deutsche Bank predicted that half of its 97,000 employees could be replaced by robots. One survey revealed that “39% of jobs in the legal sector could be automated in the next 10 years. Separate research has concluded that accountants have a 95% chance of losing their jobs to automation in the future.”

And for those in manufacturing or production companies, the future may arrive even sooner. That same report mentioned the advent of “robotic bricklayers.” Machine learning algorithms are also predicted to replace people responsible for “optical part sorting, automated quality control, failure detection, and improved productivity and efficiency.” Quite simply, machines are better at the job: The National Institute of Standards predicts that “machine learning can improve production capacity by up to 20%” and reduce raw materials waste by 4%.

It is easy to find reports that predict the loss of between 5 and 10 million jobs by 2020. Recently, space and automotive titan Elon Musk said the machine-over-mankind threat was humanity’s “biggest existential threat.” Perhaps that is too dire a reading of the future, but what is important for corporate leaders right now is to avoid the catastrophic mistake of ignoring how people will be affected. Here are four ways to think about the people left behind after the trucks bring in all the new technology.

In Oz, the wizard is shown to run the kingdom through some complex machine hidden behind a curtain. Many executives may think themselves the wizard; enthralled by the idea that AI technology will allow them to shed millions of dollars in labor costs, they could come to believe that the best company is the one with the fewest people aside from the CEO.

Yet the CEO and founder of Fetch Robotics, Melonee Wise, cautions against that way of thinking: “For every robot we put in the world, you have to have someone maintaining it or servicing it or taking care of it.” The point of technology, she argues, is to boost productivity, not cut the workforce.

McKinsey has been studying what kind of work is most adaptable to automation. Their findings so far seem to conclude that the more technical the work, the more technology can accomplish it. In other words, machines skew toward tactical applications.

On the other hand, work that requires a high degree of imagination, creative analysis, and strategic thinking is harder to automate. As McKinsey put it in a recent report: “The hardest activities to automate with currently available technologies are those that involve managing and developing people (9 percent automation potential) or that apply expertise to decision making, planning, or creative work (18 percent).” Computers are great at optimizing, but not so great at goal-setting. Or even using common sense.

When technology comes in, and some workers go away, there is a residual fear among those still in place at the company. It’s only natural for them to ask, “Am I next? How many more days will I be employed here?” Venture capitalist Bruce Gibney explains it this way: “Jobs may not seem like ‘existential’ problems, but they are: When people cannot support themselves with work at all — let alone with work they find meaningful — they clamor for sharp changes. Not every revolution is a good revolution, as Europe has discovered several times. Jobs provide both material comfort and psychological gratification, and when these goods disappear, people understandably become very upset.”

The wise corporate leader will realize that post-technology trauma falls along two lines: (1) how to integrate the new technology into the work flow, and (2) how to cope with feelings that the new technology is somehow “the enemy.” Without dealing with both, even the most automated workplace could easily have undercurrents of anxiety, if not anger.

Technology will replace some work, but it doesn’t have to replace the people who have done that work. Economist James Bessen notes, “The problem is people are losing jobs and we’re not doing a good job of getting them the skills and knowledge they need to work for the new jobs.”

For example, a study in Australia found a silver lining in the automation of bank tellers’ work: “While ATMs took over a lot of the tasks these tellers were doing, it gave existing workers the opportunity to upskill and sell a wider ranges of financial services.”

Moreover, the report found that there is a growing range of new job opportunities in the fields of big data analysis, decision support analysts, remote-control vehicle operators, customer experience experts, personalized preventative health helpers, and online chaperones (“managing online risks such as identify theft, reputational damage, social media bullying and harassment, and internet fraud”). Such jobs may not be in your current industrial domain. But there may be other ways for you to view this moment as the perfect time to rethink the shape and character of your workforce. Such new thinking will generate a whole new human resource development agenda, one quite probably emphasizing those innate human capacities that can provide a renewed strategy for success that is both technological and human.

As Wise, the roboticist, emphasized, the technology itself is just a tool, one that leaders can use how they see fit. We can choose to use AI and other emerging technologies to replace human work, or we can choose to use them to augment it. “Your computer doesn’t unemploy you, your robot doesn’t unemploy you,” she said. “The companies that have those technologies make the social policies and set those social policies that change the workforce.”

#### Current cities are *doomed*---BUT, smart cities solve---COVID proves

Rook 21 (Tim Rook, chief markets officer at Clade Engineering, holds a BA in engineering from Cranfield University and a BA in mechanical engineering from the University of Surrey; "Has Covid-19 strengthened the case for smart cities?", 8-10-2021, https://www.eco-business.com/opinion/has-covid-19-strengthened-the-case-for-smart-cities/, DOA: 3-10-2022)//ATJ

There is no denying that the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the challenges faced by many cities across the globe. From digital connectivity to safety and security, education and work, we have already seen some sections of society progress in leaps and bounds, whilst the challenges for others have been laid bare. As we emerged from a turbulent 18 months, the case for smart cities appears to be stronger than ever.

A smart city is a place where traditional networks and services are made more efficient with the use of digital and telecommunication technologies for the benefit of its inhabitants and businesses. Insights gained from that data are used to manage assets, resources and services efficiently; in return, that data is used to improve operations across the city.

It means smarter urban transport networks, upgraded water supply and waste disposal facilities and more efficient ways to light and heat buildings. It also means a more interactive and responsive city administration and safer public spaces. Smart cities are a “system of systems”. These can include smart lighting systems, building automation systems, emergency management systems, security and access control systems, intelligent grids, renewable power, water treatment and supply, transportation, and more.

#### Otherwise, loss of megacities is an inevitable existential risk---increased technological efficiency is key to solve

William E. Rees 20, Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and former director of the School of Community and Regional Planning at UBC, “Megacities at Risk: The Climate–Energy Conundrum,” Handbook of Megacities and Megacity-Regions, Edward Elgar Publishing, 09/04/2020, <https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788972697/9781788972697.00029.xml//recut> by sposten

• The consumptive node **cannot survive in isolation**. Every modem city **depends utterly** on being able to maintain continuous **intimate contact** and **exchange** with the lands/waters that constitute its eco-footprint. A megacity imports many million kilograms o f low-entropy energy and material daily and exports a nearly equivalent mass of degraded wastes.

• The total human EF is about 20.6 billion hectares (ha) while Earth has only 12.2 billion ha of productive ecosystems, that is. the human enterprise is in ‘overshoot’ by 69 percent (2014 data from GFN, 2018). Since cities account for -7 0 percent o f global consumption and waste production, urban populations alone require the biocapacity equivalent o f -1.2 planet Earths to maintain their present lifestyles.\*

• Preventing ecosystemic collapse requires a massive reduction in the human ecological footprint (i.e., in populations and/or consumption).

These facts underscore that cities - megacities in particular are **vulnerable** to any global change that would isolate them from, or significantly reduce the area or productivity of. their supportive extra-urban ecosystems.

CLIMATE CHANGE: AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO URBAN CIVILIZATION

The Birds o f Canada (Earl, 1966) lists Anna’s hummingbird (Calypte anna) as a California breeder, merely ‘hypothetical’ in Canada. Yet, through winter o f 2018-19. three Anna’s jousted daily for position at my backyard feeder in Vancouver, Canada, and by spring were nesting somewhere in the neighbourhood.

The climate change that has shifted birds' ranges northward is real, but its effects not always so benign. In 2017 and 2018. British Columbia experienced two back-to-back ‘worst ever’ **wildfire seasons**; the deadliest wildfires on record torched California in 2018, destroying thousands of buildings and killing 85 people; droughts are becoming **longer** and **more severe**, storms more intensely energetic; and record temperatures arc destroying wildlife and livestock, property and people on every continent. Indeed, extreme weather events o f all kinds are rcllcctcd in the economic costs o f climate-related disasters globally S89S billion (in 2017 dollars) between 1978 and 1997; S2.25 trillion between 1998 and 2017, a 151 percent increase (McCarthy, 2018).

The main anthropogenic driver o f climate change is carbon dioxide, the greatest metabolic waste by weight of industrial economics and an inevitable cntropic by-product of fossil-fuel combustion. Atmospheric CO? readings in April 2018 averaged over 410 parts per million (ppm) for the entire month for the first time on record (US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration |NOAA], 2018). This is a human-induced increase o f 46 percent above prc-industrial levels o f -280 parts per million and elevates atmospheric carbon to Us highest levels in 800 000 years. CO, is still climbing by 2-3 parts per million (ppm) annually and concentrations o f other GHGs are increasing as fast or faster. (Atmospheric CO; averaged 417 ppm during May 2020 [US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAAJ 2020].)

One result is that mean global temperature has climbed by approximately 1°C, mostly since 1980. A statistically improbable 17 o f the 18 warmest years in the instrumental record have occurred in this young century (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASAJ, 2017); 2016 was the warmest year; 2017 was second followed by 2015 and 2018 - ‘the past five years arc, collectively, the warmest years in the modem record’ (NASA. 2019). When the world was last this warm (the Ecmian period 130 000 115 000 years ago) sea levels eventually rose 6-9 metres (20-30 feet), sufficient to inundate most o f today’s coastal towns and mcgacitics. (For an outstanding summary of climate change, likely outcomes, and policy implications, sec Hansen, 2018.)

The Inadequate 2015 Paris Climate Agreement

Our best science tells us that the world is currently on track to experience 3 5°C warming. There is no dispute that 5°C warming would be catastrophic, likely fatal to civilized existence. Even a 'modest’ 3°C implies disaster - enough to destroy economies, destabilize **geopolitics** and **empty megacities**. Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change therefore committed in the 2015 COP21 Paris Agreement to hold the rise in global average temperatures to ‘well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change |IPCCJ, 2018).

Regrettably, the voluntary commitments (nationally determined contributions or NDCs) made in Paris constitute only one-third o f the reductions needed to limit warming to 2°C; even if fully met. they put us on track for 3+°C. System dynamics confounds the issue. There is a -40-year lag between causc and effect bccause of ocean thermal inertia (the seas absorb 90 percent o f accumulating heat but warm slowly). Present GHG concentrations, if held constant, commit the world to an additional 0.3 0.8°C warming, enough to overshoot the l.5°C limit (Hansen, 2018; Marshall, 2010).\* Ominously, CO, and other GHG emissions are still increasing. It is therefore particularly conccming that the parties to the Paris Agreement discussed or endorsed mainly capital-intcnsivc technological solutions from green energy (e.g.. wind and solar), through unproved approaches to carbon capture and storage and even nuclear fission and fusion, that is, any techno-solution that would contribute to investment and growth Reductions in energy/resource use, fair income redistribution and population controls were not on the table. In short, the real commitment of the international community is to technological solutions that will sustain growth and not jeopardize the current social and economic system. This is the status quo by other means. Perversely, climate disaster policy is being designed to serve the capitalist growth economy ‘so the latter becomes the solution to (not the cause of) the [problem]’ (Spash, 2016, p. 931). There is another problem recent analysis suggests that:

biogcophysical fccdback processes (e.g., permafrost melting, methane hydrate releases, tropical and boreal forest die-hack] within ihc Earth System coupled with direct human degradation of the biosphere may play a more important role than normally assumed. . .there is a significant risk that these internal dynamics, especially strong nonlineantio in feedback processes, could become an important or perhaps, even dominant factor (Steffen ct a!., 2018. p. 8253)

Indeed, ‘even if the Paris Accord target o f a 1.5- 2.0°C rise in temperature is met, we cannot exclude the risk that a cascade o f feedbacks could push the Earth System irreversibly onto a ‘Hothouse Earth’ pathway (ibid., p. 8254).7

To neutralize this risk, Rockstrom ct al. (2017) assert that the world community must cut fossil fuel use in half each decade until 2050, as well as extract gigaionncs (Gt) o f carbon out o f the atmosphere, all while shining society to alternative green energy. Similarly, an IPCC Special Report on l.5°C warming and possible emissions pathways found that in ‘model pathways with no or limited overshoot o f 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO, emissions decline by about 45 percent from 2010 levels by 2030.. .reaching net zero around 2050\* (IPCC, 2018, p. C l). All such pathways require ‘the use o f carbon dioxide removal (Cl)R) on the order of 100 1000 Gt CO, over the 21st century’ (ibid., p. C3).

Significantly for megacities, limiting warming to 1.5°C would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems’. The scale o f the needed transition is unprecedented and implies ‘deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant upscaling o f investments in those options’ (IPCC, 2018, p. C2). So far, no city has taken up the IPCC challenge.

ENERGY: THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF EVERY MEGACITY

The technological outlook for a transition to renewable ‘green’ energy is superficially encouraging. ‘Solar photovoltaic and wind power arc rapidly getting cheaper and more abundant - so much so that they arc on track to entirely supplant fossil fuels worldwide within two decades’ (Blakcrs and Stocks. 2018); and do not worry about solar arrays and wind farms despoiling the countryside: ‘if we cover an area of the fcarth 335 kilometers by 335 kilometers with solar panels...it will provide more than 17.4 TW power... That means 1.2 percent of the Sahara Desert is sufficient to cover all o f the energy needs o f the world in solar energy’ (Moalcm, 2016). Jacobson et al. (2015, p. 2093) propose a set o f ‘roadmaps for converting the energy infrastructures of each o f the 50 United States to 100% wind, water, and sunlight (WWS) for all purposes (electricity, transportation, heating/cooling, and industry) by 2050'. This conversion, allegedly both technologically and economically feasible, would virtually eliminate energy-related pollution and GHG emissions while creating jobs, stabilizing energy priccs and minimizing land requirements.

Such ebullient scenarios generate unwarranted confidence in human techno-prowess and have convinced many that the necessary energy transition is easy and already well underway. This is not so. The transition to renewables is a politically loaded, economically formidable and technologically daunting challenge framed in confusion and contradiction. Opposing narratives on prospects for a 100 percent green energy system by 2030/50 abound (e.g.. Energy Watch Group, 2018; Mills 2019). In a well-known dispute. Clack ct al. (2017, p. 6722) condemn the buoyant Jacobson ct al. (2015) study for significant errors, inappropriate modelling methods and implausible, ill-documcntcd assumptions that ovcrpromise and potentially ‘(impede] the move to a cost-cffcctivc decarbonized energy system’ (see also Bryce, 2017). (icrmany’s much-lauded but faltering energy transition ( ‘Energiewemie') serves as a practical cautionary tale: investment in renewable rcachcd 464 billion euros by the end o f 2015 without significantly reducing German carbon emissions or dependence on fossil fuels (FerToni, Guckos and Hopkirk, 2017; Shcllcnberger, 2019).

The reality is that, in 2019. the world remains hooked on fossil fuels. Renewables (wind, solar, geothermal, biomass and waste) did sec the highest rate o f growth in 2017 but together supplied only onc-quartcr of a 2.1 percent increase and only 3.6 percent of total energy demand; wind and solar just 2.2 percent (British Petroleum [BP], 2018; International Energy Agency [IEA|, 2018). Similarly, energy demand was up by 2.3 percent in 2018, with fossil fuels accounting for 70 percent o f the increase (IEA, 2019). (The corresponding numbers in BP, 2019 are 2.9 percent and 66.5 percent, respectively.) The installed capacity o f wind and solar electricity, particularly solar, is rising rapidly and in 2018 produced 1270 tcrawatt hours (TWh) and 585 TWh, respectively. I lowcvcr, the increase in global demand for electricity was 938 TWh. 70 percent more than the total generated by all existing solar photovoltaic installations. Just two years o f global demand increase would swallow the entire contribution from more than three dccadcs o f wind and solar power development (data from BP, 2019). In 2019, wind and solar generation increased spectacularly by 12.6% and 24.3% respectively, contributing an additional 300 Twh to the world’s electricity grid. Nevertheless, although global electricity demand growth at 352.5 Twh (1.3%) in 2019 was less than half the ten year average growth rate, it was sufficient to outpacc the growth from all non-hydro renewables combined (data from BP, 2020). Moreover, there is concern that green investment has been essentially flat sincc 2011. It actually fell substantially in several major countries in 2017 (36 percent in Europe overall) as subsidies were reduced. Only China’s 26 percent expansion helped bump global investment up by 3 percent in 2017 (Frankfurt School o f Finance & Management, 2018; Gorcham, 2018). Analysts agree that ‘the current level o f investment [S300\* billion a ycar| is...too low to support a global transition to renewable electricity’ (Andrews, 2018a). (The SARS-CoV-2 pandcmic has added another layer o f uncertainty to global energy investment of all kinds.)

In any ease, green power generation ‘will not on its own deliver the emissions reductions demanded by the Paris climate agreement’ (Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, p. 6). Electricity is not yet a viable substitute for fossil fuel in key areas accounting for 80 percent of urban society’s energy consumption including mining, various industrial processes, heavy construction, inter-city transportation (air or highway) and agriculture. Investment in green energy technologies will have to increase multifold if it is to keep up with growing demand and capture a greater share of the total energy market (Club o f Rome. 2018). Securing that investment will become more difficult with reduced government subsidies, particularly if substantial subsidies remain for fossil fuels' and global interest rates keep increasing.

There are also significant systemic problems. Recent simulations show that, even if investment in renewables increased by 2030 to the present total investment in new energy (approximately $1.8 trillion in 2017), fossil fuels would still be providing more than 50 percent o f primary energy and emissions would be increasing again after 2035 - and this assumes an optimistic non-declining ‘energy return on energy invested’ (ERoEI or EROI) for renewables of 15:1. ‘In this case, as renewables still require some fossil fuel energy to construct, it is essentially impossible for the cconomy to meet its energy demands and remain below the emissions ceiling’ (Scrs and Victor, 2018, p. 14). Scrs and Victor call this ‘the cncrgy-cmissions trap’.

More realistically, the ERoEI o f renewables is lower than 15:1 and likely declining, so ‘the long run conscqucncc o f transitioning to renewables.. .at sufficient pace to avoid transgressing cumulative emissions limits is a decline in the net energy available to society’. At 17 percent of GDP and an ERoEI o f 3:1, ‘the redirection of investment from the secondary productive sector to the primary energy sector leads to a constraint on the productive capacity o f the cconomy and a commensurate decline in output' (Scrs and Victor, 2018. p. 17). That is, the economy implodes - hardly the future anticipated by mainstream analysts.

EKoF.I and Megacitics

The F.RoF.I concept is central to energy analysis yet remains mired in controversy. Most ERoEI studies estimate the ratio o f the energy produced by a project divided by the sum of the direct (i.e.. onsite) and indirect (i.e., offsitc energy needed to make the products used onsite) energy used to generate that output. This measure gives a satisfying global average FRoEl for coal of 46:1; for important liquid and gaseous fossil fuels and wind, about 20:1; solar 10:1 (Hall. Lambert and Balogh. 2014).

Controversy blooms when analysts ‘extend’ (ERoEItu) their assessments beyond on-site requirements. Kcrroni and Hopkirk (2016) and Fcrroni ct al. (2017) considered the energy expended on materials, labour, and so forth, for the manufacturing, transportation, installation. operation, decommissioning, integration o f the intermittent photovoltaic (PV) generated electricity into the Swiss and German grids (including the energy demand for auxiliary storage capacity) and for obtaining and servicing the required capital. Result? An ERoEItxi o f only 0.82 (+/- 15 percent). This implies that an electrical supply system based on today's PV technologies in cool northern countries may turn out to be an energy sink, not a source.11 Spain - arguably Europe's best insolatcd country actually is not doing much better. Prieto and Hall (2013) found an ERoEIct( o f only 2.45:1 for that country’s extensive centralized PV system. Most recently De Castro and Capcllin-Pcrcz (2020) demonstrate that the global average ERoEIsetl for onshore wind (2.9:1), offshore wind (2.3:1), solar Photovoltaic (PV) (1.8:1), and solar Concentrated Solar Power (< l: I ) arc well below that of fossil-fuelled electricity generation (and. we might add, insufficient to run modem civilization).

What docs all this mean for mcgacities? First, consider that the standard ERoEI o f major fuels is steadily declining as source quality declines and extraction costs increase - it is only 5:1 to 4:1 for tar sands and less for shale oil, for example. Second, if the more dismal results o f ERoEIrti for solar PV prove correct, today's green energy cannot substitute fo r fossil fuels. Question: at what point will it become impossible to sustain megacitics? (Hall ct al., 2014 suggest that ‘fuel’ requires an ERoEIfi| of 3:1 to be minimally useful to society.) Falling F.RoEIs and rising energy costs are already being implicated in everything from the doubtful promise o f electric vehicles (Gochring and Rozcncwajg. 2018) to Brexit and the so-called yellow-vcst protests in France (Ahmed, 2018).

Can We Make the Transition?

There are additional political and technical barriers to meeting even the 2°C warming limit. We need an unprecedented level of cooperation among major governments but in today's fractious world, with major emitters like the US ‘dropping out’ and others like Canada bent on developing their fossil-fuel reserves, this prerequisite will almost certainly not be met.

Even if world governments were to align in common purpose, the sheer momentum of industrial society is formidable. Driven by exponential growth, half the fossil energy and other key resources ever consumed have been used in ju st the past 30-35 years (see graphs in Steffen ct al., 2015). Thus, most of the infrastructure and equipment involved in electricity generation, manufacturing, transportation, communications, construction, spacc/watcr heating, food systems, and so on, across the modem world arc fuelled by coal, oil or natural gas. And, as noted, the addiction persists. After flattening for three years, carbon emissions increased by almost 1.5 percent in 2017 and 1.7 percent in 2018 (IEA, 2018, 2019; Le Qucrc et al., 2018). In these circumstances, it stretchcs credulity to think the world can organize to reduce fossil fuel use by nearly 50 percent (-7 percent per year) in just 10 years.10

A fu ll transition to green alternative energy - the 100 percent substitution o f fossil fuels by renewable sources (wind, solar, biomass, hydro) while meeting a projected doubling of demand over the next several decades - implies at least a 50-fold increase in net renewable energy generation capacity, particularly of wind and solar electricity. Clearly, this will not happen without global unity, universal commitment to the Paris targets and massive redirection o f investment and subsidies (all o f which might still leave us energy poor and collapse the economy; Sere and Victor, 2018) and cannot happen if the dismal F.RoF.I^ results for solar electricity arc confirmed.

This last point is pivotal. Consider the ultimate extended net energy analysis (ERoEI^). To replace fossil fuels, green energy must be sufficiently intense and abundant to produce all the equipment and machinery used in the mining, refining, transportation, manufacturing, and so forth, of the materials used to produce wind and solar installations, plus all the roads, other supportive infrastructure and labour needed to manufacture, install and operate those facilities. before it can address the bulk of society’s energy needs. So far. fossil fuel stands alone as the only energy source with the intensity both to produce itself, literally from the ground up. and provide the much larger surplus required to supply all the other energy needs o f society (and keep in mind the anticipated 35 percent growth in energy demand by mid-century). Tellingly, fossil fuels currently provide most o f the energy used to manufacture the materials, equipment and infrastructure for wind and solar electricity. (And are these alternatives really ‘renewable’ if essential equipment must be replaced every 20 25 years, repeating the original energy investment?)

A major technical barrier to wind and (particularly) solar energy is relatively low ‘density’ and intermittency compared to fossil fuels. Techno-optimists believe that these barriers can be surmounted through improved energy capture and storage technologies, but this is energy intensive and expensive today’s batteries, for example, can increase costs by a factor o f ten or more (Andrews, 2018b; Temple, 2018). Even modest fixes increase ‘integration costs’ and contribute to notably higher consumer prices for renewable electricity (Hirth, Ucckcrdt and Edcnhofcr, 2015). The added capital baggage also reduces the ERoEI o f wind and solar below viable levels in many parts o f the world. Even at low-but-viablc ERoEls, many countries would not have enough land for solar or wind installations sufficient to supply even their electricity needs (which are typically only 20 percent of all primary energy consumption).

THE CLIMATE ENERGY CONUNDRUM: THE FUTURE IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE

It has long been recognizcd that the Darwinian struggle for existence is. in effect, a competition for available energy. Building on Lotka (1922), ecologist Howard Odum formulated what is now known as the 'maximum power principle’: successful systems are those that evolve to maximize power - that is, their use o f available energy per unit time - in the performance of useful work (self-maintenance, growth and reproduction) (sec Hall, 1995). ‘Maximum power’ is a fundamental organizing force in living nature.

Certainly, by this measure, //. sapiens is the most successful vertebrate species ever to walk the earth. Modem industrial civilization is an emergent phenomenon birthed at the intersection o f abundant cheap fossil energy and human ingenuity. Fossil fuels enable societies to acquire and transform all the other low-entropy resources they need to grow and complexify. The megacity of 10 or 20 million people is certainly the greatest far-from-(thcrmodynamic)- equi!ibrium dissipative mega-structure ever created by humans and arguably modernity’s most remarkable icon.

The problem is that the enormous metabolic appetites of hundreds of city and megacity super-organisms can be satisfied only through the consumption (i.e., entropic dissipation) of prodigious quantities o f energy, to date mostly fossil fuels." Urban civilization therefore confronts a conundrum o f its own making. If we are unable to replace fossil fuels with equivalent substitutes in the next couple o f dccadcs, our urbanizing world will remain substantially reliant on coal, oil and natural gas (at least while supplies Iasi). Atmospheric CO, and other GHG concentrations will increase and global warming will exceed the 2°C limit. Our current trajectory implies 3 4°C warming.

Three-degree warming spells widespread disaster by late ccntury - more and longer heat waves and droughts, accelerating desertification, melting permafrost, methane releases, water shortages, disrupted agriculture, possible famine, rising sea levels, the flooding (and eventual loss) o f many coastal cities, mass migrations, civil unrest, and so on. Many **cities** would be **cut off from food-lands** and other essential resources with the breakdown of local and marine transportation networks (sec Fricdcmann, 2016); urban life would become **untenable** in the more vulnerable parts o f the world; **geopolitical conflict** is almost **inevitable**. And this may be a bcst-casc C 0 7 scenario. If the world warms by even l.5-2.0®C, we risk crossing tipping points (irreversible positive feedbacks) leading to runaway climate changc and the **end of anything passing for civilization**.

On the other hand, if the world attempts to avoid climate disaster through vastly increased investment in green energy or serious conservation (phasing out of fossil fuels) we could face energy shortages and shrinking economies even as global population and demand for everything increases. Reduced goods production, declining **incomes**, rising **inequality**, widespread **unemployment**, falling agricultural output, broken international supply lines, failing inter-city transportation, local famines, and so forth, are **again** a recipe for **geopolitical chaos**.

### 2NC – Iran Impact

#### An aggressive stance towards Russia draws in Iran

Troianovski et. Al 7/12 (Anton Troianovski, Ivan Nechepurenko and Dan Bilefsky; "Russia Reaches Out to Iran for Help in Countering West", 7-12-2022, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/07/12/world/russia-ukraine-war-news#in-a-frontline-town-the-city-council-is-not-working-and-the-few-who-venture-out-dont-stray-far, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

President Vladimir V. Putin will visit Tehran next week for meetings with the leaders of Iran and Turkey, taking him into challenging diplomatic terrain as he seeks to burnish ties with two nations sometimes aligned, and sometimes sharply at odds, with Russia and with each other.

Mr. Putin, who radically limited his travel during the pandemic, has been engaging in a spree of recent diplomacy, seeking to shore up military and economic backing with non-Western countries to counter the West’s military assistance to Ukraine and its sanctions against Russia.

On a visit to Central Asia last week, his first foreign trip since Russia invaded Ukraine, Mr. Putin — who had recently compared himself to Peter the Great — held court among his close allies and insisted that the war was going according to plan.

Mr. Putin’s latest diplomatic push comes as President Biden prepares to travel to the Middle East this week to meet the leaders of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.

Mr. Biden’s national security adviser said on Monday that Russia was seeking drones from Iran, including those capable of firing missiles, to make up for its scarcity of unmanned, armed surveillance aircraft on the battlefield. Analysts say that Russia also sees Iran as a newly important economic partner, offering a trade route and expertise in circumventing sanctions and exporting oil.

But Mr. Putin may also have to soothe relations with Iran as Russia eats into its share of the global oil market, while trying to find common ground with Turkey, a NATO member. Over Moscow’s objections, Turkey recently lifted its objections to the alliance expanding along Russia’s borders.

High fuel prices have buoyed Russia’s revenues as it has made gradual military gains in Ukraine, but Western sanctions have still wounded its economy and restricted its ability to build or buy technology for military use.

In Tehran, the Iranian capital, Mr. Putin will also hold peace talks on Syria, a decade-old conflict in which Iran and Russia have backed the government and Turkey has supported an opposing rebel faction. Mr. Putin will meet with President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, as well as holding separate meetings with each, Dmitri S. Peskov, the Kremlin’s spokesman, told reporters on Tuesday.

Mr. Erdogan, whose country shares the Black Sea coast with both Russia and Ukraine, has emerged as the most active mediator between Mr. Putin and President Volodymyr Zelensky. Turkey has been in talks to try to overcome Russia’s blockade of more than 20 million tons of Ukrainian grain exports, which has been intensifying a global food crisis.

Turkey will host delegations from Ukraine, Russia and the United Nations in Istanbul on Wednesday for negotiations on resuming grain shipments, Turkey’s Defense Ministry said.

Iran, long a Russian ally in its confrontation with the West, is becoming even more central to Mr. Putin’s diplomacy because of the war in Ukraine. Mr. Putin met with Mr. Raisi on the sidelines of a regional summit in Turkmenistan last month, and spoke to him on the phone in early June, according to the Kremlin.

“Our relationship is of a truly deep, strategic character,” Mr. Putin told Mr. Raisi in Turkmenistan, noting that trade between the two countries was up 81 percent last year.

At a summit meeting in Uzbekistan in September, Iran is expected to join a multilateral security group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which already includes Russia and China. Sergey V. Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, last month praised Iran’s accession as a step that would strengthen the organization “as one of the key centers of the emerging multipolar world order,” diluting the global influence of the United States.

#### US-Iran conflict causes infinite war---*“but we won’t go extinct”* does not matter and only serves to prop up incoherent foreign policy

Kristian 20 (Bonnie Kristian; "Iran can't conquer America. But we can still lose.", 1-3-2020, Week, https://theweek.com/articles/887290/iran-cant-conquer-america-but-still-lose, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

When Americans imagine losing a war, this is our default imagery. Our mental stage is set with props from World War II — where the Axis powers potentially could have conquered the United States had things gone very differently — and the Cold War — which, had it turned hot, could have seen Soviet nukes decimating major American cities (and vice versa). Pondering defeat takes us to The Man in the High Castle, a compelling alternate history precisely because its fanciful premise is still plausible, just as the idea of Iran accomplishing a comparable conquest is utterly implausible. (Iran's entire GDP, $440 billion as of 2017, is less than the Pentagon's annual budget; and even though it began breaching terms of the nuclear deal following Trump's withdrawal from the agreement, Iran does not have nuclear weapons. The power disparity between Tehran and Washington is immense.)

The trouble is conquest is not the only negative outcome of war. And I suspect failure to add that realization to recognition of America's near-total imperviousness to traditional conquest accounts for much of the stupidity in our foreign policy. Because we know one bad consequence isn't possible, we invade, airstrike, assassinate, and sanction at will as if no bad consequences are possible.

This habit is not original to the Trump administration, but it is exacerbated by the president's ignorance, petty pride, changeability, and impulsivity. He seems unable to think with clarity about any moment but the present, and that makes him extra susceptible to reckless advice and shortsighted choices. The Soleimani strike may prove the most destructive of his choices yet.

A rudimentarily prudent foreign policy would always consider at least two sets of consequences before any military action. First, what will be the human cost?

Civilian deaths in the war in Afghanistan are estimated in the tens of thousands and in Iraq in the hundreds of thousands. U.S. intervention in Yemen has helped produce the world's most acute humanitarian crisis — an estimated 85,000 Yemeni children younger than 5 starved to death between 2015 and 2018. American civilians are comparatively safe from the violence of war and terror, but we are not invulnerable, nor are military casualties to be dismissed from our accounting. War with Iran would have enormous human costs, and killing Soleimani is a major step in that direction (if not a functional declaration of war itself).

The second consideration is the path to conclusion. Here is a lesson Washington ought to have learned once and for all in Vietnam but which has been demonstrated anew by our misadventures of the last two decades: It is much easier to begin a war than to end one.

We are not at risk of foreign subjugation, but that does not mean we are not at risk of losing. What are the United States' perpetual wars if not losses? Is there any way to describe what we're doing in Afghanistan as victory? Is participating in the starvation of Yemen a triumph?

For a superpower, defeat doesn't look like conquest. It looks like fighting forever, killing and being killed for nothing, funding corruption and calling it "building democracy," wasting trillions and calling it strength, creating terrorists and calling it counter-terrorism, assassinating national heroes and insisting the act will be met with mass gratitude.

Defeat looks like death, dissipation, and self-delusion. It's time we cleared out our World War II scenery and made way for this modern set. It's time to recognize that if we go to war with Iran, this type of defeat is all but a foregone conclusion.

### 2NC – Relations Impact

#### EU-Russia relations solve public health and climate change, but the US is key

Trenin 21 (Dmitri Trenin; "Russia and Europe: the Current Impasse and the Way Out", 2/18/2021, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/83905, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

Is There a Way Out?

EU-Russia relations have reached an impasse, while the regional environment in Europe will continue to worsen in the foreseeable future. A few potential crisis spots have already been mentioned. With the link between Moscow and Brussels virtually inactive for the time being, and relations between the key EU capitals and Russia constrained, these will probably have to be dealt with by Russia and the United States, with Europe backing Washington. For many in the United States and some in Europe, this is not a bad configuration at all. It means, however, that Russian-European relations will revert to being a function of U.S.-Russian relations, reminiscent of the Cold War model.

On the military security side, this has long been a reality. With the principal danger now rooted in misperception, miscalculation, and escalation, the proper guardrails in the U.S.-Russian confrontation are not weapons limits established under arms control documents, now almost all (except for New START) defunct; they are reliable communications channels, personal contact between top military and security officials, and various confidence-building measures. These channels, contacts, and measures are essentially the business of Russia and the United States: either directly or through NATO.

In the meantime, the European Union and Russia can still do something useful together. Areas for EU-Russia collaboration may be few and far between, but they do exist. One is public health, the other is climate. Russia has surprised many in Europe and across the world with its effective Sputnik V vaccine. The COVID-19 pandemic is the first truly global pandemic of recent times, not the last. Given their geographical proximity and the level of transborder contacts, EU-Russia cooperation in this field certainly makes sense. As for climate change, this is an issue of genuine interest to Russia, given that global warming is not only making much of the Arctic ice-free, but also disrupting infrastructure in Siberia as a result of melting permafrost. Neither of these tracks will have much impact on the overall relationship, but each could bring real benefits to both parties.

### 2NC – Turns Case

#### The war destroys global security architecture

Adams 7/15 (Mubarak Adams, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana; “THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINE WAR THREATENS GLOBAL PEACE: AN EXAMINATION,” Research Gate, 7/15/2022)//sposten

Russian Ukraine War: An Implication for Global security Architecture The war in Ukraine has destroyed global peace architecture generally in the United Nations Security Council and particularly in Europe which has been in existence for decades. The repercussions are already evident far from the battlefield. The war has increased NATO’s presence (40,000 NATO forces) in Eastern Europe to defend and protect its allies (Pszczel, 2022). The fear is that the war might spread to other parts of the world mainly Russian neighbors like Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, etc. Russia’s threat has altered decades of military policies of neutrality by Finland and Sweden. The result for these small nations (Finland and Sweden) was to seek a military alliance with NATO (Ibid). The growing concern of the war is the Russian capabilities to use its nuclear weapons on western nations and the US. This has weakened the efforts of western powers to be directly involved in the war but rather send military equipment to Ukrainian forces. Russia’s desire to bring Belarus into the nuclear calculation has stoked fear of escalation (Pszczel, 2022)

### 2NC – AT: EU Upsets Diplomacy

#### EU is a neutral actor that would not disrupt negotiations

Menafn 7/20 ("What Happens If The Black Sea Blockade Is Lifted?", 7-20-2022, MENAFN, https://menafn.com/1104563351/What-Happens-If-The-Black-Sea-Blockade-Is-Lifted, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

(MENAFN- Swissinfo) A deal allowing Ukraine to resume its grain exports is urgently needed. The harvest season starts in July, but storage facilities are still full of last winter's grain. Meanwhile in Somalia, which used to import all its wheat from Ukraine and Russia, hundreds of thousands of people are at risk of famine. Copyright 2022 The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved

United Nations and Turkey-led negotiations with Moscow and Kyiv to allow Ukrainian grain exports to resume in the Black Sea are moving forward. But even if a deal is signed, its impact to alleviate the food crisis could take months.

The UN had been working for weeks behind the scenes to find a way to safely export the 22 million tons of grain trapped in Ukrainian silos and ports – enough to cover the annual consumption of the world's least developed economies, according to The EconomistExternal link . Guterres said that a“broad agreement” had been reached on many“substantive aspects” of the operation but stressed that“more technical work” was needed for a formal agreement.

Turkish defence minister Hulusi Akar was even more optimistic and said a deal could be signed this week. His comments were echoed on Monday by European Union chief diplomat Josep Borrell who said that he too hoped an agreement would be found before Sunday.

The exact details of the deal remain unknown, but an agreement is likely to cover issues such as mines clearance, naval escorts, and cargoes inspections. The date when the four delegations will meet again is not yet known.

So far, Ankara has said it would ensure the safety of export routes while warring parties would jointly inspect shipments before they enter Ukrainian ports. A coordination centre with Russia, Ukraine, and the UN would be established in Turkey.

But experts caution that even if a deal was signed today, it would likely take weeks or months before countries hardest hit by the global food crisis feel the relief, while the deal itself could prove fragile.

Food crisis

Ukraine produces enough grain to feed hundreds of millions of people and is a major exporter of wheat, corn, and sunflower oil. Before the war, most food exports used to leave Ukraine on ships out of Black Sea ports. But Ukrainian mines and Russian warships have closed sea export routes.

“Failure to open those ports in the Odesa region will be a declaration of war on global food security. And it will result in famine, destabilisation, and mass migration around the world,” UN World Food Programme (WFP) chief David Beasley warnedExternal link the UN Security Council in May.

The Black Sea blockade is adding to a global food crisis fueled by Covid-19 disruptions and climate change. Low supplies of Ukrainian grain and high food prices have been bad news for African and Middle Eastern countries that rely heavily on food imports from Ukraine. The Horn of Africa, which faces its fourth consecutive failed rainy season, has been hit particularly hard. UN agencies have warned that in Somalia, which used to import all its wheat from Ukraine and Russia, hundreds of thousands of people are at risk of famine.

External Content

A deal allowing Ukraine to resume its grain exports is urgently needed. The harvest season starts in July, but storage facilities are still full of last winter's grain. There are fears that this grain may now rot away. On top of that, if farmers cannot sell their crops, they may not be able to afford to plant or harvest in the future. On Tuesday, Ukraine's agriculture minister speaking to the Financial Times, warned farmers will plant two-thirds less this year unless a deal is agreed. Such a reduction would threaten future global food output, as Ukrainian wheat accounts for 10% of all exports. Food security experts fear that a failed harvest in Ukraine next year could turn the current food prices crisis into a food availability crisis in lower-income countries.

The heads of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group (WBG), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) issued a joint statement last week calling for urgent action now but also longer-term reforms to tackle the global food crisis. Recommendations include boosting food production across the world and investing in climate-resilient agriculture.

A deal, then what?

But reaching a deal this week would not mean that grain exports would resume immediately. The shipping industry must reorganise itself and the Black Sea needs to be de-mined.

“The ships that sail the seas are not all at the entrance to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles waiting for Ukraine to open,” says Florence Schurch, secretary general of the Swiss Trading and Shipping Association (STSA).“They continue to work, the trading companies continue to send their ships left and right. International trade continues.”

Schurch says that even if an agreement was found as soon as this week, it would still take months for the shipping industry to reorganise, and for the first vessels to enter the Black Sea.

“On top of that, ports and shipping lanes need to be cleared of mines, traders need to be assured that their captains and crew are safe, and insurers need to agree to insure all these ships and their cargoes at non-prohibitive prices,” says Schurch.

According to Richard Gowan, UN director at the International Crisis Group in New York, the UN has anticipated such issues by reaching out to“an unusually wide range of contacts” that include shipping insurers. Gowan also points out that Guterres has an“amazingly detailed grasp of issues like de-mining”.

Still, clearing mines to open up a safe corridor for ships to sail through could take time – from weeks to months, depending on how many de-mining ships are mobilised and the number of mines in the water, a naval expert told The New York TimesExternal link .

The UN plan

“I think Turkey wants the UN involved in this process, as it offers both political legitimacy and technical expertise to the discussions,” says Gowan. “Having the UN creates some additional transparency as the UN can act as a sort of neutral 'umpire' over the terms of any agreement,” he adds.

The lack of trust between Kiev and Moscow has so far been a major impediment to reaching a diplomatic agreement. Ukraine does not want to remove the mines it placed in ports without guarantees that Russia will not attack them, while Russia has asked to inspect the cargoes of ships entering Ukrainian ports to ensure they do not carry weaponry.

Moscow also asked for sanctions on Russia to be lifted if a deal was found, which Western countries oppose. The UN and Turkey-led deal could include measures to support Russian fertiliser and grain exports. Russian grain is not under sanctions, but many traders and banks have stayed away from dealing with Russia out of fears they may be exposing themselves to fines.

Schurch confirms that grain traders have stopped working with Russia. According to her, the European Union sanctions, which Switzerland adopted, are too vague. She calls on Brussels and Bern to clarify their position so that traders can work without risk.

According to Gowan, if an agreement is reached, the deal could still be questioned in the future. He points to the UN cross-border mechanism that allows humanitarian convoys to enter rebel-held parts of Syria from Turkey. Earlier this month, Russia threatened to put an end to the mechanism by vetoing a 12-month extension of its mandate before eventually agreeing to a 6-month extension, which will make planning aid deliveries more difficult.

“I am sure that even if a Black Sea grain export mechanism is created, Russia will frequently question how it is managed and threaten to cut it off. The Russians know how to play games with humanitarian aid,” says Gowan.

If all fails

If the current negotiation process fails, Gowan suspects that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France will raise the issue at the UN Security Council, where the three countries sit as permanent members together with Russia and China.

He says the three countries could table a resolution demanding that Russia allows grain exports to resume out of Black Sea ports, which Moscow would most likely veto. Russia would then need – under a resolution adopted last spring that aims to increase accountability for permanent members using their right of veto – to explain its decision in front of the General Assembly in which, unlike the Security Council and its 15 members, every member state has a seat.

“Western diplomats will want to make the Russians explain to African and Arab countries why Moscow is cutting off their food,” says Gowan.

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – UQ

#### The EU is pursuing a military strategy against Russia

EU Neighbors East 7/21 ("War in Ukraine: EU adopts ‘maintenance and alignment’ package against Russia", 7-21-2022, EU Neighbors East, https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/war-in-ukraine-eu-adopts-maintenance-and-alignment-package-against-russia/, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the European Union today adopted new measures intended to tighten existing economic sanctions targeting Russia, improve their implementation, and strengthen their effectiveness.

This ‘maintenance and alignment’ package introduces a new prohibition to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, gold, if it originates in Russia and it has been exported from Russia into the EU or to any third country after. This prohibition also covers jewelry.

The package also extends the list of controlled items, which may contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or the development of its defence and security sector, thereby reinforcing export controls on dual use and advanced technology.

Furthermore, the new measures extend the existing port access ban to locks to avoid the circumvention of sanctions and expand the scope of the prohibition on accepting deposits to include those from legal persons, entities or bodies established in third countries and majority-owned by Russian nationals or natural persons residing in Russia. The acceptance of deposits for non-prohibited cross-border trade will be subject to a prior authorisation by the national competent authorities.

The EU is also introducing a number of clarifications to existing measures, for instance in the field of public procurement, aviation and justice. For instance, technical assistance to Russia for aviation goods and technology will be allowed insofar as it is needed to safeguard the technical industrial standard setting work of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, and the prohibition to enter into any transactions with Russian public entities will be slightly amended to ensure access to justice.

The EU also decided to extend the exemption from the prohibition to engage in transactions with certain state-owned entities as regards transactions for agricultural products and the transport of oil to third countries.

“None of the measures adopted today or earlier in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine target in any way the trade in agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers, between third countries and Russia,” specifies the EU. “Similarly, EU measures do not prevent third countries and their nationals operating outside of the EU from purchasing pharmaceutical or medical products from Russia.”

According to EU High Representative Josep Borrell, the EU also “listed another major Russian Bank, Sberbank, and added further individuals involved in Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, such as military officials, the Night Wolves motorcycle club and disinformation actors”.

The Council also strengthened reporting requirements, putting the burden of declaring assets onto sanctioned people. This measure aims to facilitate the freezing of their assets in the EU.

“It sends a strong signal to Moscow: we will keep the pressure high for as long as it takes,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen commented on Twitter.

#### Putin can’t be trusted by his words

RFE 22 ("Putin Claims Russia Will ‘Guarantee’ Peaceful Export Of Ukrainian Grain", 6-3-2022, Radio Free Europe, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-war-grain/31882556.html, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Russian President Vladimir Putin denied accusations his armed forces are blocking Ukrainian grain exports from the Black Sea and said his government would “guarantee" peaceful passage to ships leaving Ukraine's ports.

In an interview with Russian state television on June 3, Putin tried to put the blame on Ukraine for the trapped grain, saying Kyiv has mined the Black Sea and sunk vessels, preventing grain ships from leaving.

Ukraine carried out those steps after Russia launched a massive, unprovoked invasion by land and air on February 24, sparking fears it could seek to use its navy to storm the key Black Sea port of Odesa.

“I have already told all our colleagues many times: let them clear the mines and let the ships loaded with grain leave the ports. We guarantee their peaceful passage into international waters without any problems," Putin said.

The Russian president said his armed forces would not use the removal of mines “to launch any attacks [on Ukraine] from the sea.”

Glen Howard, a military analyst and president of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, said history shows Putin can’t be trusted to abide by his word.

The Kremlin repeatedly said Russia had no intention of invading Ukraine in the months leading up to its attack.

Howard said Ukraine now has anti-ship missile systems to defend its coast from invasion, including several delivered late last month by Denmark.

However, he said that grain ships leaving Ukrainian ports would have no escort if they set sail and thus would be “trusting the Russians at their word.”

Putin’s comments came after he met with Senegal's President Macky Sall, who is also the current head of the African Union, to discuss surging food prices.

Africa is heavily dependent on grain supplies from Russia and Ukraine and any disruptions could lead to social unrest on the continent.

The surge in food prices triggered by the conflict is already putting pressure on African governments and, in some countries, leading to protests.

Amid isolation from the West, Putin has been seeking to build his ties with African nations, many of whom have significant historical ties to Moscow dating back to Soviet times.

"President Putin has expressed to us his willingness to facilitate the export of Ukrainian cereals," Sall wrote on Twitter after meeting Putin.

The war has blocked as much as 25 million tons of Ukrainian grain at local ports, Howard said.

Putin sought to downplay the significance of the issue, saying Ukrainian grain only represents about 2.5 percent of total world grain production.

However, Ukrainian grain makes up a significant percentage of global exports and thus has outsided influence on world prices.

Putin also blamed the United States for rising food prices, saying the U.S. central bank stimulated inflation by printing too much money.

But wheat and corn prices have surged more than a quarter since Russia began massing its troops along Ukraine’s border in late October amid fears over grain exports while the United States has taken steps to curtail inflation by raising rates.

Russia also cut back on gas exports to Europe leading up to the war to gain leverage in talks with the West over Ukraine, driving prices to record highs. Natural gas is a key component in fertilizers used by farmers.

Putin suggested Ukraine could export grain via the Baltic Sea by shipping its products by rail through Belarus.

The West would have to lift sanctions against Belarus to do so.

Howard dismissed Putin’s suggestion as impractical, saying there is not nearly enough rail capacity to move Ukraine’s grain.

Rail is also more expensive and shipping from the Baltic ports to Africa would extend the sea route by thousands of miles.

Howard said time is running out to export the grain, adding it will begin to rot by July.

#### G20 summit failed and heightened tensions

RFE 22 ("G20 Diplomats Find No Common Ground As Western Countries Press Russia Over War In Ukraine", 7-9-2022, Radio Free Europe, https://www.rferl.org/a/g20-diplomats-gather-ukraine-war-global-inflation/31934288.html, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Diplomats from the world’s major industrialized nations failed on July 8 to find common ground over Russia’s war in Ukraine and how to deal with its impact on grain shipments and energy markets.

Russia’s foreign minister walked out of two sessions held by diplomats from the Group of 20 (G20) amid criticism of the war on Ukraine and amid calls for Russia to allow Kyiv to ship grain out to the world.

The July 8 meeting in Bali, Indonesia, was intended to lay the groundwork for a summit of G20 leaders later this year. The war and soaring global food and energy prices that have resulted from it topped the agenda.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov walked out of the morning meeting after German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock criticized Moscow for the war.

The vast majority of representatives at the meeting had condemned "Russia's brutal war of aggression," Baerbock said. "The appeal of all 19 states was very clear to Russia: This war must end."

Lavrov left the afternoon session before Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s scheduled virtual speech. Kuleba told ministers to "remember about 344 families who have lost their children when listening to Russian lies."

Lavrov told reporters the discussions "strayed almost immediately, as soon as they took the floor, to the frenzied criticism of the Russian Federation in connection with the situation in Ukraine."

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Lavrov was in the room when the meeting began and "about two hours later he began to hold bilateral talks with colleagues in the same forum in the next room."

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also condemned the Russian invasion.

"What we've heard today already is a strong chorus from around the world...about the need for the aggression to end," Blinken said.

During a closed-door session of officials, Blinken, who refused to hold one-on-one meetings with Lavrov, demanded Moscow allow grain shipments out of Ukraine.

"To our Russian colleagues: Ukraine is not your country. Its grain is not your grain. Why are you blocking the ports? You should let the grain out," Blinken said, according to a Western official present.

Zakharova said Lavrov was not present to hear Blinken's comments.

Members of the G20, whose countries account for about 80 percent of the world's economic output and about two-thirds of the world's population, had much to address as prices for meat, cereals, vegetable oils, dairy products, and sugar have soared in recent months, due largely to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Ukraine is not a member of the G20 but is one of the world’s largest exporters of corn and sunflower oil, but Russia’s invasion halted most of that flow. Millions of tons of Ukrainian grain are stuck in silos, unable to be exported due to Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea.

Those disruptions threaten food supplies for many developing countries, especially in Africa.

But the meeting ended with no group photo taken nor a final communique issued as has been done in previous years. It also exposed further evidence of an East-West split driven by China and Russia on one side and the United States and Europe on the other.

In closing remarks, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said "participants expressed deep concern about the humanitarian impacts of the war" in Ukraine, and "some members expressed condemnation" of the invasion.

The meeting's agenda was also rocked by the resignation of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, which prompted his foreign secretary, Liz Truss, to depart Bali, and the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

While in Bali, Blinken will also seek to reopen dialogue with Beijing in talks on July 9 with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Lavrov met Wang on July 7 to discuss Russia's invasion. The United States has condemned Beijing's support for Russia, and Blinken is expected to reiterate those warnings in talks with Wang.

### 2AC – Grain UQ

#### Huge barriers to grain deal---demining ports, persuading shippers, Russia already stole the grain, and substantial political divisions

Malsin et. Al 7/21 (Jared Malsin, William Mauldin and Alistair Macdonald; "Russia, Ukraine Face Thorny Issues to Complete, Implement Grain Deal", 7-21-2022, WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-ukraine-face-thorny-issues-to-complete-implement-grain-deal-11658408580, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

ISTANBUL—Negotiators, having reached the outlines of a deal for Ukraine to export grain from seaports amid the war with Russia, face challenges to getting it done, from the demining of ports to persuading shippers they can operate safely in a conflict zone.

Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and United Nations officials are expected to resume negotiations this week on a framework that would establish a grain export corridor in the Black Sea and potentially help alleviate a hunger crisis in some developing countries.

U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres planned to fly to Istanbul on Thursday evening, a U.N. spokesman said. The announcement of the trip raised hopes that a deal could be signed in the coming days, although the spokesman said the situation remained fluid.

Turkey’s and Russia’s presidents have sounded positive about the talks, as has a senior Ukrainian official. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose government has brokered the negotiations with the U.N., expressed optimism Wednesday that Russia and Ukraine would soon sign a deal.

Video Investigation: Russia Is Using a Secret Network to Steal Ukraine GrainPlay video: Video Investigation: Russia Is Using a Secret Network to Steal Ukraine Grain

While the war in Ukraine has upended the global supply of grain, a WSJ investigation reveals how Russia has quietly institutionalized the theft of hundreds of thousands of metric tons of it out of newly occupied areas of Ukraine and into Russian-allied countries in the Middle East. Photo illustration: Adele Morgan

“This week, we want to put this agreement into writing. And we wish that this plan will start to be implemented in the coming days,” Turkey’s state-run news agency quoted Mr. Erdogan as saying, a day after he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

An agreement could potentially free up about 18 million tons of wheat, corn and other supplies that war has prevented Ukraine from exporting, with the Russian invasion contributing to a rise in global food prices that U.S. officials said has sparked protests in 17 countries.

Substantial differences still need to be bridged among the warring parties, said Western officials. Should the governments reach a deal, privately owned freighters, insurers and sea crews might be reluctant to handle cargoes from Odessa and other war-zone ports, given the threat of further attacks, according to the officials, grain traders and other industry experts.

Ukraine faces the challenge of how to store or export its coming summer harvest.

Both Russia and Ukraine have laid sea mines in the Black Sea that pose a hazard to the movement of any ships in the area. Military delegations from Russia and Ukraine disagreed in the talks in recent weeks over how the demining would take place, a U.S. official said.

Ukraine has also increased the number of mines near its ports in recent weeks to defend against possible Russian attacks, the official said.

Safe passage for ships handling food cargoes and procedures for searching private vessels to ensure they aren’t carrying military equipment are among the issues to be resolved, officials said. Beyond that, Ukraine has demanded international security guarantees to prevent a Russian attack once mines are removed.

“You still have to get the parties to address the demining and the unfettered access and movement for the vessels themselves,” said the U.S. official.

Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and U.N. officials took part in grain-export talks in Istanbul earlier this month.PHOTO: TURKISH DEFENCE MINISTRY/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Russia is still seen as a potential spoiler, U.S. and other officials said, with Washington and Ankara trying to pressure the Kremlin to reach a deal and implement it.

“Turkey is pressing Russia to say this can’t be a zero nothing forever. And Russia, you’re not going to like the look if you make your own navy guys take back their own mines. That’s an admission of guilt,” the official said.

Mr. Putin, meeting Mr. Erdogan on Tuesday, thanked him for his mediation and said that the talks had made progress. “Not all issues, however, have been resolved. But the fact that we have moved forward is already good,” Mr. Putin said, according to remarks shown on Russian television.

Meanwhile, skeptical U.S. officials this week pointed to recent Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and grain-storage facilities as part of its war strategy.

“We are hoping for the best, but we have seen how Putin weaponizes food,” Jose Fernandez, the U.S. undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy and the environment, said on Wednesday.

To nudge the talks forward, the U.S. and the European Union have in recent days clarified that financial sanctions against Russia don’t pertain to food and agricultural trade. Clearing a path for Russia’s food and fertilizer exports is part of the framework for a broader deal on grain exports put forward by Mr. Guterres.

Russia and Ukraine have laid sea mines in the Black Sea. Cargo ships wait for port access near Constanta, Romania.PHOTO: ANDREI PUNGOVSCHI/BLOOMBERG NEWS

The stakes of a potential agreement are high for the poorer nations that were Ukraine’s biggest customers. Much of the grain formerly exported via the Black Sea went to Asian countries and to Egypt, the world’s largest importer of wheat.

While grain prices have fallen from the highs they reached in the aftermath of the invasion, an increase in Ukrainian supply would ease pressure on prices.

Grain traders working in the region also expressed doubt that Russia would allow the grain exports while its military campaign continues to destroy Ukraine’s farms, roads, grain-storage facilities and other vital infrastructure necessary to export grain.

“To me, their objective is strangulation, somehow or another, of Ukraine. They’ve been stealing grain from the occupied areas,” said Jonathan Grange, a partner at Sunstone Brokers, an agricultural-commodities brokerage working in Ukraine and the Black Sea region.

Ukraine exported about two million metric tons of grain in June overland and via smaller ships leaving the Danube River into the Black Sea, according to Ukrainian officials. That maritime route opened up this month after Ukraine’s military retook strategic Snake Island from Russia, which occupied it soon after the invasion began in February.

In addition to up to 18 million tons of grain currently trapped in Ukraine as a result of the invasion, there is also the challenge of how to store or export the country’s coming summer harvest of an estimated 65 million tons, according to Mr. Grange.

“We are desperately looking at those negotiations,” said Ivan Kriuchkov, a director at Ukrainian agribusiness IMC. “If the ports don’t open, where do we put all our grain?”

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A truck unloads harvested wheat into a storage facility in Ukraine’s Donetsk region as the Russian invasion continues.PHOTO: AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

### 2AC – Internal Link Turn

#### Continued assistance to Ukraine is key---otherwise, Russia is emboldened to engage again, and the US will lose its diplomatic credibility

Ferguson 7/14 (Michael P. Ferguson, **Master of Science in Homeland Security** at San Diego State University; "Is imperialism negotiable?", 7-14-2022, Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3559028-is-imperialism-negotiable/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

Despite modest gains in east Ukraine, June was not a good month for Russia. Within a single week, European Union leaders offered Kyiv candidacy for membership, NATO reached an agreement to bring Sweden and Finland into the alliance and Great Britain’s defense secretary, Ben Wallace, called for a 20 percent hike to his budget.

These historic developments are sure to rile Kremlin officials, but the future of Western support to Ukraine’s fight remains uncertain. As public interest in the war continues to dwindle, appeasing Russia’s extortionate demands could become more desirable. Such concessions would do more than disfigure Ukraine and impose devastating new realities on Western security institutions — they would declare to the world that imperialism is negotiable.

The debate over policy toward Ukraine has split experts into two camps. One side believes this war will end only when Russia is humiliated and exhausted militarily by a stream of Western arms packages. Until now, the Biden administration has pursued a strategy along these lines.

The other camp sees that option as far-fetched and too costly, and instead seeks diplomatic solutions to Russia’s war. Proposed remedies typically include allowing Russia to expand its borders into Ukraine and insisting that Kyiv amend its constitution by swearing never to join NATO. These conditions echo Moscow’s demands to the letter. In exchange, Russia might stop leveling Ukrainian cities. While this bargain is clearly an example of political extortion, it tends to moonlight under the cover of various euphemisms.

Among them are the terms “diplomacy,” “negotiations” and “realist international relations theory.” Veteran diplomat Henry Kissinger, scholars John Mearsheimer and Barry Posen and the New York Times editorial board have all argued for solutions in line with such euphemisms. Admittedly, as the war wears down the pocketbooks and attention spans of Western governments, even some Russia hawks have crept slowly into the appeasement camp. French President Emmanuel Macron, who only months ago reminded Putin slyly that France too was a nuclear power, has since said that Russia must not be humiliated in Ukraine.

These arguments have merit, but they miss the underlying question that appeasement poses to the world: If Ukraine is not worth saving from an overestimated and supposedly crumbling power, who is?

Such inquiries give shape to the type of global power competition described in U.S. strategic documents of the last two presidential administrations. The question is essential not only to resolving the war in Ukraine, but also to enabling the Biden administration’s integrated deterrence concept aimed at competing with powers such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea — each of which jockey for leverage over the West.

For them, this jockeying process involves convincing observers that the U.S.-led security infrastructure established after the Cold War is in a twilight and can no longer sustain the existing international order. Fear plays a role in driving the point home.

Bringing Finland and Sweden into NATO might strengthen the alliance, but their desire to join after seven decades of neutrality is proof that nations external to NATO feel remarkably vulnerable. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s political party won a super majority in Japan shortly after his July 8 assassination. He was perhaps most famous for his role as architect of the informal Quad alliance, what some consider the early phase of an Indo-Pacific NATO.

Aside from its paternalistic nature, appeasement fails to see the bigger picture. The idea of the free world as a conglomerate of nations that share liberal democratic values has animated political campaigns and national security policies for generations. This concept is rooted in the assumption that a rules-based international order prevents tyrants from doing exactly what Putin is doing. If the existing order cannot serve this purpose, it will suffer a severe blow to its credibility, especially in places where diplomats and military advisers such as myself work to assure foreign partners of our commitment to those principles.

Condoning Russia’s extortion further undermines the diplomatic process because it corrodes the legitimacy of existing treaties upon which many countries rely for materiel and political support. Clearly, Moscow has thrown out the Russo-Ukrainian Treaty of 1997. But the 1994 Budapest Memorandum – bearing the signatures of the United States, Russia and United Kingdom – offered Western-backed security guarantees in exchange for Kyiv relinquishing its nuclear arsenal. If that parlay ultimately contributes to Ukraine’s disintegration, the West could face a credibility crisis in future diplomatic exchanges. Putin’s statements amplify this erosion of trust and nest it conveniently within the twilight narrative.

Realists want the West to shake off the war in Ukraine and focus on China, even as Belarusian president and Putin ally Alexander Lukashenko uses terms like “moral cleansing” to describe his vision of Europe’s future. But if Moscow can leverage its atrocities in Ukraine to bludgeon the free world into conciliation, it will signify a terrifying new beginning, not the end of a war.

As argued by Lt. Gen. James Dubik in these pages, forcing Ukraine to the negotiating table in a position of weakness is a recipe for disaster. Considering the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the ongoing use of genocidal tactics in Ukraine and the likelihood of a protracted insurgency in Russian-occupied territories, it is folly to assume that a sacrificial land offering will produce anything resembling stability.

Russia’s incursion presents to the world a troubling question that it must answer collectively: Is imperialism negotiable? Outside Ukraine, appeasement is an easy option because it creates the mirage of reconciliation while demanding nothing from those conjuring the illusion. On the other hand, generating the political will to explore new frameworks of burden sharing in support of Ukraine’s fight is much harder, but it is the only solution that clearly answers the question of how much imperialism Europe will tolerate this century.

If the answer is anything more than zero, then Moscow is at liberty to continue exploiting that ambiguity with its imperial interests. Public officials from Washington to Canberra must consider the long-term effects of Russia experiencing anything less than abject failure in Ukraine.

One calls to mind the 1805 “Plumb-pudding in danger” cartoon in which Napoleon Bonaparte and British Prime Minister William Pitt are depicted at a dinner table carving up the globe. A rising tide of authoritarianism over the last decade means the situation in Ukraine might determine *who* now gets a seat at that table. The United States and its allies spend billions each year persuading foreign partners that the West can help deter, and, if need be, stop modern Napoleons. Now is the time to prove it.

#### “Do not humiliate Russia” is a dumb idea and only bolsters Russia’s stance---we are past the point of return

Bento 7/15 (Xavier Bento, Programme Assistant at Friends of Europe; "Don’t humiliate Russia! Or how to repeat past mistakes at the cost of European security", 7-15-2022, Friends of Europe, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/dont-humiliate-russia-or-how-to-repeat-past-mistakes-at-the-cost-of-european-security/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

Last month, French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that Europe “must not humiliate Russia so that the day the fighting stops, we can build a way out through diplomatic channels,” contesting that diplomacy must consistently be considered to address violent conflicts. Problematically, Macron simultaneously implied that negotiations could only take place if Russia can escape any form of shame or humiliation.

This gave rise to mixed reactions from other Western leaders. The United States Ambassador to the European Union, Mark Gitenstein, declared that Russian President Vladimir Putin had “humiliated himself” by his conduct in the war and that the West wanted to see him defeated on the battlefields of Ukraine. Similarly, former US ambassador to Moscow, Michael McFaul, claimed: “Putin will only negotiate when his army can’t keep marching forward, humiliated or not. Macron should focus on creating that condition.” The strongest European reactions came from the head of the Estonian parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission, Marko Mihkelson, who stated that Macron was “still looking for ways to save war criminal Putin from humiliation,” and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis claimed Macron’s comments risked jeopardising the unity and security of the EU. Most notably, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba said that allies should “better focus on how to put Russia in its place” and that “calls to avoid humiliation of Russia can only humiliate France and every other country that would call for it.”

By contrast, no reactions emerged from the German and Italian governments. Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Prime Minister Mario Draghi have previously hinted that resolving the conflict might require Ukraine to comply with Russian claims on certain territories. The four-point plan Draghi put forward in late May included a bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine to clarify the future of Crimea and Donbas, which would, in this scenario, have almost complete autonomy. The Italian plan’s proximity to core Russian demands had led many to describe it as ‘classic appeasement’. For his part, Scholz has avoided non-committal or conflicting public announcements, refraining from affirming that Ukraine should recapture all lost territory, settling instead to comment that Putin could “not win” the war.

Calls to avoid Russia’s humiliation do not guarantee Europe’s security, but rather strengthen Russia and weaken the EU in the long run

The notion that the EU would be well advised to spare Russia prevails within the Union, not least among the leaders of three member states. This stance is not only disrespectful to Ukraine, but its strategic thinking is fundamentally erroneous and short-sighted, and even endangers Europe in the long term. Recent history reveals that indulging a Putin-led Kremlin is not only an impractical and reckless policy, but prone to placing many European nations in a position of dependency vis-à-vis Russia, creating divisions between EU member states, and thus, making the Union vulnerable to Putin’s intimidations and pressures. Calls to avoid Russia’s humiliation do not guarantee Europe’s security, but rather strengthen Russia and weaken the EU in the long run.

Macron’s posture relies on the precedent set by post-WWI Germany, a nation whose humiliation caused by the Versailles Treaty is often cited as a driving factor for its return to the battlefield 20 years later. The takeaway behind this is that deeply humiliated countries make for bad partners in peace. In this case, Macron’s phrase reflects an attempt to avoid ‘making things worse’ and antagonising Russia to an extent that would be critical for Western democracies.

However, Russia has undermined Western objectives even in the absence of any provocation or humiliation. The Russian management of the Syrian issue, even before its 2015 intervention, and its illegal annexation of Crimea are just two illustrations of this reality.

Moreover, Moscow has repeatedly shown its tendency to use compromise frameworks to leverage permanent interference in its neighbours’ affairs, rather than to seek conflict resolution. This was displayed most recently by the 2014-2015 Minsk agreements, signed as a means to reunite Ukraine, but distorted by the Kremlin to enshrine a process that would see Russian-aligned administrations emerge in Luhansk and Donetsk. Making concessions that could be used by an adversary to maximise its influence and further escalate destabilisation abroad is evidently not a clever diplomatic strategy – and not one that Europe should rely on.

Putin’s demands contradict the very nature of what cooperation with Europe might entail

Behind this appeasement rhetoric lies a flawed and ineffective strategy for peace that is based on the premise that Russia still adheres to the post-Cold War status quo and seeks to integrate the European and Western circle. While this could have been true in the 1990s and the beginning of Putin’s first term as president, the perspective for improved relations suffered from the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the pro-Western democratic changes in Georgia, Ukraine and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan between 2003 and 2005, and Russia’s attack on Georgia in 2008. Any prospects whatsoever ceased to exist after Putin’s 2012 re-election. Macron’s belief in a functioning appeasement strategy for Europe is effectively ten years outdated.

Nowadays, Putin’s demands contradict the very nature of what cooperation with Europe might entail, as made clear by recent draft agreements with the US and NATO. With demands such as NATO withdrawal from eastern Europe or officially closing the door on Ukraine’s membership, these documents reinforce the Russian president’s obsessions with the survival of his regime and the country’s geopolitical might. As seen with Ukraine, Putin is clearly willing to engage in hostile actions and even go to war when he believes these objectives are threatened or that Russia risks being humiliated. Here lies the core problem with trying to appease or indulge Putin’s Russia: as the protagonist, Putin defines the rules of the game. The practice of appeasement leaves Europe in a position of weakness, vulnerability and ill-preparedness.

Rather than passively react to Russia’s demands, the EU must fortify its voice and set its own terms to Russia, even if the Kremlin will reject them. The point is not to get Russia to accept European terms, it is to stop playing by Russian rules.

This will require European nations to considerably bolster their stance vis-à-vis Russia. This is already being done through NATO, which significantly reinforced its military posture on its eastern flank and prepares to welcome Sweden and Finland to its ranks. But the greatest change needs to occur within the European Union.

A sense of urgency alone cannot sustain a common sense of purpose and unify all member states over time

A more secure Europe can emerge only with an EU that is better prepared to deter – or face – Russia politically, economically and militarily. The Union will thus need to take actions in all three of these domains.

First, it is essential that the EU abandon ambiguity and adopt more unified rhetoric when addressing foreign policy issues. The relative speed at which the EU27 managed to agree on sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine constitutes grounds for hope; however, a sense of urgency alone cannot sustain a common sense of purpose and unify all member states over time. The EU now needs to prioritise its unity on the international stage.

Second, the EU must be willing and able to protect its interests and oppose any adversary seeking to undermine its objectives through the use of economic instruments. Although limited in scope, the EU has only just started to leverage gas imports to pressure Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, despite medium and long-term costs for the Union. The EU must hold its ground and further integrate economic instruments in its foreign policy toolbox to compel opponents. The fact that the EU needs Russian gas more than Russia needs European cash is not immutable.

Finally, the EU must endorse its willingness to militarily defend itself against any potential aggressor. While the military aspect of defence is and will remain in the hands of NATO, the EU and its member states should clearly express and demonstrate the will to take up arms if needed. Moreover, Europe must prove its determination and ability to defend itself alone; the US cannot, and will not, fight Russia in a full-scale war at a time when its greatest strategic threat comes from the Pacific. In its recent ‘The Case for EU Defense’ report, the Center for American Progress proposed that the EU must now “focus on developing and acquiring new capabilities that can enable Europe to act without the involvement of the U.S. military.” Accordingly, the report called for American leaders to stop opposing EU defence integration initiatives, maintaining that the current approach encouraged unnecessary redundancies among EU countries.

Only with a long-term, coordinated, intensified and complementary rearmament strategy will the EU component of NATO be able to play its part within the alliance

While many EU member states have already increased defence spending in reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, these efforts will now need to be elevated to the EU level to ensure close coordination between member states – an objective also shared by NATO. Only with a long-term, coordinated, intensified and complementary rearmament strategy will the EU component of NATO be able to play its part within the alliance as an effective deterrent force against Russia.

Instead of debating if it should or shouldn’t humiliate a belligerent nuclear power, the EU must strengthen itself to keep Russia from ever crossing the line as it did with Ukraine not but six months ago. After all, as John Chipman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) put it: “Humiliation is a mild punishment for war crimes.”

#### Realism cannot solve the war now---negotiations will be rendered ineffective

Sood 7/11 (Rakesh Sood; "Ending the Ukraine war in an imperfect world", 7-11-2022, ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/research/ending-the-ukraine-war-in-an-imperfect-world/, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

The war in Ukraine has been underway for over four months. What began as a European conflict has had global repercussions. Of course, Ukraine and its people have borne the maximum brunt. More than five million Ukrainians have left the country and over eight million are internally displaced. Rising casualties and large-scale destruction have set back the country by decades. Recent estimates for rebuilding the destroyed cities and infrastructure are as high as $750 billion.

During 2020-21, most economies that could afford to, provided generous financial support to its citizens in the form of direct payments and subsidised food to tide over the economic hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Supply chains suffered disruptions, aggravated by politics. Economic recovery has generated demand, creating inflationary pressures. Today, inflation rates are rising across the world and in the largest economies have reached levels not seen since the early 1980s. As these countries tighten money supply, fears of recession loom large. The war in Ukraine has aggravated the situation for the poorer countries by creating food and fertilizer shortages. The sharp surge in energy prices threatens the prospects of economic recovery. Prospects of collective global action to deal with these challenges appear remote, given growing tensions among major powers.

Inflation rates are rising across the world and in the largest economies have reached levels not seen since the early 1980s.

And so, the war grinds on, with no end in sight.

The inevitable conflict

It is a fact that Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022 in gross violation of the United Nations Charter and international law; it is equally true that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not an innocent bystander. In 2022, Russia is the guilty one but NATO’s folly was to forget that the cost of its expansion goes up as it gets closer to the Russian border. Its strategic error was in concluding that Russia was in terminal decline and adopting an ‘open door’ policy.

By 2005, 11 former East European and Baltic states had joined NATO. Addressing the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin described NATO’s decision of moving eastwards and deploying forces closer to Russian borders, “a serious provocation”. The warning was ignored. At the NATO summit in early 2008, the United States pushed for opening membership for Ukraine and Georgia. France and Germany, sensitive to Russian concerns, successfully blocked a time-frame for implementation. As a compromise, it was the worst of both worlds. It convinced Russia of NATO’s hostility and dangled prospects for Georgia and Ukraine that NATO could not fulfil.

NATO continued to strengthen its relationship with Ukraine by providing it training and equipment, formalising it in 2020 by making Ukraine a NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partner.

Later that year, Russia intervened in Georgia on the grounds of protecting the Russian minorities, taking over the neighbouring provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2014, following the Euromaidan protests in Kiev against President Viktor Yanukovych, who was pro-Russian, Russia annexed Crimea and pro-Russia separatists, assisted by Russian mercenaries, created autonomous regions in eastern Ukraine. The fuse, lit in 2008, was now smouldering.

Post-2014, NATO continued to strengthen its relationship with Ukraine by providing it training and equipment, formalising it in 2020 by making Ukraine a NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partner. The presence of warships from Britain and the United States began to increase in the Black Sea. In 2019, the United Kingdom entered into a cooperation agreement with Ukraine to develop two new naval ports, Ochakiv on the Black Sea and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov, a move that Russia saw as potentially threatening. The die was cast.

Liberalism trumps realism

Neither side wanted war. NATO members insist that Ukraine would not be joining NATO but remains unable to walk back from its 2008 statement. This would be seen as ‘appeasement’. In diplomacy, appeasement had long been accepted as an honourable route to ensuring peace, practised by the British since the mid-19th century in its dealings with European powers and especially the U.S. as it sought to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Neville Chamberlain too used appeasement to negotiate “peace in our times” in 1938 but Winston Churchill employed it to pillory him and the term never regained respectability thereafter.

An equivalent term surfaced — sensitivity for each other’s core interests — practised during the Cold War to prevent the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from getting into conflict. With the end of the Cold War, this became history. The liberal school, having vanquished the Marxist school of thought, was now convinced of the righteousness of its cause. If only the rest of the world could be made to see reason, democracy would flourish, free markets ensure prosperity and a western-led rule-based order prevail. The triumph of liberalism led the neo-con believers towards interventionism (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, the Colour Revolutions, Syria); others, attracted by the prospects of the Chinese and Russian markets, deluded themselves that economic growth would lead to political openings.

The realist school of thought cautioned against military interventions backed by a one-size-fits-all democratic prescription and the risks of excessive economic dependence on China but these voices were dismissed. Many U.S. scholars and strategic thinkers cautioned against NATO enlargement, warning that Russia may be weak but it would be reckless to ignore its security interests; they were charged with ‘appeasement’. Liberalism was upholding ‘moral values’; amoral realism was easy to reject as immoral.

The realist school of thought cautioned against military interventions backed by a one-size-fits-all democratic prescription and the risks of excessive economic dependence on China but these voices were dismissed.

French President Emmanuel Macron talked in February of the Finlandisation model as an option for Ukraine. Austrian neutrality imposed by the U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and France in 1955, enshrined in its constitution was mentioned. But these solutions had found acceptance in a war-weary Europe when politics was frozen by the Cold War. Finland had accepted limited sovereignty and just two Presidents guided it — Urho Kekkonen (1956-82) and Mauno Koivisto (1982-94) and both also served as Prime Ministers. In 2022, such stability is impossible with power politics in flux, rivalries sharpening and populism on the upswing.

In early March, in an interview to Russian media, the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, declared that Ukraine was not pressing for NATO membership but wanted neutrality to be guaranteed; he even talked of autonomy for Donbas as a compromise and a period of 10 years for talks on Crimea. But that interview was soon forgotten.

How wars end

Wars often develop their own momentum and the Ukraine war is no exception. Russia possibly anticipated a short, sharp conflict, a collapse of the Kiev regime (perhaps similar to what happened in Kabul last August), and a lack of NATO cohesion. It has had to readjust its aims as it has settled down to a long and brutal war. The G-7, the European Union (EU) and NATO have displayed unusual cohesion and Ukrainians have shown exemplary grit and motivation. Russia is in a bind. Even its limited war aims of controlling Donbas and the Black Sea coast have been a slog. Finland and Sweden joining NATO will squeeze it further in the Baltic Sea. Ukraine’s ability to fight depends on how long western funds and military hardware keep flowing.

In a moral world, there is a right and wrong and Russia should be held to account. But in the real world, other factors come into play. A blame game or establishing the root cause will not help end the crisis. Eventually, talks will need to take place, between Ukraine and Russia and with NATO and the U.S. playing an outsize role behind the scenes. This means acknowledging Russia’s security interests in its neighbourhood.

The G-7, the European Union (EU) and NATO have displayed unusual cohesion and Ukrainians have shown exemplary grit and motivation.

The problem is that the war is now being cast in binaries — a battle between freedom and tyranny, between democracy and autocracy, a choice between rule-based order and brute force. This makes compromise difficult. And Russia cannot be defeated unless NATO wants to engage in a full-scale war.

The longer the war continues, the greater the suffering for the Ukrainians. The more territory Ukraine loses, the weaker will be its bargaining position at the table. And the longer the war continues, the greater the risk of an inadvertent escalation. History tells us that when faced with choices, major powers have a propensity to double down. The nuclear taboo has held since 1945; sane voices need to ensure that it is not breached. The sooner the war ceases, the better it is for Ukrainians, Russians and the world. It is an imperfect world, but we do not have another.

#### An “epic military win” is key---Russia’s on the brink of losing---BUT, giving up on military operations signals weakness to China over Taiwan, causing miscalc---current Western support is *slow*, but the AFF *speeds* it up

Corera 7/21 (Gordon Corera; "Russia about to run out of steam in Ukraine", 7/21/2022, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62259179, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten

Russia will struggle to maintain its military campaign and Ukraine may be able to hit back, the head Britain's foreign intelligence service says.

MI6 chief Richard Moore said Russia had seen *"epic fails"* in its initial goals; removing Ukraine's president, capturing Kyiv and sowing disunity in the West.

He was speaking at the Aspen Security Forum, in a rare public appearance.

He called the invasion "the most egregious naked act of aggression... in Europe since the Second World War."

He said recent Russian gains were "tiny" and that Russia was "about to run out of steam".

"Our assessment is that the Russians will increasingly find it difficult to find manpower and materiel over the next few weeks," Mr Moore told the conference in Colorado. "They will have to pause in some way and that will give the Ukrainians the opportunity to strike back."

That view may be seen as optimistic and Ukraine's ability to counter-attack may well depend on greater supplies of Western weaponry, which its officials say has often been too slow in arriving.

The MI6 chief said some kind of battlefield success would be an "important reminder to the rest of Europe that this is a winnable campaign" - particularly ahead of a winter which was likely to see pressure on gas supplies.

"We are in for a tough time," he said. A further reason to maintain support to help the Ukrainians win, or "at least negotiate from a position of significant strength", he said, was because China's leader Xi Jinping was "watching like a hawk".

"There's no evidence that [President Vladimir] Putin is suffering from ill-health," he replied when asked, echoing comments from his US counterpart CIA Director William Burns at the Forum yesterday.

Around 400 Russian intelligence officers operating under cover have been expelled across Europe, he said, reducing Russia's ability to spy in the continent by half.

"Our door is always open," he said when it came to recruiting disaffected Russian officials to spy for Britain.

MI6 puts most effort on China

On China, he said MI6 had "never had any illusions whatsoever about Communist China".

He revealed MI6 now devoted more effort to China than to any other single subject - the effort in this field having just moved past that devoted to counter-terrorism.

He said it was "too early to tell" what lessons China would draw from Putin's actions in Ukraine, but there were lots of signs officials in Beijing were going into overdrive to work out what they thought. "It is quite difficult to read at the moment," he said.

He said it was "important" to remind China's leadership of how an invasion of Taiwan could go wrong. He said China's leadership underestimated US resolve and power and this might lead them to miscalculate. "I don't think it is inevitable," he said when asked about a major conflict.

On Iran, he said a nuclear deal was "absolutely on the table", but he was sceptical that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wanted to sign a deal.

For all the limitations, he said the previous deal was still the best means available to constrain the Iranian nuclear programme.

Asked if the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan last year made it harder to deal with threats, he acknowledged "this was a reverse for us when it happened and it is now more difficult". He said it would require finding "different ways" to deal with the Islamist terrorist threat, including working with partners who MI6 may not normally deal with.

Asked to reflect on the state of politics and violence in the United States, the MI6 chief sidestepped the question, but stressed his "huge affection" for the US, where he had studied and taken his first paid job as a teenager.

He corrected the interviewer to say this job had been as a beach attendant rather than a lifeguard. "I didn't have the body for that," he said to laughter from the audience.

#### China-Taiwan war goes nuclear. Deterrence is key. It’s fast and more probable than European war.

Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, \*senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, \*\*fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear/)//BB>

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.

### 2AC – AT: Link

#### There is still room for NATO involvement---fears of escalation are unfounded---the US and NATO must adopt a policy of going just-behind crossing the redline

Altman 7/12 (Dan Altman; "The West Worries Too Much About Escalation in Ukraine: NATO Can Do More Without Provoking Moscow", 7-12-2022, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-07-12/west-worries-too-much-about-escalation-ukraine, DOA: 7-17-2022)//sposten

As the world looks on while Ukrainians fight for their lives and their freedom, many feel a burning desire to do more to support them. The problem is not a lack of forces or resources—it is fear of provoking a wider, perhaps nuclear, war with Russia. That fear is why U.S. President Joe Biden and other NATO leaders have consistently made clear that they will not intervene directly in the conflict, instead limiting their help to weapons, money, intelligence, and sanctions. As devastating as events in Ukraine are today, a nuclear war with Russia could kill more people than Ukraine’s entire population of roughly 44 million.

NATO leaders understand that they must walk this fine line between aiding Ukraine and risking war with Russia, but they have no theory of how to do it. The German and French governments hem and haw about whether to provide Ukraine with tanks. When Poland proposed a plan to transfer MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Ukraine, the United States refused. U.S. Defense Department spokesperson John Kirby warned that it “raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance” and therefore was not “tenable.” Yet the United States was already shipping Javelin antitank missiles and Stinger surface-to-air missiles. Soon after, it began sending other weapons, including M777 howitzers and now HIMARS multiple rocket launchers. What is the difference? Those weapons do more to strengthen Ukraine’s combat power than MiG-29s, so the theory cannot be that Russia reacts more strongly to policies that do more harm to its interests. Why, then, missiles and artillery but not planes? The answer is that there is no answer. It is simply arbitrary.

NATO needs a strategy predicated on a theory of what it can do to aid Ukraine without widening the war to a direct conflict between it and Russia. Lessons from past crises point to the principles that should guide such a strategy. History shows that NATO would recklessly risk war only by crossing two Russian redlines: openly firing on Russian forces or deploying organized combat units under NATO-member flags into Ukraine. As long as NATO stops short of unmistakably crossing those lines, it can do more to help Ukraine at an acceptable risk of war.

Arms transfers and sanctions are both wholly consistent with this approach, so it is tempting to conclude that NATO members are doing all they can. They are not. They should build on current policies by dispensing with arbitrary limits on the types of conventional weapons they are providing Ukraine and expanding sanctions. Moreover, there is a third way to support Ukraine besides arms and sanctions—one that NATO is neglecting. It is time for NATO to encourage, organize, and equip its soldiers to volunteer to fight for Ukraine.

WALKING THE LINE

NATO should pursue a strategy of going as far as possible in Ukraine without plainly crossing Russia’s redlines—meaning refusing to openly attack Russian forces or send combat units into the country. The United States prevailed in the gravest crises of the Cold War by using this approach.

The Cold War’s first major showdown—the Berlin blockade of 1948–49—evinced this strategy. Although easily able to overwhelm U.S., British, and French troops in what would become West Berlin—an enclave deep inside Soviet-occupied East Germany—Soviet leader Josef Stalin did not seize the territory. To do so would have meant attacking those troops and thus provoking war. Instead, he imposed a blockade that choked off food and coal for two million Berliners. When Soviet troops blocked the roads and railways, Western leaders declined to attack them to reopen supply corridors. They resorted to an airlift instead, betting that Stalin would not attack defenseless transport aircraft. In the end, the vaunted Berlin airlift succeeded.

More than a decade later, American leaders decided to impose a blockade in lieu of launching an open attack—this time, during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Angered by the Soviet Union’s attempt to sneak nuclear missiles into Cuba and Moscow’s lies about it, U.S. President John F. Kennedy was initially inclined to destroy the missiles with airstrikes. He and others around him, however, decided the risks were too great. Director of Central Intelligence John McCone deemed airstrikes too risky, writing in a memo that the “consequences of action by the United States will be the inevitable ‘spilling of blood’ of Soviet military personnel.” He went on: “This will increase tension everywhere and undoubtedly bring retaliation against U.S. foreign military installations.” Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev recognized this, too. According to a transcript of his remarks at a Soviet Presidium meeting, he feared that a U.S. attack would spark a war: “The tragic thing—they can attack, and we will respond. This could escalate into a large-scale war.” Kennedy chose neither to attack nor to accept the missiles as a fait accompli. He instead blockaded Cuba. In history’s gravest nuclear crisis, neither leader ordered an attack.

One attack did occur, however, when Soviet generals on the ground in Cuba decided to launch surface-to-air missiles to shoot down an American U-2 spy plane that had entered Cuban airspace. The attack killed U.S. Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., the pilot. Khrushchev’s fears of war peaked at that moment, and Moscow chastised the generals who carried out the attack. Before retaliating, Kennedy gave diplomacy one last chance. Shared fears about the implications of that shootdown led both sides to make concessions that helped resolve the crisis. In the end, the United States prevailed by taking risks without attacking.

The United States and the Soviet Union also engaged in proxy wars to avoid attacking each other directly and starting World War III. Both countries used large-scale arms shipments and sometimes soldiers fighting as volunteers to support local forces. Designed to avoid escalation, such covert wars are a common tactic in international politics. During the Korean War, Soviet pilots secretly fought in the Chinese air force. Soviet arms equipped North Vietnam, and Soviet soldiers even operated surface-to-air missile batteries against U.S. aircraft. Despite its losses, the United States decided to tolerate this Soviet participation rather than widen either war. The Soviets also allowed similar behavior from the United States on other battlefields. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, for example, the United States armed and financed the mujahideen resisting it. The Soviet Union eventually withdrew. As recently as 2018, Russian Wagner Group mercenaries in Syria unsuccessfully attacked U.S. forces operating alongside Kurdish forces. The United States did not treat it as an attack by the Russian government.

HOW FAR CAN NATO GO?

These examples underscore that pushing as far as possible without openly attacking is often the best way to compete while managing escalation risks. Creative policymaking can engineer options that achieve objectives without crossing redlines, thus preventing a wider war. Providing intelligence that Ukrainian forces use to kill Russian soldiers is not the same as NATO openly attacking Russia, nor is support in cyberspace. Lithuania’s restrictions on Russia’s use of its territory to ship goods to Kaliningrad meet this standard. Even enlarging NATO to include Finland and Sweden and deploying forces eastward to defend NATO members bordering Russia entail acceptable risks; such actions do not constitute an attack on Russia. In fact, there is good reason to think that NATO can do even more in Ukraine without provoking a wider war.

Some believe that Russia’s nuclear weapons and greater interests in Ukraine give it the advantage over NATO. This is mistaken. It is true that NATO leaders prioritize avoiding war with Russia over aiding Ukraine, but it is just as true that war with NATO would cost Russia far more than would abiding most forms of aid to Ukraine. After all, Russia is already struggling mightily against Ukraine. It cannot simultaneously win a conventional war with NATO. And no one would win a nuclear war.

Interests alone do not determine who has the advantage when both sides wish to avoid war. Instead, the advantage goes to the side that puts the other in the difficult position of choosing whether to escalate or accept a limited defeat. The side that must start the war is in the more difficult position. Russia has tolerated NATO’s sanctions and arming Ukraine for precisely that reason.

### 2AC – AT: Negotiations

#### Sanctions mean the U.S. and its allies are key to negotiations.

James M. Acton 3/10, Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., 3/10/2022, “To Support Zelensky, the United States Needs to Negotiate With Putin,” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/10/to-support-zelensky-united-states-needs-to-negotiate-with-putin-pub-86612>, RES

“It’s not that I want to talk to Putin,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week about Russia’s president. “I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. There is no other way to stop this war.” The United States should heed this plea. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion has been both heroic and effective, but its situation is precarious. For all their flaws, Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict, and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government. Moreover, even if Ukraine can hold off Russian forces indefinitely, the prospect of forcibly evicting them from its territory—particularly in the south—is daunting. All the while, Russia is slaughtering Ukraine’s citizens ever more indiscriminately. But as Zelensky’s statement suggests, Ukraine’s plan to end this war is probably not to vanquish the invading forces. Rather, its goal appears to be to make the prospect of continuing the war, and the occupation that could follow it, exceptionally painful for Russia—so painful that Putin comes to view a settlement agreement that preserves Ukraine’s independence as the lesser of two evils. Putin may already be feeling the pain. The United States believes that Putin embarked on this war seeking to conquer most or all of Ukraine. Today, Moscow has implicitly recognized Zelensky’s government by demanding, in return for an end to the war, that Kyiv agree to Ukrainian neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. If Ukrainian forces continue to perform well, Putin will have to settle for still less and may even have to pay Ukraine reparations. (Conversely, if Russian forces achieve breakthroughs, Putin will be able to drive a harder bargain.) Even in the best case, if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement, he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. Any such concessions will probably be bitterly opposed by many in the United States and Europe. Ultimately, though, it is not their call. The democratically elected government of Ukraine should get to decide what price it is willing to pay for an end to the slaughter of its citizens and the preservation of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state. The United States and its allies should support Zelensky in any diplomatic course he pursues. Indeed, he cannot end the war without them. Economic sanctions on Russia strengthen his hand at the negotiating table by raising the costs to Russia of continuing to fight. By the same token, however, it is virtually inconceivable that Russia would agree to a settlement without sanctions relief. For this reason, the United States and its allies must be prepared to lift sanctions—including on Russia’s central bank—if Russia and Ukraine negotiate and implement a settlement agreement.

#### OR The U.S. isn’t going to be involved in negotiations.

Anurag Roushan 7/3, 7/3/2022, “Russia-Ukraine war | US Won't Press Ukraine To Engage In Peace Negotiations With Russia, Says John Kirby,” <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/us-wont-press-ukraine-to-engage-in-peace-negotiations-with-russia-says-john-kirby-articleshow.html>, RES

As the forces of Russia and Ukraine continue to engage in the ravaging war, US National Security Council (NSC) coordinator John Kirby stated that it's not Washington's role to press Kyiv to engage in peace talks with Moscow. “It’s time for the United States to continue to support Ukraine, and that’s what we are doing,” Kirby told a journalist on Fox News Sunday. He went on to say that the decision of whether and when to pursue a diplomatic settlement with Russia would always be made by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. "President Zelenskyy gets to determine how victory is decided and when and on what terms. And what we’re going to do is continue to make sure that can succeed on the battlefield so that he can succeed at the table. But even President Zelenskyy will tell you that the time is not now for those discussions," the US NSC coordinator added. According to reports, Russian troops continue to make steady progress in Ukraine's eastern region and launched recent strikes on Kyiv and other cities in the country. Kirby also commended Ukrainian forces, saying that they have resisted Russian invaders far more successfully than anyone anticipated.

# Germany-Russia Relations

## 1NC – Germany Relations

### 1NC – German Economic Collapse Scenario

#### German-Russia relations are high despite the Ukraine War – lack of draw towards NATO solidifies Russian influence

Stefan Meister ’22, Head of Program, International Order and Democracy, DGAP, “Germany’s Russia problem”, Wilson Center, 2/1/22, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/germanys-russia-problem

In the framework of Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine and the Kremlin’s calls for a new security order for Europe, Germany has become the weak spot for the West. It is the major entry point for the Kremlin to divide Europe and upset transatlantic relations. With the departure of Angela Merkel, however, Germany finds itself without an adequate Russia policy and irresolute in its defense of Ukraine. **The new governing coalition in Germany**, which sees the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz as chancellor, Annalena Baerbock of the Green Party as foreign minister, and the Liberal Christian Lindner as minister of finance, **lacks a common Russia and Eastern Europe policy**. This leads to disagreements on how to respond to the substantial security challenge Europe is facing now. **The new coalition’s agreement had no clear statement on Russia**. Nord Stream 2, a particular point of contention for the EU and the United States, was not mentioned at all. The text said only that Germany’s energy policy is to be regulated at the EU level. **Chancellor Scholz seems unwilling to deal with the Russia challenge and allows the leftists in his own party to undermine Germany’s and Europe’s sanction and deterrence efforts**. The governing coalition appears to lack leadership on the current crisis with Russia. German politics and society are divided over Russia. There is still a strong legacy of guilt linked to the Nazi regime and the more than 20 million deaths in the Soviet Union; Ostpolitik has also had a long tail affecting current sentiment in Germany. Former chancellor Willy Brandt’s decision to open relations between the former West Germany and the Eastern bloc, which became known as his administration’s Ostpolitik, is a solid part of the identity of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and important segments of German society. Many talk about Russia, but few people in the Bundestag today really understand the logic of Putin’s regime. **There are wings in both the Green Party and the SPD that are opposed to supplying weapons to Ukraine or challenging nuclear deterrence**. Relevant parts of the SPD want to see Nord Stream 2 operational, and Frank Walter Steinmeier (also of the SPD) a year ago was still arguing that Nord Stream 2 and Germany’s energy policy were probably the last bridges to Russia. **The rhetorical ambiguity with regard to Nord Stream 2 and possible sanctions supports the perception in the Kremlin that there will be again no tough sanctions imposed by the West, just as no tough sanctions were imposed in 2008, in response to the Russo-Georgian War, or in 2014, with the Russian occupation of eastern Ukraine**. Key politicians from the biggest opposition party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), have made it clear they will not support the international banking system SWIFT sanctions and argue that sanctions levied against Russia should not harm Germany too much, especially in a time of high energy prices. Several key actors in the governing coalition, including those from the (neo)liberal Free Democratic Party, support this position. Crisis of Communication **Germany, with its history of Nazi rule, has credible grounds for its refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine**. **But with the changing security situation in Europe, Germany needs to engage in a responsible debate on this topic, a debate nobody is willing to lead**. At the same time, it is incomprehensible that Germany should try to prevent NATO partner Estonia from supplying older East German−origin weapons to Ukraine. **The unwillingness of Chancellor Scholz to clarify Germany’s position has created a communication crisis for the German government**. He does not provide leadership for Germany on Russian bellicosity, and Germany is not leading Europe in addressing the current crisis. In this light it becomes ever clearer how important Angela Merkel was in providing leadership to Europe with respect to Russia after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the Donbas, and in maintaining a direct channel of communication with the Russian president. The current lack of a strong German presence weakens Europe even more at a time when Moscow has made clear that only talks with Washington are relevant in discussing the future of Ukraine and European security. The U.S. president Joe **Biden took political risks when he made a deal with Angela Merkel on Nord Stream 2. He further supported Germany in the U.S Congress by preventing, at the time, additional sanctions against Russia.** But Germany is not returning the favor. **Lower gas prices and finalization of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline seem to be more important than a united transatlantic front. Germany now receives more than 50 percent of its gas from Russia, making it even more vulnerable**. This dependence weakens the Western sanctions policy and Ukraine. Germany under Angela Merkel had become the main political partner for Ukraine after Poland pivoted to focusing on historical and domestic policy issues.

#### German relations with Russia are increasing due to lack of a cohesive NATO vision for European security – the plan flips that

Tank Oguzlu ’21, Professor, Antalya Bilim University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Antalya, Turkey, “NATO's Transformation into a Global Actor in the Age of Great Power Politics.”, Perceptions (Vol. 26, Issue 1), Center for Strategic Research, Spring-Summer 2021, https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA674712060&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=abs&issn=13008641&p=AONE&sw=w&userGroupName=umuser

While many Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the three Baltic republics, view Russia as their key geopolitical challenge, many Western and European allies are predisposed to see both Russia and China more from a geoeconomic than geopolitical perspective. **While they feel quite concerned about the challenges that China and Russia pose to the roots of the liberal international order, the Western European allies seem to share the view that adopting a tough geopolitical approach toward Russia and China would likely diminish any hope left to help revitalize multilateral global governance** in the years to come. From a European perspective, it would not be possible to achieve long-term peace and stability across the European continent if Russia were to be excluded from the European security architecture as a legitimate player. **Indeed, pushing Russia further into a corner would endanger European security**. **A similar situation prevails in the context of the Europeans' relations with China**. China offers Europe immense opportunities to tap into. **It is quite notable that Germany is not buying into American pressure to stop cooperating with Russia in the Nord Stream II project, nor are many European allies heeding the American warning that they would do well to prevent China from building the 5G telecommunication infrastructure** across the continent.

**Given that the U.S. is no longer as committed to European defense at it was in the past and does not want to act as the sole leader of the liberal international order any longer, it behooves the European allies to develop their own capabilities to survive as an herbivorous actor among such carnivorous powers as Russia, China and the U.S**. The willingness of the European allies to mantle such a role in the emerging global order is now more evident than ever, and the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Layen has underlined that the EU will have to evolve into a geopolitical actor. This seems to explain why the EU has recently mentioned China in its documents as a systemic rival while signing off on NATO's latest communique in late 2019 that the rise of China and Russia now offer both opportunities and challenges.

European members of NATO would likely invest in building up their hard and soft power capabilities if this were the only way for them to protect their decades-old achievements alongside the EU-integration process. They need to acquire a more geopolitical vision in order to survive in the emerging great power competitions. It remains to be seen, however, whether they will build up their geopolitical identity within a NATO or an EU framework. **It is also uncertain whether they view the U.S. as a committed believer in the liberal international order**--**or as a rouge global power that adopts a zero-sum perspective toward international politics and sees the world from a sphere of influence mentality**. It is an open-ended question whether the transatlantic allies will be able to refashion NATO as a credible global security actor that meets the challenges of the emerging century.

#### Relations with Russia are key to the German economy – underpins the entire EU economic system

Evgeny Tugolukov 7/13/22, investor, founder of the Medscan group of medical companies., “Evgeny Tugolukov: Germany’s prosperity is fueled by Russia, and the Siemens story suggests the penny may be dropping in Berlin”, RT, 7/13/22, https://www.rt.com/news/558883-germanys-prosperity-fueled-by-rus/

Since its historic reunification in 1990, Germany has secured its prosperity with advanced industry and technologies, which in turn has been driven by the hard work and creative spirit of its people. **However, to a large extent, the success of German industry was ensured by energy and raw materials from Russia, which made its goods more competitive on the global market**. This informal alliance, in many ways, allowed Berlin to become the locomotive of the entire economy of the European Union, and enabled Russia to overcome the crisis of the 1990s that followed the collapse of the USSR. In the days of Gerhard Schröder’s chancellorship, **Russian-German relations were a model of mutually beneficial cooperation**. From a philosophical point of view, the fate of the two countries is an example of an historical paradox, when how things are contradict how they should be. Right now, we are not in direct conflict, but clearly Berlin, along with its Western allies, has engaged in a proxy fight with Russia. One that has been building since shortly after Schröder left office and his successor, Angela Merkel, agreed to a number of measures which set the course for a confrontation. The “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck, the founder of the united German state, once prophetically said: “A war between Germany and Russia is the greatest stupidity. That’s why it’s bound to happen.” From the point of view of objective logic, a strategic alliance between the two great continental powers could be a guarantor of peace and prosperity in Europe. Sadly, now it is difficult to discuss the perspectives of a partnership, but the Germans, as practical people, always think – and indeed talk – about what will come the day after some tumultuous event. Severing ties that have developed over decades is fraught with hardship. Thus, there is still hope that among the elites of Western countries there will prevail not only the instinct of self-preservation, but also a rational approach, which is usually so characteristic of the Germans. In this sense, the outcome of the Siemens gas turbine story can be considered a landmark event. Of course, the company produces far more than turbines. The exchange of knowledge, experience, technology, equipment, and pharmaceuticals plays a huge role. **Thus, attempts to isolate Russia will not only lead to human suffering, which is immoral, but also slows down the development of research in many areas**. Such as in medicine, for example, where – as the COVID-19 pandemic has recently shown – every day counts. Cooperation in humanitarian areas such as healthcare can pull our relationship out of the hole where it currently exists. **The revival of interaction in such cases, there is no place for confrontation, will help develop both economies, and restore trust**. Do not forget that a native of Lower Saxony, Baron Karl von Munchausen, who served as an officer for the Russian empresses and even took part in one of the Russo-Turkish wars, was able (if, of course, we can believe his stories) to pull himself, along with his horse, out of a swamp by his own hair. Germany needs Russia and Russia needs Germany. More importantly, **a safe, secure, and prosperous Europe needs them both working in harmony**. **The alternative will benefit neither side**.

#### Collapse of EU economy results in cascading economic warfare that draws in all countries in the region – on the brink now due to Ukraine

Amanda Cooper 7/12/22, freelance journalist, “As 'economic warfare' threatens to break out in Europe, the euro finally crumbles below $1 for the first time since 2002”, Yahoo! News, 7/12/22, https://www.yahoo.com/news/economic-warfare-threatens-break-europe-102400479.html

The euro hit exactly $1 for the first time in 20 years on Tuesday, after Russia's decision to shut off a major natural gas pipeline threatened to wreak havoc across the region and business sentiment in Europe's economic powerhouse hit a 10-year low. The euro has lost around 12% in value against the dollar already this year, in part because of an expectation for the Federal Reserve to raise US rates more quickly than the European Central Bank will raise eurozone rates, even though both are racing to contain surging inflationary pressures. Behind the drive towards the buck this week has been Russia closing the Nord Stream 1 natural gas pipeline for 10 days this month for seasonal maintenance. While closures for maintenance are routine on refineries or pipelines, the fear among European governments is that Moscow will not reopen it, which could pave the way for an epic surge in energy prices. "T**his scenario will also create massive gas shortages in the region, prompting authorities to implement fuel rationing and, in the worst case, order brief shutdowns of factories to reduce energy consumption heading into the winter season, paving the way for what could be a deep recession**," Diego Colman market analyst at Daily FX, said. "The threat of economic warfare will be on every trader's mind and depress the euro in the coming days until market participants have a better idea of what Russia plans to do next," he said. The final catalyst arrived on Tuesday, when an index of German businesses showed confidence hitting a 10-year low in July of -53.8, marking a sharp deterioration from June's -28. "**The experts assess the current economic situation significantly more negatively than in the previous month and have further lowered their already unfavorable forecast for the next six months**," Achim Wambach, president of the ZEW institute, which produces the survey, said. The euro briefly hit a session low in Europe of $0.9999, before recovering modestly to $1.00377, flat on the day. The last time it went below $1 was December 2002. **Europe relies on Russia for 40% of its natural gas needs, most of which arrive via pipeline**. Russia was already piping gas at around 40% capacity through Nord Stream 1 in retaliation for Western sanctions on its financial and energy sectors over its war in Ukraine. With regional natural gas prices now showing a 380% increase compared with last year and little prospect of shoring up inventories ahead of the winter, EU governments are scrambling to find alternative sources of fuel, firing up idled coal and even nuclear plants, and some have even considered rationing. Wholesale inflation in the eurozone is running at an eye-watering 36.3%, largely because of energy prices, while that in the United States is just 10.8%. The ECB has not yet raised interest rates, which are at 0%, while the Fed has raised rates to 1.75% from 0.25-0.50% at the start of the year and more large hikes are in the works. Another unwelcome surge in natural gas prices could force manufacturers and businesses across the region to slow, or shutter activity altogether, which could keep the euro below $1.00 for some time, analysts said. "**I fear that once this dam is broken, the euro could settle below that level** for the time being, until we (hopefully) know at the end of next week whether the gas is flowing again," Commerzbank strategist Antje Praefcke said in a note.

#### Multiple scenarios for extinction

Markley 16 (Stephen, Journalist for Paste Magazine, “Is France the Final Domino for the European Union?”, Paste Magazine, December 15, 2016, https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2016/12/is-france-the-final-domino-for-the-european-union.html)

For many Americans reading this, there is no doubt a sense of remove from the relevance of the European project. Think of it this way: for centuries Europe was the Middle East of the world. It was a war-hungry, dysfunctional, violent, chaotic piece of the globe that could barely go a decade without a barbaric, usually pointless blood-letting conflict. Since World War II and the economic and political integration that brought former nation-state rivals into mutually beneficial coexistence, the continent has been a region of remarkable prosperity and stability. Keep in mind, this has never happened before in human history: a set of political leaders and their constituents voluntarily chose to cede elements of sovereignty in order to form a better, stronger union. The United States and Great Britain, often mentioned as democratic ideals, were two empires won by violent conquest in which wealthy elites only begrudgingly allowed democracy to sift down to the most impoverished and brutalized citizens.

The parochial movements of the last five to ten years—from the EU’s troubles to the Scottish independence vote to the surge of American nationalism that brought us such phenomenon as the go-it-alone war in Iraq and now Donald Trump—have different roots and causes but they do share a common thread. We live in an increasingly complex and interdependent world where the greatest threats to peace, individual well-being, and human flourishing are largely transnational. Climate change, infectious disease, nuclear proliferation, financial crisis, cyber insecurity—these are all borderless phenomenon that do not care if their victims are French, British, American, or Syrian. Their worst consequences do not care about our flags, languages, religions, or skin colors. And yet at a time when transnational peril necessitates a greater need for cooperation, tolerance, and unity, Western liberal democracies are taking a hard turn into fragmentation, arrogance, self-pity, and denial. The break-up of the European Union brought on by a wave of selfish, quasi-authoritarian nationalism would be a staggering blow to the economic and political security of what remains of the increasingly precarious free world.

## 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox

### 2NC – UQ

#### Scholz’s speech condemning the Ukraine invasion was all bluster – Germany is choosing closer relations with Russia now

Priyanka Shankar ’22, journalist for Al Jazeera, “**Months into the Ukraine war, has Germany’s position changed?**”, Al Jazeera, 5/5/22, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/5/germanys-russia-policy-under-the-microscope-amid-war-in-ukraine

President Vladimir Putin has been intensifying Russia’s aggressive stance for years, with the Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Even so, Berlin’s ties with Moscow have remained strong. According to Germany’s Federal Statistical Office, **trade with the Russian Federation increased in January 2022 compared with January 2021**. German exports to Russia increased by 30.7 percent while imports grew by 57.8 percent compared with the previous year. Since the war began in Ukraine, Berlin has begun phasing out its trade relations by imposing sanctions against Russian oligarchs and businesses and supporting a proposed European Union ban on Russian oil. **But some German officials continue to maintain a close relationship with the Kremlin**. Former German Chancellor Gerhard **Schröder has kept key positions at Russia’s oil firm Rosneft and energy giant Gazprom**. While he has participated in efforts to broker peace, his bond with Putin has been criticised. “For a long time, German decision-makers were under the illusion of a ‘change through trade’ policy approach. However, Gerhard **Schröder in particular has also lost his ‘democratic compass’ towards Russia by turning his close ties with Putin into a personal benefit for himself and by refusing to dissociate from the Russian leader** – despite Russia’s aggression in Ukraine,” Stefan Scheller, an associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations told Al Jazeera. But, according to Ischinger, the former chancellor’s relationships and business affairs are a private matter. “Germany has a system, which is a system based on freedom. The former chancellor can conduct whatever business he wishes to do, just like anybody else. He does get criticised every day by almost everyone because people don’t like his close association with the Kremlin. But that’s his problem and not the problem of the German government,” he told Al Jazeera. Scholz refuses to visit Kyiv Meanwhile, Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently upset some when he told German broadcaster ZDF that he would not visit Kyiv – a decision that came after Ukraine snubbed German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. **Ukraine had said Steinmeier would not be welcome in the capital because of his close relations with Putin**. But the president has admitted to “getting Putin wrong” and that the now-halted Nord-Stream 2 project, which he advocated, was a mistake. Referring to Scholz, Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, Andrij Melnyk, said his ostensibly retaliatory refusal to visit doesn’t sound very “statesmanlike”. This was not the first time Ukraine has called out a German chancellor’s actions. In early April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy referred to former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and ex-French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to block Ukraine’s NATO application bid as a “miscalculation” that led to “the most horrific war in Europe since World War II”.

#### Germany-Russia relations are high now – Nord Stream 2 and Russian troop withdrawals

France 24 ‘22, the international news channel, broadcasts 24/7 (6 hours a day in Spanish) to 355 million households around the world in French, Arabic, English and Spanish., “‘Lasting security’ in Europe can only be achieved with Russian help, Scholz says”, France 24, 2/15/22, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220215-lasting-security-in-europe-can-only-be-achieved-with-russian-help-chancellor-scholz-says

**Germany’s Chancellor** Olaf **Scholz** on Tuesday **welcomed Russia’s partial troop withdrawal from the Ukrainian border, labelling it a “good sign”, and noted that lasting stability and security in Europe could only be achieved with Russia’s help**. In the first apparent de-escalation in weeks, Moscow on Tuesday announced that some of the more than 100,000 troops and hardware amassed along Ukraine’s border were returning to their bases at the end of planned exercises. Western leaders have accused Moscow of positioning the troops in advance of a possible invasion of pro-Western Ukraine, warning that any attack would be met with severe economic sanctions. Speaking at a press conference after talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, **Scholz said Russia was a crucial player in maintaining security in Europe and that Russia must remain a partner in ensuring stability on the continent.** "For Europeans it is clear that lasting security cannot be achieved against Russia but only with Russia," he told reporters. “**The diplomatic possibilities are far from being exhausted**,” Scholz said. “That we hear now some troops have withdrawn is a good sign, we hope more will follow,” he said, noting that: “It should be possible to find a solution. No matter how difficult and serious the situation seems to be, I refuse to say it is hopeless.” Nord Stream 2 as leverage **Scholz also said that he was committed to ensuring the transit of gas through Ukraine**. “**We are committed to ensuring gas transit in Europe works through Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and Nord Stream 1 according to the agreements we have. And we also want to ensure peaceful development in Europe**,” Scholz said. Scholz reiterated that while he was intent on ensuring that a confrontation did not occur in Ukraine, if that were to happen, there would be consequences. The controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine in bringing Russian energy to Germany, has emerged as a sticking point in Berlin’s relations with Washington and Kyiv. Many observers in Europe are concerned over Germany’s increasing reliance on Russian energy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned that Russia would use the pipeline as leverage. “We have certain disagreements in our assessments” of the Russia-Germany energy link, Zelensky said after talks with Scholz in Kyiv on Monday.

#### Multiple factors tie Russia and Germany together

Paul Maurice ’22, is a researcher at the Committee for the Study of Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) at Ifri, where he works in particular on questions of German domestic policy, Franco-German relations in the context of European construction and the political foreign and security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany., “A ''change of era''? Towards a Reorientation of German Foreign Policy after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”, Ifri Briefings, Ifri, March 7, 2022., translated by Google Translate, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/briefings-de-lifri/new-era-toward-realignment-german-foreign-policy-after-russian

The escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine at the beginning of 2022 raises the question of Germany's reliability with its partners - within the Atlantic Alliance or the European Union (EU) . **In this crisis, Germany first appears as the "weakest link" of Europe, even the "Trojan horse" of Russia within** the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (**NATO**). This Russian-Ukrainian crisis has had the effect of "testing both the cohesion of the new ''traffic light'' coalition, the authority of Chancellor Scholz and the adaptability of German foreign policy postMerkel1 ". Within the Chancellor's party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), there are a large number of “ Rußland-Verstehers ”, who have a measured, even complacent attitude towards Vladimir Putin. The case of former Social Democrat Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) is the most symptomatic. **The "personal friend" of Vladimir Putin sits on the boards of Russian energy companies such as Nord Stream AG and Rosneft, and is due to join that of Gazprom in June 2022**. After his controversial remarks on the "threatening attitude" of Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz had to clarify his position on Gerhard Schröder2. The former Chancellor has today, despite the pressure, still not resigned from his post, but he is increasingly isolated. Green MEP Reinhard Bütikofer spoke of personal sanctions against him, and most of his close aides resigned in early March. Gerhard Schröder is certainly an extreme case within the SPD in terms of his position on Russia, but opposing camps have existed for a long time on this subject. This is why the party's new co-president, Lars Klingbeil, wanted to put an end to the dissonance. **This position within the SPD has, however, marked German foreign policy in recent years** – especially since the Social Democrats have occupied the Foreign Ministry for twelve years out of the sixteen that have passed. **This ambiguity vis-à-vis Russia is shared by other political parties, such as Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Party** (CDU). **Admittedly, the former Chancellor was known for her cordial** – reciprocal – **intimacy with Vladimir Putin**, but it had always refused to characterize the Nord Stream 2 project as anything other than a “purely economic” project. She had also refused to put this project in the balance during the balance of power with Russia in August 2020 – when she welcomed the opponent Alexeï Navalny in Berlin. **Finally, within the army, certain officials also adopted an ambiguous attitude, which may have sown doubt as to German intentions**. The head of the German Navy, Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach, had made controversial remarks on January 22, 2022 regarding the "respect" that Vladimir Putin deserved and the "ineptitude" of the intentions lent by the allies NATO to Russia to invade Ukraine. If the admiral resigned the same evening and was disavowed by the Ministry of Defense, the remarks questioned the reliability of Germany. –,

### 2NC – AT: Ukraine

#### To appease Russia, Germany has refused to supply arms to the allied effort in Ukraine.

Karnitschnig ’22 [Matthew; correspondent at Politico; 1-20-2022; "Germany’s pivot from America"; POLITICO; https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-pivot-from-america/; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]

The unfolding crisis in Ukraine reveals that reality cuts both ways.

Germany’s allies hoped Olaf Scholz’s coalition, which includes the Russia-critical Greens, would back away from the accommodative policies toward Moscow that marked the Angela Merkel era. Recent days have shown such optimism to be misplaced.

As Washington has tried to present a united Western front against Russian intimidation in recent weeks, Germany has been a conspicuous outlier. Under the influence of a potent cocktail of energy and commercial interests, and a political culture laced with good old-fashioned anti-Americanism, Germany has strayed from the Western fold.

To outward appearances, Berlin is far from AWOL on Ukraine.

“After years of rising tensions, staying silent isn’t a sensible option,” Chancellor Scholz said on Wednesday in reference to Russia’s amassing of troops on the Ukrainian border, stressing that Germany was committed to Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

“It’s hard not to see this as a threat,” Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said of the border buildup on a trip to Moscow this week.

But when the cameras are turned off, Germany’s tone changes.

While the U.K. scrambles to deliver tanks, rocket artillery and other weaponry to the Ukrainians, Germany has refused to send even rifles.

And instead of locking arms with the U.S. and other transatlantic allies to help Ukraine prepare for an attack, Germany has sought to placate Russia by taking some of the West’s most powerful deterrents off the table.

As the crisis has intensified, German officials and politicians have strenuously opposed using the threat of suspending Russia from SWIFT, the Belgium-based international payments system, a step that would make it extremely difficult for Russian entities to engage in international commerce.

Even Germany’s conservative opposition cautioned against using SWIFT as a bargaining chip. Friedrich Merz, leader of the center-right Christian Democrats, said suspending Russia’s access to the network would be the financial market equivalent of dropping an “atomic bomb.”

While Scholz has signaled that halting Nord Stream 2, a natural gas pipeline between Germany and Russia awaiting final regulatory approval, would “have to be discussed” if Russia invades Ukraine, he has stopped well short of pledging to do so.

So what’s Berlin’s plan? Germany’s big idea for resolving the Ukraine crisis is to revive a dormant diplomatic process known as the Normandy Format that includes Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine but, notably, not the U.S. (That same gathering came up with the so-called Minsk accords, a failed effort to halt the fighting in eastern Ukraine.)

Out of sync

Pipeline politics and the affinity many German elites hold for Russia are often cited to explain Berlin’s steadfast refusal to take a harder line toward Russia.

### 2NC – Link – T/L

#### Russia will abandon Germany if they perceive them taking a pro-NATO stance – reverses decades of precedent in the relationship

John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,\*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, \*\* is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “Introduction”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22

For German policymakers today, **Russia’s readiness to have an adversarial political relationship with Germany and disrupt its alliances while continuing to sell it gas and buy its goods is disturbingly counter-intuitive**. To them, it makes no sense for Russia to turn away from Europe and sacrifice a relationship with Germany that brought it clear advantages in the past. **After all, Germany lobbied for the G7 to expand to include Russia. It consistently went the extra mile in both the EU and NATO to encourage its allies to show sensitivity to Russia**. For example, it played a key role in 2008 in blocking the US proposal in NATO to give Membership Action Plans to Georgia and Ukraine. It also took on the burden of justifying the Nord Stream pipelines designed to bring gas directly from Russia to Europe. Moscow’s apparent indifference to damaged relations is even more bewildering since Putin likes the country and takes a deep interest in it. Worse still, **Russia is attacking Germany indirectly by fanning divisions within the EU and NATO and weakening its strategic anchors**.

#### Germany is choosing Russia now despite Ukraine – only the plan’s attempt to rebuild trust with allies flips the script

Jörn Fleck ’22, is Deputy Director of the Europe Center., “Experts react: The view from European capitals as consensus emerges against Russia”, The Atlantic Council, 1/28/22, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-the-view-from-european-capitals-as-consensus-emerges-against-russia/#the-view-from-germany

A tumultuous few weeks seem to have nudged the new German government toward aligning with allies on a stronger deterrent stance. Should Russia escalate in Ukraine, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock pledged on Thursday that the cancellation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline would be among the measures on the table, alongside a panoply of severe sanctions. **No talk of sending arms to Ukraine or of enhancing forward presence on the Eastern flank however**—that’s still a bridge too far for this coalition. Germany’s coming around is too little, almost too late—and a real shame, as Germany had made some progress towards becoming a more responsible stakeholder in Europe, especially since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. Foreign-policy officials and eventually even former German Chancellor Angela erkMel had come to understand that Russian revisionism had teeth. Berlin had started to tack away from a naïve view of Germany-Russia relations and toward a more hawkish stance. **The last few weeks have undermined German credibility among allies and partners**—from Kyiv to Tallinn, and from Warsaw to Washington. Some of the rhetoric directed at Berlin in recent days has been excessive, but it reveals real disappointments. The recent German pledge to supply five thousand helmets for Ukrainian troops betrayed a keen lack of understanding of where key allies are in preparing for the worst. Recent moves by the United States to increase the pressure on Russia and prepare for further escalation only accentuate how far behind the curve Berlin is. **Rebuilding the trust squandered this January will require a step up in international engagement, as well as a concrete plan for Germany to support tougher measures should the crisis escalate further**.

#### Germany’s relations with Russia are driven by conflicting interests – the plan forces them to align against Russia for fear of aggression

John Lough ’21, is an Associate Fellow with the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, “Why Germany’s relationship with Putin’s Russia is a problem for Ukraine”, The Atlantic Council, 7/9/21, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-germanys-relationship-with-putins-russia-is-a-problem-for-ukraine/

If the German political class today has fewer illusions about Russia, many of its reflexes have remained. **The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is a monument to Germany’s undimmed desire to use economic relations as a tool to stabilize Europe’s ties with Moscow and to prevent Russia’s isolation**. Although Merkel is believed to have privately hoped that the pipeline was in breach of EU competition law and would not go ahead, she has made no effort to stand in its way. Merkel has belatedly accepted that Nord Stream 2 is not just a commercial project, and the German government is now trying to agree a formula with the US that will incentivize Russia to continue the transit of gas through Ukraine and limit the Kremlin’s ability to use the pipeline for geopolitical purposes. **Germany’s instincts towards Russia are shaped in large measure by the contradictory and violent history between the two countries in the twentieth century.** Germany fears Russia but admires it at the same time. **It senses that Europe is incomplete without Russia firmly anchored within it, but cannot reconcile itself to the fact that today’s version of Russia is not compatible with today’s Europe**. At the same time, Germany tries to avoid confrontation and struggles to resist aggressive Russian behavior. It cannot countenance supplying defensive weapons to Ukraine. Its historical narrative about “the east” gives little space to the Belarusian and Ukrainian lands, a reflection of its discomfort with the murderous devastation carried out there by Hitler’s armies. Instead, Germany transfers its sense of guilt about Nazi crimes inflicted on the peoples of the USSR exclusively to modern Russia. Its academic expertise on Belarus and Ukraine is strikingly underdeveloped compared to that on Russia. With her East German background, Merkel has a clear understanding of Russia and is far from indifferent to Ukraine. For all her limitations, she has provided vital support to Kyiv since 2014. Her successor is unlikely to bring the same insight and confidence to dealing with Germany’s eastern neighborhood.

### 2NC – Link – Cyber

#### Russia’s influence in Germany is driven by ability to conduct cyber operations – the plan forces Germany to respond and restrict that influence

John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,\*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, \*\* is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “7 Russian influence in Germany”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22

**German discussion of Russian influence in Germany focuses almost exclusively on disinformation, cyber vulnerabilities and the susceptibility of the Russian German community to the AfD message**. Clearly, these should all be factors of concern for German policymakers, but they pale in comparison to the significance of Russia’s well-established networks in Germany across the worlds of politics, business, media and NGOs. These make Germany an easy target for Russian influence operations. There has been no in-depth research on the political connections of the CDU/ CSU and SPD in Russia. For example, it is surely significant that the East German head of the CDU’s political foundation office in Moscow has close personal ties with the Kremlin party, United Russia.61 **Yet, in an article discussing foreign political influence in Germany, the head of counter-intelligence at the domestic intelligence agency did not even refer to these relationships**62 – an indication perhaps of their sensitivity. The registration of the DOC and the lack of restrictions on the professional activities of former officials point to further alarming gaps in Germany’s counterintelligence defences. **In addition, Russia’s influence-building activities benefit from another factor in Germany, which is unavailable elsewhere in Europe**. Despite tensions in bilateral relations, the combination of trauma about Russia and gratitude for reunification require the political class to think in terms of reconciliation with Moscow and to pursue dialogue and cooperation. **This creates multiple opportunities across different fronts to build relationships and project Russian views**. Some journalists and businesspeople who have served for long periods in Moscow and have ‘gone native’ provide valuable channels for projecting pro-Russian views. For example, the Spiegel journalist Benjamin Bidder, who spent ten years in Russia, caused controversy in late 2019 after writing a story casting doubt on the veracity of Hermitage Capital’s account of the agonising death of its lawyer Sergey Magnitsky in a Moscow jail in 2009. As noted in Chapter 6, Andrea von Knoop, the official representative of Germany business from 1993 to 2007, is another example of an outspoken critic of western policy towards Russia. In 2016, Putin granted her Russian citizenship in recognition of her contribution to building business ties. She has lived in Russia for over thirty years.63 Germany’s deep respect for Russian culture is another significant advantage that facilitates the process of conditioning Germans to a Russian message. Currently, 158 members of Parliament (Die Linke and the AfD combined out of a total of 709) whose parties have clearly pro-Russian positions on sanctions, for example, provide Moscow with a much larger influence platform than it has in any other major European country. Finally, a further benefit for Russia in Germany is that public opinion has marked pacifist tendencies and does not support significant investment in defence. For now, Russia can remain sure that Germany’s bark will be worse than its bite. At the same time, in the face of pressures aimed at societal disruption, Germany has proved resilient thanks to its strong institutions, including its media, and its relatively low levels of inequality compared to the UK and the USA. **However, past performance is not necessarily a guide to the future since Russia has so far deployed some of its ‘harder’ instruments sparingly possibly because it does not want to alienate irreversibly its once strongest advocate in the EU and NATO**. For example, Moscow chose not to deploy the data it stole from Parliament and government servers in the run up to the federal 2017 election. This would have risked moving beyond managed disruption and damaging the bilateral relationship beyond repair. In the case of its interference in the US presidential election in 2016, Russia appeared to conclude that it had more to gain than to lose, while in Germany the calculation was possibly the reverse. There is speculation that a high-level German warning beforehand persuaded Putin to refrain from interference in the election. In addition, it is uncomfortable for Germany to discuss the dangers posed by Russian ‘soft’ power without calling into question the guiding principle of seeking maximum contact with Russia to prevent conflict and as redemption for the past. **To this extent, Russia does not need to use the ‘harder’ instruments of power as robustly as in many other countries to achieve its desired levels of influence.** This situation may change if Germany’s Russia policy hardens further. Some of Russia’s established influence-building advantages are in any case already starting to erode. The Ostpolitik generation is leaving the scene. Their successors, born in the 1980s, have less awareness of the Second World War and the division of Germany. They were still children when the Wall fell and have less instinctive sympathy for Russia. **Over time, Moscow will need to find new tools and messages to ensure that Germans remain conditioned to respond to its voice**. Yet for now, Russia’s influence in Germany remains strong and of a qualitatively different nature to that in other major European countries.

## 2NC Impact Toolbox

### 2NC – EU Collapse Impact

#### Collapse of the German economy results in dissolution of the EU

Samuel Geddes ’22, journalist, “From Brussels to Beijing, a wave of economic collapse may be about to strike”,, Al Mayadeen English, 5/11/22, https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/opinion/from-brussels-to-beijing-a-wave-of-economic-collapse-may-be

Where the price of oil will go as a result is anyone’s guess, but what is certain is that all energy importing countries will suffer from unprecedented economic stress. Many economies may cease functioning entirely and effectively exit the modern world system. **As well as the Global South, this shock will profoundly affect the European Union, itself overwhelmingly dependent on imported energy**. Bafflingly, Brussels seems only half satisfied with ending its oil imports from Russia, roughly 25% of its total needs. Of far greater significance is the nearly 40% of European energy imports from Russia in the form of natural gas, that Brussels, with enthusiastic encouragement from Washington, has declared its intent to phase out. With the Russo-Ukrainian conflict devolving into a protracted war of attrition, the EU leadership is more aggressively pushing for an immediate end to gas imports as well, cutting off Moscow’s single largest income stream. Among the few opposing voices has been Irish MEP Clare Daly, who noted that further sanctions would not only cause huge privation to ordinary Russians but would fuel already rampant inflation and a historic decline in living standards within Europe. Whether the EU embargoes Russian gas, whether Moscow pre-empts this with its own embargo against Europe, or whether Ukrainian forces begin targeting pipelines from Russia that transit their territory, Daly’s warning may prove to have been overly conservative. **For Germany alone to completely lose access to Russian energy would be a crisis on par with the hyperinflation of the 1920s**. Contingency plans have been activated to prepare for fuel rationing, signaling the choice Berlin will soon have to make between heating and electrifying the homes of its citizens and keeping its industries alive. **If the vast petrochemical facilities of western Germany, which have been the economic nerve center of the continent for over 150 years, are forced to scale down or even end production, the Eurozone’s days as a pole of the global economy are likely finished for good**. Even if the conditions causing the collapse are only temporary, Europe’s aging demographics are already well past the point at which it will be able to rebound to its previous economic prominence. A wave of sovereign bankruptcies and exits from the Eurozone and the end of the European project itself seem to be an on-rushing reality.

#### The EU prevents a North Korean arms race and escalation.

Boris Toucas 17, Visiting Fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “North Korea: The European Union Could Help Break the Diplomatic Stalemate”, Beyond Parallel – CSIS Blog, 1/5/2017, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korea-the-european-union-could-help-break-the-diplomatic-stalemate/

North Korea’s continued progress on its nuclear and missile programs remains one of the most significant challenges to the international community. This is why the adoption of a new UN Security Council resolution that closes an important sanctions loophole and imposes closer scrutiny of North Korea’s diplomatic activities sends a strong, if late, message of unity and international resolve. But what comes next? There are a variety of options: Diplomatic normalization? This could trigger a regional arms race. Military intervention? This could plunge Northeast Asia into chaos. Unfortunately, prospects for negotiations are bleak, and unofficial discussions between North Korea and the United States are unlikely to succeed as in previous rounds.

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. —Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950

I recently argued that North Korea isn’t the only actor responsible for the international community’s fatigue in addressing a dangerous security dilemma. In fact, the Six-Party Talks–only framework may have undermined prospects for exploring other types of negotiations when these talks failed. Such a situation is counterproductive as it convinces North Korea to continue its destructive behavior to achieve a new outcome. By contrast, introducing more actors into the talks could potentially reduce tensions between the main parties and could help Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo reframe the discussion. Mongolia, Singapore, Malaysia or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could be potential participants, but what about the European Union and its member states? While the European Union will never be the main actor in resolving the North Korean crisis, there is an argument for Europe’s increased participation in the debate.

The European Union’s Potential Added-value on North Korea

The European Union’s multiple-layered diplomatic approach represents a unique tool for placing pressure on troublesome countries: besides members states’ bilateral channels, the European Union is also a vehicle aimed at undertaking coordinated action once political consensus has emerged. Twenty-six out of twenty-eight EU members maintain diplomatic relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), six of which have diplomatic offices in Pyongyang (France only has a humanitarian and cultural office). These bilateral ties are diverse, with some dating back to the Cold War. They are of crucial importance to the North Korean regime, as part of its narrative on legitimacy and its appetite for international recognition, which may be attractive to them. Washington would certainly benefit from having the European Union and its members more proactively using their own diplomatic influence on the regime and its clients.

Furthermore, EU expertise in proliferation crises is often underrated. The European Union was a party to the negotiations with Iran, as was France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Most member states actively take part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), intercepting illicit trade flows across the Mediterranean. Moreover, the European Union has implemented one of the most comprehensive restrictive measures regimes against North Korea, which has evolved into a comprehensive strategy directly targeting the civil and military proliferation chain, as well as strategic economic sectors. Finally, the 2016 decision to put an end to hosting the DPRK’s overseas workers also represents a laudable attempt to tackle financial flows that indirectly support proliferation activities, which sets a precedent for the activities of Russia, China, and several of North Korea’s clients in Africa and the Middle East. However, outreach among the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union on these practices has been limited so far, preventing full harmonization of national policies among the like-minded.

As an external actor to the region, the European Union could play a particular role in unlocking negotiations. First, it has a better record on implementing restrictive measures than, for example, some potential new Asian players, whose stance is more ambiguous. Second, it is a bureaucratic machine that has the unique capacity to build consensus among partners even when their interests are at odds. Paradoxically, the ability to observe North Korea from afar might give the European Union an advantage over the participants of the Six-Party Talks where the six countries have different vital interests at stake. In this regard, the European Union is detached just enough to dare to make innovative proposals.

#### Nuclear war

Timothy Graves 17, Master’s Degree in Creative Writing from Birkbeck, University of London, “Is The World On The Brink Of Nuclear Armageddon?”, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/timothy-graves/nuclear-armageddon\_b\_14789678.html

Since Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration last month, sales of dystopian fiction have soared. Novels that have flown off the shelf, or recently made it into Amazon’s top ten best-selling books chart, include George Orwell’s 1984, Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale and Huxley’s Brave New World. The resurgent interest in fiction that depicts a bleak totalitarian and authoritarian society reflects the fact that we are now living in a much more volatile and dangerous world. I do not think it is scaremongering to say that in recent years humanity has faced a number of catastrophic or even existential threats. From climate change and the rise in international terrorism to the prevalence of biological and chemical weapons, our capacity for warfare and destruction, and what the poet Robert Burns called ‘man’s inhumanity to man’, is self-evident.

But I believe the most pressing and immediate threat is that posed by the arsenals of nuclear weapons that have been stockpiled by the nuclear-armed states of the world who take false refuge in the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine (MAD). In light of President Trump’s comments about nuclear weapons, last month atomic scientists in Chicago moved the hands on the Doomsday Clock to the closest it has been to midnight for sixty four years. Midnight represents global nuclear war.

With the ushering in of what some are already calling The New World Order, there are currently several flashpoints across the globe which could trigger a nuclear war. With a realignment in U.S.-Russian relations and Trump’s commitment to NATO in question, if Putin were to invade one or more of the Baltic States the situation could easily escalate and potentially trigger a nuclear strike. Russia itself is preparing for nuclear conflict. In October last year, the Russian government launched a nationwide nuclear training exercise with forty million people. It also unveiled Russia’s latest ‘super-nuke’, aptly dubbed ‘Satan 2’, which has the power to wipe out most of Britain, Northern France, the Netherlands and Belgium in a single strike. This month Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian air force to prepare for a ‘time of war’.

Other potential geo-political flashpoints include North Korea and the Pakistan/Indian dispute over Kashmir. A few days ago, in violation of United Nations resolutions, North Korea successfully test-fired a new type of medium to long-range ballistic missile. Kim-Jong-Un, supreme leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, has warned the West that he will soon have nuclear weapons capable of targeting the U.S. Whether this is true or not, it seems highly likely that North Korea already has the capacity to put a nuclear warhead on a medium range missile which would be in easy striking distance of South Korea or Japan. This, in turn, increases the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region.

### 2NC – EU Economy Impact – AT: Defense

#### German economic decline collapses EU and US economies

Ewing 19 (Jack Ewing writes about business from New York, focusing on the auto industry and the transition to electric cars.Before relocating to New York in late 2021, Mr. Ewing spent more than two decades reporting from Europe. He joined The International Herald Tribune, now the international edition of The New York Times, in 2010 as European economics correspondent, based in Frankfurt. Previously, he worked for a decade at BusinessWeek magazine, where he was European regional editor, August 16, 2019, “Germany Has Powered Europe’s Economy. What Happens When Its Engine Stalls?”, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/business/eu-economy-germany-recession.html>)

When a debt crisis slammed the eurozone nearly a decade ago, Germany’s powerhouse economy helped lift troubled neighbors like Greece, Portugal and Spain above the turmoil. The question that Europe faces now is whether those countries are strong enough to return the favor. **Germany is on the brink of recession** after its economy declined in the year’s second quarter. Spain, by comparison, is experiencing brisk growth, and even the Portuguese and Greek economies are expanding. Buoyed by tourism, booming construction and steady job growth, the southern European countries are helping to offset Germany’s weak performance. But will it be enough? As the **United States economy appears to slow**, **China loses momentum and Brexit looms, can Europe dodge a downturn**? The question may be decisive for Europe, and crucial for the United States. The **European Union and the United States are each other’s biggest trading partners**, and a **slowdown in Europe would be another drag on America’s economy** at a time when bond markets are already flashing warning signs. Most economists are not yet predicting a Europewide recession, but they are worried about the prospect. There is little chance that the European Union can thrive when Germany is sickly. “If the largest member state is affected,” said Katharina Utermöhl, senior economist at the German insurer Allianz, “this will also start to weigh on the euro area as a whole because of the close economic relations.” Should Europe sustain more economic body blows, like a no-deal Brexit, a debt meltdown in Italy or an escalation of the trade war, Ms. Utermöhl said, “the **risk of a recession is rather high**.” Some economists are more pessimistic. “Euroland is headed for a recession,” Carl Weinberg, the chief international economist at High Frequency Economics, a research consulting firm in White Plains, N.Y., said in an email Friday. “All the writing is on the wall.” Mr. Weinberg cited numerous indicators of trouble: less production at eurozone factories, surveys showing increasing gloominess among business managers and a contraction in global trade. The perilous state of the eurozone economy will be an early test for Christine Lagarde when she succeeds Mario Draghi as president of the European Central Bank in October. Mr. Draghi is expected to announce a new package of stimulus measures next month, but Ms. Lagarde will have to consider what the central bank can do if the situation gets worse. When Germany’s official statistics office reported on Wednesday that the economy shrank 0.1 percent in the second quarter, shock waves rippled through stock markets around the world. The reaction reflected the degree to which Germany sets the tone for the Continent. **Germany has the eurozone’s biggest economy**, accounting for more than a quarter of the bloc’s output. It has the most people, 83 million, **and the most workers**, who help stoke nearly every other country’s economy. The list of European Union countries that count Germany as their No. 1 trading partner is long. It includes France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Slovakia and Sweden. The relationships sometimes border on dependency. Germany accounts for 27 percent of Poland’s foreign trade. Britain, Poland’s No. 2 trading partner, accounts for only 6 percent, according to World Bank data. Suppliers throughout Europe earn much of their revenue by selling to big German manufacturers like Daimler, Siemens and ThyssenKrupp. But those companies are struggling. Daimler, the maker of Mercedes-Benz cars, has issued three profit warnings since October. Siemens, whose products include high-speed trains and equipment for oil and gas producers, this month reported a 6 percent decline in net profit. And the ratings firm Moody’s downgraded ThyssenKrupp’s debt further into junk territory this week, an indication that the giant steel maker is considered a default risk. As it strains against the German downdraft, Europe is battling a host of other woes. High on the list is Italy, which has a stagnant economy, an unstable government and one of the highest debt burdens in the world, giving it the potential to touch off another financial crisis. Another risk is that Britain will leave the European Union without a deal with Brussels, creating chaos in the flow of goods across the English Channel. And car sales are plunging around the world, threatening an important source of jobs in countries like Italy, France and Slovakia. The biggest squeeze comes from the trade war. President Trump’s tariffs on a range of Chinese imports and on European steel and aluminum have disrupted supply chains and profoundly unsettled managers who make decisions about how much money to invest in new factory space and how many people to hire. Germany is especially vulnerable to trade tensions because exports account for almost half of the country’s gross domestic product. And it is most sensitive to the downturn in the auto industry because vehicles are the country’s biggest export. Sales of German cars have slumped as Chinese buyers pull back. It can be difficult to gauge how deeply other individual economies are rattled by the trade war, but the latest numbers across Europe, released on Friday, contained troubling signs. Eurozone exports fell 5 percent in June, the European Union’s official statistics agency reported. Trade accounts for about one-third of the bloc’s gross domestic product. **Eurozone growth has already been meager this year**. The 19 countries in the currency bloc collectively grew 0.2 percent from April through June. The European Union, which includes the eurozone plus nine other countries, recorded the same rate. Spain was one of the best performers, registering a growth rate of 0.5 percent compared with the previous quarter, which helped balance out Germany’s 0.1 percent decline in output. But Spain and other fast-growing countries like Denmark and Finland are not big enough to replace Germany as Europe’s economic locomotive. Even if Europe manages to avoid two consecutive quarters of declining output, the technical definition of a recession, no one expects growth to be particularly impressive. “The **slowdown in growth is everywhere in the eurozone**, more or less,” said Jörg Krämer, the chief economist at Commerzbank. “**There is no decoupling.”**

#### Economic decline causes great power war and extinction

Liu 18 (Qian Liu is an economist based in China, November 13, 2018, “From Economic Crisis to World War III”, https://www.neweurope.eu/article/from-economic-crisis-to-world-war-iii/)

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a **prolonged economic crisis**, combined with rising income inequality, could well **escalate into a major global military conflict**. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labour markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilise and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, **prolonged periods of economic distress** have been characterised also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to **fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war**. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in **income inequality is often followed by a great crisis.** Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalisation, political polarisation, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald J. Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the **next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation.** By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue.

### 2NC – EU Economy Impact – Internal Link

#### Cohesion with the rest of Europe incentivizes Russia to shut of German pipelines, destroying their economy

Al Jazeera 22 (Al Jazeera is the state-owned Arabic-language international radio broadcaster of Qatar. It is based in Doha and operated by the media conglomerate Al Jazeera Media Network, July 11, 2022, “Nord Stream 1 pipeline shuts down amid German suspicion of Russia”, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/11/gas-pipeline-shutdown-starts-amid-german-suspicion-of-russia>)

A **major gas pipeline from Russia to Germany shut down** for annual maintenance on Monday, as Berlin grew concerned that Moscow may not resume the flow of gas as scheduled. The Nord Stream 1 pipeline, Germany’s main source of Russian gas, is scheduled to be out of action until July 21 for routine work that the operator says includes “testing of mechanical elements and automation systems”. The operator’s data showed the gas flow dropping as planned on Monday morning. But **German officials** are **suspicious about Russia’s intentions**, particularly after Russia’s Gazprom last month reduced the gas flow through Nord Stream 1 by 60 percent. Gazprom cited technical problems involving a gas turbine powering a compressor station that partner Siemens Energy sent to Canada for overhaul. That turbine could not be returned because of sanctions imposed over Russia’s war on Ukraine. Canada said over the weekend that it would allow the part to be delivered to Germany, citing the “very significant hardship” that the German economy would suffer without a sufficient gas supply. **German politicians have dismissed Russia’s technical explanation** for last month’s reduction in gas flows through Nord Stream 1, **saying the decision was a political gambit** to sow uncertainty and push up prices. German Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck had said he suspects that Russia may cite “some little technical detail” as a reason not to resume gas deliveries through the pipeline after this month’s maintenance. However, a spokesperson for the economy ministry said that while **Germany is in a serious situation when it comes to its gas supply,** the security of supply is currently guaranteed. The Nord Stream 1 pipeline transports 55 billion cubic metres (bcm) a year of gas from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea. The head of Germany’s network regulator, the Bundesnetzagentur, said “no one can say exactly” whether the gas will be switched back on. “As expected, Nord Stream 1 is at zero since this morning,” Klaus Mueller, head of the Bundesnetzagentur, told Reuters on Monday. “What happens at the end of the maintenance, nobody is able to say at this moment. We won’t know any time sooner than a day before its scheduled end.” Mueller said that gas consumers have lobbied Bundesnetzagentur for priority treatment in the event of potential gas rationing later in the year. The regulator would base allocation decisions on their social and economic impact and consequences for delivery chains, Mueller said. Such decisions would be taken in October with the help of an IT platform, he added. Ukraine and its allies accuse Moscow of using spurious pretexts to strangle gas flows in retaliation for sanctions over the invasion, which **Russia describes as a “special military operation**”. The Kremlin denies the manipulation of gas flows or using energy as a political weapon. Meanwhile, **Germany** and the rest of Europe are **scrambling to fill gas storage** in time for winter and reduce their dependence on Russian energy imports. Germany, **home to Europe’s biggest economy**, has been getting about **35 percent of its gas to power industry and generate electricity from Russia.**

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – UQ

#### Germany is firmly committed to NATO again post-Ukraine invasion

Paul Maurice ’22, is a researcher at the Committee for the Study of Franco-German Relations (Cerfa) at Ifri, where he works in particular on questions of German domestic policy, Franco-German relations in the context of European construction and the political foreign and security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany., “A ''change of era''? Towards a Reorientation of German Foreign Policy after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”, Ifri Briefings, Ifri, March 7, 2022., translated by Google Translate, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/briefings-de-lifri/new-era-toward-realignment-german-foreign-policy-after-russian

But this turnaround in German foreign and security policy is not only beneficial to Europe, however. **The German Chancellor gave numerous pledges to US President Joe Biden who hoped to see Germany once again become this “model ally” after the Trump era**14. Once again, **Germany remains faithful to its principles, according to which “the cohesion of the European Union” is not incompatible with “the strength of NATO”.** Finally, in this volte-face vis-à-vis Russia, the strength of these changes must be for Olaf Scholz to use "as much diplomacy as possible", but "without being naive": it is the duty of the diplomacy "to keep the channels of discussion open". Diplomacy within the framework of international institutions has always been the guarantee of a democratic German foreign policy faithful to the principles of international organizations of collective security. At an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly on March 1 , 2022, Foreign Minister Annalaena Baerbock, called on the international community to condemn outright the Russian aggression which “brutally attacked” the international order of peace. His speech reaffirms both the attachment to the principles of collective security and also shows that the Russian invasion marks the beginning of a new era for German diplomacy.

#### The Ukraine invasion was the last straw for Germany-Russia relations

Judy Dempsey ’22, is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe., “Russia’s Invasion Has Become a Watershed Moment for Germany”, Carnegie Europe, 3/3/22, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/03/03/russia-s-invasion-has-become-watershed-moment-for-germany-pub-86553

In just thirty minutes on Sunday, Chancellor Olaf Scholz put Germany on a radical new path. **In an extraordinary speech made during a special session of the German parliament on Sunday, Scholz ended the decades-long Ostpolitik of his Social Democratic Party** (SPD), **with immense ramifications for Europe and NATO**. Ostpolitik, or “eastern policy,” was forged in the early 1970s and intended to bring the Soviet Union politically and economically closer to Europe. One major component was building a gas pipeline, which the United States opposed, that West Germany hoped would bring confidence, stability, and predictability with the USSR. But Ostpolitik also meant that Germany’s ruling left wing had little sympathy for dissident movements in communist Eastern Europe, as these movements upset the Cold War status quo. **That belief in having a special relationship with Russia persisted even when President Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014**. Germany’s powerful and influential business lobbies and pro-Russia left-wingers preferred to protect their interests with Russia, despite the Kremlin’s crackdown on human rights, press freedom, and civil society. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Thursday was the last straw for Scholz. He became convinced that Germany could no longer hedge its bets with Russia. In his speech to legislators, he laid out his vision for the country’s radical shift. Scholz said German defense spending would increase to 2 percent of gross domestic product, meeting the target set in 2014 during NATO’s summit in Wales. In addition, he announced a special 100 billion euro ($113 billion) fund to provide much-needed basic equipment for the German armed forces. Scholz also said Germany would send weapons to Ukraine, ending a long-held policy that it would not deliver weapons to a conflict zone—hardly a plausible argument when Germany supplies weapons to authoritarian regimes. Finally, the country would move quickly to reduce its dependence on oil and gas. This means sharply cutting back its imports of Russian energy, which account for 55 percent of its gas imports. Apart from mapping out an ambitious new course for Germany, it was Scholz’s impassioned support for Ukraine that won him rapturous applause. “The twenty-fourth of February 2022 marks a watershed in the history of our continent,” he said. “With the attack on Ukraine, Russian President Putin has started a war of aggression in cold blood.” But **what does Scholz’s speech mean in practice?** First, Russia has lost one of its most important supporters in Europe, and Germany no longer sees Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine through the prism of Russia. The time when the SPD tacitly acknowledged Russia’s sphere of influence over these sovereign, independent countries is over. In addition, Germany’s relations, particularly with Poland and the Baltic states, will markedly improve. These countries were highly critical and distrustful of Berlin’s commitment to Nord Stream 2, the $11 billion project to bring Russian gas directly to Europe that was finished and awaiting certification when Scholz halted it last week. **They, along with Ukraine, believed the pipeline would increase their vulnerability in terms of energy supplies and make Germany more dependent on Russia for its energy, pushing Germany to lean more Russia-friendly inside the EU and NATO**. Expect a thaw in relations. Scholz’s announcement to send weapons to Ukraine will also boost Germany’s standing in this part of Europe. Early last month, Germany faced widespread ridicule over its promise to supply Ukraine with 5,000 helmets, as other NATO members sent weapons, and it blocked Estonia’s move to send German-made weapons to Kyiv. This policy change ends the long-held suspicion that Berlin did not want to antagonize Russia. In addition, these decisions are a boost for NATO, with Germany now fully committed to the defense of Europe via the U.S.-led military alliance. The change shows that Germany no longer wants to be seen as a “free rider,” always relying on the United States to be Europe’s security guarantor without paying much for that security umbrella. Germany was repeatedly criticized for its unwillingness to spend 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, and this raised questions among allies if Germany was taking America’s protection for granted. One caveat to the increase in defense spending. The 100 billion euro “special fund” will kickstart a long overdue modernization of Germany’s armed forces. This is no joke: German soldiers were sent recently to the Baltic states lacking thermal underwear and other basic clothing. But spending more over the next few years will not be useful if it leads to more duplication of equipment among allies instead of focusing on adapting weapons systems to cyber attacks, modern aircraft fighters, and the changing nature of warfare. **Germany could now shape the future direction of EU foreign policy**. **The war in Ukraine has shown how the EU, pushed by Germany, needs a revamped “Eastern Partnership” policy that entails not only reducing Russian interference, especially by pro-Russian and local oligarchs in politics and the economy, but also strengthening the state institutions and combating corruption**. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—countries in which Russia has consistently meddled—want to join the EU, or failing that, some special relationship that will make their trade, economy, political, and social structures more closely tied to Europe. Scholz’s policy change indicates that Germany will no longer stand in the way of these changes, and could even lead them.

#### Germany and Russia relations low, they are threatening conflict now

Gorman 21 (Lucy has been a correspondent intern at the OWP since 2021. She is a junior at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, studying Peace, War, and Defense and Psychology with a concentration in intelligence and international relations. Through her studies, she has developed a special interest in counter-terrorism, understanding the effects of war on populations, and regions of the Middle East and East Asia, November 3, 2021, “Germany And Russia Threaten Nuclear Arsenal Use Against Each Other”, <https://theowp.org/reports/germany-and-russia-threaten-nuclear-arsenal-use-against-each-other/>)

A protest note was handed to the German military by the Russian Defense Ministry in response to comments about deterring Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Germany especially had been coming out with statements about the pressing need to focus on Russia and reducing their nuclear capabilities, causing Russia to deliver the note. According to Reuters, Russia announced it would break off existing institutionalized contacts with NATO and the alliance agreed on a new plan to defend against any potential Russian attack. In an interview last Thursday, incumbent Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer stated that “**We have to make it very clear to Russia that in the end** — and that is also the deterrent doctrine — **we are ready to use** such means [**nuclear weapons] so that it has a deterrent** effect beforehand and nobody gets the idea…” It is alarming that Germany is quick to state that they would put to use such weapons against Russia. The spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, said that “there are level-headed people in the German leadership who can prevent their defence minister from recklessly wanting to test our armed forces.” It is unknown what the note from Russia stated, but it introduces a possible strife between the two nations over nuclear power. Janis Kluge, an expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, views the **current relationship between Berlin and Moscow as at an all-time low in post-Soviet history**. Germany-Russia relations have always been complicated with shifts from alliances to total warfare. The recent rise in negative relations stemmed from Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Within NATO, Germany was quick to impose multiple rounds of harsh sanctions against oil and other Russian industries. This **leaves Germany and Russia with unstable relations today**, meaning the note is **indicative of a possible major conflict between the two**. **Germany** has **made** an **aggressive threat towards Russia by stating that they would go as far as to use nuclear weapons in acts of deterrence**. This puts hundreds of millions of people at risk, as a deadly conflict would arise if Germany took such severe action. Germany’s initial comments and responses to the situation are intended to make Russia fearful of an attack and be cautious with their nuclear program. Weapons of mass destruction like the ones in question are obviously catastrophic, which pushes the common reaction to often be the use of them as it is the only way to counter such a massive threat. It is ironic that many nations choose to fight the problem with further use of the same weapons. However, nations may not see many alternatives to preventing the spread of nuclear power as they have to put forth a large enough and credible type of threat.

### 2AC – AT: EU Economy Impact

#### EU’s economy is declining now due to the Ukraine war

**Randow 22** (Jana Randow, ECB, economics & more at Bloomberg in Frankfurt, April 29, 2022, “Recession Threat Hangs Over Europe’s Fragile Economic Growth”, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-29/recession-threat-hangs-over-europe-s-fragile-economic-growth>)

The euro **zone’s recovery from the pandemic is already showing signs of flagging even before it meets the economic storm clouds heading its way**. The **danger of a recession loomed into view** this week after Russia halted gas flows to Poland and Bulgaria, offering a foretaste of what the region might have in store. But even without the energy rationing such a move might provoke, the outlook looks ominous, underscored by weaker-than-expected growth reported Friday. European Weakness Inflation and war are weighing on economic output across the region European Central Bank Chief Economist Philip Lane insisted after the data that there’s “still a lot of momentum” in the recovery. Even so, European factories are signaling distress amid record inflation and a stubborn supply squeeze, aggravated by strict lockdowns in China. Meanwhile any catch-up on leisure and travel by Covid-liberated consumers may fade, not least as price increases eat into incomes. The coronavirus itself could return with a vengeance. **European financial markets reflect the gloom**, and economists at Morgan Stanley are among those seeing a “meaningful slowdown” in the second half. Corporate giants including Germany’s BASF SE are bracing for “serious disruptions,” and the OECD is warning that governments underestimate the impact of the war in Ukraine. What that suggests is that a year that began with the region extending its growth beyond pre-Covid levels, and offered the prospect of further tailwinds from European Union fiscal aid, now risks becoming another sorry episode in the single currency’s history of frustrating setbacks to growth. “The economy may show resilience in the coming quarters, but the problem is, what will happen at the end of the year?” said Anatoli Annenkov, an economist at Societe Generale SA in London. “We don’t know what will happen with wage growth and fiscal stimulus in 2023, there’s as much concern over China as there is over energy costs, and it’s easy to become pessimistic in light of the war.” Given the backdrop, Europe’s main equity benchmark has struggled to find its footing this year and widening bond spreads are feeding concerns that fragmentation will return to the 19-nation euro zone. First-quarter gross domestic product data didn’t offer cause for hope. The euro area grew only 0.2%, less than economists anticipated, hurt by a contraction in Italy, stagnation in France and weaker-than-expected growth in Spain. Indicators since then aren’t much better. Factory output and new orders are close to grinding to a halt, and business confidence across major economies has declined since the start of the year. That’s left services to shoulder the burden, undermined by waning consumer confidence. “**Manufacturing will be very weak** in the coming months and quite likely contract in the second quarter,” said Veronika Roharova, an economist at Credit Suisse International, who predicts euro-area growth of 2.8% this year. Still, “services are strong and household savings high, the labor market continues to look healthy and fiscal support is ensuring we won’t see a spending slump.” Lane of the ECB, interviewed by Bloomberg Television after the growth data, observed that it was “not very high admittedly, but still positive.” “We know from the near-time indicators, from what’s going on right now, that there still seems to be reasonable activity right now here at the end of April,” he added. Even so, **economic forecasts for this year are being slashed**. The International Monetary Fund cut 1.1 percentage point off its projection this month and now sees growth of 2.8%. The Institute of International Finance anticipates just 1% expansion. ECB officials acknowledged this month that growth risks have increased “substantially,” but they remain optimistic they can deliver an accelerated exit from crisis-era stimulus to combat inflation at a record 7.5% in data on Friday. Some policy makers are touting the first interest-rate increase since 2011 as soon as July, and even Russia’s complete halt of gas deliveries to Poland and Bulgaria and the prospect that euro-zone countries could also be shut off next doesn’t seems to deter them. While “this would definitely have a more negative, stronger immediate effect” Governing Council member Madis Muller said on Wednesday, he added that “the risk of an economic contraction in the euro area on the whole is more likely to be small.” The **effect in Germany, the region’s biggest economy, might be more significant**. First-quarter growth of 0.2% matched expectations, but the Bundesbank sees a risk of it shrinking nearly 2% this year if the war escalates and an embargo on Russian coal, oil and gas leads to restrictions on industry. Scores of companies including BMW AG and ThyssenKrupp AG have warned earnings could be affected, and utility Sniper SE said Wednesday that the economic toll of any stoppages in gas supplies would be “dramatic.” German Economy Minister Robert Habeck insisted this week that a full embargo on Russian oil would be “manageable.” Meanwhile the EU has been discussing new sanctions targeting the commodity, and Emmanuel Macron’s victory in French presidential elections may reinforce the bloc’s cohesion in addressing challenges together. The ECB also highlighted this month that fiscal measures to help households cope with surging inflation are helping. The prospect of such policies being extended, particularly in the event of a Russian energy shut-off, could provide a cushion for the economy, though at a cost to public finances. “Fiscal measures, including at EU level, will help shield the euro area from the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine,” ECB President Christine Lagarde told the IMF meetings last week. The central bank’s next policy decision is on June 9.

#### EU economy will collapse now regardless

Smith 22 (Elliot Smith is a Markets Reporter for CNBC in London. He joined the team in April 2019 after two and a half years with Citywire, where his reporting garnered the 2018 PressGazette British Journalism Award for Specialist Media (Finance), May 6, 2022, “We see a big recession in the making’: Top CEOs are fearing the worst in Europe”, <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/06/we-see-a-big-recession-in-the-making-top-ceos-fear-worst-in-europe.html>)

The **CEOs** of several European blue chip companies have told CNBC that they **see a significant recession coming down** the pike **in Europe**. The continent is particularly vulnerable to the fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war, associated economic sanctions and energy supply concerns, and economists have been downgrading growth forecasts for the euro zone in recent weeks. The euro zone faces concurrent **economic shocks from the war in Ukraine and a surge in food and energy prices exacerbated by the conflict**, along with a supply shock arising from China’s zero-Covid policy. That has **prompted concerns about “stagflation**” — an environment of low economic growth and high inflation — and eventual recession. “For sure, **we see a big recession in the mak**ing, but that’s exactly what we see — it’s in the making. There is still an overhanging demand because of the Covid crisis we just are about to leave,” said Stefan Hartung, CEO of German engineering and technology giant Bosch. “It’s still there and you see it heavily hitting us in China, but you see that in a lot of areas in the world, the demand of consumers has already even been increased in some areas.” In particular, Hartung noted lingering consumer demand for household appliances, power tools and vehicles, but suggested this would dissipate. “That means for a certain amount of time, this demand will still be there, even while we see the interest increase and we see the pricing increase, but at some point in time, it won’t be just a supply crisis, it will also be a demand crisis, and then for sure, **we are in a deep recession**,” he added. Inflation in the euro zone hit a record high of 7.5% in March. So far, the European Central Bank has remained more dovish than its peers, such as the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve, both of which have begun hiking interest rates in a bid to rein in inflation. However, the ECB now expects to conclude net asset purchases under its APP (asset purchase program) in the third quarter, after which it will have room to begin monetary tightening, depending on the economic outlook. Berenberg Chief Economist Holger Schmieding said in a note Friday that near-term risks to economic growth are tilted to the downside in Europe. “Worsening Chinese lockdowns and cautious consumer spending in reaction to high energy and food prices could easily cause a temporary contraction in Eurozone GDP in Q2,” Schmieding said. “An immediate embargo on gas imports from Russia (highly unlikely) could turn that into a more serious recession. If the Fed gets it badly wrong and catapults the U.S. straight from boom to bust (unlikely but not fully impossible), such a recession could last well into next year. Yet Schmieding suggested that the euro zone is likely to enter recession only “if worse came to worst,” and that it isn’t a base expectation. Mark Branson, president of German financial regulator BaFin, said any military escalation in Ukraine or further energy supply disruption could pose serious risks to growth in Europe’s largest economy, with industrial sectors particularly vulnerable. “We’re already seeing that growth is down to around zero in many jurisdictions, including here, and it’s vulnerable. It’s also vulnerable from the ongoing Covid-related shocks,” he said. “**We’ve got inflation that’s going to need to be tackled**, and it’s going to need to be tackled now, so that’s a cocktail which is difficult for the economy.”

### 2AC – Impact Turn

#### Germany-Russian ties enable further Russian aggression – turns the DA

Constanze Stelzenmüller 6/21/22, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and trans-Atlantic Relations, “Merkel’s lack of regrets illustrates the fallacies of Germany’s Russia policy”, Brookings, 6/21/22, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/21/merkels-lack-of-regrets-illustrates-the-fallacies-of-germanys-russia-policy/

Merkel left office of her own will, the only postwar chancellor to do so. She was popular at home and she was admired worldwide as one of Germany’s greatest postwar leaders. **Now, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 has cast a dark backwards shadow over her tenure**. Should she not have paid more attention to Putin’s repression of civil society and murders of political opponents in Russia? His poisoning of European politics by means of disinformation and corruption? His careful weaving of a continent-wide web of dependency on Russian gas? His stationing of intermediate-range missiles in Kaliningrad? **His increasingly evident imperial ambitions**? Should she not have seen a connection between the assault on Chechnya, with which Putin began his reign at the turn of the millennium, the war with Georgia in 2008 which resulted in that country’s dismemberment at Russian hands, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and eight years of proxy war in Donbas with 14,000 dead? But those who expected a self-critical examination of her record were disappointed. “I don’t see that I should now have to say, that was wrong. And I will therefore not apologize.” The literal English translation is clunky, but then so is Merkelish in the original German. The point of the former chancellor’s remarks to a Berlin theatre audience was clear enough: she had nothing to regret. Merkel contended that she always saw through Putin: “I always knew he wanted to destroy Europe.” **Yet she insisted** — in a phrase redolent of Bismarckian Realpolitik — **that it was important to maintain “a trade connection” with “the world’s second largest nuclear power.”** One commentator branded her comments as appeasement. A second seized on her description of Putin’s war as “a great tragedy” as evidence of fatalistic determinism. Others suggested that Merkel had simply been “the perfect chancellor for a system that had reached its limits.” None of these explanations is entirely off the mark. **What matters, however, is that Merkel’s signature approach to dealing with problems** — comprehending them fully, but choosing to manage rather than to resolve them — **was shared not just by her various coalition partners, but by the German business community and by voters**. It is in line with a longstanding postwar tradition of German leaders framing strategic choices as strategic constraints, thereby evading the appearance of agency or responsibility. As a recipe for grappling with an unchained totalitarian Russia — and with a future of permanent upheaval and disruption — it is not just futile but reckless.

# Greece-Russia Relations

## 1NC – Greece Relations

### 1NC – Oil Scenario

#### Greece-Russia relations are warm right now – cautious optimism

George Tzogopoulos ’22, Ph.D., Lecturer at the European Institute of Nice, Director of EU-China Programmes, Senior Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy and the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, “What is Next for Russia and Greece?”, RIAC, 1/14/22, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/what-is-next-for-russia-and-greece/

**The new year starts with cautious optimism for the Greek–Russian relations**. The meeting between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Sochi in December, 2021 was significant for two reasons. It has confirmed the willingness of Russia and Greece to leave the diplomatic crisis of 2018 behind and bring the bilateral relationship back to normalcy—after three years of arduous efforts. More importantly, it has outlined their joint interest in placing this bilateral relationship into the general international environment and its contradictions. The two leaders thus used several adjectives to illustrate the nature of the Sochi discussions—such as ‘productive’, ‘constructive’, ‘substantive’, ‘open’, ‘direct’, and ‘sincere’. **Greece’s membership in the EU and NATO**—the cornerstone of its foreign policy—**does not allow illusions about the future course of the Greek–Russian relations,** which could deviate from the Western framework. **This reality, however, makes both countries keen on rather being pragmatic and setting realistic goals they can possibly fulfil**. President Putin, for instance, has expressed the belief that Greece would always advocate for a balanced and objective position on a number of issues pertaining to the interaction between Russia and the EU. Premier Mitsotakis, for his part, has considered Russia to be essential to the architecture of European security, making a reference to the Ukraine crisis. At the meeting, he was talking about the need of the Minsk agreements (among other accords) to be respected and implemented, and he concluded that the Greek government could not but be interested in a settlement as well as in non-aggravation, since many Greeks also live the region. Although tensions between Russia and NATO over Ukraine go beyond the capacity of Greece to influence these developments, the latter considers the preservation of communication channels essential. In the words of Mitsotakis during the press conference, ‘the absence of communication does not lead to anything good’. **Amid the ongoing debate in Europe, Greece belongs to the countries interested in Russia’s engagement in a dialogue with the EU**. This position is shared by core member states of the EU, namely Germany, France and Italy. As far as the Eastern Mediterranean is concerned, Russia is continuously reiterating its standard position about such a resolution of the Cyprus issue that ought to be built on the UN framework. The Greek Prime Minister publicly thanked the Russian President for this firm position. From another prism, the changing Eastern Mediterranean dynamics have brought Moscow and Ankara quite close in the last years, which is a source of concern for Athens. **This is another reality that has rendered Greece determined to mend ties with Russia**. **The rapprochement also serves the interests of Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has certainly found a modus vivendi with Turkey while Moscow does not always agree with Ankara**. In that regard, the principal advantage of the ties between Greece and Russia is their historical longevity. It is symbolic that the visit of Kyriakos Mitsotakis to Russia, the first in his capacity as Prime Minister as he had already visited the country in February 2019 (then the leader of the main opposition New Democracy party), took place during the 200th anniversary of the Greek Revolution. Emotional celebrations and Russia’s active participation in them have facilitated the forging of a new type of understanding between the two countries. Looking towards the future, the Joint Plan of Action for 2022–2024 offers an institutional umbrella for common actions where tourism will certainly play a critical role. President Putin has commended relevant bilateral collaboration during the coronavirus crisis, saying: ‘We are grateful to the Greek authorities for the decision to recognize Russian Sputnik V vaccination certificates.’ Synergies in the handling of taxation issues, science, high technology, finance, and maritime security are expected to continue. This is also the case for closer cooperation between Greek and Russian universities, think tanks and research centers. **Greek-Russian discussions are not always easy. Russian appetite for new investments in Greece, for example, often turns into a complex and time-consuming process due to strict European regulations.** Besides, energy talks do not automatically result in agreements on prices in accordance with the requests made by the one or the other side—however, these talks are taking place in good climate. One day before the meeting of the two leaders in Sochi, Kostas Skrekas, Greek Minister of the Environment and Energy, met with Gazprom Chairman, Alexey Miller, in St. Petersburg. **On the whole, challenges did not prevent bilateral trade from growing by 56 per cent in the first nine months of this year as President Putin said**. Notwithstanding the policy of sanctions, there is still room for Greek exporters to reach the Russian market. The warm meeting between President Putin and Premier Mitsotakis marks the beginning of a new chapter in the Greek–Russian relations under the existing circumstances, where both sides raise expectations that they are able to meet. There was no better way to launch this new chapter than with the announcement of President Putin to transfer the archives of its Jewish communities to Greece, which the Nazis moved to Germany during World War II and which have been in Moscow since 1945. This is another emotionally significant development in a special year. Following the Sochi meeting, Premier Mitsotakis and his Russian counterpart Mikhail Mishustin had a telephone conversation to discuss the Joint Action Plan 2022–2024. Moreover, **President Putin sent a letter to the Greek Prime Minister wishing ‘peace and prosperity to our friends, the Greek people.’ This good climate is beneficial for Russia and Greece, which are both striving for stability, continuity and progress in the bilateral relationship**.

#### However, relations are on the brink now – lack of trust in NATO unity solidifies mutual desire in the Greek-Russo relationship, but plan flips it – new security cooperation fully puts Greece in the West’s court

National Herald ’22, is the paper of record of the Greek Diaspora community. Through independent journalism, we bring news to generations of Greek-Americans, with stories on the individual, community and international level, “Russia’s Ukraine Invasion Put Greece on World Stage, Divided Greeks”, The National Herald, 3/23/22, https://www.thenationalherald.com/russias-ukraine-invasion-put-greece-on-world-stage-divided-greeks/

ATHENS – Initially applauded for expressing “full solidarity” with Ukraine and sending small arms to help its people fend off a Russian invasion, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis suddenly finds himself under fire for going too far. The New Democracy leader told Parliament when the invasion began that he was standing by Ukraine – and ethnic Greeks there, 10 of whom were killed in the early stages and scores of thousands still trapped in the besieged city of Mariupol. In breaking with a history of Greek government being reluctant to be involved in foreign wars, his was among the first off the bloc to offer more than tweets of support, shipping arms and backing European Union sanctions – even if still buying Russian oil and gas and letting shipping continue between the countries. **But most Greeks don’t agree with what he did, and not just the major rival SYRIZA, which came to power in 2015 on a promise to take Greece out of NATO and not send troops to Afghanistan but reneged on both promises**. Still, with most of the EU fiddling about what to do, NATO saying it won’t get involved, the United States not supporting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s request for a No-Fly zone over his country, Greece was an outlier. **In a feature on the ambivalence if not outright opposition to Mitsotakis’ tough stance, the site POLITICO noted that a just-released survey found that 70 percent of Greeks said his hard line against Russia**, a close Orthodox country, **was a mistake**. In another survey, 63 percent said the decision may prove dangerous for Greece, especially if, as expected, Russian President Vladimir Putin may see most or all of his demands met in return for ending the war – and target those against him. That would be Greece, which relies on Russian oil and gas and has tried to keep tight relations with Putin, a volatile character who had rejected SYRIZA overtures for a bailout, leaving the Leftists to embarrassedly turn to international lenders. Even Mitsotakis is apparently feeling a big sheepish and trying to mediate his opposition to Putin’s War, his government turning down Ukraine’s request teo send Soviet-era TOR-Μ1 and Osa-AK missile systems, saying enough was enough. **The war has seen his government tilt even further toward the United States,** with which it renewed a military defense cooperation agreement **and said would allow a greater US military presence in the country**, including more bases. SIDING WITH PEACE When he first talked to lawmakers, the site noted, he stood up boldly and said his government was all-in on the side of Ukraine and that, “There can be no equal distances. You are either with peace and international law or against them.” Turns out most are against them and in Putin’s camp with the same kind of fervor still seen among former US President Donald Trump’s near-religious fervor zealots who believe he can do no wrong. **What Mitsotakis did was take Greece out of a neutral act and balancing role to get involved in international intrigue, a path many Greeks don’t want, especially with the country having a hard-core sector of Russian sympathizers**. The EU sanctions that bar Russian airlines will also cost Greece Russian tourists and Mitsotakis’ government got into open undiplomatic spat with the Russian Embassy, neither side backing off and with worries hard feelings will remain. The feature by Nektaria Stamouli pointed out that many Greeks were caught by surprise but his initial decision to jump into the battle with both feet as Russian sentiments remain in parts of Greece. **And there are centuries of religious, military, economic and cultural ties between the two countries, with SYRIZA also seizing the chance to snipe again from the sidelines and attack him** – while supporting his call to back Ukraine, up to a point. Unlike the EU, which during the war has fumbled over a response and limited sanctions, likely in anticipation of hoping a post-war Putin won’t take some kind of political revenge, Mitsotakis wasn’t timid about taking on the Russian leader. “Greek society also has historical ties to Russia, a fellow Christian Orthodox nation that helped the Greeks fight off Ottoman rule in 1821. More recently, **Moscow has been viewed as a protector in Greece’s long-running rivalry with neighbor Turkey**,” the story noted. Mitsotakis met with Putin in December, 2021 and Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias was among the last to meetRussian foreign chief Sergei Lavrov days before the invasion but no reports he asked him to help save ethnic Greeks in Mariupol. “Greece,” Mitsotakis declared in the Greek Parliament, “is the last outpost of the West,” sidelining its relationship with Russia – and Putin – and leading to wonder if it marked a bigger shift in Greece’s role on the world stage. That’s as it still tries to recover from a near-decade long economic and austerity crisis that required 326 billion euros ($358.75 billion) in three international bailouts after generations of wild overspending and runaway patronage. Constantinos Filis, Director of the Institute of Global Affairs and a professor of international relations at the American College of Greece, described the shift as “two choices,” to POLITICO. TAKING A STAND First, he said, **Greece decided “it cannot depend on the EU and NATO to secure itself from Turkey”** – **it also needs bilateral military deals to boost its own capacity**. Second, he added, “Greece under the current government has decided to get more deeply involved and put its hand in the fire, even with boots on the ground.” Turkey – which started now-stalled EU accession talks in 2005 – opposes EU sanctions but isn’t, like Serbia which allowed Russian airlines, taking any heat for it and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has emerged as an unlikely peace broker. While defying the EU he wants to join, sending drones to help Ukraine fight Russian forces, he’s also bought Russian-made S-400 missile systems that undermine NATO and could be used against Greece, but it drawing applause for trying to mediate a settlement to the war, leaving Greece out of the equation. When he authorized sending arms to Ukraine, Mitsotakis said he thought it would help Greece’s national interests although most Greeks feel otherwise now, even more as the war continues. “With what moral standing would we ask for similar assistance if we found ourselves in the same position?” he told the site in an interview. “We have an additional reason, compared to other European countries, to be on the right side of history,” he added, making a clear reference to Greece’s tense relationship with Turkey. But there’s belief in Greece that NATO – which has refused to intervene over Turkey sending fighter jets and warships into Greek airspace and waters and plans to drill for oil and gas off Greek islands – would leave Greece on its own in a conflict. In a poll conducted after Russia’s invasion, 71 percent condemned the invasion, but 65 percent said Greece should remain completely neutral. And in a POLITICO poll, 60 percent said Russian invasion was unacceptable, the lowest figure among the six countries polled. After giving support to the decision to support Ukraine, SYRIZA leader Alexis Tsipras, trailing Mitsotakis’ party in polls up to 14 percent, said that shouldn’t have included sending weapons, his party having strong Communist ties. George Katrougalos, Syriza MP and a former foreign minister, told the site that, “The subversion of the old doctrine … that Greece has a political home in Europe but also wants to have a bridge role with the other political powers, and its replacement with the Cold War mantra that ‘Greece is a Western outpost,’ does not benefit our country.” Several retired senior army officers have also gone on TV in Greece to vehemently oppose the Greek arms shipments to Ukraine. “Harmful, unnecessary and silly,” said one. Added Filis: “**Greece has to follow a multidimensional foreign policy, act as a bridge between politicians and state**. It cannot close its door to China, Russia and other emerging powers.” But it may just have.

#### Greece-Russia relations are key to maintain Russia oil exports flowing

Reuters ’22, international news agency, “Greece turns into new hub for Russian ship-to-ship fuel oil exports”, Daily Sabah, 5/20/22, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/greece-turns-into-new-hub-for-russian-ship-to-ship-fuel-oil-exports

**As sanctions on Moscow drive traders to find new ways to export Russian oil via ship-to-ship** (STS) **loadings, fuel oil arrivals offshore Greece jumped to record levels in April**, data showed and sources said. Trading Russian crude and oil products remain legal for now as the European Union is yet to fully agree on a proposed embargo, but banking and other financial sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24 have made it increasingly more difficult to do so. In April, shipments of Russian fuel oil with Greece as a destination reached nearly 0.9 million tons, about double March levels and could reach new records in May, according to Refinitiv Eikon data. The bulk of this was shipped from Russian ports to Greece’s Kalamata port, the data showed. The Greek energy ministry declined to comment on what it said was private companies' business. **Traders said the fuel oil** – a by-product of refining crude oil into lighter, cleaner products like auto fuels – **is being stored and blended offshore onboard tankers and being loaded via ship-to-ship transfer for re-export**. **While it is not uncommon for fuel oil to load offshore Greece for exports to other destinations, the level of activity was very high compared to normal April levels**, one industry source said. The Evridiki tanker, which has the capacity to load 130,000 tons, loaded a Russian fuel oil cargo in mid-April off Kalamata, two shipping sources said. The tanker then made its way to the United Arab Emirates oil hub of Fjairah, Refinitiv data shows. **Russia has been increasing fuel exports to the hub, with arrivals set to jump to about 2.5 million barrels according to data** from oil analytics firm Vortexa. **Another tanker, Okeanos, with the same capacity, loaded fuel oil via STS off Kalamata earlier this month and is currently heading to India**, the data shows. The Kriti King, which loaded a 130,000-ton fuel oil cargo offshore Kalamata in early May, is currently heading to China, according to Refinitiv data. Shipping sources told Reuters that Russian oil sellers have restored STS operations in Rotterdam and near Spain's Ceuta, after EU sanctions and activist protests derailed such operations in Denmark.

#### Russian oil is key to avert an economic collapse – full embargo decks growth

Steven Mufson et al. ‘22, \*covers the business of climate change for The Washington Post, \*\*Aaron Steckelberg is a graphics reporter who creates maps, charts and diagrams that provide greater depth and context to stories over a wide range of topics, \*\*\*Andrew Van Dam writes the Department of Data column each week for The Washington Post, \*\*\*\*Naema Ahmed is a graphics reporter at The Washington Post, “Here’s where Russian oil flows”, The Washington Post, 3/8/22, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/03/08/russia-oil-imports-ban/

The shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended politics around the world and posed a key question: Should the rest of the world shun Russian oil to avoid paying money to the Putin regime? The Biden administration has decided to ban the import of oil and natural gas from Russia, expanding on the sweeping economic sanctions already in place. **The European Union**, which relies much more heavily on imports of Russian oil, **has not yet taken action**, though it has vowed to cut its use of Russian gas by two-thirds this year. Russia is the world’s largest oil exporter. **Many lawmakers from both parties in the United States are arguing that it is possible to impose a ban on Russian oil without hurting the U.S. economy**. But will the barrels add up in the global market? **Oil analysts say the sheer magnitude of Russia’s oil exports makes them difficult if not impossible to offset,** setting up high prices and an economic slowdown.

#### Economic decline causes great power war and extinction

Liu 18 (Qian Liu is an economist based in China, November 13, 2018, “From Economic Crisis to World War III”, https://www.neweurope.eu/article/from-economic-crisis-to-world-war-iii/)

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a **prolonged economic crisis**, combined with rising income inequality, could well **escalate into a major global military conflict**. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labour markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilise and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, **prolonged periods of economic distress** have been characterised also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to **fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war**. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in **income inequality is often followed by a great crisis.** Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalisation, political polarisation, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald J. Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the **next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation.** By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue.

## 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox

### 2NC – UQ

#### Greece reveres Putin – pushes the nation’s politics to maintain relations

Diet Simon ’22, is a freelance journalist having spent 50 years contributing to Germany’s Deutsche Welle, “Why Putin has so many fans in Greece”, Neos Kosmos, 4/3/22, https://neoskosmos.com/en/2022/04/03/sport/sport-opinion/why-putin-has-so-many-fans-in-greece/

**As far as Putin’s war against Ukraine is concerned, Greece is deeply split**. The Russian president has many fans in the country. Part of the reason are historical roots. There’s probably no other EU country where as many people as in Greece revere Vladimir Putin. The war against Ukraine has not damaged the friendship with Russia that many Greeks feel. The affection has religious, historical and ideological roots. “Murderer Putin” was written on placards held up by demonstrators recently in Thessaloniki in northern Greece. But where Putin and his war are concerned Greeks are deeply split. Opinion polls have found 65% of men and women thinking that Greece should stay neutral about the conflict. 39 per cent said Greece should not join the EU’s sanctions against Russia. 67% oppose Greece supporting Ukraine by supplying weapons. More than a third even expressed “understanding” for the Russian invasion. The government of the conservative prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, supports Ukraine with weapons and humanitarian aid. Mitsotakis declared: “There can be no neutrality. Either one favours peace and international law or one is against.” **But when on Thursday President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses the Greek parliament by live video link from Kiev a number of seats will probably remain empty**. **The Greek communist party KKE has already announced it won’t take part in the session**. **All but one member of the left wing Mera25 party of the former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis will also stay away**. It will be interesting to see whether deputies of the left alliance Syriza of former premier Alexis Tsipras will also boycott. Like the majority of the leading Syriza politicians Tsipras hails from the Stalinist KKE. A few weeks after the Russian annexation of the Crimean the then opposition leader Tsipras went to Moscow in May 2014 where he flagellated the “neo-fascism” in Kiev. A year later as premier Tsipras continued his snuggle-up course with Vladimir Putin. Just hours after being sworn in as premier he received the Russian ambassador Andrey Maslov as the first foreign diplomat. One of the first congratulatory telegrams came from Putin. A little later Panos Kammenos, Tsipras’ coalition partner of the right wing-nationalist Independent Greeks, the new defense minister and also a Putin fan, brought into play the option that Greece should ask Moscow for loans to cut the umbilical cord to the financial support from the EU. When the Greek financial crisis peaked in summer 2015 and Tsipras flirted with withdrawal from the Euro zone. He is said to have asked Putin to help him print new drachma notes. The then French president François Hollande reports in a book Putin had told him this in a telephone conversation. Tsipras denies this episode. Less than three months after being elected the new Greek Prime Minister Tsipras went to Moscow. Putin returned the visit the following year. As part of his official state visit agenda the Kremlin chief made a side trip to the sacred Mount Athos, the monks’ republic in northern Greece. The reason for the pilgrimage was a celebration of the 1,000th year of Russian monks joining the others on the mount. **In the perception of many Greeks the common religion is a strong bond between the two countries**. The Orthodox Christianisation of Russia started from Byzantium in the 10th century. In both Greece and Russia the Orthodox faith remains a major driver of nationalism. That explains the affinity to Russia of large sections of the Greek right and clergy. **But the attraction also has historical roots**. Early in the 19th century the Russian czarist empire supported the Greeks in their war of liberation from Ottoman occupation. In 1827, in the sixth year of the Greek uprising, Russian warships, jointly with French and British units, demolished the Turkish fleet in the Battle of Navarino (Navarino Bay (modern Pylos), is on the west coast of the Peloponnese). **That was the turning point that secured independence for the Greeks. For that reason Russia already then had many fans among them.** From 1827 to 1865 there was even an influential “Russia Party” in Greece, a collection point for conservative-absolutist forces. In 2021 both countries celebrated the “​Year of History of Greece and Russia”, commemorating the 200th year of the Greek revolution. Hence many Greeks still regard Russia as a natural ally of their country, including because of the historical Russian rivalry with Turkey for control of the maritime straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles as well as the spheres of influence in central Asia. Among leftist politicians like the former communist Tsipras an ideological, antifascist elective affinity resonates that links back as far as the era of the Greek civil war from 1946–49. Then the mainly KKE-comprised left popular front fought with support from Albania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union for Greece to join the Eastern Bloc. But now the war on Ukraine puts the love for Russia of many Greeks to a severe test, because in the Ukraine there are about 150,000 ethnic Greeks. Most live in Mariupol and Odessa. Many have already been killed in the Russian attacks. **Yet a poll found only 26 percent of Greeks willing to actively help Ukraine. 68 percent are dissatisfied with the government’s stance regarding the conflict**. That is likely to include many followers of the governing party, Nea Dimokratia (ND)**. Since 2011 the ND has been in a partnership with Putin’s party United Russia**.

#### The majority of the Greek government officials are Russophiles – only the action of the plan forces the country’s hand

Riya Baibhawi ’22, author for RepublicWorld.com, “Explainer | Tied To Russia For Centuries, Modern Greece Struggles To Pick 'right Side' In Ukraine War”, RepublicWorld.com, 3/12/22, https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/tied-to-russia-for-centuries-modern-greece-struggles-to-pick-right-side-in-ukraine-war-articleshow.html

**While Mitosotakis announced that he was on the right side of history, the choice was not that clear for a majority of his compatriots who still hold Russophile views**. Both Greece and Russia have been tied together for decades with the ex-Soviet State protecting the Hellenic Republic from regional rival Turkey. Their history dates back to the 19th century when Russia joined forces with UK and France to aid Greece in the naval battle of Navarino. While the war was far from over, the victory proved to be a cornerstone in Greece’s independence movement. **Apart from history, both the countries have an overwhelmingly Orthodox Christian population and unbreakable cultural ties**. Another factor is shared mistrust towards the west which multiplied manifold as the Mediterranean country continued sinking in financial debt. Notably, there are Greeks, a small number of them, who believe that Putin is a ‘great leader.’ “Speaking to VOA news Nikos Marantzidis, professor of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies at the University of Macedonia said, “Greek public opinion has a Russophile dimension, friendly feelings linked to history, a common culture based on Orthodoxy and for some, mistrust towards the West."”

#### Relations are high now – all the aff’s args are just blips in the road

Florian Schmitz ’22, author for DW.com, “Ukraine-Russia war: Greek government and public don't see eye to eye”, DW.com, 4/26/22, https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-russia-war-greek-government-and-public-dont-see-eye-to-eye/a-61585099

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis adheres to the EU's course of supporting Kyiv in the fight against Moscow. Greece has already supplied weapons to Ukraine. **But recent opinion polls show that more than one out of two Greeks do not support the government's policies.** While refugees from Ukraine are welcomed with open arms in Greece, many Greeks reject the EU measures against Russia. According to one survey, more than 60%t are decidedly opposed to arms shipments — they see culpability for the war in both Moscow and Kyiv. **One of the reasons for the ambivalent attitude is that Greek conservatives traditionally see Russia as an ally**. In 2019, five years after the annexation of Crimea, Mitsotakis, who was opposition leader at the time, traveled to Moscow**. Underlining a "relationship of trust" between his Nea Demokratia party and Putin's United Russia party**, he promised Russia would always find Greece to be a "trustworthy dialogue partner." Significance of a shared faith Many Greeks' sympathize with Russia first and foremost because of their shared Orthodox faith, says Athanasios Grammenos. "The Russians for centuries presented themselves as the protectors of Orthodox Christians during the Ottoman Empire." **Moscow never actively helped, but the myth of the great savior in the east is strongly anchored in Greek culture**, the political scientist at the University of Thessaloniki told DW. Many people with right-wing convictions, also members of the conservative party, still believe that for some magical reason the Russians are going to take Istanbul, formerly the Orthodox stronghold of Constantinople, liberate it and give it to Greece, fulfilling the dream of a new Byzantine Empire, he says. **The political scientist argues that Russia is trying to gain influence through the Orthodox faith in other Balkan countries**, too, particularly in North Macedonia and Serbia, **where people are divided concerning the European Union**. **That's where Russia is using "the old strategy of the Orthodox Commonwealth.**" That hasn't been as easy in Greece, Grammenos notes. The Greek Orthodox Church recognized the autocephalous church of Ukraine in 2019, clearly acting against the wishes of Russian Orthodox Church leaders. "In Greece, church is a reflection of society," he says, adding some priests are into strange conspiracy theories, which "has an impact on many believers."

#### Polls show that Greece sides with Russia even post-Ukraine

ANADOLU AGENCY AA ‘22, is a state-run news agency headquartered in Ankara, Turkey, “Almost half of all Greeks are against EU sanctions on Russia: Poll”, Daily Sabah, 7/7/22, https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/almost-half-of-all-greeks-are-against-eu-sanctions-on-russia-poll

**A poll has revealed that more than 40% of Greeks disagree with European Union sanctions against Russia**, according to a Eurobarometer survey. Results of the online poll published on Thursday showed just over half of respondents – 51% – hold Russia responsible for the crisis, while 45% do not agree with this view. Some 66% of Greeks believe a distinction should be made between the Russian leadership and the Russian people, as opposed to 27% who clubbed the two together. However, the poll found 53% of Greek respondents agreed with the economic sanctions imposed on Russia and wealthy Russian oligarchs. Only 31% of Greeks are satisfied with their government's response to the war in Ukraine, with the figure dropping further down to 29% for the EU's reaction. Some 40% agreed on financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine. Almost all Greeks – 95% – were in favor of providing humanitarian support, while 74% backed the idea of financial support for Ukraine. Rising energy bills As Greeks grapple with massive energy bills, 94% agreed that measures should be taken at the European level to limit the impact of rising energy prices on consumers and companies. Another 94% said rising energy costs have significantly impacted their purchasing power. However, regarding Greece's dependency on Russian energy, 70% of respondents said the country should reduce its reliance on Moscow. **The poll also found Greeks to be particularly skeptical about sources for information about the war** – **only 39% trust European authorities**, state authorities (39%), journalists (23%), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (21%) and social media (35%).

### 2NC – UQ – AT: Diplomat Expulsion

#### No impact on the relationship – relations have stabilized

Iefimerida 6/29/22, Greek news site, “Greece and Russia expected to normalize diplomatic relations over time, Russian FM spox”, iefimerida, 6/29/22, https://www.iefimerida.gr/english/greece-russia-expected-normalize-diplomatic-relations

**Common sense should prevail over time and diplomatic activity between Russia and Greece in Moscow and Athens become normalized**, Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova noted at a press briefing of Russian and international journalists on Wednesday. Responding to questions, the Russian spokeswoman said the expulsion of 8 Greek diplomats from Moscow "was a necessary response to the unfriendly actions of the Greek side," while she called the deportation of 12 Russian diplomats from Greece "unprecedented." She claimed that the deportation by Greece was based on "the desire, the aim to weaken Russian diplomatic representatives and obstruct their natural operations to greatest degree possible, based on a made-up excuse." Zakharova also complained that "Greece's present government moved to a greater escalation, by developing a loud mass media campaign, publishing private data of these people," an "unethical tactic which we are naturally not going to copy." She **stressed that "mutual deportations were not Moscow's choice," and added that despite staff reductions the Russian embassy in Athens and the Russian consulate general in Thessaloniki would continue to operate as per usual**.

### 2NC – Link

#### Security cooperation with NATO reverses the trend of Greek-Russo relations – empirics prove that Greece will abandon the relationship in favor of liberalizing their economy

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**Relations between Russia and Greece have always been friendly and mutually beneficial; this is primarily due to the lack of fundamental differences between the two countries**. They were united and are still united by common historical memory and cultural heritage, which stimulates initiatives both from Russian and from Greece. **Special role in the Russian-Greek relations have played the development of direct links with the Black Sea regions of Russia** –these are the places of residence of representatives of the Greek Diaspora. Greece occupies a special position in Russian foreign policy and according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in the world, as he says, "there are few other countries, that are so closely related as Russia and Greece, with such a long history of sincere friendship"6 . In addition Greece is the only NATO country to actively develop military-technical cooperation with Russia. Year 2016 is a cross-year for Russian-Hellenic culture and heritage and as the Prime Minister of Greece A. Tsipras characterized his visit to Russia as "the beginning of a new spring" in relations between Athens and Moscow. In May 2016 a joint declaration for an effective Government Partnership between the two countries was signed. It declares modernization, according to which willingness to contribute to the creation and promotion on the market of modern competitive products and encouraging mutual investments in innovative technologies, the elimination of barriers and constraints to the free and cost-effective sharing of the results with activities, improving the business environment in a fair, prompt and constructive dialogue between the business communities and public authorities of the two countries. Also a memorandum of understanding on inter-regional cooperation between the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece was adopted. The parties signed a "road map" of RussianGreek relations in the field of agriculture, adopting a tourism program of mutual actions for the next three years, including contributing to the speedy changes from the agreement signed in May 25, 2006 between the Russian Federation and the European Community on the facilitation of visas issuance to the citizens of these countries, promoting the dialogue on establishing visa-free travel for them. In addition, Russia and Greece signed a Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation in the field of standardization between the Federal Agency for Technical Regulation and Metrology of the Russian Federation and the national infrastructure system in Greece, a memorandum of understanding between the autonomous non-commercial organization "Russian Investment Agency: Invest in Russia" and the Greek organization of investment and foreign trade, as well as a memorandum of understanding between the Ural Federal University and the University of Piraeus. **The paper notes readiness to expand trade in goods and services, the importance of development of small and medium-sized businesses for the economies of both countries, cooperation in energy, agriculture and the transport sector including the transit potential of the Greek transport system**. The institutional framework for the partnership between the two countries is: Mixed Russian-Greek Commission on Economic, Industrial and Scientific Cooperation (within the framework of working groups on energy, agriculture, scientific and technical cooperation, tourism, and inter-regional cooperation), Mixed RussianGreek intergovernmental commission on military-technical cooperation, the GreekRussian Chamber of Commerce, Russian-Greek Council for cooperation and investment (created with the participation of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Russian businessmen), Russian-Greek Business Council for trade and economic cooperation, the Russian-Greek forums of civil society and more. Russian-Greek cooperation is developing in the framework of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CCI): the Union of Greek Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Athens, the Piraeus Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Thessaloniki and Kozani and the Federation of Greek producers, the Greek Organization of Small and Medium Enterprises, the Center of Inter-Balkan cooperation "HELEKSPO" organization. Cooperation with Greek partners is also carried out within the Euro Chambers and the Business Council of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). In September 2016 the Russian delegation, which includes more than fifty companies from different regions of the country, participated in the largest exhibition in the Mediterranean area, the 81st Thessaloniki International Fair (TIF) in the city of Thessaloniki. At the same time the International Forum "The RussianGreek Business Dialogue" was held. It consisted of Russian-Greek business in a forum in which the development of cooperation in the field of agriculture, the prospects for regional cooperation, cooperation in the sphere of science and education, for the exchange of technology capabilities and more were discussed; in addition the Russian-Greek Forum on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency took place. 2. Theoretical, Informational and Empirical Grounds of the Research The downgrading of the Russian-Greek relations observed since 2009 fits into the general trend of world development: in the context of globalization the mutual trade and investment is highlighted, whereas stability and positive dynamics of bilateral cooperation depends on the availability of sufficient economic basis. In the case of trade relations between Russia and Greece in the period before 2009 the economic potential has not been implemented adequately, even in 2008, which was the peak point of trade cooperation, while trade turnover between Russia and Greece gave way to trade turnover between Russia, Bulgaria and Romania, not to mention investments7 . **The causes for the decline of economic relations development will be divided into three groups**: In the first group, the national-ethnic causes, which are expressed in the actual disappearance of the Russian lobby in Greece and the Greek lobby in Russia, are included. Currently, you can only talk about individual initiators of the development of Russian-Greek relations among businessmen. Despite the fact that among the major Russian businessmen there are a lot of people of Greek origin, their role in the economic relations between the two countries is insignificant. In addition, they have to withstand the tough competition with pro-Turkish and pro-Serbian lobby in Russia, because of its economic content of Russian-Greek, Russian-Turkish and Russian-Serbian relations which are very close. We have to admit a landslide reduction of contingent media ideas and supporters of maintaining the dialogue between the two countries, its practical implementation in the trade and mutual investment. In the second group, the historical-ideological causes, which consists of a slowdown in the Russian approach to the possibilities of relations with Greece, due to the fact that their current state and prospects are assessed mainly through historical and ideological stereotypes, are included. The current angle approach to Russian-Greek relations should be recognized as outdated, inconsistent with the global trend, the growth and the strengthening of economic integration in international relations. **In the third group, the domestic economic and social causes, which are the sharp deterioration of the situation in the Greek economy, the change in its foreign policy priorities, its strengthening policy and its dependence on creditors, are included**. The crisis has not forced the Greek leadership to pursue a more diversified foreign policy so far. **On the contrary, it has led to greater coherence in economic** (including foreign trade) **Greece's policies with those of the European Union,** and in the field of international security policy - with a common vector of NATO. And these factors are negative from the standpoint of the development of Russian-Greek economic relations, a fact that is necessary to take it into account as long as Greece does not come out the crisis.

#### Greek-Russian relations are driven by perception of Greece being an active member of NATO – only the action of the plan results in a decrease in Russia’s willingness to pursue the relationship – empirics prove that only security cooperation, not harsh words impact the relationship

Constantinos Filis ’18, is Research Director of the Institute of international Relations in Athens, Greece. He is a specialist in Russian and former-Soviet affairs and a strategic planning expert on Greek foreign policy., “Orthodox myths: Greece’s pragmatic approach towards Russia”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 10/29/18, https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary\_orthodox\_myths\_greeces\_pragmatic\_approach\_towards\_russia/

The Greek government has dialled down its rhetoric since the expulsions, releasing official statements in favour of rapprochement. But **the Russian leadership now appears to see Athens as a long arm of Washington: at the height of the dispute in July,** Russia blamed the United States for the deterioration in Greek-Russian relations. Still, **it does not want to break ties completely**. With its relations with Turkey becoming more strategic in nature (energy, trade, and revisionism are common denominators), **Russia needs to maintain a balance** – **with both Greece and Cyprus** – **in securing its enhanced position in the eastern Mediterranean**. The mood in Greek-Russian relations has therefore shifted from neutral-positive to neutral-negative, but prime minister, Alexis Tsipras’s visit to Moscow in December is already creating a more positive atmosphere. The recent resignation of the foreign minister, Nikos Kotzias, should also alter things; the July crisis had begun to take on the nature of a campaign between Kotzias and Russia. After the expulsions, Kotzias publicly accused Russia of being Turkey’s ‘comrade-in-arms’ and of betraying the level of Greek-Russian friendship attained over the past 190 years, insinuating that Moscow and Ankara were joining forces against Athens. Despite the obvious limitations in Greek-Russia relations, a further deterioration would serve no purpose, particularly at a time of general fluidity and in the midst of Greece’s attempt to return to normality and attract investment. Athens needs to be careful to avoid finding itself part of opportunistic joint ventures that Russian might perceive as aggressive in nature, be it against Russia itself, or Iran. That said, **even in Kotzias’s harshest words he alluded to a supposed closeness between Greece and Russia**. **Under certain circumstances Athens may still find it difficult to take a firm stance against Moscow, given the latter’s assertiveness and the confrontational trend in Western-Russian relations**.

### 2NC – AT: Link Thumper

#### Thumpers only put the DA on the brink – relations may have soured in many areas post-Ukraine, *BUT* they are being maintained now for the purposes of oil exports – the new and unexpected action of the aff throws the whole situation into disarray

Alexi Friedman ’22, author for the Greek Reporter, “Greece Not Safe For Russian Citizens, Putin’s Minister Claims”, Greek Reporter, 6/23/22, https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/23/greece-not-safe-russian-citizens/

**Sympathies among many Greeks still lean toward Russia**. In a survey released last month, Greeks and Cypriots were the least likely among Europeans to blame Russia exclusively for the war. The Europe-wide poll showed that while 54 percent of EU Nations overall strongly agreed that Russia was primarily responsible for the war, just 27 percent of Greeks polled shared the same feeling. It showed that 24 percent of Greeks mostly agreed while 23 percent mostly disagreed and 22 percent totally disagreed. In Cyprus, 21 percent totally agreed, and 24 percent mostly agreed. Those who mostly disagreed are at 28 percent while those who totally disagreed with the statement comprise 23 percent of the Cypriot votes, according to the tally. The poll was conducted by Eurostat—the statistical body of the EU. In late April, Russia’s Foreign Ministry warned Greece that relations between the two nations that “share the same faith” have been “reduced to almost nothing” after Greece’s decision earlier that month to declare twelve Russian officials “persona non-gratae.” Governments around the world, including Greece, have imposed sweeping sanctions against Russia and its citizens for the invasion. In mid-March, Greece began freezing assets of Russian citizens identified on an international list for sanctions sent to all European Union countries in the wake of the invasion. Late last month, Athens also said it would send its older weapons to Ukraine after Germany said it would send a fleet of cutting edge infantry fighting vehicles to Greece. Greece has not totally cut its ties to Russia. **For the month of April, the number of tankers carrying Russian fuel that arrived in Greece reached record-breaking highs, indicating that the country’s waters have become a top destination for transporting Russian fuel**. **Arrivals of ships carrying fuel from Russia to Greece doubled in April** compared to March, according to a Reuters report at the time.

## 2NC Impact Toolbox

### 2NC – Oil Internal Link

#### Cutting off oil leads to economic decline

Associated Press 22 (May 4, 2022, “EXPLAINER: What's the Impact if Europe Cuts off Russian Oil?”, <https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2022-05-04/explainer-whats-the-impact-if-europe-cuts-off-russian-oil>)

The European Union's executive commission has proposed phasing out imports of Russian oil within six months. It is part of Europe's struggle to stop paying Russia $850 million a day for energy and hit the Kremlin's finances over its invasion of Ukraine. But **reversing decades of dependence on Russian oil and natural gas is not a simple matter** for the 27-nation bloc. For one thing, **Hungary says it won't go along with a boycott**, while Slovakia and Czech Republic are seeking a multiyear transition period. All are landlocked and big users of Russian oil. Here is what the oil sanctions could mean for people in Europe and the rest of the world: HOW MUCH DOES EUROPE PAY RUSSIA FOR ENERGY? Gas and oil have kept flowing even as governments denounce the war. The **EU sends $450 million a day to Russia for oil** and $400 million per day for natural gas, according to calculations by analysts at the Bruegel think tank in Brussels. That means energy revenue is bolstering the Kremlin's budget, adding to foreign currency reserves that could help Russia support the ruble and partly make up for Western sanctions that froze much of Russia's foreign currency reserves held outside Russia. HOW MUCH RUSSIAN OIL GOES TO EUROPE? Europe is the biggest purchaser of Russian crude, receiving 138 million tons in 2020 out of Russia's total exports of 260 million tons — or 53%, according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Europe, which imports almost all of its crude, gets a quarter of its needs from Russia. Oil is refined into fuel for heating and driving as well as being a raw material for industry. WHY IS THE FOCUS ON OIL INSTEAD OF NATURAL GAS? It’s **harder to find alternative sources** of natural gas because it comes mainly by pipeline. It would be easier to find other sources for oil, which mostly moves by tanker and is traded globally. So a natural gas boycott is off the table for now. **Heavy gas users like Germany say an immediate cutoff could cost jobs**, with industrial associations warning of shutdowns in glass **and** metals **businesses. Cutting off both natural gas and oil would likely cause a recession in Europe, economists say.** WHAT COULD HAPPEN WHEN RUSSIAN OIL SUPPLIES STOP? Europe imported 3.8 million barrels a day from Russia before the war. In theory, European customers could replace those barrels from suppliers in the Middle East, whose exports now mostly go to Asia, as well as from the United States, Latin America and Africa. Meanwhile, cheaper Russian oil could take the place of the Middle East shipments to Asia. But it would take time to make that adjustment. New supplies would have to be found elsewhere. Several large refineries in central and Eastern Europe rely on oil from a Soviet-era pipeline and would have to find another way of getting oil to make gasoline and other products. Bruegel analysts say that means European countries should be ready to impose measures to reduce fuel use, such as making public transport free and incentivizing car-sharing. If those measures don't work, tougher ones such as odd-even driving bans based on license plate numbers would be needed. Similar measures were taken during the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, when Germany imposed car-free Sundays. Russia is a major supplier of Europe’s diesel fuel for trucks and farm equipment, meaning its **price affects those for a wide range of food and goods**. EU governments also are gambling that Russia will not respond by turning off natural gas supplies to Europe. Russia has already cut off Bulgaria and Poland, ostensibly for refusing to pay in rubles. WHAT COULD HAPPEN TO THE GLOBAL OIL MARKET? Chances are that **oil prices would go up for everyone because oil is a global commodity.** That would mean higher prices at the pump and for home heating, less disposable income for consumers and be a drag on the economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia would probably produce and export less oil after losing its biggest customer, Europe. That's because all of Russia's exports can't simply be redirected from nearby Europe to far-off Asia due to shipping and logistical constraints. It would mean a major reshuffling of the world's crude oil flows. Buyers in India and China might avoid Russian oil if it means possible sanctions trouble with the West. And Western customers are already shunning Russian oil because they don’t want to be associated with the country or can't find insurers or banks willing to handle dealings with Moscow. On the other hand, some Asian customers might jump at the chance to snap up discounted Russian oil. Especially if the sales are off the books, as appears to be happening in some cases. The OPEC oil cartel led by Saudi Arabia — which sets production levels along with allied non-members like Russia — has made it clear it won’t increase output to make up for any supply loss from Russia due to a boycott. They meet again Thursday. Rystad Energy expects a loss of 1.5 million to 2 million barrels per day and oil reaching $120 to $130 per barrel by year's end. A milder scenario, in which most Russian oil shunned by Europe is snapped up in other energy-hungry countries not taking part in the sanctions, would see a loss of 1 million barrels per day. Oil prices would drop below $100 by June and keep falling to $60 by year's end.

### 2NC – Brink

#### European sanctions are already tanking EU economies–it will only get worse

Noack 3-2 (Rick Noack is a Paris-based correspondent covering France for The Washington Post. Previously, he was a foreign affairs reporter for The Post based in Berlin, where he covered international news. He also worked for The Post from Washington as an Arthur F. Burns Fellow and from Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Originally from Germany, he studied at Sciences Po Paris, Johns Hopkins University and King's College London, 3-2-22, “European sanctions on Russia will cost Europe, too, early signs show”, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/02/europe-russia-sanctions-backlash/)

PARIS — One factor has long underpinned pushback by European governments and business over sanctions on Russia: concern for their own pocketbooks. But in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the continent has seen a rapid about-face and has already begun to feel the effects. When Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and backed separatists in Ukraine’s east, European business groups were among the most vocal skeptics of the E.U. sanctions that followed. Just weeks ago, a major German business association was celebrating a “gratifying” surge in trade with Russia, while Italian CEOs met virtually with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss stronger ties even as the crisis was heating up. In a matter of days, the tone has changed. Since the invasion began last week, Russia, facing a flurry of sanctions, has become an economic pariah. Even Putin’s defenders among European businesses, especially in Italy and Germany, have rallied behind what France’s finance minister this week called an “all-out economic and financial war” against Russia, the European Union’s fifth-biggest trading partner. (He later apologized for saying “war.”) “It is beyond any discussion that the German business world supports the imposed sanctions,” read a statement by the chairman of the German Eastern Business Association, a trade group in long-standing favor of robust ties to Russia. The widespread support for sanctions has already begun to come at an economic cost, on top of those borne from the turmoil of war, affecting energy prices, inflation and the cost of raw materials. Experts warn that backlash could follow. Many of the effects, including higher gas, electricity and food prices, have either set in or could hit in the next six weeks, said Andrew Kenningham, chief Europe economist at Capital Economics, a research consultancy. That spans the final stretch of the French presidential election campaign, potentially playing into the hands of the crowded field of populist candidates running against President Emmanuel Macron. In a written address to parliament last Friday, Macron prepared voters for volatile weeks and months ahead. “This major crisis will have consequences on our lives, our economy,” he said. Prime Minister Jean Castex has said the government would intervene to shield companies and citizens “as well as possible.” Sanctions “will have dramatic long-term implications and, relatively soon, very strong price implications, starting first with energy but then trickling down through the entire economy,” said Georg Zachmann, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank. While much of the continent seems willing to bear the price for now, such effects could drive division, especially if Europe targets Russian gas and oil exports, or if Russia decides to withhold supplies. Even in the absence of such moves, the international oil benchmark surged beyond $110 a barrel on Wednesday, as buyers refrained from purchasing Russian crude amid financial uncertainty and the prospect of supply chain disruptions. European natural gas — of which some 40 percent comes from Russia — hit an all-time high this week. “We will need gas, we will need oil. And if that doesn’t keep coming, then political unity in Europe will be difficult to maintain,” Zachmann said. Germany, which imports more than 50 percent of its natural gas from Russia, will be hard-pressed to find alternatives. The country has already suspended the newly built Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which was built to convey gas from Russia, last month. Some see nuclear energy as a possible lifeboat. The crisis has reawakened one of the country’s most divisive debates — and one that appeared to have been settled, with all remaining nuclear power plants set to be taken off the grid this year. But speaking on Sunday, Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, whose Green Party is rooted in the country’s anti-nuclear movement, was no longer willing to rule out an extension. “Nothing is a taboo,” he said, also raising the possibility of more reliance on coal. In the aftermath of the invasion, European leaders seemed to set economic concerns aside, agreeing to disconnect seven Russian banks from SWIFT, the world’s most important payment mechanism. European companies and banks with subsidiaries or strong links to Russia, including British multinational oil and gas company BP and French bank Societe Generale, are expected to bear the initial brunt. Countries including Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which have significantly reduced their dependency on Russia but remain more exposed than many other European nations, could also be among the first to feel the hit. The E.U. has yet to impose import bans on some of the most lucrative Russian exports — including oil, gas and raw materials. But experts say it will be impossible for the E.U. to fully disentangle desired sanctions targets from broader economic effects that will rebound on Europe. Trade with Russia and Ukraine has already been disrupted enormously. Key Russian banks will be cut off from SWIFT within days, major shipping companies have said they would stop most cargo deliveries to and from Russia, and flight bans are preventing some goods from reaching their destinations. German carmaker Volkswagen said this week that it would suspend production in two electric car plants because of supply chain disruptions linked to the conflict. Meanwhile, a major Russian steel exporter, Severstal, said it was redirecting exports “to alternative world markets” after its main shareholder was sanctioned by the E.U. For European consumers, the most noticeable impact could be surging inflation, which was already up. A potential “2 percent reduction in purchasing power doesn’t sound much, but those households who have lower incomes and high heating and fuel costs will be much worse affected,” Kenningham said. As inflation rises, inequality could deepen — and consumers in countries including Spain and Germany, where governments have largely refrained from freezing gas and electricity prices, could be hit more severely than consumers in France, for example, where policymakers intervened early. A senior French official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to be candid, said the European Commission is already in contact with countries that could “if necessary, divert part of their production to the European Union.” The official cited Qatar and the United States, along with Algeria, Nigeria and other exporters, as possible options. The prospect of energy shortages — and a full halt in Russian deliveries — could overshadow European politics through the rest of the year. In the long-run, the disruptions could be a boost for supporters of renewable energy. But in the short run, the urgent need to find alternatives to Russian oil and gas is likely to have the opposite effect.

### 2NC – AT: Sanctions

#### Greece has recently started helping Russia with oil exports

Wetzel 5-8 (Daniel Wetzel. Principal Agilist / Agile Coach at Discover Financial Services | CSM, ICP-ACC, ICP-ATF · Daniel Wetzel. Head of Tracking Sustainable Transitions, 5-8-22, “Greece helps Russia circumvent sanctions - Die Welt”, <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3478601-greece-helps-russia-circumvent-sanctions-die-welt.html//BVN> SC)

Russian oil tankers continue to call at European ports unhindered amid EU attempts to limit Russia's ability to export energy. Greece is now helping Russia to circumvent this ban. That’s according to Die Welt, Ukrinform reports. It is noted that Greek shipowners are expanding their business with Russia. In April, Greece’s share in the transportation of Russian oil has tripled against 2021. According to Lloyd's insurance company, a total of 190 tankers departed from Russian ports in April, of which 76 flew the Greek flag. In late April, the Greek-flagged supertanker Nissos Rhenia loaded Russian oil at a port in the Netherlands and headed for Singapore. The number of shipments to India, China, and South Korea has also increased. According to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Russia exports 7 million barrels of oil and petroleum products daily. It should be recalled that earlier Dutch dockers refused to unload the Sunny Liger tanker carrying Russian diesel fuel, as European nations are close to approving an embargo on Russian petroleum products.

#### Greece has become the hotspot for STS transfers because they can evade sanctions – crucial to supply over 1/4 of all European energy

Ryan Hogg ’22, joined Business Insider in March 2022 as a Weekend Business News Fellow on the UK team based in London. He holds a Gold Standard NCTJ qualification, and previously interned with the Financial Times, “Greek shipping companies are profiting by masking the transport of Russian oil, report says”, Business Insider, 6/5/22, https://www.businessinsider.com/greek-shipping-companies-profit-from-transporting-russian-oil-report-2022-6

**Greek shipping companies are engaging in "ship-to-ship" switches to disguise the transport of Russian oil**, according to data reviewed by London's Sunday Times newspaper. The data suggested "ship-to-ship" transfers in the Russian port of Kavkaz, where a Russian ship will unload oil from its vessel onto another vessel coming from a neutral company, has been on the increase since Russia invaded Ukraine in February. Findings by the newspaper also showed Greek ports had become a hotspot, with transfers in the port of Kalamata rising by 20% in a month. The Sunday Times cited one example of a Russian-flagged ship, the Vladimir Monomakh, entering the port of Kavkaz on March 1, before transferring its oil to the 25,000 tonne Greek-owned, Maltese-flagged Minerva Emily, thereby masking the oil's origins. The report said Andreas **Martinos, the owner of Minerva Marine, was making large profits by transferring Russian oil in this way**. **There was no evidence of sanctions being breached and Minerva was not attempting to conceal its actions**, the Sunday Times said. It also cited data from Lloyd's List showing that ships owned by Greek billionaire George Economou transported 1.9 million tonnes of oil directly from four Russian ports in April. Oil prices following Russia's invasion have hit 14-year highs, fueling Russia's war efforts. Moscow is thought to be making $800 million a day from oil exports as Western countries try to reduce their reliance on Russian energy. This week the European Union reached an agreement to ban Russian oil arriving by sea by the end of this year, but supplies sent through pipelines will be exempt. **Russia supplies just over a quarter of the EU's oil**.

### 2NC – AT: Shutoff Now

#### Greece is effectively supplying Russian oil despite pressure for European shutoff – they are increasing STS transfers to avoid future sanctions

Tsvetana Paraskova 6/19/22, author for Oilprice.com, “Tanker Companies Race To Ship Russian Oil Ahead Of New Sanctions”, Baystreet.ca, 6/19/22, https://www.baystreet.ca/commodities/5673/Tanker-Companies-Race-To-Ship-Russian-Oil-Ahead-Of-New-Sanctions

Western sanctions have so far failed to crush Russia’s oil exports as Moscow is redirecting crude to its more than willing Asian buyers, China and India. **European vessel owners,** especially private Greek operators**, are moving a lot of the Russian oil in the months before the EU ban on seaborne Russian oil imports kicks in at the end of this year**. **Greek tanker owners have increased their exposure to Russian oil shipping in the past two months as they race to profit from the higher demand for heavily discounted Russian oil in China and India.** Once EU sanctions on seaborne imports of Russian oil take effect this December, Greek tanker operators will have to stop shipping Russian oil. A much bigger blow to Russian oil exports that will have dramatic consequences on the global oil tanker market and oil prices comes from provision number two in the sixth sanctions package - EU operators will be prohibited from insuring and financing the marine transportation of Russian oil to third countries. **Until the sanctions enter into force, European, especially Greek, tanker owners are moving a lot of Russian oil to Asia, making a lot of money in the process**. Shippers from Greece, China, and Turkey are eagerly taking advantage of the situation, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. By shipping Russian ESPO crude from Kozmino to the Chinese coast, a ship owner can make $1.6 million—three times what they would have made before the war in Ukraine. Earlier this month, Ukraine called out Greece for shipping Russian oil. “We see Greek companies providing almost the largest tanker fleet for the transportation of Russian oil,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in a speech to a conference in Athens via video link. “Once again: this is happening precisely when another Russian energy resource is being used as a weapon against Europe and against the family budget of every European. I am sure that this does not meet the interests of Europe, Greece, or Ukraine,” Zelensky added. Greek vessel owners made 151 port calls from Baltic and Black Sea Russian ports between May 1 and June 27, up by 41% compared to the same period last year, according to data compiled by Lloyd’s List using Lloyd’s List Intelligence**. Almost half of all crude and refined products exported from key Baltic or Black Sea ports were shipped on vessels Greek tanker owners beneficially own**, the data showed. **TMS Tankers of billionaire George Economou is the biggest Greek player in the Russian market and second overall, second only to Russia-owned Sovcomflot, which is under Western sanctions**, according to the data. **Greek tankers are also participating in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers offshore Greece, Malta, and south of Gibraltar**, Lloyd’s List data showed. It’s difficult to predict what will happen to the global tanker market when the EU sanctions enter into force, but demand for oil remains high, so tankers will be used on other routes, a CEO at a Greek shipping firm told The Wall Street Journal. “They will travel longer distances which means they will make more money,” the executive added. **“Dark” STS transfers of Russian crude, alongside shutting off vessel transponders and attempts to disguise the origin of the oil, are set to only increase as the EU sanctions approach**, analysts say.

#### Europe wont completely shut off Russia

Smith 22 (Elliot Smith is a Markets Reporter for CNBC in London. He joined the team in April 2019 after two and a half years with Citywire, where his reporting garnered the 2018 PressGazette British Journalism Award for Specialist Media (Finance), March 11, 2022, “Goldman Sachs predicts what will happen to Europe’s economy if Putin shuts off the gas taps”, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/11/goldman-predicts-what-will-happen-to-europes-economy-if-putin-shuts-off-gas.html)

Given **Russia’s reliance on exports to Europe** and its ever-shrinking sources of revenue elsewhere in light of the suite of international sanctions, **BCA Research strategists suggested in a note Wednesday that a complete stoppage was unlikely**. “Although Moscow forged a new deal with Beijing last month to supply China’s CNPC with an additional 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year, the new planned pipeline to carry these supplies will take two to three years to complete,” said Mathieu Savary, chief European strategist at BCA Research. “In the meantime, **Russia will have to rely on its sales to Europe** to fund its military incursion in Ukraine and ensure domestic stability.” Savary suggested, however, that Novak’s threat still highlights the risk of disruption to European energy supplies, which will continue to exert upward pressure on natural gas prices in the near term. “Until the risk premium in oil and natgas prices dissipates, high energy costs will lead to a period of stagflation in the Eurozone,” Savary added. “Investors should maintain a cautious stance towards European risk assets over the near-term.”

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – UQ

#### Greece-Russia relations are low – tit-for-tat diplomat expulsions

Agence France-Presse AFP 6/28/22, is a French private international news agency headquartered in Paris, France, “Russia expels eight Greek diplomats”, Inquirer.net, 6/28/22, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1617997/russia-expels-eight-greek-diplomats

MOSCOW — Russia said Monday it was expelling eight Greek diplomats over a decision by Athens to deliver military equipment to Ukraine, where Moscow’s troops are fighting. Greece’s ambassador was summoned to the Russian foreign ministry and told the diplomats had eight days to leave the country, said a ministry statement. **The decision was “the direct consequence of unfriendly actions taken by the Greek authorities”, said the ministry**. The statement referred specifically to the delivery of weapons and military material to Ukraine and the expulsion of Russian diplomats from Greece. **The Greek foreign ministry expressed “profound regret” over the move, which it claimed was “baseless**”. Athens said the diplomats in question were “distinguished by their professionalism and high sense of responsibility (and) performed their duties in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations.” **Athens expelled 12 Russian diplomats in April, following Moscow’s military operation in Ukraine**, launched in late February. **Despite the two countries historical ties**, because of their shared Orthodox Christian religious heritage, Athens has joined other Western nations in condemning the Russian military operation. Western countries around the world have expelled several hundred Russian diplomats over the issue, and Russia has replied in kind.

#### Greece-Russia relations are at an all-time low–Ukraine proves

Kokkinidis 4-23 (Tasos Kokkinidis is a Greek Reporter journalist, 4-23-22, “Russia Warns Greece of Complete Breakdown in Relations”, Greek Reporter, <https://greekreporter.com/2022/04/23/russia-warns-greece-breakdown-relations//BVN> SC)

On Friday, Russia’s Foreign Ministry warned Greece that relations between the two nations that “share the same faith” have been “reduced to almost nothing.” Maria Zakharova, director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, warned in a statement released on social media that the “historical parallels” between Greece and Russia were in danger of becoming “a solid double line between us.” The Russian official focused on Greece’s decision to declare 12 Russian officials “personae non-gratae,” on April 6 joining other European states that had taken similar steps in response to accusations of atrocities committed by Russian forces against civilians in Ukraine. The Foreign Ministry said the decision was made in line with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963. Russia’s embassy in Athens condemned Greece’s decision and warned of consequences. “We have strongly protested against this unjustified and hostile step which aims to further destroy our bilateral relations,” the Russian embassy announced in a statement. “We made clear that this action will not remain without consequences,” it further said. Grecian Delight supports Greece Breakdown of Greece, Russia relations despite historic ties In her social media post, Zakharova lamented the breakdown of relations between Russia and Greece and delved into the historic ties between the two countries. “There was a time when Russia helped Greece achieve independence and restore its statehood, and its first head was previously Russia’s foreign minister, but now this country’s diplomatic relations with Russia have been reduced to almost nothing,” Zakharova warned. She added that “this happened despite the fact that we share the same faith with the Greeks, the same traditions, and were always there to help our Greek friends.” “This is not so much an issue of Euro-Atlantic solidarity erasing the past, since it is a sovereign choice for every nation to decide whom to honor. Even worse, this deprives people and nations of their future, independence and the right to make sovereign choices,” Zakharova concluded. Diplomatic spat between Russia and Greece The Russian official has previously alleged that there is an orchestrated defamation of Russia in Greece following the ongoing war in Ukraine. “Senior officials in Athens find themselves making gross accusations against our country and its leadership,” Zakharova said. She added: “We noticed the unprecedented campaign launched in Greece to defame Russia’s policy. Senior officials in Athens allow themselves to make crude accusations against our country and its leadership [and] they are literally competing with their like-minded people. They hypocritically speak of an ‘unprovoked attack’ against Ukraine, for the first time since World War II, a ‘mass invasion’ and so on.” “Europe, including Greece, is fully integrated into the ranks of the Kiev regime’s advocates, while the anti-Russia hysteria cultivated by the authorities has reached a boiling point,” the Russian foreign ministry official said. Greece responded to the statements saying they are “unacceptable.” The spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry, Alexandros Papaioannou, noted the following: “The recent statements by the spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the posts of the Russian embassy in Athens are, unfortunately, unacceptable.”

#### Hostile statements have been exchanged – relations are low

Keep Greece Talking KGT ’22, Greek News in English, “Russian statements against Greece are “unacceptable”, says Foreign Ministry”, Keep Greece Talking, 3/7/22, https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2022/03/07/greece-russia-foreign-ministry-unacceptable-statements/

**The statement by the spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry are “unacceptable” the Foreign Ministry in Athens said late on Sunday. Greece ’s Foreign Ministry responded to the unprecedented statement by Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova who lashed out against the country for its stance on the war in Ukraine**. **Zakharova went to far to accuse the Greek government of “hypocrisy.”** – Statement is here. “Greek foreign policy is a principled policy and has always been based on complete respect for international law,” Zakharova’s counterpart in the Greek Foreign Ministry, Alexandros Papaioannou said late on Sunday. “Greece contributes to, and is bound by, the decisions of international organizations it takes part in, such as, among others, the European Union and NATO,” he added. “A main concern of our country’s is to promote truth, on the basis of confirmed and irrefutable facts. Every effort to promote fake news and disinformation, aiming to mislead public opinion, is to be condemned, wherever it comes from. The recent statements by the spokeswoman for the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the (social media) posts of the Russian Embassy in Athens are, unfortunately, unacceptable. **They do not comport with diplomatic practice, or the historical bonds connecting the Greek and Russian people**. Greece would like to see historical relations maintained and Russian behavior reflecting this,” the spokesman’s statement concluded.

#### Relations are dead

Tasos Kokkinidis ‘22, author at Greek Reporter, “What Has Russia Ever Done For Greece?”, GreekReporter.com, 4/28/22, https://greekreporter.com/2022/04/28/what-russia-ever-done-greece/

Recently, **Russia’s Foreign Ministry warned Greece that** relations between the two nations **that “share the same faith”** have been “reduced to almost nothing.” Maria **Zakharova**, director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, **warned in a statement released on social media that the “historical parallels” between Greece and Russia were in danger of becoming “a solid double line between us.”** Greece has joined its EU and NATO allies in condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine and has sent military and humanitarian aid to Kyiv. **Relations reached a nadir when Greece expelled 12 Russian diplomats in early April.** However, recent opinion polls show that more than one out of two Greeks do not support the government’s policies. While refugees from Ukraine are welcomed with open arms in Greece, many Greeks reject the EU measures against Russia. According to one survey, more than 60 percent are decidedly opposed to arms shipments; they see culpability for the war in both Moscow and Kyiv. Greece is also concerned about the close ties between Turkey and Russia. Moscow has been providing Ankara with weapons, including the controversial S400 missile system and has been financing a nuclear power plant built in Turkey.

### 2AC – Sanctions Thumper

#### Greece struck down Russians ships in support of EU sanctions

RFERL 4-19 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a United States government funded organization that broadcasts and reports news, information, and analysis to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Middle East where it says that "the free flow of information is either banned by government authorities or not fully developed", 4-19-22, “Greece Seizes Russian Tanker As Part Of EU Sanctions Over Ukraine”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, <https://www.rferl.org/a/greece-russia-oil-tanker-seized/31810864.html//BVN> SC)

Greek authorities say they have seized a Russian oil tanker in the Aegean Sea as part of European Union sanctions imposed against Russia for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The Russian-flagged Pegas, with 19 Russian crew members on board, was seized on April 19 near the coastal city of Karystos on the southern coast of the island of Evia. "It has been seized as part of EU sanctions," a shipping ministry official said. The coast guard said the seizure order concerned the ship itself and not its cargo. The vessel had experienced mechanical issues and was being escorted by a tug to the Peloponnese so that its cargo could be transferred to another ship. However, rough seas forced it to Karystos. The European Union, of which Greece is a member, has adopted a wide range of sanctions against Moscow over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, designed to cripple the Russian economy and pressure President Vladimir Putin into ending the war against Ukraine. The sanctions include import and export bans for a wide array of goods and a ban on access to EU ports by Russian-flagged ships.

### 2AC – Link Thumper

#### The link is non-unique – the US has already designated Greece as a important ally for security cooperation – draws them away from Russia

Edmond Y. Azadian 6/9/22, Senior editorial columnist EDMOND Y. AZADIAN is Advisor to the Alex and Marie Manoogian Museum in Detroit, Michigan; Advisor from the Diaspora to the Ministry of Culture in Armenia; member of the Republic of Armenia’s Academy of Sciences, “Armenia, Greece and Cyprus Triangle May be in the Offing”, The Armenian Mirror-Spectator, 6/9/22, https://mirrorspectator.com/2022/06/09/armenia-greece-and-cyprus-triangle-may-be-in-the-offing/

More recently, Greece’s former socialist government had reduced the country into a basket case. **But Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ center-right New Democracy Party won a landslide election in 2019 and brought about a turnaround to the country’s economy and politics**. Although Turkey brags that it has the second strongest army after the US **in the NATO structure**, **Greece no longer lags** far **behind**. As Turkey continues to abuse its power and thus erode its standing in NATO, sympathy and support is shifting to Greece. **After Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias met US Secretary of State Antony Blinken** in May, **a spokesperson called the two countries to resolve their problems through diplomacy and characterized Greece as “an irreplaceable ally and key ally of the United States in NATO,” while describing Turkey as “an important US partner and important ally in NATO.”** The characterizations are very subtle but clear enough to make clear their place in US foreign policy.

#### Greece is firmly in NATO’s camp

Dr. Jake Sotiriadis and John Sitilides ’22, \*is Director of the Center for Futures Intelligence at National Intelligence University and an Air Force Intelligence Officer, \*\*is a geopolitical strategist at Trilogy Advisors and diplomacy consultant to the State Department under a U.S. government contract., “U.S. and Greece Take Strategic Partnership to New Heights”, The National Interest, 5/16/22, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-and-greece-take-strategic-partnership-new-heights-202444

President Joe Biden is hosting Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in the Oval Office today, but this is no ordinary visit. The Biden-Mitsotakis meeting showcases Greece’s enhanced role as one of Washington’s closest allies, **with U.S.-Greece cooperation advancing American foreign policy objectives across Southern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa**. **Underscoring this historic visit will be Mitsotakis’ address to a joint session of Congress at the invitation of Speaker** Nancy **Pelosi**—**a rare honor reserved for prominent international leaders**—and the first ever to Congress by a Greek prime minister. The timing of Mitsotakis’ visit comes at a critical moment, as the largest conflict in Europe since World War II rages in Ukraine. **Mitsotakis has burnished Greece’s Atlanticist credentials, voting to sanction Russia, sending weapons to Ukraine at considerable domestic political cost, and expelling Russian diplomats suspected of espionage**. Greece is a small country in terms of territory and population, yet its outsized impact on world history, culture, and civilization has shaped the values that define America’s constitutional republic. Thus, the joint session also celebrates the bicentennial of Greece’s 1821 declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire, and the shared Western ideals of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. Indeed, U.S.-Greece diplomatic relations have never been better. **Last week, Athens ratified the U.S.-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, extending the current agreement by five years and solidifying and expanding the U.S. military presence in Greece under the Strategic Dialogue launched by President Donald Trump and continued by President Biden**. Greece’s northern port of Alexandroupolis, near the Dardanelles Straits entry to the Black Sea, is taking on a significant role in America’s forward defense footprint. The port is now a U.S. and NATO defense hub, hosting the largest-ever U.S. military shipment in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, to deter and defend against regional aggression and augment NATO’s air, ground, and naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. Alexandroupolis is also becoming a key energy hub in Europe, with a new liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility set to expand the gas supply grid for Europe and reduce reliance on Russian energy. **Greece’s heightened defense and energy roles posture Athens to defend the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean as well as to cooperate with NATO allies Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania to constrain Russian naval and air forces in the Black Sea**. Greece is a strong advocate of European Union accession for Western Balkan countries, to boost the regional economy, advance democratic reforms, and combat malign Russian influence, especially in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. **The United States greatly benefits from Greece’s network of strategic alliances beyond Europe’s borders**. Despite the lack of White House support for the EastMed natural gas pipeline project, **the 3+1 mechanism of Cyprus, Greece, Israel**—the three most democratic states in the Eastern Mediterranean—**along with the United States, represents a key cooperation framework in trade, technology, energy security, counterterrorism, and interconnectivity in an extremely volatile region**. Greece is strengthening ties to the Persian Gulf as well, hosting a Saudi Air Force exercise on Crete and a diplomatic gathering called the “Philia Forum,” including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as Egypt and Cyprus. In 2021, Greece deployed a Patriot battery along with 130 troops for operations in Saudi Arabia, and concluded a military cooperation agreement with the UAE. Two major hurdles—the unresolved Cyprus problem and Turkey’s challenges of Greek sovereignty in the Aegean Sea—present perilous dilemmas for the region. While the war in Ukraine highlights U.S. and NATO efforts to keep Turkey in the Western camp, heightened Turkish-Greek tensions are counterproductive for the security alliance. Ankara is seeking to mend fences in its immediate periphery, with Egypt, UAE, and Israel, but has been escalating direct overflights of Greek islands in recent weeks. Greece and Turkey have a long and troubled history, and nearly came to blows over maritime disputes in the Aegean in 2020, as they nearly did in 1976, 1987, and 1996. These sovereignty disputes are not Washington’s alone to help resolve. Greece’s key NATO allies, such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, also have important roles in resolving conflicts in Southern Europe. **The Ukraine crisis clearly emphasizes the criticality of continued stability, security, and cooperation on NATO’s southern flank**. **Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ visit presents an opportunity to elevate these regional and functional issues to Biden, the U.S. Congress, and the American public**. Washington can use its indispensable influence carefully to reinforce this key alliance and dial down regional tensions where solidarity within NATO is of the utmost importance, and where its seams are under greatest stress.

#### NATO and Greece are already working together now

ET 3-25 (The Economic Times is an Indian English-language business-focused daily newspaper. It is owned by The Times Group, 3-25-22, “Greece is a critical partner and NATO ally of the US, Blinken says”, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/greece-is-a-critical-partner-and-nato-ally-of-the-us-blinken-says/articleshow/90447832.cms?from=mdr//BVN> SC)

US Secretary of State, Anthony J. Blinken, acknowledged Greece’s role as a critical partner to the US. According to the US, Greece is a strategic partner and a crucial NATO ally. Blinken highlighted the historical ideals and democratic rights that bind the people of both countries on Greek Independence Day. Blinken also expressed gratitude to Greece for its response to the Ukraine conflict, which entered its 30th day on Friday.Greece and the US have enhanced cooperation across a range of vital topics. Last year, the relationship became more robust as the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement modification strengthened their defense and security cooperation for years to come. A proclamation honoring Greek Independence Day was issued by US President Joe Biden President Joe Biden also expressed his heartfelt gratitude towards the US and Greece partnership by signing a proclamation today. Biden emphasized Greece's leadership role in supporting peace and prosperity from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Black Sea and the Western Balkans and the solid historical and current relations between Greece and the US. He also mentioned that Greece and the US are working together to address the problems of our day, including managing the climate catastrophe and diversifying the region's energy supplies, demonstrating that democracies work for people and combating the growing menace of authoritarianism. Blinken’s statement on Greek Independence Day Blinken pointed out the crucial importance of the partnership that both the countries share at the present moment of the Russian-Ukraine war. He also thanked Greece on behalf of the United States for its unwavering and unwavering support for Ukraine's people, authority, and democracy. Both Greece and the US have a stronger relationship, boosting security and prosperity for both the nations and the broader transatlantic connection. Lastly, Blinken stated that the US carries on to support Greece to strengthen and expand the strong and significant relationship governed by democratic values that originated in Greece.

### 2NC – AT: Oil Impact

#### The EU has already adopted large sanctions–they are working now–it hasn’t collapsed the economy

Borrell 7-16 (Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, 7-16-22, “The sanctions against Russia are working”, <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sanctions-against-russia-are-working_en//BVN> SC)

Since Russia brutally invaded Ukraine, the EU has adopted six packages of sanctions against Moscow – and we are about to finalise a “maintenance and alignment” package to clarify a number of provisions to strengthen legal certainty for operators and align the EU's sanctions with those of our allies and partners of the G7. Our measures already now target nearly 1,200 individuals and almost 100 entities in Russia as well as a significant number of sectors of the Russian economy. These sanctions were adopted in close coordination with the G7 member, and the fact that over forty other countries, including traditionally neutral countries, have also adopted them or taken similar measures enhances their effectiveness. Sanctions require strategic patience because it may take a long time for them to have the desired effect. Now, as the war drags on and the costs of energy rises, people in Europe and elsewhere ask whether these sanctions are working and/or whether the side effects are too great. Without underestimating different problems that could occur, including attempts made to bypass them, sanctions remain an important instrument of political action. But for sure we need to use them in a well targeted manner, and, above all, they require strategic patience because it may take a long time for them to have the desired effect. One of the main sanctions adopted is to stop buying 90% of EU oil supplies from Russia by the end of 2022, depriving Moscow of corresponding revenues. Yes, Russia is able to sell its oil to other markets, however this benefit is limited by the fact that Russia is forced to give high discounts on each barrel (Russian oil is sold at around $ 30 less than the global average). In addition, and this is perhaps the most important point, this gradual oil embargo and the scaling back of the import of gas, liberates Europe from its energy dependence on Russia. We have discussed this issue at the EU level for years, but now we are implementing it. Cutting our structural energy dependence on Russia matters a lot because this dependence has been an obstacle to developing a strong European policy towards Moscow’s aggressive actions. Cutting our structural energy dependence on Russia matters a lot because this dependence has been an obstacle to developing a strong European policy towards Moscow’s aggressive actions. This dependence probably played an important role in Putin's initial calculations in Ukraine. He may have believed that the EU would never sanction Russia seriously because it was too dependent on energy. This is one of his most important blunders when launching this war. Of course, this rapid detoxification from Russian energy involves significant costs for a number of countries and sectors that we will have to face. However, it is the price to pay to defend our democracies and international law. We have to handle these consequences by reinforcing our internal solidarity and that is what we are doing. By breaking its energy dependence, in line with its climate ambition, the EU is learning that interdependence is not always a neutral instrument that is beneficial to all or a mean to guarantee peaceful international relations. The Ukraine war confirmed that interdependence can be used as a weapon. This rapid detoxification from Russian energy involves significant costs for a number of countries and sectors that we will have to face. However, it is the price to pay to defend our democracies and international law. Are the sanctions really hurting the Russian economy? Some observers have argued they are not very effective because the exchange rate of the Russian currency is very high. But this interpretation is dubious. The exchange rate of the Rouble simply reflects the fact that Russia has a massive imbalance between the high volume of oil and gas exports and the parallel collapse of imports that has followed the sanctions. This trade surplus is not a sign of good economic health, especially for an economy like Russia. While exporting unprocessed raw materials, Russia must import many high-value products that it does not manufacture. For advanced technology products, Russia depends on Europe for more than 45%, the United States for 21% and China for only 11%. Russia may of course try to limit the effects of sanctions by substituting imports through domestic products. This was done, not without success, in the agricultural sector after the 2014 sanctions. However, for high-tech products, import substitution is much more difficult to achieve. Russia will try to substitute imports through domestic products. This was done, not without success, in the agricultural sector after the 2014 sanctions. However, for high-tech products, it is much more difficult to achieve. Sanctions on semiconductors imports for instance have a direct impact on Russian companies that produce consumer electronics, computers, airplanes, cars, or military equipment. In this field, which is obviously crucial in the war in Ukraine, sanctions limit Russia's capacity to produce precision missiles. On the ground, the Russian army is not making much use of this type of precision-guided missiles, not out of moderation, but out of necessity, as it does not have enough of them. In addition, the Russian air force has underperformed in Ukraine, also because it lacks precision-guided munitions. The automotive sector is another sector that is very much feeling the effects of the sanctions. Almost all foreign manufacturers have decided to withdraw from Russia and production was last May down by 97% compared with 2021. In addition, the few cars that Russian manufacturers still produce will not have airbags or automatic gearboxes. The Russian oil industry will suffer Russia as the world’s second largest oil producer is still earning large sums from selling its oil worldwide, notably to Asian customers and this helps it to keep financing the war. But over time, the Russian oil industry will suffer not only from the departure of foreign operators but also from its increasing difficulty in accessing sophisticated technologies such as horizontal drilling. In fact, the capacity of Russia to put new wells in production will be limited, which will lead to a drop in production. Finally, there is the airline industry, which plays a very important role in such a vast country. Around 700 of Russia's 1,100 civilian aircraft are of foreign origin. Russia will have to sacrifice a large part of its fleet, to find spare parts, so that the remaining aircrafts can fly. Even the Russian-produced aircrafts are dependent on technologies and material from western countries. As Alexander Morozov, the head of the research department of Bank of Russia recently wrote: ”The restrictions will lead to decreases in technological and engineering sophistication and in labour productivity in the sanctioned industries. Industries that rely on the most advanced foreign technologies and those with highly digitalized business processes risk being hit harder than others”. The list could go on with other important factors: the loss of access to financial markets; the disconnection of Russia with the major global research networks such as CERN for example; the massive brain drain of Russian elites with thousands of highly qualified professionals having left the country. The effects of such moves are not immediately visible. However, the scientific, economic and technological isolation of Russia is a major loss for the country in the medium term. The scientific, economic and technological isolation of Russia is a major loss for the country in the medium term. Moscow may claim that its relations with many countries remain intact. However, in reality, sanctions against Russia are also hurting its trade with non-sanctioning countries like China. The alternative offered by China to the Russian economy remains indeed limited. Although Beijing seems to want to make ideological gestures by siding with Moscow; refusing to condemn its invasion; or taking up the Russian narrative on the threat of NATO, it is overall rather careful regarding helping Russia circumvent the sanctions. While its imports from Russia have risen (mainly through greater energy imports), Chinese exports to Russia have decreased in proportions that are comparable to those of Western countries. Even if it does not admit it publicly, China is probably worried that this war could strengthen the position of the United States not only in Europe but also in Asia, with the strong involvement of countries such as Japan and South Korea in responding to Russia’s aggression. This is not exactly what China is aiming at. As a result, the latest Russian figures released by Bank of Russia show that transactions through the Russian payment system are down 7.2% in June compared to the first quarter of 2022. This is a real-time indicator of the important slowdown in the Russian economy. Of course the biggest question of all is this: will the sanctions and the real effects they have, lead Putin changing his strategic calculations and if so when? Here we need to be cautious and recognise that his actions have always been disconnected from economic considerations. Putin believes in the magical power of political voluntarism. However, this cannot last forever. Hence Europe must show strategic patience. The war will be long and the test of strength will last. We have no other choice. Allowing Russia to prevail would mean allowing it to destroy our democracies and the very basis of the international rules-based world order. Europe must show strategic patience. The war will be long and the test of strength will last. Allowing Russia to prevail would mean allowing it to destroy our democracies and the very basis of the international rules-based world order. Even if sanctions do not change the Russian trajectory in the short-term, that does not mean they are useless for they do affect sheer amount of resources it has to wage its war. Without sanctions, Russia would ‘have its cake and eat it’, as the expression goes. With sanctions, it will be forced to “choose between butter and guns” locking Putin in a vice that is gradually tightening. Finally, let me raise here as well the issue of the alleged or real impact of our sanctions on third countries, particularly African countries, which depend on Russian and Ukrainian wheat and fertilisers. Here it is very clear where responsibility lies for the food crisis. Our sanctions do not target Russian wheat or fertiliser exports. And it is until now Russia’s aggression and its blockade of the Black Sea that is preventing Ukraine from exporting its wheat. We hope however that the negotiations led by the Secretary General of the United Nations will enable this issue to be resolved quickly. I have informed my African counterparts that we are ready to assist them with any difficulties they may encounter related with our sanctions while urging them not to be fooled by the Russian authorities' lies and disinformation regarding this subject. I have informed my African counterparts that we are ready to assist them with any difficulties they may encounter related with our sanctions while urging them not to be fooled by the Russian authorities' lies and disinformation regarding this subject. There is a “battle of narratives” going on internationally over who is responsible global food and energy crisis as was clear at the last G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. But the real answer is to bring an end to the war and this can only be achieved by Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine. I keep reminding all our international partners that respect for the territorial integrity of states and the non-use of force are not Western or European principles. They are the basis of all international law and Russia is blithely trampling on them. To accept such a violation would open the door to the law of the jungle on a global scale. Europe must become a real power The war in Ukraine makes clear that, contrary to what many thought rather naively just a few years ago, economic interdependence does not automatically guarantee peaceful international relations. This is why Europe must become a real power, as I have been calling for since the beginning of my mandate. Faced with the invasion of Ukraine, we have moved from debates to concrete actions, showing that, when provoked, Europe can respond. Since we do not want to go to war with Russia, economic sanctions and the support of Ukraine are at the core of this response. And our sanctions are beginning to have an effect and will do so even more in the months to come.

# Iran-Russia Relations

## 1NC – Iran Relations

### 1NC – Syria Scenario

#### Russia-Iran ties are at an all-time high – they are united against the West

MEHR News ‘21, made up of Mehr News agency and Iran’s best-selling international Daily, The Tehran Times, is one Of Iran’s Main stream News sources., “Iran, Russia in full solidarity against inhumane sanctions”, MEHR News Agency, 3/12/21, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/170991/Iran-Russia-in-full-solidarity-against-inhumane-sanctions

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of **Iran issued a statement** on Friday **to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the** "Treaty on the basis for **mutual relations and the principles of cooperation between** the Islamic Republic of **Iran and** the **Russia**n Federation," which expires today. The statement reads "The twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the basis for mutual relations and the principles of cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation "coincides with the exchange of messages between the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation." It also said that the Islamic Republic of **Iran views the Russian Federation as a strong neighbor and friend on the basis of "cooperation and mutual respect" and is interested in further expanding its relations with the country in all fields.** It further said, "In the light of the will of the leaders and high-ranking officials, the cooperation between the two countries in line with their shared interests has gone beyond the level of normal bilateral relations and has entered the phase of assisting the regional and international security and it is stronger than ever." **Iran and Russia are in full solidarity against "unilateral and inhumane sanctions", "Western interference in the affairs of other countries", "preventing third parties from playing a role in their own relations" and the need for "respect for international rights,"** the Iranian Foreign Ministry concluded.

#### Lack of NATO cohesion drives the Russia-Iran relationship – plan recalibration undermines influence

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Relations between Washington and Tehran have deteriorated since the onset of the Syrian conflict and even more so since President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal. At the same time, **Russia and Iran have grown closer through military cooperation in Syria**. **Moscow’s expanding influence in Syria suggests that a conflict between the United States and Iran could advance Russia’s power and reputation in the region**. At the very least, Russia will be able to paint the United States as an erratic aggressor, leading regional actors and international allies to question cooperation with Washington. Russia has helped the Assad regime maintain control in Syria, even as the U.S. and its NATO allies demanded Assad’s ouster. As the U.S. pulls back from Syria, Assad and Russia remain in control. **Russia’s backing of Assad began as a quest to undermine U.S. interests and gain influence in the Middle East**. More than four years later, **Russia’s triumphs from that conflict include drawing Turkey away from its NATO allies, building a reputation as a valuable foreign backer, and emerging as a kingmaker**—all at the expense of the United States. Poorly reasoned U.S. foreign policy decisions, such as, most recently, abandoning Kurdish partners in Syria, helped create a power vacuum that Russia has stepped in to fill. Friday’s strikes — and every Trump administration action taken since — will likely improve Russia’s position in Syria and the broader region. Iraq’s government is outraged by what it views as a U.S. violation of its sovereignty, with the Iraqi prime minister calling the strike a “flagrant violation of the conditions authorizing the presence of U.S. troops.” Iraq could soon expel U.S. forces from the country in response. With no troops in Iraq, the United States will find it hard to sustain a presence in Syria. That void would create more maneuverability for Moscow in the region — essentially, cementing its position as a regional power broker. **Beyond strengthening Russia’s position, the Soleimani strike contributes to Russia’s goals of driving a wedge between Washington and its partners and advancing global perceptions of the United States as volatile and belligerent**. **Moscow has already succeeded in undermining U.S. relations with Middle Eastern allies. The prime example is Turkey**: Although Russia and Turkey were on opposite sides of the conflict in Syria, they now jointly control operations in the north of the country after a remarkable October 22 agreement between Washington and Ankara to establish a “Syria Safe Zone” and the withdrawal of U.S. troops. In reaction to Soleimani’s death, Turkey released a statement that it opposes “foreign interventions, assassinations and sectarian conflicts in the region.” Moscow could also benefit if the U.S. strikes create more disunity between Washington and its European allies. **Numerous U.S. decisions in the Middle East have frustrated allies, particularly its withdrawal from the nuclear deal**. Reports suggest that the Trump administration even failed to warn Britain and other allies ahead of the strikes on Soleimani. **If Washington does not heed its allies’ calls for immediate de-escalation, the United States could find itself further isolated on the world stage**. Washington could incur additional damage to its relationships with European allies if Iran now hastens its pursuit of a nuclear weapon as a result of the strikes. Iran announced Sunday it would stop obeying all restrictions imposed by the Iran deal on its nuclear activities. Russia has been a vocal critic of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the deal and instead mount a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. In fact, Moscow’s position has placed it on the same side as European powers like France and Germany opposing the U.S. decision to reimpose sanctions. Russia has worked with France and Germany to sidestep U.S. sanctions to keep Iran in the deal. Consequently, **Russia is ideally situated to emphasize its efforts to maintain the agreement and blame Washington for pushing Iran toward a nuclear bomb.** Of course, there are major downsides for Russia from a U.S.-Iran conflict in the Middle East. A proxy conflict could stress Russian forces in Syria, especially if Israel escalates its strikes against Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah, which vowed to revenge Soleimani’s death. Furthermore, any Iranian progress toward nuclear breakout surely would destabilize the region, complicating Russia’s ability to control the situation in Syria. Finally, if Russia cooperates too closely with Iran, it will attract criticism from other Middle Eastern partners. For a while it seemed that Trump was trying to fulfill his campaign promise of a reduced U.S. presence in the Middle East. Now, it seems as if he’s trying to draw the country into another prolonged quagmire — whether as a distraction from impeachment proceedings or to force Iran to the negotiating table, it is too early to tell. Russia, on the other hand, is left with the enviable position of capitalizing on the turbulent behavior of the United States in the Middle East, regardless of whether the United States and Iran go to war. Ultimately, U.S. actions will strengthen Russian leadership: first, by removing American competition, and second, by turning regional and global sentiment against the United States. Provided Moscow continues cooperating with all regional states and maintains stability in Syrian territory where Russian forces are present, **Russia stands a good chance of supplanting U.S. influence in the Middle East — no matter what happens next.**

#### It’s the sole factor behind the relationship – Russia only pursues Iran if it feels threatened by Western interests

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**Vacillating between cooperation and contention, the Russian–Iranian partnership has long been riddled with contradictions**. For scholars, Moscow’s mercurial manoeuvrings have made it challenging to decipher the nature of the partnership. One Iranian analyst qualified Moscow’s interactions with Tehran as a ‘run with the hare, hunt with hounds’ approach. **Following its ‘zigzagging’ trajectory**, he argued that the degree of expansion or contraction in Russian–Iranian cooperation depended on whether relations between the US and Russia were amicable or hostile at the time. Evidence of this was the construction of the Bushehr power plant and the delivery of the sale of Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. **Russia stalled for years**, **especially during** Russian President Dmitri **Medvedev and** US President Barack **Obama’s dalliance with** the idea of a ‘reset’ in relations. What was underplayed was the fact that while Russia delayed, it did deliver in the end. This point cannot be emphasised enough – for an isolated Iran, with more foes than friends, what ultimately mattered was that (some) of its needs were being met. In the end, Russia delivered on its matrimonial promises. **Curiously, the Russian–Iranian partnership has proven to be steady**. What explains the durability of the partnership despite conflicting interests in different geopolitical theatres? Syria, for example, is regularly singled out as the arena in which the Russian–Iranian partnership is bound to unravel. Tehran and the Kremlin are aligned in that they both support Bashar al-Assad’s leadership, but they pursue very different approaches when it comes to post-conflict Syrian governance, state-building and military reform. In fact, tensions have been brewing for years over reconstruction and investment opportunities. Vying over lucrative government contracts, both states expect dividends. ‘We have probably paid $20–30 billion to Syria, and we have to take that money back’, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a member of the Iranian parliament’s national security committee said in an interview with the state-run news website Etemad Online. There was also speculation that tensions would flare up between the two states when on 8 July, Iran and Syria signed a bilateral pact to strengthen military and defence cooperation. **Analysts were quick to predict that the Iranian military deployment** (two batteries of surface-to-air missiles) **authorised in the military deal would challenge the partnership**. However, as long-term patterns of engagement suggest, the Russian–Iranian partnership will likely pass this litmus test as it has others. Iranian analyst, Shuaib Bahman, corroborates this view. Speaking to the Mehr News Agency, he explained that **although Russia and Iran have disagreements over Syria, they are not competitors**. Bahman maintains that that while other actors and coalitions in Syria, including Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and the US have disbanded over discrepancies and disputes, Tehran and Moscow have been able to successfully manage their differences in Syria. **Russia and Iran**, he argues, **will continue cooperating in Syria and beyond.** In the past month alone, Tehran and the Kremlin have reaffirmed their commitment to bilateral cooperation in several ways. On 20 July, Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, who visited Moscow for the third time in six months, confirmed that Tehran was planning to extend a 20-year agreement with Russia. The agreement is set to expire in March 2021. In turn, Moscow expressed its willingness to help Iran complete work on their nuclear power plant. On 2 August, Zarif reaffirmed to Leonid Slutsky, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of Russia’s State Duma, Iran’s readiness to ramp up parliamentary relations to a strategic level. Russia recently came to Iran’s defence in the UNSC over the controversial vote over the Iranian arms embargo. On 14 August, Russian President, Vladimir Putin proposed a seven-way online summit of UNSC permanent members, along with Germany and Iran, in a bid to avoid ‘confrontation and escalation’ at the UN. The US lost the bid to extend a UN arms embargo, set to expire on October 2020. **How can we explain the durability of the partnership despite ups and downs, clashes and discord?** In my research**, I have identified a unique ideational synergy binding Moscow and Tehran despite asymmetrical approaches and conflicting interests**. Both states espouse a similar political logic and understanding of the international system. **This shared geopolitical vision has developed organically along deeper lines of convergence**, including civilisational peculiarities, historical experiences, normative values and social identities, cultural orientations, **and a similar discursive genealogy in relation to the West**. While Russia and Iran may clash in different regional theatres, their alignment is buttressed by several ideational pillars. Russia and Iran are both anti-hegemonic, opposing the idea of a single state or a constellation of states being able to impose particular normative values and power structures as universal. Both states have demonstrated a commitment to building alternative integrative networks, and multilateral institutions on a regional level in order to create a counterweight to US unipolarity (the Shanghai Cooperation Council, the Eurasian Economic Union, or Iran’s recent 25-year agreement with China, for instance). Both have a common security threat perception, strongly opposing the universalist normative aspirations of the international system, which they deem as a threat to their unique civilisational identities. Moscow, in particular, opposes the US-led Atlantic ideological and power systems that gained traction at the end of the Cold War, when Russia and the West entered the era of ‘Cold Peace’. **As a countermeasure, Russia’s overriding strategic goal has been to advance what Trine Flockhart refers to as a ‘multi-order’ in which different ‘inter-orders’ of sovereign states are nested within an overall international system**. In this pursuit, Tehran has been a reliable partner. Iran and Russia are firmly ensconced as an ‘inter-order’ within this emerging ‘multi-order’ international system. In order to better understand the paradoxes and contradictions of this partnership, it is useful to conceptualise two separate levels that define Moscow–Tehran relations: on the top plane there are both common or clashing realpolitik interests that are held down by a gravitational pull onto a foundational level, comprised of common principles and perceptions of the international system. **It is this crucial foundational level that accounts for the paradoxes of this most peculiar, but permanent, partnership.**

#### Key to successful Astana resolution in Syria

Basel Haj Jasem ‘20, Researcher in Russian and Turkish affairs, political adviser, “Moscow and Tehran in Syria: Competition or partnership?”, Daily Sabah, 9/5/20, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/moscow-and-tehran-in-syria-competition-or-partnership

**Russia and Iran's partnership has** often wavered between cooperation and rivalry due to the incompatibility of interests and goals in many regional and international issues. However, their joint efforts have **so far succeeded in achieving** substantial results in Syria, **which has become an important pillar in the foreign policy of both countries**. It is no secret that Iran is a regional competitor of Russia, as well as a major target for Washington and Tel Aviv. Moscow also knows well that this tension will escalate as long as Iran stays in Syria and this is considered a major threat to Russian interests. Several months ago, during an interview with Russian news agency TASS, Israel's Moscow envoy asserted that Israel was satisfied with Russia's stance on Iranian military presence on the Israeli-Syrian border. He pointed out that Israel and Russia are engaged in intensive discussions on this issue while stressing that the presence of Iranian forces in the region is "targeting Israel." According to the report of the Israeli "Politics and Strategy" Institute, the undeclared war between Tehran and Tel Aviv, which has been continuing since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, does not worry Russia, at least, as long as the parties are wary of harming Moscow's interests in the process. However, the competition between the Kremlin and Tehran for control, influence and for determining Syria's future is fast becoming a problem. Israel's frequent attacks on Iranian locations inside Syria, in addition to pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump on Iran, increase Iran's need to have a good relationship with Russia, which makes Moscow stronger than before when confronting Tehran in Syria. **It cannot be ignored what many observers have said, that the invitation of Iran to participate in Astana talks in 2017 was an attempt by Ankara and Moscow to push Tehran to fulfill its obligations because it is difficult to control groups affiliated with Iran in Syria, and unlike Tehran, Russia has managed to build bridges with the Syrian political and armed opposition through Saudi Arabia and Turkey**.

#### Syrian conflict causes nuclear war

Alex Lantier 19, PhD at the University of Geneva and writings appeared on Global Research, Countercurrents, "Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria," 10/14/2019, https://countercurrents.org/2019/10/syrian-army-iran-threaten-counterattack-against-turkish-invasion-of-syria, /\

The war unleashed by Turkey’s invasion of Syria, targeting formerly US-backed Kurdish forces, escalated out of control this weekend as the Syrian army and Iran moved to counterattack. With Turkish troops and allied Al Qaeda militias advancing deep into Kurdish-held territory in Syria, the Middle East is only days away from an all-out war between the major regional powers that could trigger a global conflict between nuclear-armed world powers. UN reports show that 130,000 Syrians have fled their homes in the region amid the Turkish offensive, and Turkish officials claim they had “neutralized” at least 415 Kurdish fighters. Turkish troops seized the cities of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, amid heavy fighting including ongoing Turkish air raids, and seized a road crossing that cut off US and Kurdish troops in Kobani. Turkish troops also fired artillery at US troops near Kobani in what former US envoy Brett McGurk said was “not a mistake,” although Turkish officials later denied this. Turkey’s Syrian “rebel” allies, the Islamist Syrian National Army (SNA, formerly the Free Syrian Army), are executing Kurdish civilians in areas they hold, according to multiple reports. Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf was executed; her bullet-riddled car appeared in a video surrounded by SNA fighters. Beyond Al Qaeda-linked calls to destroy infidels, the British Daily Telegraph noted, the SNA’s main outlook “is sectarian: they are anti-Kurdish and they are Arab chauvinists.” Yesterday evening, the Syrian army announced it would march on the area. The official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported: “Syrian Arab Army units began moving north to confront Turkish aggression on Syrian territory... The movement comes to confront the ongoing Turkish aggression on towns and areas in the north of Hasaka and Raqqa provinces, where the Turkish forces committed massacres against locals, occupied some areas and destroyed infrastructure.” The Syrian army has reportedly reached an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) militia, whose alliance with the United States was broken by Washington a week ago. Under this agreement, Syrian army troops would reach the city of Kobani near the Syrian-Turkish border in 48 hours. On Saturday, President Donald Trump had authorized the remaining 1,000 US troops in Kobani to withdraw, and US forces were in full retreat across northern Syria this weekend to avoid being cut off by advancing Turkish troops. Iran, which has deployed tens of thousands of troops as well as drones to Syria in recent years to back the Syrian regime against a NATO-led proxy war, indicated it would support the Syrian army. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Advisor for International Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati met with Syrian Ambassador to Iran Adnan Mahmoud yesterday in Tehran. He gave Iran’s “full support to Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, calling for the withdrawal of the Turkish forces,” SANA reported. Velayati added, “The principled policy of Iran is based on supporting the people and government of Syria and defending their righteous stances in a way that entails continuing joint cooperation until terrorism and terrorist organizations are completely eliminated.” At the same time, military tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are surging amid mutual attacks on tankers carrying Persian Gulf oil supplies that are critical to the world economy. Last month, the US and Saudi governments blamed a September 14 missile attack on Saudi oil facilities that caused a sharp rise in world oil prices on Iran, without providing any evidence. Then on October 11, two missiles hit the Iranian tanker Sabiti off Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, said yesterday that Iran would retaliate against unnamed targets for the attack on the Sabiti. “A special committee has been set up to investigate the attack on Sabiti... Its report will soon be submitted to the authorities for decision,” Shamkhani told Fars News. “Piracy and mischief on international waterways aimed at making commercial shipping insecure will not go unanswered.” Saudi officials declined to comment on the Sabiti attack, and officials with the US Fifth Fleet in the Gulf sheikdom of Bahrain claimed to have no information on it. But there is widespread speculation in the international media that the attack was carried out by Saudi Arabia or with its support. The conflicts erupting between the different capitalist regimes in the Middle East pose an imminent threat not only to the population of the region, but to the entire world. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers. The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a Third World War. The Kurdish-led SDF militias in Syria, vastly outgunned by Turkish forces and vulnerable to air strikes, warned US officials in talks leaked by CNN that they would appeal for Russia to attack Turkey and protect SDF and Syrian army forces. As Turkey is legally a NATO ally of Washington and the European powers, such an attack could compel the United States and its European allies to either break the 70-year-old NATO alliance or go to war with Russia to protect Turkey. “You are leaving us to be slaughtered,” SDF General Mazloum Kobani Abdi told US officials in a meeting last Thursday. “You are not willing to protect the people, but you do not want another force to come and protect us. You have sold us.” Mazloum dismissed US officials when they replied by demanding that the SDF not cut a deal with Russia, but instead keep taking huge casualties from Turkish air raids. He said, “I need to know if you are capable of protecting my people, of stopping these bombs falling on us or not. I need to know, because if you’re not, I need to make a deal with Russia and the regime now and invite their planes to protect this region.” US forces across Syria were in full retreat, however, and US Defense Secretary Mark Esper told US television news yesterday that the Turkish-Kurdish conflict “gets worse by the hour.” Given the attempts by the Kurds to work out an alliance with Syria and Russia, he added, Trump “directed that we begin a deliberate withdrawal of forces from northern Syria.” Esper said he would “not place American service members in the middle of a longstanding conflict between the Turks and the Kurds. This is not why we are in Syria.” Esper said the Turkish army was rejecting the Pentagon’s appeals for a ceasefire with the Kurds and instead expanding its war aims inside Syria. “In the last 24 hours, we learned that they likely intend to expand their attack further south than originally planned, and to the west,” he said. Esper added that “all the exact things” US officials warned their Turkish counterparts would likely happen if they invaded Syria were now taking place, including the release of tens of thousands of Islamic State (ISIS) fighters held in prison camps by Washington’s former Kurdish allies.

## 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox

### 2NC – UQ – Russia-Iran Ties

#### Cooperation is high.

Maziar Motamedi 22, a Tehran-based journalist who covers Iran, 1/21/2022, “What next for Iran and Russia ties after Raisi-Putin meeting?,” <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/21/what-next-for-iran-and-russia-ties-after-raisi-putin-meeting>, RES

Tehran, Iran – Prior to his departure for Moscow this week, Ebrahim Raisi expressed hope that the visit, the first by an Iranian president in almost five years, would lead to a “turning point” in his country’s relations with Russia. In the Russian capital, both Raisi and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, supported improving bilateral ties during a three-hour meeting on Wednesday in which they also discussed regional and international issues. For their part, Iran’s petroleum and economy ministers who accompanied Raisi said their talks with their counterparts exceeded expectations. Without disclosing many details, the ministers said agreements were made in trade, energy, transportation and banking sectors and promised that the results would be felt in the foreseeable future. Following the two-day visit, analysts said Iran and Russia were on track to improve their bilateral ties across the board – but the scale and timing were complicated by a number of factors. As in previous years, comprehensive United States sanctions on Iran are sure to complicate any commitments, for as long as they persist. Meanwhile, the record figure of Iran-Russia bilateral trade that exceeded $3.5bn in 2021, according to Iran’s ambassador in Moscow, still falls far short compared with the levels reached between Russia and several other regional actors. “The visit seems more ceremonial than a substantive turning point in bilateral relations,” Nicole Grajewski, a research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, told Al Jazeera. For one, she said, a new and improved 20-year cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia has yet to be finalised, and Raisi only handed over Iran’s proposed draft during his trip. “That being said, Russia-Iran relations are significantly stronger today than they were the last time an Iranian president visited Russia in 2017 under [Hassan] Rouhani,” Grajewski added, referring to Raisi’s predecessor, whose term ended in August 2021. Nuclear deal The fate of the ongoing intensive talks in Vienna aimed at restoring Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal with world powers will still play a major role in the future of Iran’s ties with Russia. Russia, a signatory, has been actively trying to facilitate the revival of the landmark accord that the US unilaterally abandoned in 2018, and has been a mediating force between Iran, the European signatories and the US. “It is very important for me to know your opinion on the JCPOA,” Putin told Raisi on Wednesday, referring to the deal by its formal name, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. All sides have attested that some real progress has been achieved in recent weeks in the Austrian capital, but resolving outstanding political issues appears to hinge on concessions by both Iran and the US. “The Iranian nuclear issue has historically affected Russia-Iran relations but it has been variable in its impact across certain issues,” the Belfer Center’s Grajewski said. “The Vienna talks are a central aspect of the Russia-Iran relationship today. Moscow has historically adopted a constructive position on Iran’s nuclear programme even during low points of US-Russia relations after Ukraine.” However, Grajewski pointed out that if the talks fail because Iran refuses to tone down some of its demands, different aspects of the two countries’ relations could be affected. Arms deal For instance, the two have been discussing the possibility of Iran purchasing advanced arms – especially the top of the line S-400 air defence systems and Su-35 fighter jets. Such a prospect is made possible by the lifting of a United Nations embargo on conventional arms sales to Iran in 2020 as a result of the nuclear deal, something Russia supported. At the moment, Iran may not have the funds to pay for such a major deal as tens of billions of dollars of its money are frozen abroad and its revenues have been slashed due to US sanctions. Moreover, the Iranian establishment may not be eager to face potential local criticism of an arms deal when its population is under the enormous strain of rampant inflation amid an ailing economy. According to Samuel Ramani, associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute, Russia may not be eager to sell the arms to Iran at the moment either. “Russia’s overall policy in the Middle East is to be friends with all, allies of none, enemies of none, so selling arms to Iran might disrupt its efforts to balance closer ties with Israel and the UAE, in particular, as tensions are heightened between these countries and Tehran right now and Saudi Arabia,” he told Al Jazeera. But that does not mean Iran and Russia are disinterested in boosting military cooperation, as the two held a joint trilateral naval drill with China in an area north of the Indian Ocean on Friday. Regional cooperation Observers say Iran and Russia have shared interests across the region that will be maintained or improved regardless of others factors, such as the Vienna talks – something that was also apparent in the two presidents’ meeting. Both Raisi and Putin praised “successful” joint efforts in Syria, where the two countries support President Bashar al-Assad in the country’s 10-year war. They agreed that “combating terrorism” in Syria is a shared goal. Iran and Russia have a shared concern about the fate of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan after the chaotic US exit in August. Both have been active in organising talks to find solutions on a number of issues. Along with China, Iran and Russia have repeatedly denounced US “unilateralism”. And Moscow and Beijing recently supported Tehran’s successful bid to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Putin on Wednesday also expressed his support for Iran to gain a larger foothold in the Eurasian Economic Union, and said both sides are working to create a free-trade zone. Lastly, Russia has been vocal about its interests in being increasingly engaged in mediating efforts on Persian Gulf and regional security. On Friday, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia wants to organise a conference to resolve regional issues through dialogue. Lavrov described it as “a conference that would bring Iranians and Arabs together where Iran would not be the subject of discussion and where each side would lay their concerns on the table” and would address issues with Yemen, Syria and Iraq as well.

#### Russia-Iran relations are high now

Syed Zafar Mehdi ’20, journalist for the Anadolu Agency, “Iran likely to renew 20-year agreement with Russia”, Anadolu Agency, 7/21/20, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-likely-to-renew-20-year-agreement-with-russia/1917909

**Iran and Russia are likely to renew their “20-year agreement”, which expires in March 2021**, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said during his official visit to Moscow on Tuesday. Speaking to Iranian media in Moscow, **Zarif said another “long-term deal” with Russia is “on the agenda”, terming the relations between the two all-weather allies as “strategic.”** Zarif, accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araqchi, left for Moscow early on Tuesday for talks with the Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. It is the second visit by the Iranian foreign minister to Moscow in a month, and coincides with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s first official visit to Tehran. Zarif had visited Baghdad on Sunday. While it was not immediately clear which “20-year agreement” Zarif was referring to, according to reports it pertains to a series of petrochemical and weapons deals signed by the two sides in 2001. The long-term deals were signed in Kremlin in March 2001 between then Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, when Putin agreed to sell Russian conventional arms to Iran after a gap of six years. In what was the first meeting in four decades between the top political functionaries of the two countries, Moscow had also expressed its willingness to help Iran complete work on the country’s only nuclear power plant in the Persian Gulf region. Since 2001, **the relations between the two countries have strengthened while Iran’s relations with the US have gradually deteriorated**. Extension of arms embargo **Pertinently, Russia is one of the countries that have opposed the US’ demand for extending the UN arms embargo on Iran**, which is slated to expire in October this year. **The US government officials have upped the ante** in recent weeks, **calling for extension of arms embargo on Iran, and threatening to invoke sanctions snapback**. Commenting on why he chose to visit Moscow just a month after his last visit, Zarif said “continued dialogue with Russia and other friendly countries such as China is essential given the major international developments.”

#### – Corona cooperation

TASS ‘21, Russian News Agency, “Putin pledges aid to Iran in fight against novel coronavirus”, TASS, 2/29/21, https://tass.com/society/1125183

MOSCOW, February 29. /TASS/. Russian President Vladimir **Putin in a phone call with his Iranian counterpart** Hassan **Rouhani offered his condolences over deaths from the new coronavirus in Iran and offered assistance in curbing the spread of the infection**, the Kremlin said in a statement on Saturday. "Vladimir Putin offered condolences to Hassan Rouhani over fatalities in the coronavirus infection outbreak in Iran and pledged help aimed at containing the spread of the infection," the statement says.

#### – Iran Deal

Iran Press IP ’20, is an international news agency providing you with real-time visual news content. Iran Press is the first and only Iranian video news agency specializing in video on demand, providing our customers with real-time visual news from Iran, Middle East, and the wider world, broadcast on Eutelsat, on a round-the-clock 24-hour basis, “Iran-Russia relations, stronger than ever: Zarif”, Iran Press, 7/22/20, https://iranpress.com/content/24330

Iran Press/Europe: Addressing the reporters at the end of his visit to Moscow, Mohammad Javad Zarif referred to the constructive talks with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov and his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, saying: "**One of the most important topics of this trip was the discussion about the Iran Nuclear Deal**, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) **and the US policies towards it and Russia's very good stance in this regard**." Iran's top diplomat further referred to the cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, noting: "**Today, our relationship with the Russian Federation is much broader and stronger than the relationship we had 20 years ago**." According to Iran's Foreign Minister, regional issues, including Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen, were other issues that the two sides discussed during the meetings. Regarding his meeting with Putin, **Zarif said that talking to Putin and conveying the message was very useful**.

#### – Trade

Vlad Kondratiev 3/30/2022, “Russia and Iran intensify trade and economic ties,” <https://www.specialeurasia.com/2022/03/30/russia-iran-trade-business/>, RES

While the Western world is increasingly moving away from Russian exports, Moscow and Tehran are taking measures to intensify trade and economic cooperation, as evidenced by intensive negotiations between the parties. A delegation of Iranian businessmen will visit Moscow in early April to present industrial and investment potential. Notably, Russia and Iran are working on the issue of combining financial message transmission systems bypassing the SWIFT international system for transferring interbank payments. Tehran is also considering recognising the Russian payment system “Mir” cards. Moreover, Eurasian Economic Union member states are preparing an agreement to establish a free trade zone between them and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Russia-Iran entente on Eurasian current issues and dynamics). Iran – Russia’s potential cooperation in agribusiness, industry and trade On March 18th, 2022, a working meeting was held in Moscow between the Deputy Head of Rosselkhoznadzor Konstantin Savenkov and the Head of the Iranian Plant Protection Organization (IPPO) Jahpur Jamshid Alai Moghadami and the Head of the Iranian Veterinary Organization (IVO) Seyyed Mohammad Aghamiri. The event was attended by senior officials of the Iranian Embassy in Moscow and the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia. The parties confirmed their intention to develop bilateral trade and business relations intensively, adhere to the principles of openness and trust, and build a direct dialogue to resolve emerging issues promptly. The Iranian side said that it is interested in increasing the volume of imports of grains and oilseeds from Russia from the current 7 million tons per year to 12 million tons. In addition, Iran plans to consider opening its market for Russian poultry, lamb and other meat products in the near future. Shortly, Iranian specialists will come to Russia to inspect poultry processing enterprises. As for Iranian food exports to Russia, the talks discussed Iran’s ability to supply up to 2 million tons of vegetables, such as tomatoes, eggplants, cucumbers, peppers, greens and apples. The volume of imports of these crops to Russia by the Iranian side is estimated at 570,000 tons. The parties discussed in detail the existing quarantine and plant protection systems in Russia and Iran, the mechanisms for ensuring phytosanitary and veterinary safety, which allow for strict control over the supply of products for export. During the meeting, an agreement was reached to promptly complete work on two agreements that will regulate the interaction of the parties in the field of the safe use of pesticides and agrochemicals and allow for the establishment of electronic document management for traceability of trade processes. A separate topic of the dialogue was the export of dairy products from Iran. Rosselkhoznadzor reported that after the reconstruction, the international checkpoint “Yarag-Kazmalyar” (Republic of Dagestan) is starting to work, the import of products through which will significantly simplify logistics between countries. The Russian department noted that Iranian enterprises certified for export consistently supply Russia with a wide range of dairy products in consumer packaging, including cheese, butter, and cream. In a short time, the Rosselkhoznadzor will send detailed explanations to the Iranian Veterinary Service regarding the situation with frozen concentrated cream, the import of which to Russia is temporarily limited. A few days after the talks in Moscow, on March 23th, 2022, a working meeting was held between the Russian Ambassador to Iran, Levan Jagaryan and the head of the Trade Development Organization, Deputy Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade of Iran A. Peymanpak. Rustam Zhiganshin, Trade Representative of Russia in Iran, reportedly took part in the meeting. At the talks, the Iranian side confirmed the growing interest of the country’s business circles in expanding trade and economic cooperation with Russia. It was announced that a delegation of Iranian businessmen is scheduled to visit Moscow in early April to present industrial and investment potential. More than forty companies producing food products, seafood, cosmetics, household chemicals, construction and sanitary materials, leather and textile products, accessories, polymers, plastics, medicines have already expressed their readiness to hold meetings at the site of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation. During the conversation, A. Peymanpak spoke about the demand for Russian mining equipment and machinery, buses and minibuses, locomotives, ships, agricultural raw materials in Iran and expressed the seriousness of intentions to implement joint investment projects in the automotive industry, medicine and agriculture. Rustam Zhiganshin informed the Deputy Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade of Iran about the increased number of proposals from Russian companies for cooperation with Iranian partners. In turn, the Head of the Trade Development Organization, A. Peimanpak, assured that the Iranian side would provide the necessary assistance in expanding foreign economic relations with Russia. Against the backdrop of the negotiations held in March, it became known that Russia and Iran are working on the issue of combining financial message transmission systems bypassing the SWIFT international system for transferring interbank payments. Kazem Jalali, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) to Russia, told journalists. “We are making efforts in this direction (connecting Iranian banks to the SPFS) to hold good events in this area in the future,” Jalali said. As the Iranian ambassador noted, his country is also discussing with Russia the recognition of the cards of the Russian payment system “Mir”. “This issue is also on the agenda. We discussed it with our Russian colleagues,” the ambassador said. Notably, the integration of the Iranian payment system Shetab with the Russian MIR was announced in 2017 when a corresponding agreement was signed between the countries. In August 2017, much technical work began, but the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 partially created sanctions risks for certain Russian banks planning to integrate with the Iranian Shetab system. The Financial Message Transfer System (SPFS) of the Bank of Russia was created in response to the risks of a possible disconnection of Russian banks from SWIFT, an international interbank system for transmitting information and making payments. Conclusion In conclusion, one more important event that took place in Tehran in March should be noted. On March 14th-16th, 2022, the second round of negotiations was held to prepare an Agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone between the Eurasian Economic Union and its member states and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The event was attended by representatives of the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Trade Development Organization of Iran, the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, various departments of the EAEU member states joined via videoconference. As a result, the parties agreed to hold the next round of talks in Moscow. Recall that the Interim Agreement leading to forming a free trade zone with Iran was signed on May 17th, 2018 and entered into force on October 27th, 2019. As a result, the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran are increasing the volume of mutual trade. Thus, according to the Iranian customs service data, the trade turnover between Iran and the EAEU countries for 11 months of the current Iranian year (March 21st, 2021 – February 19th, 2022) increased by 48%, amounting to more than $5 billion.

#### Relations are sky-high.

Tasnim News Agency 6/30, a private news agency in Iran launched in 2012. Its purpose is to cover a variety of political, social, economic and international subjects along with other fields, 6/30/2022, “President Highlights Great Potential for Expansion of Iran, Russia Relations,” <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/06/30/2736650/president-highlights-great-potential-for-expansion-of-iran-russia-relations>, RES

TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi hailed the high level of the ties between Tehran and Moscow but said there is still great potential for developing the relations. “Relations between the two countries in the field of trade and energy cooperation are at a high level, but given the existing fields in the two countries, these relations still have great potential for expansion,” Raisi said in a Wednesday meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Turkmenistan's capital, Ashgabat. The two presidents had traveled to Ashgabat to take part in the sixth summit of the Caspian littoral states. “After my (recent) visit to Russia, several reciprocal visits have been made by the relevant officials in order to follow up on the agreements between the two countries, and the implementation process of these agreements is at a good pace,” Raisi said. The Iranian president had paid a two-day visit to Moscow at the head of a delegation in January and met Putin. He described the visit as a "turning point" in bilateral relations between the two countries, saying they could boost their security and trade through maintaining close dialogue. Last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Tehran where he met Raisi, confiding that Moscow was adapting to what he called the West's aggressive policies. “In all the countries experiencing the negative influence of the selfish line taken by the United States and its satellites, there arises the objective need to reconfigure their economic relations so they can avoid relying on the whims and vagaries of our Western partners,” Lavrov said. Last month Moscow said Russia and Iran, which are both under Western sanctions and sit on some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves, had discussed swapping supplies for oil and gas as well as establishing a logistics hub. On Wednesday, Raisi stressed the need for the two countries to support strengthening of the North-South corridor, saying Iran and Russia have also good capacities for cooperation in the field of energy, including swaps. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a multimode network of sea and rail routes that links the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to Iran, India, Russia and North Europe. The Iranian president also stressed the need for mechanisms to strengthen banking and monetary relations between Iran and Russia, stating that financial exchanges between the two countries should be carried out within an independent framework outside the Western financial exchange system so that no country can manipulate it for pressure. Putin expressed his satisfaction with meeting his Iranian counterpart again, saying trade and economic relations between the two countries have increased in recent months, adding the path must continue. The Russian leader also welcomed Raisi's proposal to increase energy cooperation between the two countries, including swaps. Putin also asked the Iranian president to convey his warm greetings to Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei. The two countries have been working to sign a new and improved long-term bilateral cooperation agreement. Iranian officials have said they have been making headways on banking cooperation, most importantly on foreign currency transfers. Bilateral trade surged 80% percent last year, hitting a record high of $4 billion, including $1 billion in Iranian exports, deputy minister of industry, mining and trade Alireza Peyman-Pak has said.

#### Russia-Iran relations are high---Syria, grain exports, and drones.

Nasser Karimi 7/19 and Vladimir Isachenkov, 7/19/2022, “Isolated by West, Putin arrives in Tehran to deepen Russia-Iran relations,” <https://www.timesofisrael.com/isolated-by-west-putin-arrives-in-tehran-to-deepen-russia-iran-relations/>, RES

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived Tuesday in Iran for a visit intended to deepen ties with regional heavyweights as part of Moscow’s challenge to the United States and Europe amid its grinding campaign in Ukraine. In only his second trip abroad since Russian tanks rolled into its neighbor in February, Putin is scheduled to hold talks with Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan about the pressing issues facing the region, including the conflict in Syria and a UN-backed proposal to resume exports of Ukrainian grain to ease the global food crisis. As the West heaps sanctions on Russia and the costly campaign drags on, Putin is seeking to bolster ties with Tehran, a fellow target of severe US sanctions and a potential military and trade partner. In recent weeks, Russian officials visited an airfield in central Iran at least twice to review Tehran’s weapons-capable drones for possible use in Ukraine, the White House has alleged.

#### Ties are increasing.

Tehran Times 6/22, 6/22/2022, “Iran, Russia upgrade ties,” <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/473958/Iran-Russia-upgrade-ties>, RES

Russian state news agency TASS said Lavrov will meet Iranian President Ayatollah Seyed Ebrahim Raisi and Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian during his two-day visit. Lavrov is expected to discuss with Iranian officials a full range of issues spanning economic cooperation, and political consultations on bilateral and international issues. The visit is noteworthy for two major reasons: First, it is Lavrov’s first visit to Tehran since Ayatollah Raisi assumed the presidency in August 2021. Second, the visit comes amid growing economic sanctions by the West against Russia over the Ukraine war and uncertainties over the talks in Vienna over reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. During Lavrov’s visit, “issues around the signing of a long-term cooperation agreement and work to expand bilateral economic contacts amid the West’s tightening sanctions will be discussed. Cooperation in regional security, concerning Syria and Afghanistan, will also be key,” according to TASS. Russia is facing blanket Western sanctions over the Ukraine war and it has overtaken Iran as the most sanctioned nation in the world, according to press reports. Exploring avenues for cooperation against sanctions is on the agenda of the visit, according to Al Araby Al Jadeed. Citing Iranian sources, the Qatari-owned newspaper said Lavrov and Iranian officials will discuss “the intensification of Iranian-Russian cooperation in the face of U.S. sanctions.” The newspaper pointed out that Russian officials visited Iran secretly and publicly in recent months to “benefit from its experience in facing sanctions.” Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak paid a visit to Iran on May 25. The Russian official met Iranian Petroleum Minister Javad Owji and First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber in Tehran. Earlier in January, President Raisi visited Russia and met with President Vladimir Putin. This exchange of visits is part of President Raisi’s foreign policy agenda of fostering relations with neighboring countries and major non-Western powers. The policy, known as the Neighborhood Policy, saw Iran strengthening its relations with central Asian countries, China, Russia, and some Arab states. A major part of this policy is to boost ties with countries under Western sanctions such as Venezuela, Syria, and Russia in what came to be known as the club of sanctioned countries. To this end, Iran signed long-term cooperation documents with China and Venezuela. It is in the process of signing another one with Russia. Officials and experts of the sanctioned countries have voiced support for this kind of cooperation. Marco Fernandes, a researcher at Tricontinental Institute for Social Research, has said that the BRICS group of nations needs to focus on creating an alternative to the U.S. dollar’s hegemony in global transactions, which gives Washington leverage over its opponents, according to TASS. Fernandes added, “After reserves and assets worth tens of billions of dollars were confiscated from countries like Venezuela, Iran, and Afghanistan, the U.S. and EU decision to freeze Russian reserves worth over $300 billion raised alarms all over the world, underscoring the need to find an alternative to the dollar’s dominance.” Overcoming the dominance of the U.S. dollar over bilateral trade between the sanctioned countries is a major goal of the efforts to found the club of sanctioned countries.

#### Trade between Russia and Iran is increasing relations.

Bloomberg News 5/25, news service provider based in NYC, 5/25/2022, “Russia, Iran Tighten Trade Ties Amid US Sanctions,” <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-25/russia-iran-tighten-trade-ties-amid-us-sanctions-interfax-says>, RES

Russia said it’s strengthening trade with Iran, boosting the economies of both nations as they contend with heavy US sanctions. “We agreed to accelerate the preparation of agreements on a free trade zone, and discussed cooperation in the nuclear area in detail,” Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said in Tehran after meeting with the co-chairman of the Russian-Iranian intergovernmental commission. Also discussed were oil and gas supply swaps and increasing joint investments in hydrocarbon projects, he said. Novak, who co-chairs the intergovernmental commission from Russia’s side and oversees the nation’s energy affairs, is visiting Tehran as both nations seek to galvanize economic ties. Trade between the nations rose 81% to a record $3.3 billion in 2021, but Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said that level was “not acceptable” and vowed to increase two-way commerce to $10 billion a year. On Wednesday, top officials set even more ambitious target. Iran and Russia plan to raise trade to $40 billion a year by 2025, said Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji, who co-chairs the commission from the Iranian side, according to the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency. Bilateral trade will be conducted in the countries’ own currencies, according to Owji. The energy industries of both countries are sanctioned by the US -- in response to Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, and following America’s withdrawal from the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal. “We’re on track to raise trade, economic, logistics, investment, financial, banking cooperation, despite the unprecedented pressure that Russia is experiencing,” Novak said at a meeting with businesses in Tehran earlier, as reported by news service Interfax. Trade between Russia and Iran rose by more than 10% in the first quarter, he said. “We are ready to continue the implementation of already-initiated projects and to launch new ones,” Novak said. Among those is the expansion of the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear plant. Talks with Moscow continue on the second and third phases of the facility, which will require “a lot of investment,” said Behrouz Kamalvandi, a spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. Moscow is also interested in developing the long-delayed North-South Transport Corridor, a rail cargo route from Russia to India that would boost trade from the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions, according to Novak.

#### Russo-Iranian relations are high now.

Javad Heiran-Nia 3/30, director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, 3/30/2022, “Iran won’t break with Russia over Ukraine. Here’s why.,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-wont-break-with-russia-over-ukraine-heres-why/>, RES

Russia has abandoned a recent attempt to exploit the Vienna talks to gain sanctions relief beyond what was guaranteed in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, there are no signs that Tehran is walking away from its relationship with Moscow despite Russia’s actions toward Iran and its invasion of Ukraine. Any improvement in Iran’s relationship with the West has always been a concern for Russia. Its March 5 demand for a written guarantee from the United States that trade with Iran not be affected by new US sanctions imposed on Russia for the invasion is the latest example of Moscow playing the Iranian card and jeopardizing Tehran’s interests to secure its own interests. This isn’t the first time that Russia has used nuclear talks in such a manner. Former Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said in March 2021 during a leaked interview about Russia’s destructive role in the Iran nuclear talks: “The Russians have been trying to prevent the nuclear deal (JCPOA)since 2015 and [Foreign Minister] Sergei Lavrov wanted to disrupt everything on the night of the agreement. After the JCPOA, when Lavrov returned to Russia, he was attacked by the Russian media. Why did you allow this agreement to be reached and Iran to get closer to the West?” On the other hand, Russia doesn’t want Iran to become a nuclear weapons state or be subjected to sanctions, since this would undermine trade and technical relations with Iran. Russia’s policy is to maintain crises that can be controlled and hinder the improvement of Iran-West relations. As Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group said in December 2021: “Russia is seeking to revive the agreement because alternatives to Russia are not attractive at all. If Iran goes to nuclear weapons, it is possible that some other actors and Russia’s neighbors, such as Turkey and even Azerbaijan, want to go in this direction, or the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, and this will be a real big problem for Russia.” However, Rajab Safarov, a former member of the Russian Federation Presidential Political Council and head of the Iran Commission at the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said in March that a pro-Western Iran is far more dangerous to Russia than a nuclear Iran. Russia fears that a further expansion of Iran’s nuclear program could lead to new conflict in the region and a bigger US military presence. It’s also in Russia’s interest that sanctions against Iran be lifted to expand trade relations in the form of a twenty-year cooperation document, while preventing Iran from improving relations with the West. Moscow also seeks Iran’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Iran’s membership process in the SCO takes about two years and, after the technical and legal process concludes, Tehran will formally join this organization). “We are working on a draft of a new agreement between the two countries, which defines the principles of our cooperation in the international arena,” said Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov on March 15. “This document has increased the volume of economic relations with Iran by 82 percent during the sanctions period. No illegal sanctions can stop the escalating growth of Iran and Russia.” Still, the Iran-Russia agreement hasn’t had much economic benefit for Iran so far. Trade with Russia currently accounts for only 4 percent of Iran’s imports and 2 percent of Iran’s exports—only about $4 billion a year. Tehran plans to increase its trade volume with Russia to $25 billion, but that goal seems overly ambitious. Iran also sees the twenty-year agreement to strengthen its security cooperation with Russia and obtain new weapons. On January 21, Iran held a tripartite maneuver with the Russian and Chinese navies. Tehran is reportedly seeking to purchase Russian Sukhoi-5 fighter jets and the S-400 missile defense system. The government of President Ebrahim Raisi also seeks to utilize a twenty-five-year cooperation agreement with China to bolster a “look to the East” policy first introduced by the administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during an earlier bout of US-led sanctions. Additionally, a February 27-published document on the transformation of the government of Raisi in Iran’s foreign relations doesn’t mention North America. This document does seek lifting sanctions but doesn’t view the nuclear deal as a basis for improving relations with the West. Iran’s political elites see the future of the international order as belonging to the East. They argue that cooperation with the West on issues such as Afghanistan and Iraq didn’t improve relations, as the George W. Bush administration labeled Iran an “axis of evil.” The Raisi position isn’t universally shared in Iran. Reformists and even moderate conservatives as well as the middle class and many ordinary people have reacted negatively to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Domestic opponents see Iran’s long-term agreements with Russia and China as unilateral concessions comparable to the treaties of Golestan and Turkmenchay, in which imperial Persia gave up important territories in the Caucasus to tsarist Russia. Accordingly, the content of these agreements has been kept secret, leading parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf to comment on January 26 that “a contract has not been legally concluded, otherwise the parliament would have been informed.” Russia did abandon its effort to hold the Vienna talks hostage after Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian visited Moscow on March 15, but Iran appears to have granted concessions. During the visit, the two countries discussed cooperation in the Caspian Sea, the EAEU and the acceleration of Iran’s membership in the SCO. It should be noted that Russia views its policy towards Iran as a package. In other words, Russia connects different issues and makes the support of one issue conditional on receiving concessions on another. For example, Russia has linked its support in the Vienna talks to the Iranian ratification of a Convention on the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea, signed on August 2018 at the Fifth Summit of the Caspian littoral states in Aktau, Kazakhstan. Tehran had previously considered Iran’s share in the Caspian Sea to be 50 percent, citing a 1921 Treaty of Friendship and 1940 Soviet–Iranian Trade and Navigation Agreement, but then agreed to a 20 percent share. Per the median lines formula, Iran’s share is actually about 13 percent. However, based on the Aktau agreement, it would be 11 percent, according to former Iranian member of parliament Mahmoud Sadeghi. The agreement benefits Russia by making Moscow the de facto naval power in the Caspian Sea, granting Russian warships the right to operate unhindered and barring the US from any military presence. Russia uses the Iran card to create balance and gain points. Whenever Iran’s relations with the West improve, Moscow balances with gestures towards Iran’s rivals. On the other hand, whenever Iran’s relations with the West is bad, Russia approaches Iran and seeks closer ties. Despite extensive Iranian-Russian cooperation in Syria, Moscow doesn’t want Iran to have widespread influence in Syria. Allied Iranian forces stationed near the Golan Heights have retreated under Russian pressure. Moscow also gives the green light to Tel Aviv for freedom of action in Syria. Days after Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett traveled to Moscow and met with President Vladimir Putin, Israel assassinated two senior IRGC officers on the outskirts of Damascus in early March. Recent Israeli attacks on the Iranian-controlled port of Latakia reportedly include covert Russian-Israeli cooperation in Syria. Despite Russia’s attempts to use relations for its own benefit and widespread international condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Iran isn’t walking away from its relationship with Moscow. Iranian officials have refrained from condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine and blamed the crisis on the United States and expansion of NATO. Raisi, for example, said on February 24 that he understands Russia’s security concerns; “NATO expansion is a serious threat to the stability and security of independent states in different regions,” the Iranian president told Putin. In the United Nations General Assembly, Iran abstained from voting on a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Raisi government appears committed to the “look to the East” policy, whatever happens with the JCPOA. It sees Russia as a strategic partner that is both a counterweight to Western pressure and a pillar for the survival of the Iranian political system.

#### Iran and Russia are cooperating now–they’ve met to talk about Syria and NATO

Dixon et. al. 7-19 (Robyn Dixon is a foreign correspondent on her third stint in Russia, after almost a decade reporting there beginning in the early 1990s. In November 2019 she joined The Washington Post as Moscow bureau chief, Kareem Fahim has served as the Istanbul bureau chief and a Middle East correspondent for The Washington Post since September 2016. Previously, he worked for 11 years as a staff reporter for the New York Times, with assignments on the metro desk and as a Cairo-based foreign correspondent reporting on the Arab uprisings and their aftermath, Karina Tsui is a reporting intern on The Washington Post’s Foreign desk. Before The Post, she was a Toni Stabile fellow for investigative reporting at Columbia Journalism School, 7-19-22, “Putin makes rare international trip to Iran amid isolation from the West”, The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/19/putin-iran-ukraine-war-erdogan//BVN> SC)

RIGA, Latvia — Russian President Vladimir Putin, shunned by much of the world after his invasion of Ukraine, traveled to Iran on Tuesday in a show of deepening ties between the two nations, united in their isolation from the West. Putin met with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi soon after arriving in Tehran, and then with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Later in the evening, he held talks with both Raisi and Erdogan, part of his first trip outside the former Soviet Union since the start of the Ukraine war in February. Khamenei said the West did not want Russia to be strong, describing the United States as “cunning” and NATO as “dangerous,” according to Iranian state media. “As regards Ukraine, if you did not take the initiative, the other side would have initiated the war,” IRNA quoted Khamenei as saying, echoing a common talking point from Putin. Putin also discussed trade, energy, transportation and the conflict in Syria in his meeting with Raisi, who is emerging as a key ally of Moscow. Putin admitted Monday in a meeting with government officials that Western sanctions had created “colossal” difficulties for the Russian economy. He has sought to expand trade with China, Asia and the Middle East to make up for plummeting imports from the West. Putin’s only other international trip since February was late last month when he flew to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In his meeting with Raisi, he extolled growing trade ties with Iran, sending a message to his Russian audience that while Western companies have left the country in droves, Moscow still has reliable friends. “We can boast of record figures in terms of trade growth,” Putin said. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia and Iran were used to Western sanctions, which he called the price of their independence. “Iran has been under sanctions of various sorts for decades … which, as we should point out outright, we view as absolutely illegitimate from the standpoint of international law,” Peskov said in comments to Iranian media broadcast on Russian state television. He said that improving relations with Iran was “a long-term line of our foreign policy,” adding that a strategic cooperation deal will probably be signed in the coming months. The White House has claimed that Russia wants to acquire surveillance drones from Iran for use in Ukraine, but Peskov said this was not on the agenda in Tehran. The presence of Erdogan, who has tried to position himself as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv, raised hopes that he could help build on progress made last week in Turkey, when Russia and Ukraine agreed to preliminary steps that would allow grain shipments to resume from Ukrainian ports.

### 2NC – UQ – Sanctions

#### Sanctions create grounds for cooperation.

Adam Kredo 7/7, a senior writer reporting on national security and foreign policy matters for the Washington Free Beacon. An award-winning political reporter who has broken news from across the globe, Kredo’s work has been featured in the Wall Street Journal, the Weekly Standard, Commentary Magazine, the Drudge Report, and the Jerusalem Post, among many others. , 7/7/2022, “Iran and Russia Expand ‘Sanctions Busting’ Network,” <https://freebeacon.com/national-security/iran-and-russia-expand-sanctions-busting-network/>, RES

Trade between Russia and Iran has topped $4.5 billion as the two regimes integrate their economies to create a network capable of evading U.S. and international sanctions. Russia is making major investments in Iran's ports, nuclear infrastructure, energy sector, and military machine. Iran's deputy roads and urban development minister, Shahriar Afandizadeh, this week valued this trade at $4.5 billion. Tehran and Moscow also recently inked an economic deal to carry some 10 million tons of goods from Russia into Iran through a land corridor. This deal "puts emphasis on transit in addition to imports and exports," according to a summary of Afandizadeh's comments published Wednesday in the country’s state-controlled press. This relationship helps to keep Moscow afloat as international sanctions cripple Russia's economy as a result of its war in Ukraine. Members of Congress and regional experts have warned for some time that Iran and Russia are ratcheting up relations to combat Western sanctions and boost each other's militaries. With the Biden administration's diplomacy aimed at securing a revamped version of the 2015 nuclear accord, warnings have swirled on Capitol Hill that a new deal will create a "sanctions evasion hub for Vladimir Putin based in Iran," the Washington Free Beacon reported. Iran, Russia, and China also are slated to hold a series of major war drills in Latin America next month, highlighting the emphasis these countries place on combatting the United States in its own backyard. Iran also recently announced that it will boost exports to Russia, including "construction materials," with an estimated worth of $3 billion. The total amount of trade between Iran and Russia last year totaled around $2.5 billion, signaling that in the year since, trade between the countries has increased significantly. Russian companies also stand to cash in on a new nuclear deal with Iran. Several of Russia's top state-controlled nuclear companies would receive billions of dollars in revenue once sanctions are waived as part of a new agreement. Iran has reportedly already paid Russia more than $500 million for its work building out Iran's nuclear plants. If a nuclear deal is inked, Iran and Russia will be free to continue building nuclear sites. Sanctioned Russia ships also have been caught in recent months ferrying illicit Iranian oil, providing both regimes with financial lifelines. At least two Russian tankers sanctioned as part of U.S. efforts to isolate Russian businesses were seen carrying illicit Iranian oil from various ports. This type of sanctions-busting scheme is also employed between Iran and China. Behnam Ben Taleblu, an Iran expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank, said that Russia is learning sanctions evasion techniques from its ally Iran. "Russia, which is now under increasing sanctions due to its invasion of Ukraine, stands to learn a lot from the Islamic Republic in the sanctions busting space," he said. "Therefore, the value of Russo-Iranian collaboration will not just be quantitative as represented by the volume or value of trade, but qualitative, namely the industries as well as what contacts are made and experiences gained." "The longer Russia's invasion and war against Ukraine continues, the deeper its embrace of actors like the Islamic Republic, who are used to operating outside or abusing formal financial networks, will be," Ben Taleblu said.

### 2NC – UQ – Cyber

#### Russia and Iran are working closely together now, the threat of Tehran is magnified by any form of US influence

**Weschler 21** Omree Wechsler is a senior researcher at the Yuval Ne'eman Workshop for Science, Technology, and Security at Tel Aviv University. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/iran-russia-cyber-agreement-and-us-strategy-middle-east>

This January, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif signed a cooperation [agreement](https://tass.com/politics/1248963) on cybersecurity and information and communications technology (ICT). The agreement [includes](https://www.c4isrnet.com/thought-leadership/2021/02/08/russia-iran-cooperation-poses-challenges-for-us-cyber-strategy-global-norms/) cybersecurity cooperation, technology transfer, combined training, and coordination at multilateral forums, like the United Nations. Although the cooperation with Moscow outlined in the agreement could [upgrade](https://www.ynetnews.com/business/article/rk005B5FeO) Tehran’s offensive cyber capabilities, the agreement is largely defensive, motivated by the countries’ shared [animus](https://carnegie.ru/2016/08/18/russia-and-iran-historic-mistrust-and-contemporary-partnership-pub-64365) toward the United States and U.S. influence in the Middle East as well as a desire to reduce dependence on Western technology. There are limits, however, to how closely the two sides can be expected to work together. The relationship between Russia and Iran has long suffered from mutual suspicion, ideological differences, and competition. Moreover, in the past, Russian and Iranian operators have operated at cross purposes. For example, in October 2019, British and U.S. officials [revealed](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-cyber-idUSKBN1X00AK) that the Russian threat actor [Turla](https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/turla) had [hijacked](https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/hijacking-iranian-hacking-infrastructure) Iranian hacking infrastructure as part of a false-flag operation. Due to suspicion and conflicting objectives, Cyber cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is likely to be focused on intelligence sharing and improving cyber defenses, rather than sharing offensive capabilities. Nonetheless, the agreement could pose four challenges to U.S. cyber operations. First, Russia could help Iran obtain stronger cyber defense systems. Harvard’s Belfer Center’s [National Cyber Power Index 2020](https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/NCPI_2020.pdf) [PDF] lists Iran as the lowest-scoring nation for cyber defense capabilities, with Russia ranked in the middle of the countries surveyed. If Tehran addresses these defensive deficiencies with the help of Russian technology and training, it could make U.S. initiatives like [defend forward](https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF) [PDF] more challenging and costly. Second, Iran-Russia cyber cooperation could entail Russian cyber teams deploying to Iran to monitor Iranian networks in order to collect insights and identify U.S. malware, similar to U.S. Cyber Command’s “[Hunt Forward](https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2433245/hunt-forward-estonia-estonia-us-strengthen-partnership-in-cyber-domain-with-joi/)” operations. Acquiring and analyzing Cyber Command or National Security Agency hacking tools and techniques could help improve Russian and Iranian defenses, thwart future U.S. cyber operations, and force U.S. hackers to develop new exploits sooner than they hoped. Third, if able to access Iranian defense systems, Russian hackers could acquire and reverse engineer U.S. or Israeli malware that has been used against Iran. This occurred with the Stuxnet worm, which targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2010 and was attributed to the United States and Israel. Since then, numerous cyber actors have developed over [22 million](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/stuxnet-returns-striking-iran-with/) pieces of malware that used Stuxnet’s blueprint to target organizations around the world. Stuxnet eventually infected thousands of networks globally, so hackers had access to lots of samples, but an attack that did not become as widely known could still be repurposed if Russia is able to access Iranian networks. Fourth, technologies and techniques that Iran acquires from Russia could be provided to Iran’s proxies around the Middle East, including Hezbollah and militias in Iraq and Yemen. Some of these groups have already shown considerable hacking capabilities. In January, security firm ClearSky [revealed](https://www.zdnet.com/article/hezbollahs-cyber-unit-hacked-into-telecoms-and-isps/) that a Hezbollah-affiliated hacking group named Lebanese Cedar was involved in an extensive campaign that targeted telecoms and internet service providers in the United States, Europe, and Middle East. Equipping Iranian proxies with advanced Russian cyber capabilities could allow them to threaten government agencies, businesses, and U.S. operations in the Middle East. It could also hamper investigations into cyber operations conducted by Iranian proxies and lead to misattributing them to Russia, possibly causing unintended escalation. Although the agreement between Moscow and Tehran could pose challenges for U.S. cyber strategy, some of its disruptive implications can be mitigated. To minimize the risk of their hacking tools being repurposed for use against them, the United States and its allies should establish a unified vulnerability disclosure mechanism to share vulnerabilities, including those that have already been exploited, with each other and vendors. While the United States already has a [vulnerability equities process](https://www.wired.com/story/vulnerability-equity-process-charter-transparency-concerns/), other allies seem to have only varying degrees of similar processes, if at all. Because victims are likely to patch vulnerabilities once they’ve been targeted, the attacking country can disclose the vulnerabilities it used after they’ve been exploited without weakening its offensive capabilities. Furthermore, the United States could promote the responsible development of offensive capabilities by adding [self-destruct code modules](https://www.computerworld.com/article/2727776/flame-authors-order-infected-computers-to-remove-all-traces-of-the-malware.html) to prevent them from being analyzed by adversaries. These modules have been [deployed](https://www.neowin.net/news/a-new-virus-will-self-destruct-when-analyzed-by-researchers/) as part of highly sophisticated malware campaigns in the past and are designed to overwrite their own file data in order to prevent forensic analysis. Bottom of Form Establishing a standardized vulnerabilities disclosure mechanism could take place as part of a broader effort to strengthen intelligence sharing and security ties between the United States, Israel, the Gulf States, and possibly other actors in the region. As cyber cooperation between Russia and Iran grows, leaving it unchallenged could pose new threats to U.S. security and strategy in the Middle East.

#### Russia and Iran are allies now, their cooperation undermines US influence and ability act

John **Hardie**, 2-8-20**21**, "Russia-Iran cooperation poses challenges for US cyber strategy, global norms," C4ISRNet, https://www.c4isrnet.com/thought-leadership/2021/02/08/russia-iran-cooperation-poses-challenges-for-us-cyber-strategy-global-norms/

Russia and Iran [inked](https://tass.com/politics/1248963) an agreement last month on information security, a term that in Russian [strategic doctrine](https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2563163) encompasses not only cyber but information and communications technology (ICT) more broadly. Such cooperation will help these authoritarian regimes to continue suppressing internal dissent and to expand joint efforts to counter the Western goal of preserving an open and free internet. [According](https://tass.com/politics/1248963) to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the deal will allow Russia and Iran “to coordinate [their] activities given the growing importance of cyber issues and their increasing impact on” both “international relations” and “situations in various countries.” Andrei Krutskikh, Moscow’s lead diplomat on information security, [elaborated](https://iz.ru/1116475/2021-01-26/mid-raskryl-detali-soglasheniia-irana-i-rossii-ob-informatcionnoi-bezopasnosti) that the agreement stipulates broad cybersecurity cooperation, including coordination of actions, exchange of technologies, training of specialists, and coordination at the United Nations and other international organizations. Calling the deal “a milestone” in Russian-Iranian cyber cooperation, Iran’s Foreign Ministry [said](https://en.mfa.ir/portal/NewsView/625777) that the agreement envisions “international cooperation including detection” of cyber intrusions and “coordination … to ensure national and international security.” This statement suggests that Moscow and Tehran may share intelligence about U.S. cyber operations, posing new challenges for U.S. Cyber Command as it seeks to “[defend forward](https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF)” against foreign cyber threats. Moreover, stronger Iranian defenses may complicate America’s ability to use [cyber operations](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/23/us-launched-cyber-attack-on-iranian-rockets-and-missiles-reports) to [respond](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-military-carried-out-secret-cyber-strike-on-iran-to-prevent-it-from-interfering-with-shipping/2019/08/28/36202a4e-c9db-11e9-a1fe-ca46e8d573c0_story.html) to Iranian aggression as the Trump administration [reportedly](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-military-cyber-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-carried-out-secret-cyber-strike-on-iran-in-wake-of-saudi-oil-attack-officials-idUSKBN1WV0EK) did. Last week’s agreement follows a preliminary Russian-Iranian cyber [deal](https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/06/13/768309/iran-russia-agree-on-cyber-defense-cooperation-official) in 2015, which the head of Iran’s Civil Defense Organization [said](https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/06/13/768309/iran-russia-agree-on-cyber-defense-cooperation-official) was necessary because the two countries face common enemies in cyberspace. In 2017, Moscow and Tehran signed a [memorandum of understanding](https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/36659/) for cooperation on ICT-related issues, including “internet governance, network security,” and “international internet connection.” Under the new agreement, Tehran stated, the two countries will cooperate against “crimes committed with the use of” ICT, which these authoritarian regimes define as including political dissent. As with Tehran-Beijing [cooperation](https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-china-national-internet-system-censorship/30820857.html) on Iran’s national internet, Tehran will likely seek to learn from Moscow’s efforts to develop the Russian [surveillance state](https://www.amazon.com/Red-Web-Struggle-Dictators-Revolutionaries/dp/1610395735) and so-called “[sovereign internet](https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/dgap-analyse_2-2020_epifanova_0.pdf).” The latter is designed to expand Moscow’s [censorship and monitoring](https://www.rferl.org/a/explainer-russia-sovereign-internet-law-censorship-runet/30248442.html) capabilities and enable it to “[unplug](https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50902496)” connections to the global internet, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has [called](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/vladimir-putin-web-breakup-internet-cia) “a CIA project.” During 2019 and 2020 [working](https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/437369/We-are-in-Iran-for-cooperation-not-to-sign-memorandums-Russian) group [meetings](https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/40038/) on ICT cooperation, for example, Moscow offered to help Iran emulate Russia’s [Smart City](https://meduza.io/en/news/2020/07/21/moscow-subway-to-deploy-facial-recognition-surveillance-system) project, which allows authorities to track citizens through technologies such as facial recognition — something Moscow specifically offered to provide to Iran. Tehran will also likely seek insights — and potentially technology — from Russia as both nations seek to reduce their dependence on Western technology. In 2016, the countries [agreed](https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/35486/) to cooperate on “demonopolizing software” to end “unilateral Western domination” in the field. For example, Iran may be interested in a Russian [alternative](https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/russias-microsoft-knockoff-gets-security-upgrade/157310/) to Windows and in Russia’s “MyOffice” product, which [allows](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-02/russia-s-myoffice-is-putin-s-solution-for-his-africa-ambitions?sref=3OIZCXOE) for local data storage. In 2017, Moscow [offered](https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/36389/) to provide Tehran with Russian servers built on Russian processors. The new agreement also builds on existing collaboration in the information sphere. In 2018, at Tehran’s [initiative](https://russia.mfa.gov.ir/ru/newsview/613077/%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%8C%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%BE-%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D1%83-%D0%B2-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8-%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B8-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B4%D1%83-%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC-%D0%B8-%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%B9-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%BB%D0%BE-%D0%B2-%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5-%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8), the two sides established a bilateral committee on media cooperation, aimed at combating what Tehran’s delegation head has [called](https://russia.mfa.gov.ir/ru/newsview/613077/%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%8C%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%BE-%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D1%83-%D0%B2-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8-%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B8-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B4%D1%83-%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC-%D0%B8-%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%B9-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%BB%D0%BE-%D0%B2-%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5-%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8) Western “media terrorism.” The [committee](https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/40118/) works on issues such as exchanges of journalists, mutual provision of favorable media coverage, [coproduction](https://rg.ru/2019/12/09/v-moskve-dogovorilis-o-sotrudnichestve-mezhdu-smi-rossii-i-irana.html) of content, [countering](https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/39666/) Western media [narratives](https://ru.irna.ir/news/83705830/%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C-%D1%81-%D0%98%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC-%D0%B2-%D1%81%D1%84%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5-%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8-%D0%B8-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8), and media [cooperation](https://russia.mfa.gov.ir/ru/newsview/613077/%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%8C%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%BE-%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D1%83-%D0%B2-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8-%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B8-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B4%D1%83-%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC-%D0%B8-%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%B9-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%BB%D0%BE-%D0%B2-%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5-%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8) targeting foreign audiences. Russia has also provided the Iranians with [training](https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/38358/) in new media platforms and [techniques](https://www.iran.ru/news/politics/110264/SMI_Rossii_i_Irana_ukreplyayut_sotrudnichestvo). Additionally, [Russian](https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-adversaries-are-accelerating-coordinating-coronavirus-disinformation-report-says-11587514724) and [Iranian](https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/triad-of-disinformation-how-russia-iran-china-ally-in-a-messaging-war-against-america/) disinformation and global communications [efforts](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf) have converged since the COVID-19 crisis began. In August 2020, that convergence culminated in a Russian-Iranian [agreement](https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/id/4282475) to counter what Russia’s Foreign Ministry called “increasing information pressure from the West” designed “to discredit Russia and Iran,” as well as alleged Western discrimination against Russian and Iranian media abroad. For Russia, last week’s agreement is part of a broader effort that has seen Moscow sign over 30 international [cyber cooperation](http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-leverages-cyber-cooperation-deals) agreements and at least 50 international [media cooperation](https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/01/the-kremlins-expanding-media.html) agreements since 2014. These agreements often involve countries Moscow sees as areas of historical Russian influence or as vulnerable to Western interference. As analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have [documented](http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-leverages-cyber-cooperation-deals), Moscow uses these deals to expand its human and institutional networks, cultivate Russia’s image as a trustworthy information security partner, and promote Kremlin-friendly outlets, narratives, and global information security norms while countering perceived Western “digital neocolonialism” and destabilization. The ISW analysts warn that Moscow may also seek to enhance Russia’s cyberattack capabilities by expanding its access to foreign cyber infrastructure and systems. [Tehran](https://www.un.org/disarmament/open-ended-working-group/) also [supports](https://www.un.org/en/ga/third/73/docs/voting_sheets/L.9.Rev.1.pdf) Russia’s [ongoing](https://russian.rt.com/world/article/795600-dmitrii-medvedev-oon-75-let) push at the [United Nations](https://www.cfr.org/blog/competing-us-russia-cybersecurity-resolutions-risk-slowing-un-progress-further) to [advance](https://www.cfr.org/blog/united-nations-doubles-its-workload-cyber-norms-and-not-everyone-pleased) authoritarian-[friendly](https://www.cyberscoop.com/un-resolution-internet-cybercrime-global-norms/) rules and [norms](https://www.axios.com/russia-china-united-nations-internet-sovereignty-3b4c14d0-a875-43a2-85cf-21497723c2ab.html) of state control of the internet. Similar efforts are underway at the [Shanghai Cooperation Organization](https://www.mid.ru/ru/mezdunarodnaa-informacionnaa-bezopasnost/-/asset_publisher/UsCUTiw2pO53/content/id/4420179) (SCO), where Iran holds observer status and has [called](https://ifpnews.com/iran-calls-for-international-cooperation-against-cyber-terrorism) for increased cooperation against “cyber terrorism” stemming from foreign social media networks. Russia and Iran also both [participate](https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/40118/) in the Russia-based Caspian Media Forum, established in 2015 to [facilitate](https://www.riadagestan.com/mobile/news_en/society/astrakhan_to_host_1st_caspian_media_forum_/) discussion on issues such as combating “imposed external values alien to” regional countries. To counter authoritarian corruption of internet norms and to cooperate with allies and partners to hold malicious hackers accountable, “well-resourced and persistent diplomatic efforts” are essential, as the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission [observed](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ryMCIL_dZ30QyjFqFkkf10MxIXJGT4yv/view) in its March 2020 report. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin [commented](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/21-01-19-nomination) that from the Pentagon’s perspective “it is absolutely important that the State Department be resourced adequately.” Indeed, U.S. Cyber Command chief Gen. Paul Nakasone has [noted](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-25/cybersecurity) that U.S. cyber “capabilities are meant to complement, not replace” diplomacy and other tools of U.S. statecraft. To date, however, the State Department’s efforts have fallen short. Both the [Government Accountability Office](https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-607R) (GAO) and [members of Congress](https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2021/01/lawmakers-criticize-state-departments-misguided-cyberspace-reorganization/171336/) have [criticized](https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/536579-new-state-department-cyber-bureau-stirs-opposition?rl=1) the State Department’s [cyber diplomacy](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/29/cybersecurity-202-watchdog-report-criticizes-state-department-cybersecurity-bureau-established-by-trump-administration/) for its poor interagency coordination and inefficiency. In a report released last week, the GAO [concluded](https://www.gao.gov/assets/720/712040.pdf) that as currently structured, the State Department may not be able to “effectively set priorities and allocate appropriate resources to achieve its intended goals.” Given this assessment as well as the expanding cooperation among U.S. adversaries, the Biden administration and Congress should work together to better resource and organize the State Department to defend U.S. values and interests in cyberspace.

### 2NC – AT: Ukraine

#### Iran-Russia cooperation is high now–Raisi has shown broad support for Russia in Ukraine

Troianovski et. al. 1-19 (Anton Troianovski is the Moscow bureau chief for The New York Times. He was previously Moscow bureau chief of The Washington Post and spent nine years with The Wall Street Journal in Berlin and New York, Farnaz Fassihi is a reporter for The New York Times based in New York. Previously she was a senior writer and war correspondent for the Wall Street Journal for 17 years based in the Middle East, Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, based in Brussels. He previously reported from London, Paris, Jerusalem, Berlin, Prague, Moscow and Bangkok, 1-19-22, “Russia and Iran Put on a Show of Unity — Against the U.S.”, New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/19/world/europe/russia-iran-unity-us.html//BVN> SC)

MOSCOW — Sitting across a long table from President Vladimir V. Putin at a Covid-conscious distance, President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran reminded his Russian counterpart on Wednesday that Tehran had been “resisting America for 40 years.” And now that Russia was plunging deeper into its own confrontation with the United States, Mr. Raisi told Mr. Putin in televised remarks, it was time to take on “the power of the Americans with an increased synergy between our two countries.” It was a bit of geopolitical theater at the Kremlin at a critical moment for Washington and its adversaries. Mr. Raisi, the hard-line Iranian leader, started a two-day trip to Moscow on Wednesday designed to showcase tightening bonds between two countries with often-diverging interests and a history of strained relations — but, increasingly, along with China, a single adversary: the United States. For Mr. Putin, embroiled in a dispute with the United States over spheres of influence and facing harsh sanctions if he follows through on a threatened invasion of Ukraine, it was a chance to show that Russia has friends it can call on in its battles with the West. In keeping with that message, the visit will include an address by Mr. Raisi to Russia’s lower house of Parliament, a rare honor for a visiting leader. Image Ukrainian soldiers this week on the front line of Katerynivka, in eastern Ukraine. Mr. Raisi supported President Putin’s policies there. Ukrainian soldiers this week on the front line of Katerynivka, in eastern Ukraine. Mr. Raisi supported President Putin’s policies there.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times Iran, its economy already strangled by U.S. sanctions, is involved in delicate negotiations to revive the 2015 nuclear accord. Mr. Raisi nevertheless voiced tacit support for Mr. Putin in Ukraine, and Iran’s foreign minister emphasized that the two presidents had agreed on the “framework” of an agreement governing increased economic and military cooperation. Dig deeper into the moment. Special offer: Subscribe for $1 a week. No deals were signed publicly, however, and the extent of the Kremlin’s willingness to sell to Iran more of the modern Russian weaponry that Tehran has long sought remained unclear. But along with an upcoming naval exercise combining warships from Russia, Iran and China, the Kremlin appeared intent on sending a message that it was continuing to foster new ties that could serve as a counterweight to the West. Iran, too, is signaling that it also has alternatives if Western sanctions are not lifted. “On the international arena, we are cooperating very closely,” Mr. Putin told Mr. Raisi, noting the crises in Syria and Afghanistan, and pledging to bring Iran closer to the Russia-led trade bloc known as the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia and Iran still have a host of differences. Despite years of sanctions, Russia’s economy, unlike Iran’s, remains closely integrated with the West. Mr. Putin has worked to foster close ties with Israel, which Iranian leaders see as an enemy. And in Vienna, Russia has been working with the United States and Europe to try to resuscitate faltering negotiations over restoring the deal restricting Iran’s nuclear program. But as Russia’s conflict with the West intensifies, Russian officials are increasingly willing to look past those differences. Grigory Lukyanov, an international relations specialist at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, said that Russian officials had grown more aligned in recent years with the more strident anti-Western stance of some Iranian counterparts. And Mr. Raisi, an ultraconservative cleric who became president in August, has spoken out in favor of closer ties to Russia despite skepticism in the Iranian public. “This visit is oriented not so much toward the domestic audience in both countries but, most of all, toward the West,” Mr. Lukyanov said of Mr. Raisi’s trip to Moscow. “There are now more supporters in the Russian leadership of adopting Iran’s radical course, which used to be considered unacceptable in Russia.” Russia has massed some 100,000 troops around Ukraine, while demanding guarantees that the NATO alliance not expand into Ukraine or elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Western officials say Mr. Putin could launch an invasion of Ukraine at any time, and have threatened crushing sanctions against Russia and new military support to Ukraine if he does so. Mr. Raisi, in the public portion of his meeting with Mr. Putin, did not bring up Ukraine, but echoed the Kremlin’s longtime disdain for the Western military alliance. Image A Ukrainian soldier on the front line of Zolote, in the Luhansk province of eastern Ukraine. A Ukrainian soldier on the front line of Zolote, in the Luhansk province of eastern Ukraine.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times “NATO’s influence under any pretext in the Caucasus and Central Asia is a threat to the mutual interests of independent countries,” Mr. Raisi said, according to the Iranian government’s account of the meeting. He was referring to two other regions that were once within the Soviet Union and that the Kremlin still sees as part of Russia’s rightful sphere of influence. Mr. Raisi’s presidency consolidated the power of a hard-line faction that had criticized the previous centrist government of President Hassan Rouhani as too accommodating to the West, aligning Iran more closely with Mr. Putin’s stance. Mr. Putin met with Mr. Raisi despite the Kremlin’s intense efforts to shield Mr. Putin from the coronavirus, with the omicron variant coursing through Moscow. The two leaders sat some 20 feet apart, and Mr. Putin’s spokesman later told the Russian news media that the seating arrangement was due to “measures of sanitary necessity.” “Neither video conferences nor phone calls can replace in-person contact — even like this,” Mr. Putin told Mr. Raisi, pointing at the long table between them. After Wednesday’s meeting at the Kremlin, the Iranian foreign minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, posted on Twitter that the two presidents had “agreed on the framework of a long-term agreement.” In his remarks Wednesday, Mr. Raisi said the document had been “delivered” to Mr. Putin. “Tehran and Russia relations entered a new, fast-paced and dynamic path,” Mr. Amir Abdollahian said. “Excellent cooperation will begin in this new phase of relations.” The 20-year agreement discussed by Mr. Putin and Mr. Raisi, Iranian officials said, focuses on technology transfers from Russia, the purchase of Russian military equipment and Russian investments in Iranian energy infrastructure. Iran has said the agreement would be modeled after a sweeping economic and security deal signed in September between Iran and China. Under that agreement, China will invest nearly $400 billion in a wide range of projects in Iran in exchange for discounted oil for two decades. “We are definitely pursuing a long-term agreement with Russia because it is a necessity,” Mahmoud Shoori, deputy director of the Institute for Iran and Eurasian Studies in Tehran, said in a phone interview. “More important than economic partnership with Russia is a military and intelligence alliance.”

#### Ukraine doesn’t thump–Iran-Russia relations are still high

Fathollah-Nejad 3-21 (Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad is an Associate Fellow and the author of the Iran in Focus brief at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut (AUB). He is also the author of Iran in an Emerging New World Order: From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani (2021) and the initiator and co-host of the Berlin Mideast Podcast (Konrad Adenauer Foundation). He is affiliated with the Center for Middle Eastern and North African Politics, Freie Universität (FU) in Berlin and the Centre d’Etudes de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (CECID) at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), 3-21-22, “Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the nature of Iranian-Russian relations”, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-invasion-ukraine-and-nature-iranian-russian-relations//BVN> SC)

Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, which triggered Europe’s first major conflict since the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, marks a watershed in the continent’s post-Cold War history. The conflict poses significant security challenges for countries throughout Eurasia and beyond, and has given rise to unexpected changes in long-established European foreign and security policy paradigms toward autocracies, as the case of Germany illustrates. Iran is by no means immune to the geopolitical changes underway. Before the war on Ukraine broke out, after almost a year of back-and-forth diplomatic efforts in Vienna, the Iran nuclear negotiations seemed poised to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The invasion, which caught many in the West by surprise, initially led Tehran and Moscow to seemingly modify their positions, giving rise to widespread uncertainty over the talks and even fears of their collapse. As of late March, however, the talks appear to be back on track and are expected to lead to a deal soon. Beyond the JCPOA, the New Cold War pitting Vladimir Putin’s Russia against the transatlantic alliance has also re-energized debates within Iran about its implications for the country’s standing in the world order. In this context, it is crucial to analyze Iran’s domestic discourse about its powerful Russian partner — some might say overlord — and its relationship with the leadership in Tehran. Iranian reactions to Russia's invasion and Moscow acting as overlord Tehran’s geopolitical hopes The Islamic Republic of Iran’s official reaction to the Russian invasion, both by state media and officials, echoed Moscow’s war propaganda, all while paying lip service to “the preservation of the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of all countries” (in the words of President Ebrahim Raisi). In most cases, the invasion was described as a Russian “special operation” provoked by the eastward expansion of the U.S.-led NATO alliance. From this viewpoint, Russia is simply safeguarding its security in the face of decades of destabilizing Western expansionism. This narrative has been promoted by key Iranian media outlets (affiliated with the state and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC) and representatives (including the supreme leader, president, minister of intelligence, and the Tehran Friday prayer imam). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they argue, constitutes a necessary act of resistance against Western/NATO aggression, so blame for the present escalation lies squarely with the latter. By defending Russia, they implicitly justify Iran’s own offensive regional posture, known as “forward defense,” which Tehran similarly likes to portray as a legitimate reaction to equally destabilizing U.S. expansionism in its near abroad. From this elite group’s perspective, Russia’s move against Ukraine in the face of Western hesitation is in line with Tehran’s own interests and overlaps with an Iranian grand strategy of confronting the U.S. and projecting power in the Middle East and beyond. Western reluctance to intervene, especially militarily, poignantly signals the decline of U.S. power. The image of America’s military prowess had already been undermined by the fiasco of the Afghanistan withdrawal last fall and other West Asian quagmires in which the U.S. and its allies failed to overcome Iran-allied groups. In sum, these misadventures left Washington bereft of its superpower status in international relations.

#### Ukraine and JCPOA create cooperation.

Maziar Motamedi 2/24, a Tehran-based journalist who covers Iran, 2/24/2022, “‘Rooted in NATO’: Iran responds to Russia’s Ukraine attack,” <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/24/rooted-in-nato-inside-irans-response-to-the-ukraine-crisis-2>, RES

The significant escalation in the Ukraine crisis comes as consequential talks in Vienna to restore Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal with world powers have entered their “endgame”, according to diplomats. The United States in 2018 unilaterally abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the deal is formally known, imposing harsh sanctions. In response, Tehran has since 2019 significantly advanced its nuclear programme while maintaining it is strictly peaceful. Seyed Mostafa Khoshcheshm, a Tehran-based Iran affairs analyst currently focused on the Vienna talks, said the Ukraine war has just started and would require more time to directly affect the talks in the Austrian capital. But he told Al Jazeera both Ukraine and JCPOA are security issues and “crises that have been manufactured by the US”. “It appears this will ultimately lead to Russia getting closer to Iran and expand its support of Iran,” Khoshcheshm said, adding this could include closer economic cooperation despite US sanctions, since Russia is now heavily sanctioned by the West. The analyst said the Ukraine crisis could also lead to closer security and military cooperation between Iran and Russia, especially in Syria. He pointed out that Israel had built strong ties with Russia, but its support of the Western bloc on Ukraine could endanger that.

#### Sanctions and Ukraine drive cooperation.

Yana Dlugy 7/14, a contributing writer with the Briefings team at The New York Times, and has reported from abroad for more than 20 years. She has been on several postings in Moscow, including for Newsweek and Agence France-Presse, and has also been based for AFP in Kyiv, the Middle East and Europe, 7/14/2022, “Russia Gets Closer to Iran,” <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/14/briefing/russia-ukraine-war-iran.html>?, RES

Russia gets closer to Iran President Vladimir Putin will travel to Iran next week to shore up military and economic support for Russia. The trip will follow President Biden’s tour of the Middle East this week, where Iran and its nuclear program were main topics of discussion. The relationship between Moscow and Tehran stretches back centuries and has often been fraught. Iranians still recall the territory that the Persian Empire had to cede to Russia’s czar in the early 19th century. Today the two countries find themselves in the club of nations hit by sanctions and shunned by the West. To learn more about the relationship, I spoke to Farnaz Fassihi, a Times journalist who covers the U.N. and is an expert on the Middle East. Our conversation has been lightly edited. How has the war changed relations between the two countries? Before, Iran and Russia had an alliance that was much more tactical than strategic. Iran really always wanted to develop this relationship. But because Russia had economic dealings with the West, Russia was always keeping Iran at arm’s length. The war in Ukraine changed that. Russia now faces international isolation, so it needs to figure out how to skirt sanctions. So it’s looking at Iran, a country with a lot of expertise on getting around sanctions. Iran sees an opportunity to get closer to Russia. And Russia now sees Iran as an important ally that could help it sell oil and energy and avoid sanctions.

### 2NC – AT: Swindland

#### Swindland and NATO expansion embolden Russia to also expand its own alliances–Iran joined their fold

O’Connor 7-1 (Tom O'Connor is an award-winning senior writer of foreign policy at Newsweek, where he specializes in the Middle East, North Korea and other areas of international affairs and conflict. He has previously written for International Business Times, the New York Post, the Daily Star (Lebanon) and Staten Island Advance, 7-1-22, “As NATO Grows, China and Russia Seek to Bring Iran, Saudi Arabia Into Fold”, Newsweek, <https://www.newsweek.com/nato-grows-china-russia-seek-bring-iran-saudi-arabia-fold-1720780//BVN> SC)

Finland and Sweden's green light to join NATO is set to bring about the U.S.-led Western military alliance's largest expansion in decades. Meanwhile, the G7, consisting of NATO states and fellow U.S. ally Japan, has adopted a tougher line against Russia and China. In the East, however, security and economy-focused blocs led by Beijing and Moscow are looking to take on new members of their own, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, two influential Middle Eastern rivals whose interest in shoring up cooperation on this new front could have a significant impact on global geopolitical balance. The two bodies in question are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. The former was established in 2001 as a six-member political, economic and military coalition including China, Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before recruiting South Asian nemeses India and Pakistan in 2017, while the latter is a grouping of emerging economic powers originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) upon its inception 2006, and including South Africa in 2010. "The BRICS and the SCO share one important ideological quality: they are both focused on multipolarity, and their summits have even been held back to back with one another at times," Matthew Neapole, an international affairs expert and contributor to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Canada, told Newsweek. "Both are angling to act as force multipliers for this drive for multipolarity, to help along with alternatives [i.e, in currency or banking]," he added. "It could, in theory, facilitate economic linkages and step into gaps that U.S. institutions are not filling due to sanctions, such as those laid on Russia." Iran, already an SCO observer, began its formal membership ascension process amid the latest leaders' summit in September. On Monday, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced the Islamic Republic would also seek to join BRICS. Across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has also reportedly considered applying for BRICS membership, as revealed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his visit to the kingdom in late May. The announcement followed Saudi Arabia joining Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates at China's invitation for a "BRICS+" discussion, after which Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced members had "reached consensus on the BRICS expansion process." Of these candidates, Argentina has already applied for membership, potentially advancing the group's status toward being a major player in international economic relations. And with the SCO seeking to grow as well, Beijing and Moscow might be poised to advance their effort to sway the international influence equilibrium toward a broader group of countries that do not necessarily sign on to an explicitly U.S.-led international order. And while Neapole argued that there would be "big hurdles to get over" in trying to transform this vision from ambitious talk to substantive action, he said a cohesive SCO-BRICS bloc could have a huge impact on reshaping the world order. "If it can be successful in positioning itself as the standard-bearer of the Global South or G20, develop strong organizational mechanisms and integrate more thoroughly," he said, "it could be quite influential." BRICS' multipolar approach to international affairs has proven attractive to both Iran and Saudi Arabia alike. The two nations, however, have their own unique reasons for seeking membership. For Riyadh, the move would likely be less about choosing sides against the close ties it has fostered for decades with Washington and more about the kingdom's own growing status as an independent player.

### 2NC – Link – Cohesion/Hypocrisy

#### Russian influence is solidified by US unilateral hypocrisy – aff fixes that

Reid Standish and Amy Mackinnon ’20, \*is an Alfa fellow and Foreign Policy’s special correspondent covering Russia and Eurasia, \*\*is a staff writer at Foreign Policy, “Putin Moves to Heighten Russia’s Role After Suleimani Killing”, Foreign Policy, 1/8/20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/08/putin-suleimani-russia-iran/

Since its pivotal intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has sought to position itself as a major player in the Middle East, establishing itself as a rare broker that is on good terms with all of the region’s feuding powers. **Now Moscow has a fresh chance to solidify that reputation**. Russian President Vladimir Putin will look to boost his country’s standing in the Middle East following the Trump administration’s decision to assassinate the Iranian military leader Qassem Suleimani last week and Iran’s missile attack against U.S. air bases in Iraq on Tuesday, which have roiled the Middle East and pushed Iran and the United States to the brink of war. **The escalating situation raises the stakes for Moscow’s calculus in the region significantly, but it also provides Putin with new opportunities to achieve two of his long-standing goals: undermining U.S. credibility and expanding Russia’s footprint across the Middle East**. “Putin sees pushing back against U.S. unilateralism as a personal mission and he is extremely opportunistic. **He will therefore seek to capitalize on every opportunity he can to use the assassination of Suleimani and any ensuing instability to tarnish Washington’s reputation in the region**,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security think tank who previously served as deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council. The killing sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity from Moscow. In phone calls with his American, Iranian, Chinese, and Turkish counterparts, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned the killing and characterized it as a gross violation of international law. On Tuesday, Putin made an impromptu visit to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and shore up Moscow’s patronage. “The last thing Putin wants is to have to pick a side in the Middle East,” said Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a Washington-based think tank. “His best card is as a mediator and I suspect they are in a wait-and-see mode now. If Russia does something major, it will be diplomatically.” On Wednesday, Putin traveled to Istanbul to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to discuss escalating tensions in the Middle East. Despite not always seeing eye to eye on the future of the region, Erdogan and Putin have managed to cut deals in the past, such as when both leaders agreed to effectively carve up northeastern Syria last year following the Trump administration’s unexpected withdrawal. On Saturday, Putin will welcome German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Moscow for talks about the crisis. Both Russia and Germany are among the countries that have sought to prop up the Iranian nuclear deal following the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2018. **The killing of** the Quds Force leader **Suleimani** in a U.S. drone strike at the Baghdad airport on Jan. 3 **will likely stress test Moscow’s ability to be a friend to all major players in the region**. Russia and Iran have developed deep ties in recent years, working together in Syria to tilt the balance of power in favor of the Assad regime. Despite their shared interests, Moscow has simultaneously pursued deeper ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s foes, as well as with other players across the region. “Moscow is trying to play this role as a reliable and stable player in the Middle East and this certainly helps its cause,” said Julia Sveshnikova, a Middle East expert and consultant at the PIR Center, a Moscow think tank. “**But Moscow is also very concerned about this situation and will be looking to stay out of the fray as much as possible**.” **The Trump administration’s decision to assassinate a high-ranking official caught many countries around the world off guard and undermined U.S. credibility in the Middle East, an opening that Moscow will be looking to capitalize on**. **The Kremlin has long proven adept at exploiting crises around the world to advance its strategic objectives, from Ukraine to North Africa to Syria**. **Washington has slapped Russia with sanctions for its intervention in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, but the Kremlin has long pointed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as** evidence of U.S. hypocrisy **and will likely use Suleimani’s killing** and Trump’s call to target Iranian cultural sites as further evidence of U.S. overreach while furthering its own standing as a regional power broker. While many of the United States’ regional allies may privately welcome Suleimani’s demise, many also feared that they may bear the brunt of Iran’s retaliation. Those fears may have been allayed slightly as Iran responded to the killing of its general by firing over a dozen missiles at U.S. military and coalition forces in Iraq. Early reports suggested that there were no U.S. casualties, and both sides showed signs that they wanted to de-escalate the situation. **U.S. allies in the region may be breathing a sigh of relief, but if they conclude that Washington had left them exposed to Iranian retaliation, it could** encourage a pivot toward Moscow **for future mediation.** The last months of 2019 were marked by a wave of anti-Iranian protests in Iraq and Lebanon, and for a moment it looked as if Tehran’s potent influence in the region may be starting to fray. But the Jan. 3 airstrike brought anti-American sentiment in the region to the fore once more, a shift that will undoubtedly be welcomed by Moscow. “As much as Putin may have wanted [a rise in anti-American sentiment] to occur, Russia could not have brought it about on its own,” said Mark Katz, a professor of politics and government at George Mason University. “But Trump has done it for him.”

### 2NC – Link – NATO Key

#### Relations are zero sum – Russia must chose NATO or Iran

Lt. Col. Gordon B. Hendrickson ’05, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, “The Future of NATO-Russian Relations: Or, How to Dance with a Bear and Not Get Mauled”, The Atlantic Council, December 2005, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46291/2005\_12\_The\_Future\_of\_NATO-Russia\_Relations.pdf

Russia is now more readily acknowledging, at least publicly, the value of NATO and of closer relations with the Alliance. Ambassador Anatoly Adamishin, President of the Russian Association for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, recently affirmed this view when he opined that NATO-Russian relations are currently exemplary, despite some disagreements. As he pointed out, Russia must “have an alliance with the Alliance” and any quarrels between the two must be settled without taking sides. He put it plainly when he said, “NATO is necessary.” The challenge, he said, is to avoid tackling new problems with old, obsolete methods.105 **It is vital for the Alliance to encourage this view and to keep Russia engaged with the West**. Without a continuation of strong, active, and regular engagement from NATO and other important Western institutions, such as the EU, Russia naturally will look for support, security and prosperity from other sources, such as China, India, and even Iran, if they offer much-needed economic capital for Russia. **NATO’s European members will be particularly key players in this regard**, both multilaterally and even bilaterally, as Moscow looks more and more toward integration into European institutions and seeks to regain what it considers its rightful, prominent role on the continent. **Without such continued active engagement, NATO could face a hardening of Russian attitudes toward the West**. The likely result would be for Russia to close more of its society and become even more secretive than it already is, clearly a step backward from the Alliance’s goal of transparency. NATO has to avoid these pitfalls, insofar as it can possibly influence them. Above all, **NATO should avoid marginalizing Russia, which will take creativity as NATO’s borders expand further eastward toward Russia’s**. The Alliance could encourage a more active Russian role in the PfP, include more Russian officers in technical ventures such as joint exercises and force planning, and even possibly integrate Russia into its own efforts at military reform.106 One thing NATO leaders can count on is that as NATO expands its membership, especially to the east, Russia will continue to look more to other nations to establish or strengthen other alliances and partnerships in response. **NATO’s leaders also must keep in mind that words matter to the Russians**. The details and exact wording of international treaties, agreements, and even simple diplomatic notes matter. The author saw this repeatedly during his time in Moscow, when reaching agreement on the seemingly smallest details sometimes took excruciating lengths of time. **In the Russian view, the spirit and intent of an agreement cannot necessarily be proven—only that which is written can be proven**. Accurate words also prevent a subsequent administration or government from changing the intent of an agreement without resorting to formal channels. Russian leaders believe they can avoid being cheated or taken advantage of by correctly spelling out everything. Conversely, they do not see a problem in taking advantage of loopholes in treaties and agreements, if the letter of the law is not violated. In their view, it is perfectly fair, even if it might violate the intent of the law. Otherwise, their treaty partner should have seen this possibility and guarded against it. The moral: Whenever Alliance leaders can join formally with Russia in an activity or partnership, they should do it. Close, honest and transparent dialogue is critical to NATO success in continuing to engage Russia, and the NRC definitely has been a step in the right direction. Fortunately, the Alliance has recognized this, and should do everything it possibly can to encourage dialogue. Ambassador Maurizio Moreno, Italian Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, recently commented on the importance of dialogue regarding NATO’s new history in its relations with Russia. In his view, Russia is now an equal partner and the process within the NRC is working well, even on sensitive issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, and the recent Ukrainian presidential election. Although there are natural differences of opinions, and even some differences between NATO and Russian values, he believes the two sides can work successfully through these challenges. According to Moreno, “there are values we can share” and he stated that we have done so recently through the NRC. Although Russia has not joined NATO, and most likely will not, in his view there is still the definite possibility for beneficial and productive dialogue.107 Former NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson captured the essence of NATO’s success in the NRC when he presciently stated in 2002, “the real difference between ‘19+1’ and ‘20’ is not a question of mathematics, but one of chemistry: the success of the NATO-Russia Council will depend on the political will of the participants.” Based on the apparent willingness of both sides to make it work, he believed “the prospects for a genuinely new quality in NATO-Russia relations appear bright.”108 Thus far, his belief in the NRC’s prospects has proven well founded. Now, it is up to Alliance and Russian leaders to ensure that chemistry remains strong and positive. This will undoubtedly require a skillful mix of patient dialogue combined at times with more forceful pressure, without resorting to confrontation. As history has shown, confrontation, demands, and ultimatums will accomplish very little with Russia (as indeed, these tactics accomplish little with any country). **The best prospects for NATO-Russia relations will result from NATO leaders honestly listening to and considering Russian views, even if in the end Moscow does not like the answer.** To the extent possible, NATO must avoid marginalizing Russia.

#### Russia’s perception of NATO is key – doesn’t see them as an economic partner in the squo which pushes them to Iran

Lt. Col. Gordon B. Hendrickson ’05, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, “The Future of NATO-Russian Relations: Or, How to Dance with a Bear and Not Get Mauled”, The Atlantic Council, December 2005, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46291/2005\_12\_The\_Future\_of\_NATO-Russia\_Relations.pdf

Leading intelligence experts also highlight the importance of a strong Russian economy to the security of Europe, and of the role Europe can play in drawing Russia closer. In their view, **if Russia knows Western Europe wants to forge a “**special relationship**” with a Russia that is economically stronger, Moscow is more likely to be tolerant of former Soviet states moving closer to Europe**.103 **Such a closer relationship to European institutions and structures would also provide Russia a vital counterweight to the strong economic lure of weapons of mass destruction and other weapons proliferation, as well as** reducing **its perceived need for** growing ties with **other regions and countries, such as** China, India, and Iran. President Putin has made clear this Russian need and desire for further development, stating shortly after his re-election in March 2004, The main goal of our policy is not to demonstrate some or other imperial ambitions, but rather to secure favorable external conditions for the development of Russia. There is nothing unusual in that. And we will be building a multi-vector foreign policy, we will work together with the United State, the European Union, and with individual countries of Europe. We will work together with our Asian partners, with China, India, and with countries of the Asia-Pacific region.104 As a result, **the** support of NATOand other Western institutions **takes on** vital importance **in keeping Russia positively engaged in and cooperating with the rest of Europe.**

### 2NC – Brink/Link UQ

#### Ties are strong now BUT could be spoiled by the US

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**The relationship between Iran and Russia has never been built on trust**. Since 1979, Iran has held a “No East, No West” policy. No country has seized more territory from Iran in recent centuries than Russia, and Iran has not fully forgiven Russia for its support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Tehran has consistently been used as a bargaining chip between Russia and the U.S., most notably in backroom negotiations in 1995 when Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to end arms sales to Iran without their knowledge or consent. But now, U.S. policymakers are faced with the challenge of a fundamentally changed relationship between Iran and Russia derived from military coordination to prop up the Assad regime. Russia and Iran have been working in tandem to ensure that the Syrian government survives. Without their support, President Assad could not have remained in power. Iran’s ambitions for regional hegemony and to counter Saudi Arabia’s strength in the Middle East require Assad’s survival. Russia seeks a larger role in the Middle East and to limit America’s influence. While Russia may not necessarily be committed to President Assad’s personal maintenance of power, it views a continued Russian-Syrian alliance as critical for its access to this region and to the Mediterranean. Because of these shared priorities with Russia, Iran appears to have diverted from “No East, No West.” In August 2016, Iran allowed Russia to use its Hamadan Air Base to take off and refuel in support of its joint military operations; no foreign power has been permitted to base forces in Iran since 1979. Russia has been training and providing weapons to Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy militia in Lebanon. Since the beginning of the war, Hezbollah has adapted from a small terrorist organization to a small-sized army, posing a direct threat to U.S. allies in Israel and Saudi. In **the aftermath of the JCPOA, Iran and Russia signed a $10 billion arms deal, and Russia delivered S-300 missile systems that had been delayed due to international sanctions regimes.** But the U.S. has the power to drive a wedge between Iran and Russia’s blossoming relationship. **Even though Iran and Russia might have similar visions of the Syrian conflict in the immediate term, their long-term regional goals differ significantly**.

## 2NC Impact Toolbox

### 2NC – Syria Impact – Astana Key

#### Astana process is effective at stabilizing Syria

Islamic Republic News Agency IRNA ’20, is the official news agency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, “Putin: Astana peace process to help normalize situation in Syria”, IRNA, 7/1/20, https://en.irna.ir/news/83841145/Putin-Astana-peace-process-to-help-normalize-situation-in-Syria

The three guarantors of the Astana peace process (Iran, Turkey, and Russia) have started to discuss the Syria peace process via video conference. President **Putin said that the trilateral summit meetings had reduced the level of violence in Syria**. **He said that Russia agrees with Iran's assessment for the continuation of cooperation in Syria**. The Russian president added that **the level of violence in Syria has dropped significantly and the activities of ISIS and terrorists in Syria have been reduced**. Referring to Russia's intensive cooperation with Turkey regarding the Idlib region, President Putin said that "we are working together to implement the September 2018 Sochi Agreement and its additional protocol dated March 5, 2020". He stated that the unilateral sanctions imposed on Syria without the approval of the UN Security Council have a negative impact on the situation in Syria. In fact, these sanctions are illegal. **He pointed out that cooperation among Iran, Russia, and Turkey within the framework of the Astana process is stabilizing Syria**.

#### Only effective solution – created a ceasefire for months – continued engagement is key

Al Jazeera ’20, is a Qatari pay television news channel owned by the Al Jazeera Media Network, “Iran, Russia Turkey in talks to find political solution for Syria”, Al Jazeera, 7/1/20, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/1/iran-russia-turkey-in-talks-to-find-political-solution-for-syria

**Opposing sides in Syria’s war Iran, Russia and Turkey have held talks reflecting “harmonised” efforts to bring peace to the country after nine years of devastating conflict**. During a meeting held on Wednesday, the three sides “expressed the conviction” that Syria’s war had no military solution and must be settled only through a political process, a joint statement said. In the virtual meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced newly imposed US sanctions that he said were aimed at “suffocating” Syria, while Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for peace and security to be restored in his country’s southern neighbour. **The talks were the first since September in the so-called Astana format, three-way talks between the key foreign powers in the Syrian conflict**. In early March, **an agreement between Turkey and Russia halted the Syrian government’s three-month air and ground campaign into rebel-held Idlib province**. The ceasefire has largely held.

#### Three guarantors agreed to maintain Syria’s borders – ensures stabilization through Astana

TRT World ’20, is a Turkish state international news channel broadcast 24 hours per day in English, “Syria's territorial integrity a priority – Astana guarantors”, TRT World, 7/1/20, https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/syria-s-territorial-integrity-a-priority-astana-guarantors-37776

**Leaders of Turkey, Russia, and Iran have called for a peaceful dialogue between warring sides in Syria while pledging to protect the territorial integrity of the war-torn country**. "Maintaining the political unity and territorial integrity of Syria, the establishment of calm on the ground and a lasting solution to the conflict are our priorities," Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said during a televised meeting with his Iranian and Russian counterparts on Syria on Wednesday. "We'll continue to do our best to provide peace, security, and stability in our neighbour Syria," he added. Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced the United States for imposing new sanctions on Syria's regime during the coronavirus pandemic. "Despite the call from the UN secretary general to ease sanctions under pandemic conditions, Washington, like Brussels, decided to prolong measures against Syria," Putin said in his speech. "In addition, new sanctions presumably aimed at economically suffocating Syria have been adopted," he said. **Putin told his counterparts that there was a need for peaceful dialogue between warring sides in Syria and that "hot spots of terrorism" still remain in Syria's Idlib and other regions.** "An inclusive inter-Syrian dialogue should be actively promoted within the framework of the constitutional committee in Geneva. I propose to support this process, to help the participants to meet and start a direct dialogue," Putin said. Rouhani: No military solution for Syria "The Islamic Republic believes the only solution to the Syrian crisis is political and not a military solution," Rouhani said in a televised opening address. "We continue to support the inter-Syrian dialogue and underline our determination to fight the terrorism of Daesh, Al Qaeda, and other related groups." "I emphasise that the fight against terrorism will continue until it is completely eradicated in Syria and the region in general," he added. **Astana talks** After delivering opening statements, the three presidents discussed Syria in private and also released a joint declaration. The talks are the first since September in the so-called Astana format, in which the three powers discuss developments in Syria, where the conflict has entered its 10th year.

### 2NC – Syria Impact – Brink

#### Ukraine put Russia’s involvement in Syria on the brink.

Dr Haid Haid 6/22, a Syrian columnist and a consulting associate fellow of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa program, 6/22/2022, “Russia maintains grip on Syria while mired in Ukraine,” <https://www.timesnownews.com/columns/russia-maintains-grip-on-syria-while-mired-in-ukraine-article-92374069>, RES

In late February, when Russia launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, regional analysts began speculating how the fighting would impact Moscow’s military presence in Syria. The guesswork didn’t last long. Faced with unexpected resilience from Ukraine’s army, Russia reportedly began to withdraw infantry, aviation, and engineering units from various parts of Syria. As a result, many assumed that Moscow’s willingness – or even its ability – to support Syrian President Bashar Al Assad had been wounded by overextension in Ukraine. The conclusion: Russia’s military role in Syria would be significantly decreased. But recent developments on the ground tell a much different story. In addition to reinforcing its forces in northern Syria in response to Turkish threats of a cross-border military operation, Moscow is carrying out operations as before with joint air force drills with Damascus over the war-torn country, and humanitarian aid to people in Sweida and Hassakeh. Taken together, these activities suggest that despite decreasing its presence in Syria, Russia is determined to mobilize its forces there to maintain its means of influence. Since September 2015, an estimated 63,000 Russian military personnel have been deployed to Syria. While the number of soldiers currently stationed in the country is likely much lower, what’s important to recognize is that Moscow doesn’t actually need to keep many troops there to maintain operational advantage. That’s because the level of active fighting has dramatically decreased since March 2020, after the ceasefire brokered by Russia and Turkey in Idlib. With somewhat frozen frontlines, Russia can recall units from Syria without fear of pushback from opposition forces. A more accurate measure of Russia’s influence in Syria is its ability to stabilise the fractured north, and so far, Moscow’s war in Ukraine has had little effect on that mission. In fact, Russia has increased its activities in the northern part of the country to deter Turkey from carrying out a new military operation against Kurdish factions based there. In late May, Moscow deployed soldiers, six Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters, and two Su-34 fighter bombers to the Qamishli airport, according to Syrian media. It also deployed military convoys with dozens of vehicles to the cities of Manbij and Tel Rifaat. More importantly, Russia has increased its air force activities over the Syria-Turkey border as well as the frontlines in Hassakeh and Aleppo governorates. The aim of these activities is to ensure that a new Turkish offensive cannot take place without a green light from Moscow. Meanwhile, Moscow remains engaged in mediating between the Syrian regime and Kurdish fighters in the northeast. Despite the absence of active hostilities between Damascus and Kurdish soldiers, clashes are still common in the region, and Russia’s ability to ease tensions is often tested. The latest round of Russian-led negotiations occurred in April, when Russia succeeded in getting rival Kurdish and Syrian government forces to lift sieges held against each other. The deal demonstrates Moscow’s continued ability to act as a mediator. Russia also appears determined to stand between Iran and Israel to prevent any escalation between those two states. For instance, Russia has allowed Israeli warplanes to use Syrian airspace to target Iranian-linked sites and arms shipments in Syria. Russia has also continued to prevent Iran from deploying its allies close to Israel’s borders. At the same time, however, Russia has pressured Israel to limit airstrikes in Syria, in deference to Iran’s interests; reportedly fired S-300 missiles at Israeli jets over Syria; and carried out joint patrols along the occupied Golan Heights in simulated confrontation with “hostile” warplanes and drones. Beyond its military presence, Russia’s ability to influence events in Syria is contingent on the financial support it provides to allied militias. While information about Russia’s funding to local militias in Syria is scant, according to Syrian news websites, Moscow does appear to have transferred roughly $250,000 in May to pay some 16,000 fighters affiliated with local armed groups. How long this support will last is unclear. Financial difficulties caused by the war in Ukraine could hamper Moscow’s ability to continue funding a second war effort. If Russian money dries up, some militias might agree to be paid by Iran or the Syrian regime, but former rebels in the south operating under the umbrella of the Fifth Corps, which remains hostile to Tehran and Damascus, are unlikely to do so peacefully. Such a development could further destabilize southern Syria, which in turn would threaten Jordan’s national security across the border through a new wave of refugees and smuggling. Hence, Russia’s continued involvement in Syria has security implications beyond the troubled north. Moscow’s shifting role in Syria will remain a topic of intense regional speculation. But while the war in Ukraine is stretching Russia’s military capacity and altering its strategic priorities, it’s hard to imagine any scenario in which Moscow completely abandons its role in maintaining Syria’s fragile status quo. On the contrary, Russia’s Ukraine-fueled withdrawal from Syria, once eagerly predicted, now seems like wistful conjecture.

### 2NC – Syria Impact – AT: Defense

#### Syria conflict causes loose nukes and Middle Eastern War.

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A senior Syrian official warned world powers of the potential of militant groups gaining access to nuclear weapons as a war at home worsened among both domestic and international forces. Bassam Sabbagh, Syria's permanent representative to the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told an agency gathering on Tuesday that "the issue of nuclear security has emerged during the past decade as an important issue that calls the attention of the international community and that the convening of this conference for the third time reflects the increasing importance of nuclear security as a common global area of concern," according to the official Syrian Arab News Agency. The diplomat argued that criminal or "terrorist" groups could potentially get their hands on and use nuclear or radioactive material to advance their agendas, presenting a major threat to global security, especially as borders are increasingly violated and cyberwarfare becomes increasingly commonplace. He invited foreign delegates to visit Syria and pool their efforts against such risks. Though a nearly nine-year nationwide civil war has calmed in many parts of the country, it has intensified in the northwest in recent months. Here, failing cease-fires between Russia and Turkey have given way to a government offensive in Idlib, the last province largely under the control of rebels and jihadis battling overthrow President Bashar al-Assad. Despite Moscow's efforts to prevent direct hostilities between the forces of Ankara and Damascus, recent deadly exchanges threatened to erupt into a wider conflict between neighboring states in the Middle East.

#### It causes World War III

Douglas Mackinnon 19, political and communications consultant, was writer in the White House for Reagan and Bush, and former special assistant for policy and communications at the Pentagon, "Syria and Hong Kong: Beware the tripwires for World War III," TheHill, 10/23/2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/466725-syria-and-hong-kong-beware-the-tripwires-for-world-war-iii, /\

In June 1914, the assassination of Austria’s Archduke Ferdinand triggered a chain of events that led to World War I and the eventual loss of more than 30 million lives.

The escalating rhetoric today regarding Syria and Hong Kong has the potential to turn dangerously high-risk conflicts into tripwires, which would set off confrontations that could spread across the globe.

Why are so many people willing to risk starting World War III? It’s a question we should ponder in all seriousness.

With regard to Syria, the Russians are being pulled deeper into that region and soon will draw bright “red lines” that must never be crossed. In Hong Kong, the authoritarian government of the People’s Republic of China soon may make those lines blood red.

This is not a game. It’s not an academic exercise, or a Hollywood movie. There will be no referees to throw a flag, no professors to give a do-over, and no rewrites with happy endings. Russia and China are two dictatorial, ruthless regimes rapidly reaching the point where they no longer will negotiate or cave to U.S. demands.

In the worlds they rule, to cave in to populist pressure regarding “rights and liberty for all” is tantamount to a self-inflicted death sentence.

If pushed into a corner, they will spring out in a vicious attack to protect that which they cannot lose — even if such an attack steps directly upon the tripwire. That should petrify us all.

“Stand with Hong Kong” is the slogan of the moment for those looking to put a dictatorial government in its place. But it also has become a cottage industry, with potential to make millions of dollars for entrepreneurs who are happy to profit off millennials protesting from the safety of cities other than Hong Kong. In a perfect world, we all want to stand with Hong Kong in its aim to remain free of China’s aggressive overreach. But our world not only is far from perfect, it’s getting more dangerous by the day. Protesters, celebrities, self-absorbed media personalities and U.S. politicians are conveniently “outraged” that the National Basketball Association, Hollywood, certain corporations and a long list of others might put profit before the oppressed people of Hong Kong. In a perfect world, that would never happen. In the real world we inhabit, it has been going on since the first days of commerce and profit. Nazi Germany benefitted from such deals with the devil, as have rogue nations and tyrants before and since. Is it right? No. Will it ever stop? Not as long as human frailties and greed exist. I suspect that most people who order Stand with Hong Kong t-shirts have no idea of what they are protesting. In a nutshell, the protests in Hong Kong started in June against proposals to allow extradition to mainland China. The city leaders of Hong Kong soon agreed to suspend the extradition bill, but the protesters then demanded “full democracy” for Hong Kong. Full democracy, for a city in a communist nation. For those who might not remember, in 1997 Britain returned control of Hong Kong to the communist government of China. The communist leaders recognized that Hong Kong had been Westernized to a large extent and, even though it was now under their rule, they allowed it to retain more rights and autonomy than in the mainland, a hybrid government known as “one country, two systems.” With all of the flaws — and outright atrocities — associated with the leadership of the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong was a functioning first-world city in many ways. We all want full democracy for every human being, everywhere on earth. But what price are we willing to pay to try to force that to happen in totalitarian nations and rogue states? Hong Kong is, in fact, a city of communist China. Will the protesters around the world next demand full democracy for Beijing? Will they travel to North Korea and demand it for Pyongyang? What about Damascus — will they travel there to march in the streets against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Russian protectors?

Conflicts and wars in the Middle East have been bottomless pits of quicksand that have sucked the life out of invading or protecting nations for centuries. The situation in Syria regarding the Kurds is now a pressure-cooker put on fast-boil by Turkey’s incursion and Russia’s actions. What price are we willing to pay if that top blows off, or if we nudge that top off?

Words are cheap but lives are precious. There is evil in the world, and people who foster and control such evil. Sometimes, as with Hitler and the Nazis, such evil must be confronted at any cost in a quest to stop it.

This is not about appeasing such evil. It is about knowing the differences and enacting policies commensurate with the crime or the threat. Hong Kong and Syria could be tripwires for the truly unimaginable. Our leaders must recognize that reality and act accordingly.

### 2NC – Central Asian Economy Impact

#### The future of Russia-Iran ties determines the future of the Central Asian economy

Alex Vatanka ’20, Director of Iran Program and Senior Fellow at Frontier Europe Initiative, “Iran and Russia: A tale of unfulfilled economic potential”, MEI, 3/17/20, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-russia-tale-unfulfilled-economic-potential

The outbreak of a Russian-Saudi oil price war earlier this month might offer some comfort to Iran, a country which has in recent years become unnerved by the increasingly close ties between Moscow and Riyadh. However, it is premature to see an Iranian geopolitical win emerging from the Russian-Saudi spat, and history should give Tehran plenty of reservations about Moscow’s ability to deliver on its economic promises to Iran. With Iran and Russia both large exporters of oil and natural gas, closer economic cooperation would invariably involve the energy sector. And **given the size of their economies,** the entire Caucasus and Central Asia region will feel the impact should Russia-Iranian relations tilt one way or another. **Iran and Russia will likely continue to pay lip-service to the idea of an economic partnership**, but each side will remain preoccupied with larger concerns. This is a tale of unfulfilled economic potential.

#### Collapse goes nuclear.

Ivan LIZAN 15. JD, National University Odesa Law Academy. “Three Fronts For Russia: How Washington Will Fan The Flames of Chaos In Central Asia.” Information Clearinghouse. February 23. <http://tinyurl.com/pn3kpgy>.

Method of destruction

The first way to destabilize Central Asia is to create problems on the borders, along with the threat that Mujahideen will penetrate the region. The testing of the neighbours has already started; problems have arisen in Turkmenistan, which has even had to ask Kabul to hold large-scale military operations in the border provinces. Tajikistan has forced the Taliban to negotiate the release of the border guards it abducted, and the Tajik border service reports that there is a large group of Mujahideen on its borders.

In general, all the countries bordering Afghanistan have stepped up their border security.

The second way is to send Islamists behind the lines. The process has already begun: the number of extremists in Tajikistan alone grew three-fold last year; however, even though they are being caught, it obviously will not be feasible to catch all of them. Furthermore, the situation is aggravated by the return of migrant workers from Russia, which will expand the recruiting base. If the stream of remittances from Russia dries up, the outcome may be popular discontent and managed riots.

Kyrgyz expert Kadir Malikov reports that $70 million has been allocated to the IS military group Maverenahr, which includes representatives of all the Central Asian republics, to carry out acts of terrorism in the region. Special emphasis is placed on the Fergana Valley as the heart of Central Asia.   
Another point of vulnerability is Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for this fall. The initiation of a new set of color revolutions will lead to chaos and the disintegration of countries.

Self-supporting wars

Waging war is expensive, so the destabilization of the region must be self-supporting or at least profitable for the U.S. military-industrial complex. And in this area Washington has had some success: it has given Uzbekistan 328 armored vehicles that Kiev had requested for its war with Novorossiya. At first glance, the deal isn’t profitable because the machines were a gift, but in reality Uzbekistan will be tied to U.S. spare parts and ammunition. Washington made a similar decision on the transfer of equipment and weapons to Islamabad.

But the United States has not been successful in its attempts to impose its weapons systems on India: the Indians have not signed any contracts, and Obama was shown Russian military hardware when he attended a military parade.

Thus the United States is drawing the countries in the region into war with its own protégés – the Taliban and Islamic State – and at the same time is supplying its enemies with weapons.

So 2015 will be marked by preparations for widespread destabilization in Central Asia and the transformation of AfPak into an Islamic State subsidiary on the borders of Russia, India, China, and Iran. The start of full-scale war, which will inevitably follow once chaos engulfs the region, will lead to a bloodbath in the “Eurasian Balkans,” automatically involving more than a third of the world’s population and almost all the United States’ geopolitical rivals. It’s an opportunity Washington will find too good to miss.

Russia’s response to this challenge has to be multifaceted: involving the region in the process of Eurasian integration, providing military, economic, and political assistance, working closely with its allies in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS, strengthening the Pakistani army, and of course assisting with the capture of the bearded servants of the Caliphate.

But the most important response should be the accelerated modernization of its armed forces as well as those of its allies and efforts to strengthen the Collective Security Treaty Organization and give it the right to circumvent the highly inefficient United Nations.

The region is extremely important: if Ukraine is a fuse of war, then Central Asia is a munitions depot. If it blows up, half the continent will be hit.

#### **Central Asian trade solves nuclear war**

Starr 3 (S. Frederick, Chair – Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, “Afghanistan: Free Trade and Regional Transformation”, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/Publications/Starr_Asia_Society_Afghanistan.htm>)

However great the economic and social benefits of renewed regional trade across the broader region of Central Asia, they are fully matched by the huge gains in world security that will flow from these changes. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any other practical and simple steps anywhere that would bring about greater geopolitical benefits for all. There are ten different areas in which these improvements will be quickly felt: 1. The revival of regional trade will do more than any other single measure to rebuild the Afghan economy, generate state income, and enable the government to provide security and basic human services to its people. This in turn will undercut the appeal of extremist and criminal activities. And it will do so in a way that reinforces Afghanistan's need to maintain cordial relations with all its neighbors. 2. Trade with Afghanistan and the broader region of Central Asia, as well as with India and Iran, will stimulate the flagging economy of Pakistan. The port of Karachi will become a regional hub and Pakistani businesses will be able to exploit new opportunities in every direction. 3. Indians will not choose to remain aloof from this opportunity, even if the price is improved relations with Pakistan. Although this will not in itself resolve the conflict over Kashmir, it will improve the climate in which the parties address that thorny problem. 4. Through regionwide trade to the northeast and east, Iran will reclaim its traditional vocation as a pragmatic trading state. This will tip today's fragile balance between mullahs and merchants in favor of the latter, hastening positive political change in that country. It will also cause Iran to look eastward and will distance it from the messy and seemingly intractable problems of the Arab world. 5. By renewing trade with their old-age partners to the south and southeast and by gaining direct access to the nearby port of Karachi, the new states of Central Asia will become economically more viable and sustainable. Although regionwide trade will benefit all five of these states, the impoverished mountain countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will see the biggest gains as they acquire the ability to market their most valuable product, hydroelectric power. 6. Trade will encourage all the Central Asian leaders and their governments to work with, rather than against, each other because these economic benefits can be reaped only when harmonious and productive relations prevail among the regional states. 7. In the five new states, as in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, trade and investment will favor the formation of an independent middle class and undercut the appeal of radical Islamist movements. As the new governments gain in confidence they will be able to tolerate greater openness and participation by members of the public. This will in turn strengthen their identity as moderate Islamic societies ruled by secular states. As such, they will presentan alternative model of modern development to the entire Muslim world.8. Through the opening of trade relations with their natural partners to the south and access to the port of Karachi, the new states of Central Asia will shed their one-sided dependence on Russia and reduce that country's ability to control their overall destinies. Stated differently, free trade will do for these countries what multiple pipelines will do for the oil-producing countries of the Caspian basin. 9. The growth of stability in Afghanistan and the broader region of Central Asia will address what Russia has, for a decade, identified as its number one security concern. Free trade with the south all the way to Pakistan and India will stimulate the flagging economies of the Urals region as well. All this will cut the ground from under those in the Russian military and intelligenceserviceswho feelthat they must somehow regain a deciding voice in Central Asian affairs. The waning of neo-imperial sentiment will in turn enhance the prospects for more open public life in Russia. 10. The establishment of stable and prosperous regimes in neighboring Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and the fadingofradical Islamist currents there will address China's major security objective, namely, that these countries not become transmission points for destabilizing movements within Turkic and Muslim Xinjiang. While this will not resolve the question of Xinjiang autonomy (any more than it will resolve the analogous issue in Kashmir), it will at least improve the climate in which it can be considered. America's Decisive Role in Building a New Central Asia Reviewing this list, it is clear that the establishment of free trade throughout the broader region of Central Asia promises benefits for all and liabilities for none. This is a policy that is not directed against the interests of any state in the region. On the contrary, it is a policy that promotes the long-term objectives of all the states and their peoples. The regional transformation described above will take place on its own, without any major push from any quarter. Supporting this claim is the fact that the changes in question are neither new nor revolutionary. Rather, they will bring about the reestablishment of certain relationships that proved their value over the course of several thousand years. The first steps along these lines are already visible, lending further credibility to this argument. At the same time, the region in question poses unique dangers. No other area on the planet is surrounded by four, possibly five, nuclear powers and a sixth power, Turkey, a NATO member. Nowhere else do the tectonic plates of several great civilizations and economic zones grind so directly against one another. So while the opening of freer trade may somehow be in the natural order of things, the risks of the process going awry are enormous. And were that to happen, it would put at risk not one but several of the relationships on whichworld security is grounded.

**Yes escalation—key geopolitical hub**

Arun **Sahgal &,** former Army officer who created the Office of Net Assessment in the Indian Joint Staff, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses and ‘Distinguished Fellow’ School of Geo-Politics at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Vinod **Anand 10**, postgraduate in defence and strategic studies and is an alumnus of Defence Services Staff College and College of Defence Management, “Strategic Environment in Central Asia and India”, <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/1004Joshi-V-Strategic.pdf>

The geo-strategic salience of Central Asia today has been underscored by two main factors. First, Central Asia has become important because of the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves and second, it has become a major transportation hub for gas and oil pipelines and multi-modal communication corridors connecting China, Russia, Europe, the Caucasus region, the Trans-Caspian region and the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, whether it was Czarist Russia or the Soviet Union or even the present Central Asian regimes, there has always been a strategic ambition in the north to seek access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Thus Afghanistan, which links Central Asia and South Asia, is a strategic bridge of great geopolitical significance. Central Asia and South Asia are intimately connected not only geographically but also strategically. The Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have borders with Afghanistan, Iran lies to its west and Pakistan to the east and south. Therefore, the geostrategic significance of Afghanistan is enhanced even though it may not be an oil- or gas-rich country. With the control of Afghanistan comes the control of the land routes between the Indian subcontinent and resource-rich Central Asia, as well as of a potential corridor to Iran and the Middle East. Thus, stability and peace in Afghanistan, and for that matter Pakistan, are a geostrategic imperative. Central Asia has never been a monolithic area and is undergoing a turbulent transitional process with a diverse range of ethnicities and fragmented societies throughout the region. These societal divisions and lack of political maturity compound the social, economic and political challenges. Security and economic issues are the two most important components of the Central Asian states’ engagement with outside powers. Among the states themselves there are elements of both cooperation and competition. Historical legacies, their geo-strategic locations, and above all their perceived national interests profoundly influence the political choices of Central Asian nations. The weaknesses of the new nations in Central Asia pave the way for outside powers to interfere in their internal affairs.

#### Asian economic decline reverberates and causes Asian wars

Auslin 17—Williams-Griffis Fellow in Contemporary Asia at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University [Michael R., 1/10/2017, “The end of the Asian Century: War, stagnation, and the risks to the world’s most dynamic region”, AEI, <http://www.aei.org/publication/the-end-of-the-asian-century-war-stagnation-and-the-risks-to-the-worlds-most-dynamic-region/>] AMarb

As this is being written, China’s economy has dramatically slowed, North Korea claims that it has a **hydrogen bomb** and is widely believed to be able to put **nuclear weapons** on top of ballistic missiles, **Thailand’s military** has launched its second coup in a decade, and Chinese newspapers warn that **war with America is “inevitable”** if Washington does not back down from opposing China’s territorial claims in the **S**outh **C**hina **S**ea. These are just some of the more visible dangers that perturb the Indo-Paciﬁc. We are on the cusp of a change in the global zeitgeist, from celebrating a **strong and growing Asia** to worrying about a **weak and dangerous Asia**. For all its undeniable successes and strengths, the broader Indo-Paciﬁc region faces signiﬁcant, potentially insurmountable challenges. The rest of us should worry because none of these problems threaten only Asia. Whether one cares about the Indo-Paciﬁc or not, **it is half of our world**. Today, one out of every three persons on earth is of Chinese or Indian descent, and the countries of the Indo-Paciﬁc account for nearly 60 percent of the world’s population. The World Bank estimates that the economies of Asia produce nearly **40 percent of total global output**, and they are central to everything from weaving textiles to crafting the most advanced electronic technology. The **militaries of Asia’s countries** have **grown dramatically**, and **China**, **India**, and **North Korea** are **nuclear powers**. Democracies jostle with authoritarian states as neighbors in the world’s most dynamic region. But the globalization that we continue to celebrate has its dark side as well. If an **economic or security crisis** erupted in Asia, it would **reverberate** around our **increasingly interconnected world**. Those **risks are festering**, some visible, others still hidden. The number one priority for the countries of the Asia-Paciﬁc, and the rest of the world, over the coming decade is managing and mitigating the risks that threaten the Asian Century. To properly conceive of these trends, one must imagine a “risk map” of Asia. Unlike a traditional geographic map, this map is a conceptual tool for identifying the most important trends in the region and assessing their risk. This book maps out five discrete yet interrelated risk regions. The first such region is the threat to Asia’s growth from the end of its economic miracle and the failure of reform. Thousands of headlines and dozens of books continue to proclaim the economic miracle as if it were destined to last forever. Yet dig beneath the headlines, and you find major problems, many of which national governments are failing to solve. From Japan to India, the nations of Asia **struggle to maintain growth**, balance their economies, and **fight slowdowns**. For most of these countries, the days of high-flying growth are long over, while for others, they never began. It is past time for the rest of the world to pay attention to the threats to Asia’s economic health. Uneven development, asset bubbles, malinvestment, labor issues, and state control over markets are just some of the features of economic risk in the Asia-Pacific. And because **Asian economies are increasingly interlinked**, **problems in one country spill over to others**.

### 2NC – JCPOA Impact

#### Russia-Iran ties are key to maintain JCPOA restrictions on Iran.

Elena Teslova 6/23, a Russian journalist and political commentator. She is an expert at the Analytical Center of the Russian Society of Political Scientists (RSPS), 6/23/2022, “Russia to seek restoration of Iran nuclear deal,” [https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/russia-to-seek-restoration-of-iran-nuclear-deal/2620780#](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/russia-to-seek-restoration-of-iran-nuclear-deal/2620780), RES

Moscow will persistently continue its efforts on restoration of the Iran nuclear deal, Russia's foreign minister said on Thursday. Speaking at a news conference in Tehran, Sergey Lavrov said there is no certainty that the US will return to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. "We will seek the restoration of the JCPOA exclusively in its original configuration, as it was approved in 2015 by the resolution of the UN Security Council without extrications, without additions," Lavrov said.

#### Prolif causes nuke war in the Middle East – draws in all Great Powers

Saab 18 - senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program (Bilal Y, “The coming Middle East missile arms race,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Sep 25 2018, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/the-coming-middle-east-missile-arms-race/>, jwg)

The main reason Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have yet to pursue ballistic missiles is that Washington has managed for years to convince them not to. The last thing the United States needs in the Middle East is an offensive missile race, which could quickly lead the antagonists into a deadly military confrontation that drags Washington and Moscow into war. Missiles are inherently destabilizing weapons because of their potential to quickly escalate conflicts. Their flight times can be very short, and new technologies are dramatically improving their accuracy and lethality.

As if that were not scary enough, the nuclear future of the Middle East is also increasingly uncertain, now that the United States has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the deal that limited Iran’s nuclear development in exchange for sanctions relief. At the same time, at least half a dozen regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar see peaceful nuclear energy as a long-term solution to their fossil-fuel dependence. The growth of nuclear power generation in the region could exacerbate the risk of nuclear proliferation, as the same technologies and materials are required to develop both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Should Middle East civilian nuclear development become militarized, possession of fleets of offensive missiles—arguably the most effective delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads—could magnify the potential danger.

Like Israel, some Gulf countries are heading toward a stronger deterrent posture—through a broader mix of offensive technologies, including missiles—because missile defense on its own does not seem to be the answer to the Iranian missile problem. Furthermore, missile defense is expensive and comes with its own set of challenges. While the best missile defense system would be one that is regionally integrated, any hope of establishing such a system in the Gulf is now gone because of the ongoing feud Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Bahrain are having with Qatar.

With US influence in the Gulf seemingly declining, it is unlikely that Washington’s preferences will register as strongly in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as they did in the past. To be sure, the drive for autonomy in national-security decision making has its limits, given the Gulf countries’ military dependence on Washington, but US weapons are not the only game in town, with both Russia and China making inroads into the region lately.

### 2NC – JCPOA Internal Link

#### Russia-Iran ties are key to maintain JCPOA restrictions on Iran

TASS ‘20, Russian News Agency, “Russia to continue efforts for preserving Iran nuclear deal - Foreign Ministry”, 9/20/20, https://tass.com/politics/1202789

MOSCOW, September 20. /TASS/. **Russia will continue efforts to ensure that the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear program remain in place and are implemented**, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement on Sunday. "The efforts on preserving and ensuring sustainable implementation of JCPOA will continue," the ministry emphasized. "**The UN Security Council Resolution 2231 remains unchanged and the commitments arising from it must be fulfilled in the initially agreed mode and volume on the basis of the reciprocity principle by all states**," it said. Moscow highlights that in August the UN Security Council’s members dismissed the US attempts to restore the UN’s anti-Iranian sanctions as void. In September, this stance was confirmed and Russia fully agrees with it, the Russian diplomats said.

#### Relations facilitate a JCPOA revival.

Maziar Motamedi 22, a Tehran-based journalist who covers Iran, 1/21/2022, “What next for Iran and Russia ties after Raisi-Putin meeting?,” <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/21/what-next-for-iran-and-russia-ties-after-raisi-putin-meeting>, RES

Nuclear deal The fate of the ongoing intensive talks in Vienna aimed at restoring Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal with world powers will still play a major role in the future of Iran’s ties with Russia. Russia, a signatory, has been actively trying to facilitate the revival of the landmark accord that the US unilaterally abandoned in 2018, and has been a mediating force between Iran, the European signatories and the US. “It is very important for me to know your opinion on the JCPOA,” Putin told Raisi on Wednesday, referring to the deal by its formal name, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. All sides have attested that some real progress has been achieved in recent weeks in the Austrian capital, but resolving outstanding political issues appears to hinge on concessions by both Iran and the US. “The Iranian nuclear issue has historically affected Russia-Iran relations but it has been variable in its impact across certain issues,” the Belfer Center’s Grajewski said. “The Vienna talks are a central aspect of the Russia-Iran relationship today. Moscow has historically adopted a constructive position on Iran’s nuclear programme even during low points of US-Russia relations after Ukraine.” However, Grajewski pointed out that if the talks fail because Iran refuses to tone down some of its demands, different aspects of the two countries’ relations could be affected.

### 2NC – Terror Impact

#### Russian-Iran ties are driven by US isolation – key to combat terror

Nicole Franiok ’20, is pursuing a Master of Public Policy in international security and economics at the University of Maryland. Currently, Nicole is a fellow at the Robertson Foundation for Government and an intern at the American Security Project. Her research interests include U.S.-Russia relations, the effects of hybrid warfare on the Baltic States, and Arctic security, “Defining The Russia-Iran Relationship”, American Security Project, 2/24/20, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/defining-the-russia-iran-relationship/

Abdolrasool Divsallar, senior fellow at the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, identifies common threat perception as a pillar of Iranian-Russian security convergence. He argues that “**both countries see their identity and stability as focal points threatened by the international order**.” A deeper Iran-Russia relationship can be expected to develop over common threats to stability such as: Sanctions The United States has imposed sanctions on Iran in various forms since 1979. On August 6, 2018, the U.S. re-imposed sanctions to target Iran’s nuclear program. **Russia**, too, **is a target of U.S. and Western sanctions**. In reaction to the annexation of Crimea, the U.S. and other Western countries imposed sanctions on Russia. The common threat of sanctions added a “justified reason” for Moscow to deepen economic ties to Tehran, according to Alireza Samoudi, Assistant Professor from Mofid University of Qom. **Samoudi also argues that “the** Ukraine crisis **convinced Moscow to improve its relations with the Middle Eastern states to prevent its international isolation.**” **Circumstances continue to encourage a strong Russia-Iran relationship, such as the unresolved Ukraine conflict and the escalation of US-Iran tensions.** Terrorism Vladimir **Putin said that “relations between Russia and Iran are multifaceted, multilateral” and that “this concerns the issues of stability in the region, our joint efforts to** combat terrorism**, including in Syria.”** Radical jihadi groups like ISIS, radical Sunni insurgents, and Wahhabi extremists pose a threat to internal stability in Syria, Iran, and Russia, respectively. In January 2015, Iran and Russia signed a military agreement to combat terrorism together. This agreement stipulates that the two countries will exchange military personnel for training purposes and the reciprocal use of port facilities for their naval forces.

#### Goes global

Ambassador Daniel Benjamin 19, director of the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College and served as coordinator for counterterrorism at the State Department 2009-2012, "What Trump’s Syria Debacle Means for ISIS," POLITICO Magazine, 10/18/2019, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/18/future-of-isis-trump-syria-turkey-kurds-229860, /\

Few, however, imagined that he might just give ISIS the enormous boost of the Syria debacle.

Just months after the last scraps of ISIS’ Caliphate were wrested from the organization, northern Syria has been plunged into chaos thanks to Trump’s abrupt removal of U.S. troops from the region. Trump, a man addicted to superlatives, can now safely boast of having squandered a hard-fought military victory faster than anyone in history. And with the Turkish military and its proxies, Syrian forces, Kurdish fighters and Russian troops converging, there is real danger that prisons holding 11,000 ISIS fighters will be breached.

According to U.S. officials, many of the Syrian Kurdish soldiers guarding the prisons have been departing either to fight the Turks or simply escape the onslaught, leaving minimal or no security. At some facilities detainees are rioting. Scattered reports have been received of escapes, with official estimates of those who’ve gotten out rising to more than 100. (Accounts of larger numbers of escapees have come from camps where families of fighters are being held.) Officials also worry that their ability to get news from the Kurdish SDF or Syrian Democratic Forces, fighters guarding the prisons is diminishing fast. As has been widely reported, the U.S. military was unable to relocate 50 “HVIs” (High Value Individuals), the most dangerous of the terrorists, in the chaos.

Although Vice President Mike Pence and his Turkish interlocutors agreed on a cessation of hostilities on Thursday, the agreement will probably have little effect on ISIS detainees. Kurdish spokesmen have already understandably derided the deal as part two of a U.S. sellout and presumably will continue to fight. The 13-point agreement has no bearing on Syrian forces who are moving to retake control of the Kurdish region. And it commits Turkey to anti-ISIS “activities in northeast Syria” and “coordination on detention facilities,” but it is anyone’s guess what that will mean.

Exactly what the various parties have planned for dealing with ISIS detainees or fighters in the field is hard to say. For the Turks, jihadi fighters are a low priority compared with the Kurds, who they depict as a profound long-term threat to Turkish security. President Recep Tayyib Erdogan deserves no small amount of credit for the rise of ISIS: His policy of allowing foreign fighters to transit Turkey en route to Syria, over the objections of innumerable allies and partners, enabled ISIS to enlist some 20,000 outsiders to the conflict in the Levant. Erdogan, another paragon of bad judgment, had hoped these fighters would topple the regime of Syrian leader Bashar Assad.

For his part, Assad also has a history of neglecting—and manipulating—the jihadists. For years, his government quietly encouraged jihadis to travel to Iraq to harass U.S. forces and the post-Saddam, U.S.-backed government. Through most of the Syrian Civil War, the Syrian regime— with backing from Russia—concentrated its fire on other regime opponents rather than the ISIS fighters who built the cross-border caliphate. U.S. officials take some hope that Russia will press their Syrian partners to keep ISIS militants—and especially foreign fighters—locked up. None of these actors is known for a commitment to civil rights, to put it mildly, so bombing the prisons or otherwise attacking the prisoners also can’t be ruled out. If, that is, ISIS fighters on the outside don’t break their comrades out first, a tactic in which the group is well-practiced.

How much of a difference would this kind of replenishment to ISIS’ ranks make? Although Trump recently tweeted that the group is “100% defeated,” that is not the case. In Syria, Carter Center reporting shows ISIS still carrying out numerous attacks each month. The same is true in Iraq, where the group has embraced a strategy of hit-and-run attacks to demonstrate its resilience. United Nations reporting has put the total number of ISIS fighters in the field at 20,000 to 30,000. That number may be high, and it is unlikely that the group could start holding significant territory in Iraq as long as there are some 5,000 U.S. troops in Iraq with air power to back them, but the scope for trouble is considerable—and all the more so with civil unrest elsewhere in Iraq, distracting the country’s leadership. In Syria, for now, fighting among the various militaries will likely prevent any new ISIS statelet from reemerging, but for the longer term, nothing is certain.

The potential for ISIS carrying out terrorist attacks elsewhere is also noteworthy. Of the detainees in Syria, 2,000 are foreign fighters representing some 40 countries. While some of these might be reluctant to return to the fight after the ordeal they’ve been through, Gen. Joe Votel, then commander of Central Command, testified in Congress in March that plenty of the “ISIS population being evacuated from the remaining vestiges of the caliphate largely remains unrepentant, unbroken and radicalized.” Intelligence services in Europe, North Africa and elsewhere will be looking hard for returnees, but borders are hardly airtight. Although ISIS’ principal focus is on the area that was home to the Caliphate, the group will want to continue to score points by carrying out violence wherever it can to demonstrate its vitality.

Numbers of militants are one measure of a terrorist group’s strength, but morale matters as well, and the Trump drawdown in Syria is a godsend for ISIS’ spirits. It’s not just that fighters in the field and supporters around the globe will be heartened by the possible return of the detainees; it’s also confirmation of the stories that jihadists tell themselves about their struggle.

At the heart of the ISIS narrative is the belief that its struggle is a long one, filled with tribulations its members must endure but also with occasional triumphs. The fact that the U.S. is abandoning Syria so shortly after the destruction of the Caliphate will resonate with the faithful as a sign of divine support. ISIS’ story is already one of comebacks, especially after the devastation the group suffered beginning in 2006, and the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, its first leader. ISIS leadership speaks of the establishment of the Caliphate as a historic achievement coming out of those ruins, and ISIS communications, though not nearly as voluminous as they were, aim to create a nostalgia for the Caliphate. Recalling that historic achievement helps keep ISIS at the forefront of its followers consciousness and aims to entice others into the fold. Just as the Prophet Mohammed faced setbacks, the propaganda claims, so do ISIS fighters, but this quick a revival will be received a portent of great things to come. Al Qaida tried a similar approach after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, likening its followers to the companions of the Prophet who endured terrible defeats, but it never benefited from the broad-based popularity of ISIS or the kind of turnaround seen in Syria. Like all jihadist groups, ISIS also has entwined in its ideological DNA the notion that the U.S. is ultimately a paper tiger. Osama Bin Laden made this argument from the earliest days of al Qaida, claiming that President Ronald Reagan’s retreat from Lebanon in the early 1980s and the pullout from Somalia after the Black Hawk Down episode were indicative. After the pounding al Qaida took in Afghanistan beginning in 2001 and the methodical dismantlement of the Caliphate, that narrative has been in eclipse. Given events in Syria and Trump’s naked eagerness to escape from Afghanistan, expect it to come roaring back.

Departing Syria will hurt global security—and the U.S. in particular—in still other ways. In the first instance, the rekindling of war in Syria will inevitably increase the production of new extremists. War may be the father of all things, but it especially prolific in producing militants. The U.S. has, until now, been remarkably effective at dispatching specific terrorist foes who aim to do us imminent harm. But after two decades of war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Yemen and the north Caucasus, the number of jihadists in the world is widely believed to be at least four or five times the number that who were operating on 9/11. So the pool of extremists who may want to harm America tomorrow is steadily growing.

#### And nuclear

William J. Perry 15, previously Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, "William J. Perry on nuclear war and nuclear terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12-8-2015, https://thebulletin.org/2015/12/william-j-perry-on-nuclear-war-and-nuclear-terrorism/, /\

ISIS. Finally, today we are witnessing ISIS undertaking terror on a grand scale, not only in the Mideast but in Europe. No one should doubt that ISIS would expand their terrorism with nuclear attacks if they had access to these weapons. Given the huge store of fissile material in the world, some of it still not well secured, making an improvised nuclear bomb could be within their reach. So a nuclear terror attack is my fifth nuclear nightmare. These five nuclear nightmares add up to a danger to our people that is greater in some ways than the nuclear dangers we faced during the Cold War. But most Americans—especially our youth—are blissfully unaware of those dangers.

### 2NC – Terror Internal Link

#### Cooperation drives counterterror efforts.

Maziar Motamedi 22, a Tehran-based journalist who covers Iran, 1/21/2022, “What next for Iran and Russia ties after Raisi-Putin meeting?,” <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/21/what-next-for-iran-and-russia-ties-after-raisi-putin-meeting>, RES

Regional cooperation Observers say Iran and Russia have shared interests across the region that will be maintained or improved regardless of others factors, such as the Vienna talks – something that was also apparent in the two presidents’ meeting. Both Raisi and Putin praised “successful” joint efforts in Syria, where the two countries support President Bashar al-Assad in the country’s 10-year war. They agreed that “combating terrorism” in Syria is a shared goal. Iran and Russia have a shared concern about the fate of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan after the chaotic US exit in August. Both have been active in organising talks to find solutions on a number of issues.Along with China, Iran and Russia have repeatedly denounced US “unilateralism”. And Moscow and Beijing recently supported Tehran’s successful bid to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Putin on Wednesday also expressed his support for Iran to gain a larger foothold in the Eurasian Economic Union, and said both sides are working to create a free-trade zone. Lastly, Russia has been vocal about its interests in being increasingly engaged in mediating efforts on Persian Gulf and regional security. On Friday, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia wants to organise a conference to resolve regional issues through dialogue. Lavrov described it as “a conference that would bring Iranians and Arabs together where Iran would not be the subject of discussion and where each side would lay their concerns on the table” and would address issues with Yemen, Syria and Iraq as well.

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – UQ

#### Russia Iran relations decreasing now

Fathollah-Nejad 22 (Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad is an Associate Fellow and the author of the Iran in Focus brief at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut (AUB), March 21, 2022, “Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the nature of Iranian-Russian relations”, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-invasion-ukraine-and-nature-iranian-russian-relations)

However, the Islamic Republic’s pro-Kremlin narrative has not remained unchallenged. There have been important cracks even with some major media outlets and especially so across Iranian society. Those seeking to bring forth counter-narratives, however, face daunting obstacles. Russian tutelage over Iranian media reporting — a demonstration of neo-colonialism After the Russian embassy in Tehran condemned a report by the Tasnim News Agency — which, curiously, is affiliated with the pro-Moscow IRGC — as “fake news” for characterizing Putin’s operation in Ukraine as an “invasion,” the report was taken offline and replaced with one that closely mirrors the Kremlin’s official wording. In another instance, the embassy lashed out against an Iranian reformist daily that criticized Russia for threatening to derail the JCPOA negotiations. Later, on March 9, Russia’s ambassador to Tehran held a press conference urging Iranian media not to use the terms “war” or “invasion” in their coverage, a blatant interference in Iranian domestic affairs that has stoked anger in the country. These cases bring to mind similar interventions by China’s embassy in Iran against unfavorable media reporting and official statements, most recently about China’s alleged stationing of security forces in Iran to protect its investment interests. Earlier, in the pandemic’s first year, the Chinese embassy had stepped in to silence skeptics of Beijing’s official COVID-19 statistics. Such interference by ambassadors from both non-Western great powers into Iran’s domestic affairs reflects the nature of Tehran’s relations with Russia and China, upon which Iran’s entire “look to the East” geopolitical strategy depends. A yawning power gap results in chronic Iranian weakness and dependency, raising the specter of a neo-feudal arrangement whereby Tehran’s leadership follows the diktats of their masters in Moscow and Beijing. However, Russia’s newfound pariah status may improve Iran’s standing in bilateral ties, but only if Tehran plays its cards carefully and doesn’t degenerate into a power that simply follows Putin’s whims. At its core, Iran’s “look East” policy has as its goal not only economic development and political support against Western pressure, but the very survival of a regime whose domestic support has been hollowed out. Moscow and Beijing hold up this teetering regime from the outside. Hence, the Islamic Republic finds itself granting concessions to Russian or Chinese interests, and sometimes even trying to anticipate their apparent desires. In this context, fears associated with Iran’s already signed 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with China are mirrored by those over the planned 20-year deal with Russia. Both long-term agreements, which are branded as “strategic,” lack transparency and have therefore stoked wild speculation. Theories abound that the Islamic Republic’s leadership is potentially selling out the country only to cement its own power amid unprecedented domestic and international pressures with the help of these non-Western great powers and their U.N. Security Council vetoes. As a core pillar of the deal with Russia, which Iran’s foreign ministry said last December was “almost finalized,” Moscow will reportedly protect Tehran’s interests at the U.N. Security Council and with the JCPOA, and finally provide it with advanced military hardware (such as the S-400 missile defense system and Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets) in exchange for Russia obtaining favorable deals on Iran’s oil and gas fields. Coinciding with this 20-year agreement is another reported deal between the two countries from last fall, granting Russian companies the largest share in the recently discovered giant Chalous gas field in Iran’s Caspian Sea territory (followed by Chinese companies and only then Iranian ones, more concretely those affiliated with the IRGC). For Russia, Iran has been a true trump card, enabling it to leverage the “Iranian threat” vis-à-vis the West while also benefitting economically from ties with Tehran, including re-energizing its nuclear industry through its prominent role in Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, if Iran normalizes relations with the West, that would likely sharply curtail Russia’s influence. In other words, a Western-oriented Iran would constitute a larger threat to Moscow’s interests than a “nuclear Iran.” Societal and geopolitical concerns The nature and possible ramifications of Iran’s relationship with Russia are hotly debated across Iranian society. Iranian fears emerge from the unevenness of bilateral ties and the perceived disconnect between national and regime interests vis-à-vis Russia — or China for that matter. These concerns about Russia are rooted in both history and geopolitical realities. The bitter memories of the 1908 bombardment of Iran’s parliament by the Russia-led Persian Cossack Brigade meant to torpedo the Constitutional Revolution as well as the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion linger in the collective consciousness as a reminder of the Kremlin’s willingness to run roughshod over Iran in pursuit of its interests. Moreover, some elements of Iran’s foreign policy community see Russia as flip-flopping when it comes to the perennial conflict between Iran and the West. For them, Moscow is an opportunistic actor focused solely on achieving its own aims, even if it means contradicting official rhetoric that lambasts the U.S. and the West, including its propensity to keep the flame of the Iran-West conflict alive as a means to maximize Moscow’s standing in that conflictual triangular relationship. Among other things, Russia is accused of breaking arms supply contracts, sabotaging the JCPOA process, and maintaining close ties with Iran’s regional foes (Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia). Furthermore, there are also broader concerns within society over the long-term alliance the Iranian regime hopes to forge with the like-minded autocracies of Russia and China. Although sparsely attended, anti-war protests in front of the Ukrainian embassy in Tehran, complete with chants of marg bar Putin (“death to Putin”), illustrate the anti-Moscow sentiment. Such reservations about Russia also pertain to China. Yet there is no organized opposition to the regime’s deepening of ties with either. The interests of the regime and those of Iranian society clash over Russia. While the former sees Russia as a formidable military-security guarantor of its stability and survival, the latter sees in such support a looming threat to democratic aspirations. Pro-democracy Iranians fear that Moscow could boost their country’s repressive apparatus, and potentially even deploy its military if popular protests ever were to imperil the regime — as witnessed in both Syria and Kazakhstan. The relationship between the Russian and Iranian regimes is also strengthened by their parallels: Both are petro-states with mafia-style ruling classes helmed by all-powerful autocrats unafraid of using a heavy hand and guided by their nostalgia for the glory days of empires past.

#### Relations are impossible---centuries of bad blood.

Michael Rubin 21, Senior Fellow at AEI, 12/2/2021, “Why the Russia-Iran Alliance Will Backfire,” <https://www.aei.org/articles/why-the-russia-iran-alliance-will-backfire/>, RES

For all its talk of leading a “resistance front,” the Islamic Republic of Iran has historically had few allies. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led his revolutionaries, “Neither East nor West but Islamic Republic” was a foundational slogan of the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini also described the United States and Russia as being “two blades of the same scissors.”[1] He meant it: While the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran symbolized the Islamic Republic’s hostility toward the United States and its European allies, Khomeini was equally distrustful of the Soviet Union and its eastern bloc satellites. Iran’s isolation was cemented when every Arab state with the exception of Syria sided with Iraq during their 1980-88 war. Tehran’s ties with Damascus have remained tight, but Syria’s influence is limited inside the Middle East and its diplomatic weight is nonexistent outside it. The Iranian authorities sought to cultivate African states and were able to purchase the occasional vote on an international body, but Tehran’s declining resources limited its success. Today, that isolation is over. Whereas Khomeini was wary lest Moscow take advantage of Iran’s vulnerability, Ali Khamenei, who succeeded him in 1989, took the risk to align with Russia in pursuit of a broader, anti-U.S. agenda. In this, he found success. But, the question for Iranians is, at what cost? Distrust Centuries in the Making Iranian leaders were aware of Russia by the fifteenth century as many European traders, seeking to bypass the Ottoman Empire on their overland journeys into Asia, traveled to Persia via Moscow.[2] Iranians worried little about their distant neighbors to the north: they viewed Russians as illiterate and cultureless peasants and worried more about Uzbeks and the independent khanates of the Central Asian steppes, which occasionally raided into Iran. The Russians were equally uninterested in the Persians. Russian tsar Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) withdrew Russian troops from the Caspian coast, believing Iranian forces posed little threat. Such neglect would be short-lived. In 1796, Catherine the Great (r. 1762-96) sent a 50,000-strong force into the North Caucasus, which at that time was part of Iran. Her death gave Iran a reprieve and saved it from what might have been a far greater conquest. As the Russians conquered more territory in Asia, British leaders grew increasingly concerned about the security of India and, by extension, Iran, which had become the only power separating Russia from India. It was this fear that led London to first dispatch an ambassador to the shah’s court in 1800. Both the Russians and the French soon followed suit. It was not long before disputes between Moscow and Tehran resumed. Between 1804 and 1813, Iranian and Russian forces fought repeatedly in the Caucasus. The campaigns drained the shah’s treasury and, in the end, the Russians forced him to cede much of what today is the Republic of Azerbaijan and eastern Georgia. Resentment simmered, and in 1826, the Iranians attacked Russia to regain what the shah had lost. The gamble failed and, in the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchai, the shah ceded much of Armenia. For Iranians, these were not some peripheral territories but rather part of the heartland and the territory over which the crown prince would serve as governor. In 1829, an Iranian mob sacked the Russian embassy in Tehran, slaughtering its thirty-seven Russian diplomats.[3] Russia became a favorite bogeyman for both nationalists and clergy, and Russians in Iran suffered occasional mob violence over subsequent decades.[4] Still, the Russian government saw commerce as a source of influence and encouraged businessmen to move to Iran. Russian leaders, like their British competitors, also sought to further their leverage with debt traps: Both powers would tempt the shah with loans to fund his profligate lifestyle but then call in their extortionate terms, the expense of which the shah would often pass to his subjects. This led to a pattern in which the Russian rulers often successfully wooed the shah while Iranian public opinion continued to harden against them. The Twentieth-century Unrest The twentieth century’s first decade was a time of upheaval in both Russia and Iran. First, the Japanese defeated Russia in war, ending Moscow’s image of invincibility. Then, first in St. Petersburg and then across Iran, revolutionaries successfully won parliamentary constraints on monarchies. In Iran, Muzaffar ad-Din Shah conceded to a constitution just five days before his death. His successor, Mohammed Ali Shah, was unhappy to see what he believed to be his birthright diluted before he could even take power. He quickly turned to Russia where Tsar Nicholas II also sought to preserve his traditional powers. As the shah worked to consolidate power and roll back reforms, the Russian government worked to cement its position in Iran. Mohammed Ali Shah continued the practice of tax farming and office selling, so Russian officials used their resources to ensure pro-Russian candidates won advantageous positions, much to the chagrin of more liberal Iranian nationalists in Tehran’s new parliament.[5] The 1907 Anglo-Russian convention divided Iran into spheres of British and Russian influence. An editorial cartoon of the time depicts the Russian bear sitting on Persia while the English lion looks on. The Russians were blatant in their disrespect of Iranian sovereignty. On August 31, 1907, they shocked Tehran when they, alongside their British competitors, unveiled the Anglo-Russian convention, which effectively divided Iran into spheres of influence. While Iranians remained angry at both parties for the affront, Britain’s main strategic interest at the time was its telegraph lines across southern Iran, and so it ceded most major Iranian population centers to Russian control. Here, the Russians chafed the population more, using proxies and pressure to force closure of Iran’s nascent civil society groups and secret societies and to impose broader censorship on Iran’s exploding newspaper scene. Even the affront of Russia’s secret agreement to divide Iran into different spheres did not break Mohammed Ali Shah’s tilt toward Russia. His ambitions were too great and so, in December 1907, he made his move against the Iranian Constitutionalists. His guards—and a detachment of Russian-trained Persian Cossacks—surrounded the parliament. Parliament’s supporters resisted and soon Iran was on the brink of civil war. As far as most Iranians were concerned, there were two sides: nationalists and Russian-backed Iranian autocrats. That perception largely remains unchanged today. Fighting erupted in July 1909 and, within two weeks, it was over. The shah and his retinue fled first to the Russian embassy and then to Russia itself. The nationalists put Ahmad, the shah’s 12-year-old son, on the throne. Still, Mohammed Ali Shah did not give up. Two years later and, again with Russian support, he invaded Iran from the north. He failed, but the episode cemented Russia’s reputation inside Iran as hostile to Iranian sovereignty. During World War I, Russian forces drove south from the Caspian Sea reaching as far south as Qom. By 1917, British and Russian forces had occupied most of Iran, leaving Mohammed Ali Shah as a titular leader. Grievance went beyond bruised pride. During World War I, Iran lost more than 20 percent of its population to disease, famine, and violence. The Soviets refused to leave Iranian territory following World War II and supported Kurdish separatism in Iran during the Cold War. The Bolshevik Revolution did not change the uneven power dynamic. In 1921, the Soviet authorities imposed a new treaty on Iran in which Moscow renounced earlier agreements and forgave Russian loans but also reserved the right to intervene should Iran host forces intent on interfering in the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities interpreted this literally and, within weeks, Moscow demanded that Tehran expel all Germans. Joseph Stalin would repeatedly cite the treaty to justify Soviet ultimatums. Indeed, Stalin used the 1921 Treaty to justify invading Iran two decades later. The Soviets were not alone in this—British and subsequently U.S. forces took part—but the Red Army was alone in refusing to leave Iranian territory when World War II ended. Not only did Iranian Azerbaijan become the focal point of the first Cold War crisis, but Moscow also sought to encourage and support Kurdish separatism in the Mahabad Republic in northwestern Iran. This was high among the reasons why Tehran tripled its defense budget in the next decade and joined the Baghdad Pact.[6] The direct military threat the Iranians felt from across their 1,100-mile border with the Soviet Union loomed large in public consciousness through the remainder of the Cold War. This is why, even as Ayatollah Khomeini railed against “The Great Satan” America during the 1979 Islamic Revolution, his suspicions and those of his followers remained just as deep toward the Soviet Union.[7] Reconsidering Russia While Khomeini did not waiver on his connection to Russia throughout the Iran-Iraq war despite the isolation Tehran faced, toward the end of his life, he signaled Iran’s need not to treat the Soviet Union with the same enmity as the regime did the United States. In May 2009, Hassan Rouhani, at the time a former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and a member of the Assembly of Experts, spoke at a roundtable on “Iran, Russia, and the West.”[8] While critical of Moscow’s posture toward Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution, he suggested then-parliamentary speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s 1989 visit to Moscow had laid the foundation for a new partnership.[9] Ali Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor as supreme leader, continued Tehran’s quiet outreach justified on shared enmity with the Russians toward Washington and on economic opportunism. Some Iranians raised questions about inherent ideological compromise, but regime officials tried to explain this away. In 2012, for example, a website affiliated with the supreme leader denied any parallels between the Palestinian plight and Muslim minorities in Russia or China. The difference, it said, was that Israel was alone in having “confiscated” Palestinian lands.[10] Other outlets acknowledged the problem but assured critics that Tehran continued to provide “emotional support” for the Chechens.[11] That same year, however, Rafsanjani—by then a senior statesman—threw cold water on the comfort some Iranian officials felt about their anti-U.S. alliance with Russia even if he was credited with its revival. In an interview, he noted the constraints Russia felt from U.S. pressure and acknowledged, “Like Western countries, Russia is also concerned about Iran becoming a power by acquiring nuclear weapons.”[12] As president, however, Rouhani disagreed, arguing both that the growing U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and the Caucasus and U.S. human rights advocacy provoked Russia enough to cause it to put other concerns aside.[13] Other officials were less sure. In 2014, Behrouz Nemati, a conservative who represents Tehran in parliament, said that the history of Russo-Iranian relations demonstrates a tendency toward Russian subterfuge and warned Iranian leaders to be careful “shaking Russia’s hand.”[14] Russian soldiers stand watch over Afghans during the Soviet invasion, December 1979. Former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani claimed that the invasion “left a bad memory of Russians in Iranians’ minds.” In contrast to Rouhani, Rafsanjani suggested that Afghanistan remained a source of distrust between Tehran and Moscow rather than a catalyst for tighter ties. “The Soviet Union’s record on invading Afghanistan left a bad memory of Russians in Iranians’ minds,” he explained. “It is too often overlooked that the Islamic Republic’s relationship with Russia was formed in such an environment.”[15] Sadegh Kharrazi, Iran’s former ambassador to France, also cast doubt on a Russian gamble. “Historically, there is a national distrust in Iranians’ nature against Russia. We haven’t been harmed by Americans like we have been by Russians,” he argued.[16] This appears to be a common attitude among some senior Iranian diplomats. Ali Khorram, a former Iranian ambassador to China, wrote that Russia was not trustworthy. “The Russians are good to Iran as long as it is in their interest,” he explained, but “as soon as Americans and Western countries [court Russia], [the Russians] will turn their back to their commitments to the Islamic Republic of Iran. … History has shown whenever we have relied on them [Russians], they have immediately abandoned us,” he added.[17] One Iranian diplomat argued, “The Russians are good to Iran as long as it is in their interest.” While Khamenei and later Rouhani may have been eager for ties to Moscow, Russia’s historical baggage in Iran continued to intrude. Both countries supported the same side in the Syrian civil war, and yet, when a Russian ship launched cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea into Syria that overflew Iranian territory, even sympathetic Iranians such as senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reacted with outrage.[18] Other Russian actions have antagonized ordinary Iranians. After Moscow provided its Iranian counterpart with technology to jam Persian-language broadcasts from diaspora stations, ordinary Iranians reacted with vitriol. Internet commentary submitted to the conservative daily Asr-e Iran webpage on the story included comments such as, “May God give Russia Death,” “Russia is the biggest jerk,” and “the Russian embassy is a nest of spies.”[19] Outside the constraints of the official press, Iranian bloggers let loose, questioning the value of alignment with a declining economic power and the stability of any alliance with Russia.[20] An Iranian doctoral student in Moscow, meanwhile, observed—correctly—that the Kremlin always acted in its own national interest, but Iranian proponents of the alliance somehow expected the Russians to act in Tehran’s national interest instead.[21] Can Trade Overcome Distrust? While Washington and its Middle Eastern allies may worry primarily about Russia-Iran military ties, the trade relationship between the two countries could potentially be broader. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia entered a deep, multi-year recession. At the time, Tehran was already heavily sanctioned and, after a series of executive orders issued by President Bill Clinton, soon became more so. Both Tehran and Moscow, however, found an outlet in the other. In 1995, for example, Russia’s Atomstroyexport became the chief contractor for the Bushehr nuclear program at a time when few countries wanted Russian nuclear assistance given the stigma of the Chernobyl disaster, and Iranian contracts were toxic for Western firms. Still, initial optimism in Tehran that Russian trade might salvage Iran’s economy quickly faded. In 2012, Rafsanjani explained, In the past quarter century … Iran and Russia have never been able to set and create a visible trade partnership. The most important commodity [oil] that Iran has to offer other countries is not attractive to the Russians, and many Russians commodities and technologies have always been the lowest priority for the Iranian side.[22] Russian exports to Iran decreased by nearly two thirds, from $3.4 billion to $1.2 billion, between 2010 and 2013, while Iranian exports to Russia grew only modestly and remained under $500 million.[23] Nor did either country’s non-military trade with the other increase appreciably over the next decade.[24] Even the arms trade did not fully reassure those in the Iranian government unsure about whether to trust Moscow. In 2007, Tehran agreed to purchase the S-300 system for $800 million. Prior to the development of the S-400, the S-300 was still Russia’s premier anti-aircraft missile system, and so the announcement of the deal was a high stakes affair. Soon, however, Iranians who expressed doubt about Russia’s reliability felt vindicated: Moscow suspended the sale under international pressure. The dispute carried on for another eight years with the Iranian government demanding a $4 billion breach of contract penalty against Russia’s Rosoboronexport. And while Tehran dropped the suit in 2015 when Rosoboronexport finally delivered the hardware, cynicism and doubt remained.[25] Shortly after the signing of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), Moscow agreed to license the manufacture of Russian tanks inside Iran. Russia and Iran also now hold joint military exercises. Ironically, it was the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), President Barack Obama’s signature Iran nuclear deal, that breathed new life into the Russia-Iran arms trade. In order to reach agreement, Obama agreed not only to end prohibitions on Iran’s military trade but also to provide a windfall for Tehran in terms of sanctions relief and enabling foreign investment. It was not long, for example, before Moscow agreed to license the manufacture of Russian tanks inside Iran.[26] The two countries likewise appear to be cooperating in the cyber sphere with drones, and, despite Russian president Vladimir Putin’s denials, with satellites as well.[27] That appears to be the tip of the iceberg.[28] Russia and Iran also increasingly hold joint military exercises, sometimes with Chinese participation.[29] The IRGC also frequently participates in Russia’s annual military games.[30] Will the Russian-Iranian Alliance Last? For Khamenei, hatred of the United States trumps animosity toward Russia. In November 2015, he visited Moscow for the first time in more than a decade, nominally to attend a summit for gas-exporting countries. After a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Khamenei declared, “America’s long-term scheme for the region is detrimental to all nations and countries, particularly Iran and Russia, and it should be thwarted through vigilance and closer interaction.” He praised Putin for “neutralizing [Washington’s] policy.” Putin was also affable. “We regard you as a trustworthy and reliable ally in the region and the world,” he told Khamenei.[31] Putin also looks to the future; he was the first world leader to call Ebrahim Raisi upon his win in the June 2021 presidential elections, a victory that many observers believe confirm his frontrunner status to replace Khamenei upon the aging supreme leader’s death.[32] For Khamenei, hatred of the United States trumps animosity toward Russia. Still, centuries of Iranian distrust and hostility do not easily dissipate. Perhaps this is why, in June 2021, the Russian and Iranian foreign ministries agreed to waive visas.[33] Few countries allow Iranians such access, and the decline of the Iranian rial makes it increasingly expensive for those that do. But a desire to bolster tourism may not be the only basis for the agreement. There is likely hope at a more senior level that enabling Iranians and Russians to meet and mix might breakdown the hostility that overshadows Iranian public opinion of Russia and its aims. While the JCPOA helped reinforce Khamenei’s flailing attempt to build a Russia-Iran strategic alliance, the drive by both Tehran and Moscow’s dictatorial regimes to cement an anti-U.S. alliance will backfire. Decades of official Islamic Republic hostility to the United States have not eroded and, indeed, likely may have encouraged a general friendliness by the Iranian public toward America. To try to push Russia upon the public will likely accelerate that trend while Moscow’s close association with an increasingly unpopular Khamenei and Raisi will reinforce Iranian public hostility toward Russia for decades to come. The nature of dictatorship, however, means that in the short term, such sentiments will not affect policy as both Tehran and Moscow work to erode the post-World War II liberal order and U.S. dominance on the regional and global stage.

#### Iran-Russia relations low – nuclear deal

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After nearly a year of painstaking negotiations, Iran and world powers were on the brink of agreeing to restore the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. But last-minute demands from Russia, one of the parties to the deal, have threatened to derail efforts to revive an agreement that curbed Tehran’s nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions. Moscow has demanded guarantees from Washington that Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine will not affect its trade and military cooperation with Tehran. The United States has described Russia's new demands as "irrelevant." France, another signatory of the original deal, warned they could dash hopes for a revived nuclear accord. Moscow’ actions have been met with surprise and anger in Tehran. Iran’s foreign minister told lawmakers on March 7, without naming Russia, that Tehran would not let its interests be undermined by “foreign elements.” Experts warn that Russia’s demands could complicate and ultimately scuttle the already fraught negotiations between Iran and world powers. If the talks collapse, Iran could further advance its sensitive nuclear activities. It could also lead to Western countries further tightening sanctions against Tehran. Observers say Iran and world powers could sideline Russia from the negotiations, although it is unclear whether Tehran would be willing to risk jeopardizing its relationship with Moscow, an ally. Iran and world powers have been holding negotiations in Vienna since April 2021, with the United States taking part indirectly. In 2018, then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew Washington from the deal. Tehran responded by gradually exceeding the limits imposed by the pact on its nuclear activities. U.S. President Joe Biden has said he is willing to rejoin the pact if Iran return to full compliance. 'Stabbed In The Back' Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, says that by inserting the war in Ukraine into the complicated nuclear negotiations, Russia appears to be determined to upend the talks and take Iran down with it. He suggested that Russia appears no longer to be interested in reviving the nuclear deal, which would allay Western concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities and allow Tehran to sell its oil. And that could bring global oil prices down. “Neither Iran's return to the oil market nor the peaceful resolution of a Western security concern in the Middle East benefits the Kremlin,” Vaez told RFE/RL. “The leadership in Tehran is waking up to the reality that you often get stabbed in the back by those you believed to have your back.” 'Tank The Talks' Analysts say the scope of Russia’s demands will determine whether they complicate or scuttle the negotiations entirely. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on March 5 said that Moscow wanted written guarantees that sanctions ‘‘launched by the U.S. will not in any way harm our right to free, fully fledged trade and economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with Iran.” Russia’s new demands coincided with mounting international pressure on Moscow over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24, a move that has resulted in unprecedented Western sanctions. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken dismissed Russia’s demands on March 6, saying U.S. sanctions that are “being put in place and that have been put in place on Russia have nothing to do with the Iran nuclear deal.” “If it is simply exemptions that allow Russia to help Iran meet its nuclear obligations in the deal, that is one thing,” Eric Brewer, a senior director at Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a Washington-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “But Lavrov's comments suggest Russia is after something much bigger. I don't see the United States giving Russia that type of sanctions relief, even if it endangers a revival of the [nuclear deal],” he added. Brewer says the United States and Russia have been able to cooperate on shared nonproliferation interests in the past, even when tensions have been high. But he says it is possible that Russia’s recent demands "tank the talks." 'Critical Decision' Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University, says Russia’s demands have forced Iran to make a difficult choice: to stick by Russia and incur the diplomatic and economic costs of the talks collapsing or to ditch Moscow and endanger its ties with an ally. “Iran would have to decide how important an agreement is to its national interest, and whether it will allow talks it has invested so much in and built its economic and foreign policies around [to] be taken hostage by Russia,” Nasr, who served as a senior adviser to the Obama administration, told RFE/RL. “It will be a critical decision for Tehran.” Nasr suggested that sidelining Russia was possible. “The nuclear side of things is in Iran’s hand. The sanctions are in the hands of the U.S. and Europe. Russia's only leverage is to prevent a deal,” Nasr said. Brewer says the other parties to the deal would have to find ways to replace Russia’s technical role under the deal, including removing excess enriched uranium from Iran. “Given enough time, you could probably come up with some workarounds for other parties to take Russia's place on these technical areas,” he says. "But it won't be easy, and time is in short supply. "At a practical level, it would be incredibly challenging to reimplement the deal if Russia, the United States, and Europe are not in alignment on the [nuclear deal] and if Russia is actively trying to play the role of spoiler.”

### 2AC – Ukraine Thumper

#### Russia is moving away from Syria to Ukraine now---the impact is inevitable.

Dr. Hamdan Al-Shehri 6/4, a political analyst and international relations scholar, 6/4/2022, “Russia’s Syria withdrawal a boon for Iran’s regional project,” <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2096641>, RES

The echoes of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which is less than four months old, have reached our region. Our talk is not about units or militias affiliated with Tehran joining the fight there. Rather, we are talking about geopolitics, as well as the void we have begun to notice as a result of the gradual military retreat and withdrawal of Russia from Syria, with the Iranian presence filling this void. Russia moved into the region in the shadow of the American withdrawal as it sought to achieve its interests. This led to Moscow improving its trade and investment balance, besides using the port of Tartus and playing an important role in the Middle East. Russia’s military presence in Syria — to support the Damascus regime — was considered a counterbalance and check on Iran, even though it is an ally of the Iranians there. Its presence has also become a reason for the regional acceptance of the spread of Iran’s militias in Syria. However, the theory of the foreign balance inside Syria is on the verge of disruption. In recent weeks, there have been reports of Russian troops leaving, possibly to the front line in Ukraine. We will likely see further Russian withdrawals, creating more space for the Iranians. The Russian withdrawal from Syria could end up as a repeat of America’s withdrawal from Iraq. This might mean the Iraqi scenario — with its sectarian war, demographic changes, armed terrorist militias, killings and displacement — is replicated in Syria.

#### Ukraine war destroys Russia and Iran relations

Emil **Avdaliani,** 5-13-20**22**, "Iran Gives Russia Two and a Half Cheers," CEPA, https://cepa.org/iran-gives-russia-two-and-a-half-cheers/

For Iran, the invasion of Ukraine is closely related to the very essence of the present world order. Much like Russia, Iran has been voicing its discontent at the way the international system has operated since the end of the Cold War. More broadly, Iran and Russia see the world through strikingly similar lenses. Both keenly anticipate the end of the multipolar world and the end of the West’s geopolitical preponderance. Iran had its reasons to think this way. The US unipolar moment after 1991 provoked a deep fear of imminent encirclement, with American bases in Afghanistan and Iraq cited as evidence. Like Russia, the Islamic Republic views itself as a separate civilization that needs to be not only acknowledged by outside players, but also to be given ana suitable geopolitical space to project influence. Both Russia and Iran are very clear about their respective spheres of influence. For Russia, it is the territories that once constituted the Soviet empire. For Iran, it is the contiguous states reaching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean — Iraq, Syria, Lebanon — plus Yemen. When the two former imperial powers have overlapping strategic interests such as, for instance, in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, they apply the concept of regionalism. This implies the blocking out of non-regional powers from exercising outsize economic and military influence, and mostly revolves around an order dominated by the powers which border on a region. This largely explains why Iran sees the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity that, if successful, could hasten the end of the liberal world order. This is why it has largely toed the Russian line and explained what it describes as legitimate motives behind the invasion. Thus the expansion of NATO into eastern Europe was cited as having provoked Russian moves. “The root of the crisis in Ukraine is the US policies that create the crisis, and Ukraine is one victim of these policies,” [argued](https://english.khamenei.ir/news/8879/Iran-supports-ending-the-war-in-Ukraine-US-root-of-Ukraine-crisis) Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei following the invasion. To a certain degree, Iran’s approach to Ukraine has been also influenced by mishaps in bilateral relations which largely began with the accidental downing of a Ukrainian passenger jet by Iranian surface-to-air missiles in January 2020, [killing 176 people](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51073621). The regime first denied responsibility, and later blamed human error. Iran, like several other of Russia’s [friends and defenders](https://www.mediaite.com/uncategorized/these-are-the-24-countries-that-voted-no-to-suspending-russia-from-the-un-human-rights-council/), the ideal scenario would have been a quick war in which the Kremlin achieved its major goals. Protracted war, however, sends a bad signal. It signals that the liberal order was not in such steep decline after all, and that Russia’s [calls for a new era](http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770) in international relations have been far from realistic. The unsuccessful war also shows Iran that the collective West still has very significant power and — despite well-aired differences — an ability to rapidly coalesce to defend the existing rules-based order. Worse, for these countries, the sanctions imposed on Russia go further; demonstrating the West’s ability to make significant economic sacrifices to make its anger felt. In other words, Russia’s failure in Ukraine actually strengthened the West and made it more united than at any point since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US. A reinvigorated liberal order is the last thing that Iran wants, given its own troubled relations with the collective West. The continuing negotiations on a [revived nuclear deal](https://uk.news.yahoo.com/eus-borrell-says-coordinator-trip-075454031.html) will be heavily impacted by how Russia’s war proceeds, and how the US and EU continue to respond to the aggression. Iran fears that a defeated Russia might be so angered as to use its critical position to endanger the talks, vital to the lifting of the West’s crippling sanctions. And despite rhetorical support for Russia, Iran has been careful not to overestimate Russia’s power. It is now far from clear that the Kremlin has achieved its long-term goal of “safeguarding” its western frontier. Indeed, the Putin regime may have done the opposite now that it has driven Finland and Sweden into the NATO fold. Western sanctions on Russia are likely to remain for a long time, threatening long-term Russian economic (and possible regime) stability. Moreover, Russia’s fostering of separatist entities (following the recognition of the so called Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” and other breakaway entities in Georgia and Moldova) is a highly polarizing subject in Iran. True there has been a shift toward embracing Russia’s position over Ukraine, but Iran remains deeply committed to the “Westphalian principles” of non-intervention in the affairs of other states and territorial integrity. This is hardly surprising given its own struggles against potential separatism in the peripheries of the country. Many Iranians also sympathize with Ukraine’s plight, which for some evokes Iran’s defeats in the early 19th century wars when Qajars had to cede the eastern part of the South Caucasus to Russia. This forms part of a historically deeply rooted, anti-imperialist sentiment in Iran. Iran is therefore likely to largely abstain from endorsing Russia’s separatist ambitions in Eastern Ukraine. It will also eschew, where possible, support for Russia in international forums. Emblematic of this policy was the March 2 meeting in the United Nations General Assembly when Iran, rather than siding with Russia, abstained from the vote which condemned the invasion. Russia’s poor military performance, and the West’s ability to act unanimously, serve as a warning for the Islamic Republic that it may one day have to soak up even more Western pressure if Europe, the US, and other democracies act in union. In the meantime, [like China](https://chinaobservers.eu/china-struggles-to-strike-a-balance-amid-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/), Iran will hope to benefit from the magnetic pull of the Ukraine war. With so much governmental, military and diplomatic attention demanded by the conflict, it will for the time being serve as a distraction from Iran’s ambitions elsewhere.

#### Ukraine thumps

Mark N. Katz, 3-23-2015, "Russian-Iranian Relations in the Shadow of Ukraine," Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/russian-iranian-relations-the-shadow-ukraine

On March 23, 2015, the Middle East Program and the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center hosted an event, “Russian-Iranian Relations in the Shadow of Ukraine” with Katz, also a former scholar of the Woodrow Wilson Center. Haleh Esfandiari, Director of the Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, moderated the event. Katz began by stating that the character of Russian-Iranian relations is much different since the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani than it was in the past. He noted the tension between the United States and Russia has increased because of the escalating crisis between Russia and Ukraine. However, he emphasized that for the first time since the 1979 Iranian Revolution there is hope for an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations. It is not likely that U.S.-Russian relations will improve in the coming years, however. Katz then explained how the nuclear negotiations are playing a large role in the three countries’ relations with one another. He said Russia would not interfere in the nuclear talks because it is not in a position to stop them but argued that Russia would not benefit from improved U.S.-Iranian relations because sanctions against Iran would be lifted with a deal, allowing for Iranian oil imports. Furthermore, Katz stated that despite the illusion of a stronger alliance created by the visits of Russian officials to Iran and vice-versa, there is still a significant amount of history between the two countries. For example, the division of the Caspian Sea is still an unresolved conflict between Russia and Iran, and Iran remains resentful of Russia for Soviet support of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. Katz emphasized that while the media may portray U.S.-Iranian relations as strained, Russian-Iranian relations are much more hostile. Katz argued that despite the differences Russia and Iran may have, they share the same view on multiple issues. He stated that both countries are fearful of the Taliban regaining control and influence in Afghanistan. In addition, both countries support Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and provide military assistance to Assad. Russia and Iran also both have a common interest in joining the fight against ISIS, which poses a threat to both countries’ national security. Regarding a potential nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1, Katz stated that Russia is very conflicted—Russia does not see Iran acquiring nuclear power as the worst case scenario but is concerned about an improvement in U.S.-Iran relations. Although Russia is not in a position to block the nuclear deal, it hopes it will benefit from the failure to secure a deal. On the topic of Russia-Iran relations with regard to the Ukrainian conflict, Katz argued that Iran is not concerned with the issue and has kept its distance from the matter. Katz stated that Iran would benefit from the crisis because it gives the country more leverage with the West, considering that the West will want to reduce their dependence on Russian gas and would be more likely to turn to Iran for support. In response to a question from Jane Harman, President of the Wilson Center, on whether Russia will benefit from taking Iran’s reprocessed fuel if the negotiations succeed, Katz said that Russia would benefit greatly from this because it would produce a profit, but whether or not this will put Russia in the good graces of the West is questionable because of the escalation and severity of the Ukraine crisis. Esfandiari asked what effect Russia’s rush to sign agreements on additional nuclear power plants with Iran will have on the talks. Katz answered that Russia views the negotiations as an opportunity for the United States to gain commercial profit rather than a national security issue. Therefore, Russia is attempting to sign as many agreements as possible with Iran before the United States has an opportunity to lift the sanctions.

### 2AC – Link Turn

#### Turn - NATO expansion improves Iran Russia relations

O’ Connor 22 (Tom O'Connor is an award-winning senior writer of foreign policy at Newsweek, where he specializes in the Middle East, North Korea and other areas of international affairs and conflict. He has previously written for International Business Times, the New York Post, the Daily Star (Lebanon) and Staten Island Advance, July 17, 2022, “As NATO Grows, China and Russia Seek to Bring Iran, Saudi Arabia Into Fold”, <https://www.newsweek.com/nato-grows-china-russia-seek-bring-iran-saudi-arabia-fold-1720780>)

Finland and Sweden's green light to join NATO is set to bring about the U.S.-led Western military alliance's largest expansion in decades. Meanwhile, the G7, consisting of NATO states and fellow U.S. ally Japan, has adopted a tougher line against Russia and China. In the East, however, security and economy-focused blocs led by Beijing and Moscow are looking to take on new members of their own, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, two influential Middle Eastern rivals whose interest in shoring up cooperation on this new front could have a significant impact on global geopolitical balance. The two bodies in question are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. The former was established in 2001 as a six-member political, economic and military coalition including China, Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before recruiting South Asian nemeses India and Pakistan in 2017, while the latter is a grouping of emerging economic powers originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) upon its inception 2006, and including South Africa in 2010. "The BRICS and the SCO share one important ideological quality: they are both focused on multipolarity, and their summits have even been held back to back with one another at times," Matthew Neapole, an international affairs expert and contributor to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Canada, told Newsweek. "Both are angling to act as force multipliers for this drive for multipolarity, to help along with alternatives [i.e, in currency or banking]," he added. "It could, in theory, facilitate economic linkages and step into gaps that U.S. institutions are not filling due to sanctions, such as those laid on Russia." Iran, already an SCO observer, began its formal membership ascension process amid the latest leaders' summit in September. On Monday, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced the Islamic Republic would also seek to join BRICS. Across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has also reportedly considered applying for BRICS membership, as revealed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his visit to the kingdom in late May. The announcement followed Saudi Arabia joining Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates at China's invitation for a "BRICS+" discussion, after which Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced members had "reached consensus on the BRICS expansion process." Of these candidates, Argentina has already applied for membership, potentially advancing the group's status toward being a major player in international economic relations. And with the SCO seeking to grow as well, Beijing and Moscow might be poised to advance their effort to sway the international influence equilibrium toward a broader group of countries that do not necessarily sign on to an explicitly U.S.-led international order. And while Neapole argued that there would be "big hurdles to get over" in trying to transform this vision from ambitious talk to substantive action, he said a cohesive SCO-BRICS bloc could have a huge impact on reshaping the world order. "If it can be successful in positioning itself as the standard-bearer of the Global South or G20, develop strong organizational mechanisms and integrate more thoroughly," he said, "it could be quite influential." BRICS' multipolar approach to international affairs has proven attractive to both Iran and Saudi Arabia alike. The two nations, however, have their own unique reasons for seeking membership. For Riyadh, the move would likely be less about choosing sides against the close ties it has fostered for decades with Washington and more about the kingdom's own growing status as an independent player. "China's invitation to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to join the 'BRICS' confirms that the Kingdom has a major role in building the new world and became an important and essential player in global trade and economics," Mohammed al-Hamed, president of the Saudi Elite group in Riyadh, told Newsweek. "Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 is moving forward at a confident and global pace in all fields and sectors." This vision, unveiled by Prince Mohammed bin Salman a year before being appointed as heir to the throne and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia in 2017, outlined a plan to diversify his country's oil-dependent economy and present a new image of the kingdom to the international community. And while Crown Prince Mohammed has sought to enhance cooperation with the U.S., especially as President Joe Biden prepared this month for his first visit to the monarchy he once branded a "pariah" over alleged human rights abuses, the Saudi royal has also expanded ties with Russia and China in recent years. Joining BRICS would demonstrate a commitment to Riyadh's resolve in dealing with other major powers and mark a significant win for the effort to boost economic frameworks established outside of the auspices of the U.S. and its immediate allies. "This accession, if Saudi joins it, will balance the world economic system, especially since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest exporter of oil in the world, and it's in the G20," Hamed said. "If it happens, this will support any economic movement and development in the world trade and economy, and record remarkable progress in social and economic aspects as Saudi Arabia should have partnerships with every country in the world." This approach came in stark contrast to that of Washington, which has regularly shut out countries it disagreed with through a growing list of sanctions. The U.S.' dominant position in the global financial system has traditionally left few options for these nations, but that situation has gradually changed as frameworks like BRICS offer potential ways to dodge these restrictions. Among those countries looking to counter U.S. economic pressure is Iran. International sanctions against the Islamic Republic in response to its nuclear activities were lifted in 2015 after a multilateral nuclear deal was reached with the U.S. and other major powers, including China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom, but then-President Donald Trump abandoned the deal in 2018, severely impacting Tehran's ability to trade with the international community. Biden has set out to negotiate a potential return to the accord that was reached during his vice presidency under former President Barack Obama. However, a series of negotiations held since April of last year has left the U.S. and Iran at an impasse and another set of talks held in Qatar this week appeared to end early with no sign of a breakthrough. Frustration over shifting politics in Washington has led Tehran to increasingly look to its own region for strategic partnerships, which it has increasingly forged with Beijing and Moscow. "Iranian officials have come to the conclusion that the U.S. and its Western allies will never allow the Islamic Republic of Iran to play its well-deserved regional role as a middle power," Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas, a research fellow at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, told Newsweek. "Therefore, they have decided to neutralize U.S. attempts to isolate Iran by further closing to non-western bodies like SCO and BRICS," she added. "In addition, Iranians consider the future world order to be Eastern and they are trying to get closer to organizations in which Eastern powers such as Russia and China play a significant role." This doesn't mean that the two blocs are necessary anti-Western in nature. Though a concerted effort has emerged to empower countries outside of the traditional G7 grouping from which Russia was suspended in 2014 as conflict first erupted over Ukraine and other major economies such as China and India have not been invited, the SCO and BRICS, which are not formal military alliances like NATO, saw themselves as inherently inclusive. "The SCO and the BRICS have not been established as an alternative to Western organizations," Yazdanshenas said, "and their specific function has not been defined on the basis of confrontation with the West or the existing world order." Still, she argued that growing international competition has only intensified "the balancing function of non-Western organizations" such as the SCO and BRICS. And here, she said Iran could serve as an important asset for both coalitions. "Joining a moderate power with an anti-Western approach such as Iran to these bodies can strengthen this aspect of SCO and BRICS," Yazdanshenas said. "Iran has been under the most severe sanctions in the last decade, yet it has been able to significantly expand its power in the region." And, like Saudi Arabia, Iran's oil and gas reserves make it an important strategic partner, especially given the worsening frictions over global energy that have been exacerbated by Western sanctions on Russia, and heated rivalry between Beijing and Washington. "Iran is the only producer of energy resources in the Persian Gulf that is not an ally of the United States and will not refuse to supply energy to China in the event of an escalation of the trade war between Beijing and Washington," Yazdanshenas said. "In addition, Iran's geopolitical position has been strengthened in the wake of Russia-Ukraine war and that is of great importance for great powers in these bodies i.e. Russia and China." The energy problem plays into two key reasons having both Iran and Saudi Arabia on board for BRICS would be a "major gain" for the organization, according to Akhil Ramesh, a fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum. "For countries like China and to an extent India, import dependency for oil has been a major headache, both from an economic standpoint of trade deficits and from a geopolitical standpoint of having to make security and strategic sacrifices for the sake of oil imports," Ramesh said. "Having three large oil producers in the grouping [Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia] could possibly give these countries the option of securing oil at discounted rates or through alternative arrangements [barter]." Tehran and Riyadh's oil reserves would also lend BRICS a stronger hand in taking on the U.S. dollar's hegemony over the world financial system as Ramesh argued that, "in order to replace the USD as the global reserve currency you would need to have more commodity-exporting countries, especially oil exporting ones buying into the idea." "Moreover," he added, "China and Russia are expanding the grouping to create a coalition of countries that have pending disputes with the West or have been humiliated by the West in the past [thinking Argentina and Falklands]." And in this respect, Ramesh expressed that the U.S. and its allies had committed "a grave error" in overlooking the importance of BRICS, as well as the SCO, emerging financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the National Development Bank and China's broader Belt and Road Initiative, which counts some 148 countries and 32 international organizations as partners. "The U.S. and its allies are grossly underestimating China, in particular," Ramesh said. "BRICS, SCO, development banks such as AIIB, NDB, and infrastructure initiatives such as China's BRI are all different platforms for engaging mostly poor countries that do not get a say in world affairs or have a seat at the high table." As internal divisions have threatened to derail NATO's agenda, feuds among members also serve as a complicating factor for organizations led by China and Russia. And even if Iran and Saudi Arabia were to both join BRICS, it would not necessarily prove a breakthrough in their bitter rivalry. The two nations have pursued quiet diplomacy over the past year, but their regional bout for influence has continued to rage across the Middle East, most violently so in Yemen, which has been devastated by a years-long war between a Saudi-led coalition in support of an exiled government on one side and the Iran-aligned Ansar Allah, or Houthi, rebels on the other. The conflict has only quieted in recent months as a result of a fragile three-month truce and not necessarily because of any lasting solution. But China and Russia have demonstrated a capacity to bring enemies together under a common banner as seen with the SCO's simultaneous admission of India and Pakistan five years ago. Yaroslav Lissovolik, a Moscow-based Russian International Affairs Council expert and Valdai Discussion Club program director, said BRICS too has the capacity to host countries with clashing worldviews, mentioning the specific case of China and India, whose rivalry has turned occasionally turned violent, and even deadly, along their disputed Himalayan border. And while he said that the "expansion of the BRICS core membership may indeed result in greater challenges in attaining consensus on key decisions going forward," he felt there was ample room to work together on broader questions. "In this respect, the addition of Iran and Saudi Arabia would not change matters fundamentally within BRICS as there is scope for a divergence in views," Lissovolik told Newsweek, "and while there may be disagreement on particular local/regional problems, there may be greater unity on global issues." He argued that disputes among members have not stopped BRICS from managing "to advance with an increasingly ambitious development agenda, including with respect to launching the BRICS+ initiative and the pragmatic cooperation within the BRICS development institutions." "What this means is that the BRICS offer the possibility of development on the basis of divergence in economic models and approaches to economic modernization rather than convergence towards one particular universal model," Lissovolik said. "While allowing for the differences in views and approaches among their members," he added, "BRICS economies can move decisively forward in tackling those global challenges where they manage to forge a consensus."

#### Russia and Iran are only brought together because of NATO and the US’ expansion

**Tasnim News Agency**, 5-17-20**22**, "Iranian Spokesman Blames Ukraine Crisis on NATO’s Expansion," https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/05/17/2712467/iranian-spokesman-blames-ukraine-crisis-on-nato-s-expansion

Iran's envoy to Russia has said NATO's expansion is not in the interest of Tehran and Moscow, and there is a global synergy against Western “unilateralism.” The comments came as Iran has supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by blaming the United States and NATO for the ensuing crisis. During a webinar about bilateral relations and regional developments, Kazem Jalali urged closer cooperation with Moscow under President Vladimir Putin, saying, “We are working with Russia on regional issues, and have a successful experience in Syria’s case”, Jamaran News in Tehran reported on Monday. "Obviously, neither we nor the Russians see NATO expanding to our borders in our interest," said Tehran’s ambassador in Moscow. Turkey, a NATO member borders Iran in the northwest but has followed a neutral policy between the Washington and Tehran. Jalali added that Russia has stood up to American unilateralism, noting that this is the same approach that the Islamic Republic has taken since the 1979 revolution. Jalali noted that Iran did not have good relations with the Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and in the post-Soviet period, adding, “The fourth era is the Putin era, which I think should be paid more attention to”. Judging by the history of Iran-Russia relations, “some people ask why we should have relations with the Russians when we have such a history with them. We should know that during the Soviet era 25 million people were killed in the war with Germany” but that didn’t stop them to cooperate on the Nord Stream --the system of offshore natural gas pipelines in Europe that runs under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany. He added that “we should look at the realities of today”, underlining that Iran’s new government prioritizes relations and strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries, and “Russia is a large economy.” Jalali went on to say that “our foreign policy should serve Iran’s national interests”, urging to keep a balance between the West and the East. In fact, in the past 30 years under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Iran’s foreign policy has increasingly tilted toward Russia and China. In the 1980s, when the founder of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was Supreme Leader, the country followed his dictum of “Neither West Nor the East.” During the same event, former member of the parliament Elaheh Koulai described ties between Iran and Russia as one of the most important issues in Eurasia. “There are bitter events in the history of Iran-Russia relations that have caused pessimism and Russophobia in Iranian society” she added. She called for a balancing approach with Russia, Europe and the United States, saying, “we must try to use Russia to our advantage”. Referring to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Koulai said, “Iran must condemn Russia's military action against Ukraine and demand that the two sides sit down at the negotiating table”. As debate about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues in Iran, [divisions reflect the political dispositions](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202202274930) of various factions over Tehran’s foreign policy. Hardliners close to the core of the regime fiercely defend a pro-Russia policy, while their rivals within the regime argue for more balanced relations between the West and the East, meaning Moscow and Beijing. Many ordinary Iranians and opponents of the Islamic Republic invariably [support Ukraine](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202202265209) and condemn the government pro-Russia policies on social media.

### 2AC – AT: Syria Impact

#### Syria war wont go nuclear, Israel destroyed their ability to use them

Farley 22 (Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book, January 26, 2022, “How Israel Prevented Syria From Developing Nuclear Weapons”, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/how-israel-prevented-syria-developing-nuclear-weapons-199923>)

On September 6, 2007, Israeli fighter-bombers destroyed a mysterious installation near the Euphrates River in the Deir-ez-Zor region. The strike incurred curiously little response from Damascus. A cyber-attack reportedly pre-empted a defensive Syrian military mobilization, and even the diplomatic outcry was muted. No other Arab governments commented on the attack, and even the Israelis did not acknowledge the operation for quite some time. Destroying the facility was not regarded as a slam-dunk decision, either in Israel or the United States. Anxiety over the strength of the intelligence in the wake of the Iraq debacle stayed the hand of the latter, while concern about international blowback, not to mention a Syrian military response, worried the former. What if cooler heads had carried the day, and Israel had never undertaken the strike? Nuclear Progress It’s difficult to assess how far Syria would have been from developing a nuclear weapon if its efforts had gone unhindered. Although we may never have the complete story regarding Syria’s interest in a nuclear program, it probably stemmed from the growing gap in conventional capabilities between Syria and Israel, as well as the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Although Syria has always denied that the installation was part of a nuclear program, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later confirmed that the site appeared to be a nuclear reactor. There is little question that Syria’s program was rudimentary compared to those of Iran or North Korea. However, it is entirely possible that Syria could have relied upon technical assistance from both countries; indeed, it is highly likely that North Korea supplied technical assistance for the development of the reactor on the Euphrates. But Damascus would have needed to master a series of technical challenges, and there is little indication that Syrian economic infrastructure was up to the challenge of managing the very serious industrial and bottlenecks that it would have encountered. Although the Syrian economy is larger than that of North Korea, it is more dependent on resource extraction, making it less capable of managing the technical challenges associated with the nuclear pivot. Syria also lacks the enormous oil wealth enjoyed by both Iran and Iraq during their nuclear drives. It became clear after the destruction of the box that Assad wasn’t all that committed to paying the costs necessary to develop nuclear weapons. Unlike Iraq and Iran, Damascus made little effort to disperse and harden nuclear facilities. Indeed, given Syria’s proximity to Israel, it’s difficult to imagine how anyone in the country believed that the project could go undetected. As Anthony Cordesman has argued, the nuclear program would have been extraordinarily vulnerable at multiple points in its development. This suggests that the bureaucratic politics of the nuclear program were complicated, and that Syria might not have gone through with its development even in absence of the strike. Nevertheless, Israel felt that even the remote possibility of a nuclear Syria was worth curtailing, and that the strikes would have the added benefit of reinforcing the Begin Doctrine. The Arab Spring In any case, it is extremely unlikely that even an unmolested Syria could have successfully developed a nuclear weapon by the beginning of the Arab Spring. The oset of the Syrian Civil War taxed the Assad regime so dearly that it’s unlikely it would have continued a nuclear program. Would the nature of the war have changed if Syria had still been actively pursuing nuclear weapons? The war developed, to some extent, out of the expectation of Western intervention. Anti-regime forces took risks and made commitments out of the hope that the United States and Europe would step up with active military support. The West offered rhetorical support for toppling Assad, but only limited and measured military assistance for anti-regime forces. Clearly, the program itself would not have deterred the West; it could not have produced a viable weapon by 2011. However, knowledge of an existing nuclear program might have reduced Assad’s standing in the West even further, potentially making intervention more attractive. Moreover, the program would presumably have achieved some degree of technical success in terms of the production of plutonium, the development of associated nuclear technologies, and the training of a cadre of scientists and engineers. This very success might have made the West nervous—perhaps nervous enough to take a more assertive policy against the Assad regime. The question is what impact the war might have had on the knowledge and infrastructure developed around the program, and how engineers and materials might have found their way into the hands of ISIS or other rebel groups. ISIS took control of the site in 2014, although the Syrian government likely would have defended it more vigorously if an active reactor had remained. ISIS would not have been able to construct a useable weapon, and either the United States or Syria likely would have destroyed any facilities before they fell into the hands of the group—but it still would have been cause for concern. And while ISIS could not have used the expertise or equipment directly, it might have tried to export either, with dangerous consequences. In any case, forces friendly to the United States captured the area in 2017. Conclusion The strike on Syria was probably not decisive in preventing Syria from getting a nuclear weapon; the program was a long-shot from the beginning, and in all likelihood would have ended at the onset of the Syrian Civil War. However, the strike helped to confirm the regional sense of Israeli military power after the failures of the war against Hezbollah, and undoubtedly also convinced both Washington and Tehran that Israel would consider using military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nukes. This, in turn, informed the negotiating strategies of all of the parties to the JCPOA, which continues to govern Iran’s relations with the international community. Whether that legacy will outlast 2018 remains in question.

### 2AC – Impact Turn

#### Turn---Russo-Iranian cooperation over Syria causes conflict---it’s a cover for their own interests.

Seth G. Jones 19, Senior Vice President; Harold Brown Chair; and Director, International Security Program; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Senior Fellow for Imagery Analysis, iDeas Lab and Korea Chair, 7/16/2019, “Dangerous Liaisons: Russian Cooperation with Iran in Syria,” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/dangerous-liaisons-russian-cooperation-iran-syria>, RES

The Issue As tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the Middle East, Russia is engaged in covert and overt cooperation with Iran in ways that undermine U.S. national security interests. This analysis of commercial satellite imagery at Tiyas Airbase in Syria indicates the scope and proximity of Russian and Iranian military ties. If Washington wants to contain Tehran and prevent further Iranian expansion, U.S. policymakers will need to increase pressure on Moscow to curb Tehran’s activities in countries like Syria. Introduction Following a June 2019 meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kyrgyzstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked that “relations between Russia and Iran are multifaceted, multilateral.” In characterizing the primary areas of cooperation, Putin noted: “this concerns the economy, this concerns the issues of stability in the region, our joint efforts to combat terrorism, including in Syria.”1 One example of Russian-Iranian cooperation is in Syria. This brief analyzes satellite imagery of Tiyas Airbase (or T-4) in Syria, which is used by Iran and Russia. It highlights what we assess to be the Iranian movement of weapons, other material, and personnel to Syria with the awareness and support of Moscow. This cooperation, which has allowed Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) to increase their capabilities and influence in Syria, should be concerning for the United States as tensions increase between Washington and Tehran. Yet Moscow’s cooperation with Tehran is double-edged. Our analysis also highlights Israeli attacks against Iranian or Iranian-linked targets at T-4 Airbase in close proximity to Russian aircraft. These developments suggest that Moscow is playing a delicate game in Syria. It supports Iranian activity and aid in Syria, but also explicitly or tacitly allows Israeli military actions against Iranian targets. The rest of this brief is divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of Russian-Iranian relations. The second section analyzes satellite imagery of T-4 Airbase, focusing on the possible Iranian movement of arms, other material, and personnel. The third section highlights Israeli airstrikes in Syria, including at T-4 Airbase, in close proximity to Russian aircraft. The fourth provides a brief conclusion. Russian-Iranian Partnership in Syria Russia and Iran have developed a complex—and sometimes contentious—historical relationship. During World War II, for example, the Soviet Union occupied northern Iran, creating deep suspicion and mistrust among many Iranians.2 Yet Moscow and Tehran have developed a working relationship in Syria, even though they have their own interests. Moscow’s decision to become directly involved in the Syrian civil war—including to work with Iran—was motivated by several concerns. First was a growing fear that Washington was preparing to overthrow the Assad regime and replace it with a friendly government, much like the United States had done in Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, and Libya in 2011.3 The possibility of losing Syria was particularly alarming because Moscow had just lost its ally in Ukraine. The 2014 Ukrainian revolution had ushered in a pro- Western government in Kiev, further fueling Russian fears of U.S. activity. Second, Syria had long been an important ally of Moscow. In 1946, the Soviet Union supported Syrian independence and provided military assistance to the Syrian Arab Army. This cooperation continued during the Cold War and endures under Russian President Vladimir Putin today.4 Third, Russian leaders were concerned that Assad’s collapse would allow the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and other terrorists to use territory in Syria and Iraq to attract more fighters, improve their capabilities, and spread terrorism in and around Russia. After all, over 9,000 individuals from Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia traveled to Syria and Iraq to join Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.5 Iran has its own interests in Syria. Following the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iranian leaders became alarmed at the rise of Sunni extremist groups like the Islamic State and U.S., European, and Gulf support to rebel groups.6 In addition to providing light and heavy weapons to the Syrian regime and militias, up to 3,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) helped plan and execute campaigns such as the 2016 Battle of Aleppo (or Operation Dawn of Victory).7 The IRGC-QF worked closely with the Assad regime and the Russian military, which conducted strikes from Russian combat aircraft and naval vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.8 Syrian forces and militias supported by the IRGC-QF shelled rebel positions in Aleppo as Russian close air support and Kalibr cruise missile strikes reduced entire neighborhoods to rubble. By December 2016, ground forces routed rebel forces, who departed under an agreement brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran.9 Iranian support continues today. In addition, Iranian leaders have tried to use their activity in Syria to counter Israel. Perhaps the most significant example is by encouraging the expansion of Lebanese Hezbollah and other militia groups in Syria. Lebanese Hezbollah deployed up to 8,000 fighters to Syria and increased its arsenal with greater numbers and ranges of rockets and missiles from Syrian territory.10 Hezbollah also trained, advised, and assisted Shia and other non-state groups in Syria. Today, the IRGC-QF works with thousands of trained fighters in Syria operating in local militias. Many of these groups like Lebanese Hezbollah possess advanced stand-off weapons, improved cyber capabilities, more recruits, and more expansive forces in Syria capable of striking Israeli targets. While Russian-Iranian cooperation has been contentious at times, both countries have collaborated in Syria in ways that serve their own interests. One example of this cooperation is at T-4 Airbase, which is located in eastern Homs Governorate and roughly 100 miles northeast of Damascus. T-4 Airbase and Flight Tracker Data Figure 1 shows the base using satellite imagery. On the east side of the base is an apron (ramp) where aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are frequently parked. On the west side is an apron where transport aircraft have been located and where Israeli aircraft have struck targets. Figure 1: T-4 Airbase Satellite imagery in Figure 2 highlights a Russian-made Ilyushin Il-76-MD cargo aircraft on the base. This aircraft is likely the former Russian Airforce Il-76 registered RA-76634, as indicated by the number painted underneath the cockpit and livery of the aircraft.11 The imagery shows the freighter being loaded or unloaded under the protection of multiple Syrian air defense systems, including three SA-2 systems and a Pantsir-S1— all of which were provided by Russia.12 We assess that the Il-76 and other commercial aircraft may have been used to transport weapons, other material, or personnel from Iran into Syria, based on the regular use of Il-76s for these purposes in Syria.13 Figure 2: Il-76 on T-4 Runway Flight tracker data of the Il-76 aircraft indicates a recent history of flights between Tehran and Damascus. As indicated on the wing, the plane is registered as YK-ATD. The Prefix (YK) is the Syrian country code. Other Syrian-owned Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft have similar registry codes, such as YK-ATA, YK-ATB, and YK-ATC. Publicly available flight tracker data indicates the YK-ATD makes regular flights between Tehran and Damascus. As illustrated in Figure 3, on May 13, 2019, YK-ATD departed Damascus International Airport. On May 14, 2019, the day we observed YK-ATD at T-4 Airbase, flight records indicate the plane left Tehran Mehrabad International Airport in the morning, arrived at what we assess to be T-4 based on imagery analysis, and then departed for Damascus International Airport in the afternoon. Our analysis of flight history for other Syrian-owned Il-76 aircraft indicates similar flight patterns between Iran and Syria for other aircraft, possibly for the purpose of clandestinely transferring weapons, other material, and personnel into Syria.14 Figure 3: Flight Data Tracker Map for YK-ATD As shown in Figure 4, we identified four Russian fixed-wing Su-25 ground attack aircraft with full weapons loads at the same site as the Il-76 aircraft, as well as an Mi-17 Hip transport helicopter and an Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter.15 The proximity of Russian aircraft to the Il-76 suggests that Russia was highly likely aware of Iranian activity. It is virtually inconceivable that Iran would transport and unload arms, other material, and personnel to a base frequented by Russian aircraft and government officials—and protected by Russian-made air defense systems— without Moscow’s knowledge and approval. Figure 4: Russian Su-25, Mi-24, and Mi-17 Aircraft on Runway The imagery also indicates three active air defense sites around the perimeter of T-4 Airbase. Figure 5 highlights one of these sites. All of the air defense sites are equipped with Russian-made weapons systems. The first SA-2 air defense site is situated to the north, another SA-2 air defense site is located to the northwest, and a third SA-2 air defense site is to the south. The SA-2 Guideline (Russian designation S-75 Dvina) is a high-altitude, command guided, surface-to-air missile system (SAM) capable of 360-degree coverage. The SA-2 Guideline is designed for the defense of fixed targets and field forces.16 The guidance system of an SA-2 site can only focus on one target at a time but can direct three missiles against a target simultaneously.17 This likely explains the need for multiple SA-2 systems around the airbase. Figure 5: SA-2 Air Defense System Also observable in the imagery is a Pantsir-S1 (NATO name—SA-22 Greyhound) transloader. The Panstsir-S1 is a short- to medium-range missile and anti-aircraft artillery weapon produced by Russia. The Pantsir-S1 provides point air defense for various installations and provides protection to air defense units. Figure 6 illustrates the Pantsir-S1 air defense system. Figure 6: S-1 Pantsir Air Defense System All military assets in the imagery are Russian made. We assess that the YK-ATD was likely either leased or sold to Syria.18 The Su-25 combat aircraft, as well as the Mi-17 and Mi-24 rotary-wing craft, are likely Russian operated.19 The SA-2 Guideline and Pantsir-S1 are Russian-built SAM systems.20These air defense systems are just two of numerous air defense systems provided by Russia to the Assad government. Others include S-75s, S-200s, S-300s, and Strela-1/-10s.21 With Russian support, Iran has used these types of activities to expand its presence in Syria. Today, the IRGC-QF works with thousands of trained fighters in Syria who are operating in local militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War demonstrated Israel’s difficulty of rooting out Hezbollah sites in Lebanon. Iran’s activity in Syria has only expanded the nature of this problem for Israel’s military. Israeli Airstrikes in the Shadow of the Bear Despite Russia’s collaboration with Iran, Moscow has also attempted to placate Israeli concerns about Iranian expansion. This section highlights Israeli attacks against Iranian or Iranian-linked targets—including at T-4 Airbase in close proximity to Russian aircraft. These developments suggest that Moscow supports Iranian activity and aid in Syria, but also condones some Israeli military actions against Iranian targets. Russia and Israel have established deconfliction mechanisms, including a hotline between the Israeli and Russian militaries. As one Israel Defense Force official remarked, “We are very strict about informing the Russians about our activities and that their operational picture is up to date.”22 This cooperation is particularly important to avoid incidents like the one in September 2018. Following an Israeli strike against Iranian-linked targets in western Syria, Syrian gunners accidentally shot down a Russian IL-20 surveillance aircraft. Russia complained that Israel had given Russian leaders less than a minute of advanced warning and Israeli aircraft used “the Russian airplane as a cover.”23 Despite some improvements in cooperation, Russia has occasionally condemned Israel for its actions in Syria. In July 2019, for example, Russia publicly criticized a series of Israeli strikes, saying that that they “grossly violate[d] Syria’s sovereignty.24 Figure 7 plots the location of Israeli airstrikes against Iranian and other targets in Syria. The darker shades of blue in the heat map indicate a higher concentration of Israeli strikes. Most of Israel’s attacks have been in southwestern Syria, near the Israeli border. But a few attacks have been against major bases used by Iran and Iranian-linked groups, including T-4 Airbase, the airbase north of al-Qusayr, and Damascus International Airport. Figure 7: Israeli Strikes in Syria On June 2, 2019, Israel conducted an airstrike on T-4 Airbase.25 This strike, along with similar strikes conducted in 2019, indicate that Israel is still committed to contesting attempts by Iran to entrench itself and its non-state partner forces in Syria. As highlighted in Figure 8, satellite imagery taken before and after the Israeli airstrike indicates that a UAV control vehicle, launch ramp, and ground equipment were likely targeted. This airstrike, which was conducted in close proximity to Russian infrastructure on the base, highlights the ongoing challenge Israel faces when conducting strikes near Russian forces. Figure 8: Before and After Imagery of Israeli Strike Against Iranian-Linked Target at T-4 Conclusion The Trump administration has expressed significant concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its missile program, and the activities of the IRGC-QF and its partner forces in the Middle East. One of the countries where Iran has been most active is Syria, where Tehran has increased its military presence to aid the Assad regime; supported Lebanese Hezbollah, which has been directly involved in the Syrian ground war; and expanded the number of rockets and missiles in the country to establish a second front (along with Lebanon) in a future war with Israel. Yet Iranian actions in Syria have been possible, in part, because of Tehran’s cooperation with Moscow. Containing Iran and preventing further Iranian expansion in the Middle East will be difficult without increasing pressure on Moscow. If Washington wants to be more effective in containing Iran, U.S. policymakers need to put greater pressure on Moscow to curb Tehran’s movement of arms, material, and people— as this case study of T-4 Airbase highlights.

### 2AC – Impact Turn – JCPOA

#### Russia is killing the nuclear deal and relations overall with it.

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After nearly a year of painstaking negotiations, Iran and world powers were on the brink of agreeing to restore the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. But last-minute demands from Russia, one of the parties to the deal, have threatened to derail efforts to revive an agreement that curbed Tehran’s nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions. Moscow has demanded guarantees from Washington that Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine will not affect its trade and military cooperation with Tehran. The United States has described Russia's new demands as "irrelevant." France, another signatory of the original deal, warned they could dash hopes for a revived nuclear accord. Moscow’ actions have been met with surprise and anger in Tehran. Iran’s foreign minister told lawmakers on March 7, without naming Russia, that Tehran would not let its interests be undermined by “foreign elements.” Experts warn that Russia’s demands could complicate and ultimately scuttle the already fraught negotiations between Iran and world powers. If the talks collapse, Iran could further advance its sensitive nuclear activities. It could also lead to Western countries further tightening sanctions against Tehran. Observers say Iran and world powers could sideline Russia from the negotiations, although it is unclear whether Tehran would be willing to risk jeopardizing its relationship with Moscow, an ally. Iran and world powers have been holding negotiations in Vienna since April 2021, with the United States taking part indirectly. In 2018, then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew Washington from the deal. Tehran responded by gradually exceeding the limits imposed by the pact on its nuclear activities. U.S. President Joe Biden has said he is willing to rejoin the pact if Iran return to full compliance. 'Stabbed In The Back' Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, says that by inserting the war in Ukraine into the complicated nuclear negotiations, Russia appears to be determined to upend the talks and take Iran down with it. He suggested that Russia appears no longer to be interested in reviving the nuclear deal, which would allay Western concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities and allow Tehran to sell its oil. And that could bring global oil prices down. “Neither Iran's return to the oil market nor the peaceful resolution of a Western security concern in the Middle East benefits the Kremlin,” Vaez told RFE/RL. “The leadership in Tehran is waking up to the reality that you often get stabbed in the back by those you believed to have your back.” 'Tank The Talks' Analysts say the scope of Russia’s demands will determine whether they complicate or scuttle the negotiations entirely. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on March 5 said that Moscow wanted written guarantees that sanctions ‘‘launched by the U.S. will not in any way harm our right to free, fully fledged trade and economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with Iran.” Russia’s new demands coincided with mounting international pressure on Moscow over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24, a move that has resulted in unprecedented Western sanctions. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken dismissed Russia’s demands on March 6, saying U.S. sanctions that are “being put in place and that have been put in place on Russia have nothing to do with the Iran nuclear deal.” “If it is simply exemptions that allow Russia to help Iran meet its nuclear obligations in the deal, that is one thing,” Eric Brewer, a senior director at Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a Washington-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “But Lavrov's comments suggest Russia is after something much bigger. I don't see the United States giving Russia that type of sanctions relief, even if it endangers a revival of the [nuclear deal],” he added. Brewer says the United States and Russia have been able to cooperate on shared nonproliferation interests in the past, even when tensions have been high. But he says it is possible that Russia’s recent demands "tank the talks." 'Critical Decision' Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University, says Russia’s demands have forced Iran to make a difficult choice: to stick by Russia and incur the diplomatic and economic costs of the talks collapsing or to ditch Moscow and endanger its ties with an ally. “Iran would have to decide how important an agreement is to its national interest, and whether it will allow talks it has invested so much in and built its economic and foreign policies around [to] be taken hostage by Russia,” Nasr, who served as a senior adviser to the Obama administration, told RFE/RL. “It will be a critical decision for Tehran.” Nasr suggested that sidelining Russia was possible. “The nuclear side of things is in Iran’s hand. The sanctions are in the hands of the U.S. and Europe. Russia's only leverage is to prevent a deal,” Nasr said. Brewer says the other parties to the deal would have to find ways to replace Russia’s technical role under the deal, including removing excess enriched uranium from Iran. “Given enough time, you could probably come up with some workarounds for other parties to take Russia's place on these technical areas,” he says. "But it won't be easy, and time is in short supply. "At a practical level, it would be incredibly challenging to reimplement the deal if Russia, the United States, and Europe are not in alignment on the [nuclear deal] and if Russia is actively trying to play the role of spoiler.”

# North Africa-Russia Relations

## 1NC – North Africa Relations

### 1NC – Libya Scenario

#### Russia-North Africa relations are strong – currently displacing US influence

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Russia’s Reach Grows in North Africa Esper’s tour came amid Russian moves to bolster its foothold in neighboring Libya, where Moscow backs the Libyan National Army (LNA) of eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar. Mercenaries from the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group are also fighting alongside Haftar’s forces against the Turkey-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). The Russian involvement in Libya is part of a regional strategy by President Vladimir Putin after the 2011 Arab Spring revolution to return to regions where Moscow used to be a key player. Russia perceived the Arab Spring revolutions as part of a US-sponsored plan to carry out regime changes in the Middle East and North Africa, causing Moscow to lose its influence in the region. As part of the new Russian strategy in the region, Moscow provided support to the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria against Turkey-backed opposition groups. The Russian military support has helped tip the tide of the war in Assad’s favor and gained Moscow a foothold in the pivotal Arab country. Washington’s Fear of Russia’s Future on the Libyan Coast Russia now has access to a naval base in Tartus on the Mediterranean coast in Syria. This base can accommodate 11 warships and perform operational capabilities throughout the Mediterranean. Moscow also operates the Khmeimim airbase in the Syrian city of Latakia. **Russia has also involved itself in Libya following a NATO-backed uprising led to the ouster and subsequent death of** ruler Muammar **Gaddafi**. Washington fears that if Russia managed to earn military bases on Libya’s coast, it would be able to threaten southern Europe and reduce US ability to maneuver militarily. **Russia has also managed to forge a strong relationship with the new regime in Egypt**, where it signed a $25-billion agreement to build the country’s first nuclear power plant. **Moscow has also maintained a strong close relations with Algeria**, which has relied on the Russian arms sales for decades. **Washington’s allies Tunisia and Morocco have also edged closer to Russia in recent years**. This increasing Russian influence was quite visible in Tunisia’s tourism industry, which is vital to the North African country’s economy.

#### Relations are driven by a desire to take advantage of Western power declining

Isabelle Falcon ’17, Deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, “Russia’s quest for influence in North Africa and the Middle East”, Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, 4/11/17, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/programs/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/russias-quest-influence-north-africa-and-middle-east-2017

In March 2017, Moscow received Prime Minister Netanyahu (for his fifth visit in ten months). Alongside the visits of Turkish president Erdogan and the Iranian president Rouhani, Moscow has found a new role for itself in the Middle East where it intends to remain for a long time. **Its involvement in Libya and in particular its support for** “Marshal” **Haftar further strengthen this assessment**. **This new geopolitical structure marks a stark contrast with that of the 1990s, characterised by a considerable weakening of Russia’s influence across the broader region**. As Russian political scientist Aleksei Mlachenko explains, Russia had then “abstained from independent endeavours in Near Eastern politics, giving the initiative entirely to its American and European partners.” On the one hand, the profound financial and economic crisis that Russia has faced has stopped its diplomatic system from having effective means of action, thus forcing it to prioritise certain areas outside of North Africa/the Middle East. (These included ex-Soviet republics, the Euro-Atlantic world and China). This marked a considerable break with the Soviet posture during the Cold War when the Soviet Union was actively involved in the region. From the mid-1950s, it actively promoted itself and extended its influence in economic, military and ideological terms. The area was of particular importance to the Soviet Union due to the proximity of the region to its borders. Indeed, the disappearance of the ideological dimension in the conduct of Russian foreign policy undoubtedly reduced the importance of certain traditional partnerships in the Middle East. The new importance given to the development of a “strategic partnership” with Western countries prescribed “an extreme prudence, if not a distance, with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict amongst other sources of tension in the Middle East.” **Around the middle of the 2000s, when Russia recovered to relative economic health, it was able to work at a renewal of its regional presence**. This set a new tone in its foreign policy with declarations of a Russian agenda concerning the main international security issues. This was driven by a desire to distinctly mark its independence from Washington (**whom the Russians believed had tarnished its image following the Iraq war and its spillovers**). Moreover, it was characterised by an active promotion of its commercial interests (the “economisation” of Russian foreign policy) alongside the implementation of an “energy diplomacy.” Finally, support for armament exports was a unique opportunity to showcase Russian technological advances. **If Russian activism is more visible on the Middle Eastern front, Moscow has also redeployed its interests in the Maghreb**. This entrance into the Maghreb and Mashrek should be seen as part of a logic of geographical continuum. In 2005, it obtained observer state status in the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation. The Arab Spring firmly “shook” the process of Russian reengagement in the North African/Middle Eastern zone. Despite a willingness to act, Russian involvement has been extremely gradual (and devoid of any spectacular successes). **Moscow was relatively reserved in its reaction to revolutions and demonstrated a preference for the maintenance of the status quo and the “legitimate” powers prioritising stability** (independent of the nature of said regimes). **This attitude marks a certain continuity in Moscow’s rejection to what it sees as the inclination of Western countries to support regime change**. **This has been the case in certain countries** (Serbia 1999, Iraq 2003, the Rose Revolution in **Georgia 2003**, the Orange Revolution in **Ukraine 2004**) and occasionally **through the use of force**. This explains the recurrence of calls by the Russian authorities to stop intervening in Arab revolutions. The Russian reaction can also be explained through fear of an expansion of Middle Eastern political instability. Indeed, from the outset, the Russian authorities have voiced their concern at the the possibility that revolution might principally benefit Islamists. The conservative posture of Russia on the Arab Spring will have been received differently at the regional level. On the one hand, according to certain experts, the Algerian regime appreciated the Russian contribution to the development of cooperation projects of Sonatrach-Gazprom. On the other, the support of key figures in the Russian government to Muammar Gaddafi will take a long time to be forgotten in Tripoli. In any case, after the erosion of its positions in Iraq and in the 2003 war, Russia is determined to prevent the repetition of scenarios of regime change. This is clearly the case in Libya and Syria, two countries it considers as important stepping stones in its return strategy to the Middle East. The UN intervention in Libya and the elimination of Muammar Ghaddafi explain to a large extent the subsequent obstruction of Moscow on the Syrian question. When several Western powers argue that there cannot be a political solution to the intra-Syrian conflict with the maintenance of President Assad, Russia concludes that Syria will be the next country on the list of regime change. This threatens to deny it one of its most stable, if not main allies in the region. In turn, this allows Russian experts to state that the rescue of the Syrian regime is the most important of considerations that underpins the Kremlin line on Syria. When Moscow justifies its military intervention in Syria through issues touching at the stability of the region “it is a lie. Russia, first and foremost supports Bashar Al-Assad!” Another parameter through which to analyse Russia’s desire for regional influence can be found in an element of context. **Moscow estimates that the world is witnessing the collapse of the old regional order and that this constitutes evidence of what it identifies, correctly or not, as** the end of the “Western moment” in international relations. For the Kremlin, this new configuration constitutes an opportunity allowing an acceleration of Russia’s reinsertion of Russia in the region. **Such a reintroduction is also** seen by Moscow as a necessity in the context of conflict with Ukraine **as it has to be demonstrated by any means that Russia is not as isolated as the West argues.** However, this endeavour also contains certain risks, notably due to the fragility of the situation and the volatility of political equilibriums prevalent in the region. 1 – The return of Russia into North Africa and the Middle East: Multiple motivations. 1.1 – **Russia as a power seeking global hegemony in a “post-Western” international context** Through the assertion that Russia is “no more” than a regional power (2014), in an interview given to The Economist, President Barack Obama undeniably “provoked” the Russian authorities. Indeed, Russia under Putin has incessantly gone back on its diplomacy of the 1990s to demonstrate its intent to weigh in on major international issues. This is particularly shown in its activity on key issues such as its role as a nuclear power and as a permanent member of the Security Council. In its vision of the world, this is evidence of its capacity to play a role in Middle Eastern affairs, an area that strongly mobilises the attention of the international community. “Those who are in a strong position in this region will have strong positions in the world” argues Fyodor Lukyanov, a Russian political scientist known to be close to the seat of power. In this context, **Russia did not hesitate to use rhetoric that denounced the West’s moral responsibility in bringing about the current Middle Eastern predicament** (this is perfectly reflected by Vladimir Putin’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2015). **This speech aimed to strengthen his own role at the forefront of the resolution of crises in the Middle East**. In any case, the post-Arab Spring situation has offered new ground which is particularly favourable to the realisation of Russian ambitions. Indeed, the United States is advocating less involvement whereas Europe seems to be confused if not predominantly because of the EU’s internal travails. An additional factor which is related to Russia’s “Middle Eastern activism” can be found in its internal dynamics. Through foreign success, the Kremlin is actively seeking to respond to domestic issues. This is particularly notable in the economic sphere, where the projection of an image of a strong Russia at the heart of international issues serves as a solution to internal impediments. Before the Arab Spring, many of the antiquated relationships established during the Soviet Union era were far from having recovered to their previous level. Indeed, even the strongest ties (Syria, Libya, Egypt and Algeria) were far from a complete return to the Cold War paradigm. Moreover, successive revolutions had compromised some of the advances that Moscow had managed to achieve since the start of the 2000s. Thus, the war in Syria represented a real opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its renewed regional importance. Besides, **there seems to have been a certain vengeful dimension to the motivations of the Russian Federation at the expense of Western countries**. Indeed, **from a Russian point of view, the military interventionism of Western states deprived Moscow of traditional** (Saddam Hussein) **or potential allies** (Muammar Gadhafi). Today, Russia seeks to compensate for such perceived or actual geopolitical losses through a return in the area, expedited through its involvement in the Syrian question. **This is certainly not unrelated to the Russian official line on Libya where Moscow holds a very similar discourse to that which it has developed in Syria since 2011.** “Undoubtedly, it is only up to the Libyans themselves to determine who runs the country. This should not and cannot be envisaged or imposed by external actors” explains Vladimir Chizhov, Russian ambassador to the European Union. Moscow’s ambition to impose itself as a central power in the Middle East had manifested itself in several ways before and since the start of the intervention by Russian forces in Syria in September 2015. Moreover, it expressed itself far beyond the Syrian question with Russian contributions to the Iranian nuclear debate and agreements with the United States on chemical weapons in Syria (September 2013). This is further highlighted by both the self-promotion undertaken by Moscow at the heart of the Quartet and initiatives pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (The aim is to remove the idea that an exclusively American process of negotiations is still an option, following changes in Washington.) In any case, the **Syrian question has allowed Russia to interact with Washington on a more level playing field** – a key objective of Russian diplomacy in the Middle East and the wider world. Thus, the **main aim of Russia’s military campaign in Syria is to impose itself as “co-leader” with the United States on intra-Syrian negotiations and to draw up of a peace initiative backed by both countries**. This comes alongside saving Bashar Al-Assad who is in in increasingly dire straits. At the time, the last step of Moscow’s “Syria plan” aimed at forming a vast coalition of Russia/the US/European countries/regional powers (Iran, Iraq, Syria) against the so-called Islamic State. It was thought that this would help thaw the relationships between Russia and Western countries putting them on an “equal footing” that the Kremlin never ceases to aspire to and make claims to. Thus, it isn’t rare to hear Russian officials or political experts close to power underline that Russia and the United States have common interests “in many regional crises and zones of instability.” Such areas include Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (which the Russian government links to the zone under consideration.) In the same way, when Russia is attempting to strengthen its presence in North Africa, it is with the calculation that this may open opportunities of interaction and dialogue with a certain number of European countries that are interested in the evolution of the regional situation. Undoubtedly, **this is one of the key agendas of its current position on Libya.** More broadly, Russian policy in Northern Africa and the Middle East is undeniably reactionary. **It marks a response to an international environment which it perceives as undergoing profound changes relating to the perceived or imagined decline of Western global leadership that is undoubtedly desired by Russia**. **The Kremlin enjoys luring regional powers to the organisations which it promotes in a bid to strengthen its vision of an increasingly multipolar global order**. Such a reading of global geopolitics highlights Russia’s importance in achieving such goals. From this point of view, the interest shown by Turkey in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the possibility of Iran (observing member) fully joining said organisation are useful stepping stones. The same can be said regarding the anticipated alignment of Egypt’s Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and the Eurasian Economic Union. Besides, **Russia is certainly aware of the inherent weaknesses hindering it weighing in as a global power**. Thus, Russia is constantly searching for new partnerships with regional powers that would increase its international visibility and credibility throughout the Middle East and elsewhere. This is the case in such countries as Iran, Israel, Egypt and Morocco.

#### In particular, Russian cooperation with Algeria is key to prevent escalation of the Libyan civil war and massive instability throughout North Africa – failure undermines global stability

Kester Kenn Klomegah ’20, MD Africa Editor and is an independent researcher and writer on African affairs in the EurAsian region and former Soviet republics, “Understanding Russia-Algerian Strategic Partnership”, Modern Diplomacy, 7/19/20, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/19/understanding-russia-algerian-strategic-partnership/

For almost 20 years, **Russia has pursued its economic cooperation and other geo-strategic interests using the Declaration on Strategic Partnership agreement** signed in 2001 **with the Arab Republic of Algeria in the Maghreb region**. The Maghreb also known as Northwest Africa, the Arab Maghreb is a subregion of North Africa that is effectively a western part of the Arab world and is predominantly Muslim. In geopolitical context, Russia has excellent relations with countries in this region compared to the rest of Africa. While that two-decade old Declaration on Strategic Partnership agreement has primarily allowed Russia to step up military-technical cooperation by supplying arms and military equipment, it also sets out principles for the consolidating long-term bilateral policy goals between the two countries. During her weekly media briefing, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova hinted about the official visit of Algerian Foreign Minister Sabri Boukadoum. “Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will hold talks with the Algerian Foreign Minister in Moscow on July 22 in order to maintain dialogue on the current issues of bilateral relations and the issues on the regional agenda,” the diplomat said. She reminded that Russia and Algeria had signed the Declaration on Strategic Partnership in 2001, which set out the long-term goals of joint work. “In nearly two decades, we have managed to expand the basis of our cooperation significantly. We are successfully developing mutually beneficial ties in the economic, military-technical, research and humanitarian spheres, and in 2019, the turnover between two states reached $3.4 billion. This is a significant figure,” Zakharova said. Undoubtedly, **Russia has tried to sustain its multifaceted bilateral relations with Algeria that** plays an important role in maintaining regional stability in North Africa. Sabri Boukadoum has served as Minister of Foreign Affairs since April 2019. In this short period though, **he has expressed his country’s keenness on resolving the Libyan crisis through dialogue and maintaining the integrity of the country’s territory.** According to him, Algeria does not accept the presence of foreign forces in Libya, regardless of which country they represent. Currently there is an intense fight between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces (the opposition from the Eastern region) to control the Libyan capital. There are external forces already supporting the two warring groups. The inflow of arms for the conflicting sides in Libya is only aggravating the situation in the country. **It adds to the involvement of foreign mercenaries and the presence of extremist and terrorist groups, whose activities reinvigorated jointly with the military escalation and is** threatening **the local, regional and** global peace. **This development largely worries Algeria that wanted to assist Libyans in addressing “structural governance and security issues” and prevent a new Arab Spring from spilling over unto its territory**. **From Russia’s perspective, besides Algeria’s role in ensuring regional stability in North Africa, this country makes a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel zone, actively participates in international efforts to achieve national accord in Mali, and has a constructive mediating potential in the Libyan settlement**. On this basis, **Russia wants to proceed from the premise that the upcoming talks help to strengthen multifaceted bilateral cooperation and to engage in the peaceful negotiation process in** its neighboring **Libya**. As a sign of cordial friendship, Russia prompt responded to Algeria’s request for humanitarian aid by delivering a cargo full of medical protective equipment to help tackle the novel coronavirus pandemic. That aid was purchased and delivered by Rosoboronexport, which is the sole State Arms Exporter, on instructions from the Russian government late April. Algeria has one of the biggest number of coronavirus-related deaths among the African nations, according to official statistics.

#### Advanced weaponry ensures escalation in Libya – causes Great Power war throughout the region

Nathan Vest ’19, is a research assistant and Middle East specialist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation., “Can Anything Stop the Flow of Advanced Weapons into Libya?”, Defense One, 12/13/19, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/12/can-anything-stop-flow-advanced-weapons-libya/161892/

**Weapons previously unseen in the conflict have now arrived**. Videos have circulated purporting to show anti-Hifter fighters using an advanced Chinese-made FN-6 man-portable air defense system to shoot down an MiG-21 jet fighter. Hifter-aligned forces have posted videos of themselves using anti-tank guided missiles to destroy enemy vehicles and using thermal sights of advanced Russian-made ATGMs for targeting and reconnaissance. U.S.-made Javelin ATGMs were discovered in Gharyan, south of Tripoli, when anti-Hifter forces captured that town in June. That such armed groups are deploying advanced weapons has dangerous implications. **With continued exposure to and training on such systems, Libyan armed groups’ capabilities will become increasingly sophisticated and deadly.** Moreover, **as they continue publishing novel uses of their advanced weaponry online, other armed groups stand to learn and benefit**. Like in Afghanistan in the 1990s and 2000s — as well as in the Sahel in the 2010s — militants from other armed groups may come to Libya to receive training. **If Libya becomes a nexus for growing expertise and potential outflow of arms, increasingly deadly regional armed groups could further destabilize the region.** As was the case between 2012 and 2014 when Libyan arms bolstered the arsenals of terrorist and separatist groups, **light weapons could proliferate into Libya’s fragile neighbors, a number of which are grappling with mounting ISIS- and Al-Qaeda-linked insurgencies**.

#### Nuclear war

**Lancaster 2k** [Carol, Associate Professor and Director of the Master's of Science in Foreign Service program at Georgetown University, Foreign Affairs, October, 2000)]

THE MOST BASIC CHALLENGE facing the United States today is helping to preserve peace. The end of the Cold War eliminated a potential threat to American security, but it did not eliminate conflict. In 1998 alone there were 27 significant conflicts in the world, 25 of which involved violence within states. Nine of those intrastate conflicts were in sub-Saharan Africa, where poor governance has aggravated ethnic and social tensions. The ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been particularly nightmarish, combining intrastate and interstate conflict with another troubling element: military intervention driven by the commercial motives of several neighboring states. Such motives could fuel future confiicts in other weak states with valuable resources. Meanwhile, a number of other wars-in Colombia, the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Angola, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi-have reflected historic enmities or poorly resolved hostilities ofthe past. Intrastate conflicts are likely to continue in weakly integrated, poorly governed states, destroying lives and property; creating large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, and threatening regional security The two interstate clashes in 1998--between India and Pakistan and Eritrea and Ethiopia-involved disputes over land and other natural resources. Such contests show no sign of disappearing. **Indeed, with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, these wars could prove more dangerous than ever**.

## 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox

### 2NC – UQ – Russia-North Africa Ties

#### Strategic partnership with North Africa is a priority of Russia’s foreign policy.

Klomegah, 6/29

(Kester Kenn, journalist specializing on socio-economic and political development issues in former Soviet republics, particularly in the Russian Federation and Eurasia. Writes for Pressenza News, Russia-African Relations in the Context of Geopolitical Changes, https://www.pressenza.com/2022/06/russia-african-relations-in-the-context-of-geopolitical-changes/)

Russia plans to hold the second Russia-Africa summit later this year. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, indicated in mid-June message that “in these difficult and crucial times the **strategic partnership with Africa** has become a **priority of Russia’s foreign policy**. Russia highly appreciates the readiness of Africans to further step up economic cooperation.” Lavrov said: “It is in the interests of our peoples to work together to **preserve and expand mutually beneficial trade a**nd investment ties under these new conditions. It is important to facilitate the mutual access of Russian and African economic operators to each other’s markets and encourage their participation in large-scale infrastructure projects. The signed agreements and the results will be consolidated at the forthcoming second Russia-Africa summit.” The above statement arguably offers some implications especially discussing this question of relationship-building. Lavrov has aptly asserted that within the “emerging and sustainable polycentric architecture of the world order” relations with Africa is still a priority, but Russians always close their eyes on the fact that Russia’s foreign policy in Africa has largely failed to pronounce itself, in practical terms, as evidenced by the countable forays into Africa by Russian officials.

#### America’s history of isolationism to Africa has resulted in Russia gaining an advantage in the area.

Bruhl 6/14 [Joe Bruhl; ; 6-14-2022; America Ignores Africa at Its Own Peril; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/america-ignores-africa-at-its-own-peril/; 7-16-2022; SK]

America’s ambivalence toward Africa puts it at a dangerous disadvantage there — and impacts U.S. leadership around the globe. While Washington focuses on the Russian military threat in Eastern Europe and Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, Russia and China are outcompeting the United States in Africa in ways that could fundamentally alter the global balance of power.

To restore momentum to its work in Africa, Washington should develop an integrated strategy that does three things: establishes continent-wide objectives with tailored regional strategies, dramatically expands mutually beneficial economic investment, and leverages areas in which the United States holds comparative advantage over its competitors.

A Continent-Wide Blind Spot

The legacy of U.S. policy in Africa is checkered. Throughout its history, the United States lacked clear objectives on the continent and, as a result, its policies were largely reactionary, vacillating between exploitation, benign neglect, and half-hearted attempts at democratization and humanitarian assistance. In the 18th and 19th centuries, U.S. engagement with Africa came principally through the slave trade. For the next century, Washington paid little attention to the continent until de-colonization coincided with Cold War competition in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. In this context, the United States focused on bringing newly independent African countries into its sphere of influence — often ignoring (or enabling) leaders with appalling records of violence and corruption. After the Cold War, U.S. policy shifted to humanitarian objectives, intervening in Somalia to stop a famine and initiating the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief — and investment of more than $100 billion to combat HIV/AIDS. After the attacks of 9/11, however, the preponderance of U.S. diplomatic and military energy has focused on countering violent extremist organizations as part of the Global War on Terror.

Today, Washington still primarily views the continent as a problem to be managed rather than as a partner in shaping the next century. Promising economic and demographic trends have driven Africa’s emergence as a significant player on the world stage. But the United States has been slow to establish a clear, proactive policy for Africa. This is a strategic blind spot that most U.S. policymakers can’t seem to shake — and one that their competitors don’t have.

Instead of a problem to be solved, China and Russia view Africa as an opportunity to be seized. From 2007 to 2017, U.S. trade with Africa dropped by 54 percent as China’s grew by 220 percent. While Russia’s total investment in Africa pales in comparison to the United States and China, it has grown by 40 percent since 2015. China supports 46 port projects in Africa — financing more than half and operating 11. The United States supports zero.

In 2006, China launched the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, bringing together heads of state from across the continent every three years. Russia began a similar junket in 2019, holding the first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi. The United States hosted something similar in 2014 — but hasn’t since. The Biden administration has recognized Washington’s error and announced plans to host a second event in 2022, but in this diplomatic game the United States is still playing from behind.

In a savvy soft-power move, China launched a 2015 initiative to put satellite televisions in 10,000 African villages. No surprise — the television sets come with free, pre-loaded access to Chinese stations, pumping state-sponsored content into homes across the continent. Today, Russia embeds a former intelligence agent as a senior defense advisor in the Central African Republic, employs the Wagner Group in Libya and elsewhere, and has deals with seven Sub-Saharan countries to build their nuclear energy infrastructure.

Each competitor’s strategy has its flaws — and there are certainly seams for the United States to exploit — but the contrast between Russia and China’s involvement in Africa and Washington’s neglect is stark.

Africa Rising

However, investing in Africa is not just about competing with China and Russia: Africa is an epicenter of tremendous opportunity. If human capital truly is the greatest asset to economic growth, Africa has unappreciated potential. In the next 35 years, Africa’s population is expected to double — comprising nearly 30 percent of the world’s population by 2050. By 2025, an additional 90 million African households will enter the consumer class — contributing purchasing power of $2.1 trillion to the global economy.

Africa also has the potential to become the world’s next manufacturing epicenter. As the cost of labor in China increases, experts project that 100 million labor-intensive jobs will leave the country by 2030 — with Africa as a likely landing spot. The Brookings Institution estimates that manufacturing spending in Africa will grow by over 50 percent — reaching more than $660 billion by 2030. In 2021, 54 of 55 African nations initiated the African Continental Free Trade Area — a free trade agreement that eliminates tariffs on 90 percent of goods, enabling the free flow of the raw materials essential for manufacturing to thrive.

There are also more immediate economic interests at play. Africa holds vast repositories of rare earth elements, vital to the production of everything from cell phones and LED screens to energy infrastructure and defense technologies. More than two-thirds of the world’s cobalt — an essential ingredient in lithium-ion batteries — is in Congo. Around 35 percent of the world’s bauxite — a key component of aluminum production — is found in Guinea. However, China currently holds a virtual monopoly on the world’s rare earth elements production — putting America’s economy and national security at risk. If the United States wants to secure access to the raw materials required to build the future, it’s going to have to do it in Africa.

Politically, African nations wield surprisingly significant, yet subtle, influence on a host of global issues. At the United Nations, African countries comprise nearly 28 percent of member states — providing a powerful voting bloc capable of channeling resources to initiatives aligned to its interests. Unity among the A3 — the three rotating African members of the U.N. Security Council — increases Africa’s voice on council resolutions, even ones that don’t relate to Africa. What’s more, the way in which African leaders choose to implement the African Continental Free Trade Agreement will determine which global powers have greatest access to continent-wide markets worth more than $3.4 trillion. Early indications are that China is the big winner.

No doubt, there are challenges to progress in Africa. But progress is being made and the truth is that Africa will play a central role in the next century — demographically, economically, and politically — whether the United States likes it or not.

#### Russian re-engagement with the region ensures power-broker status

Stephen Norris ’20, is the Walter E. Havighurst Professor of Russian History and the Director of the Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies, “Russia and the South: Five Things to Know about Russia’s Relationship with the Middle East and North Africa”, Havighurst Center, 5/15/20, https://blogs.miamioh.edu/havighurst/2020/05/15/russia-and-the-south-five-things-to-know-about-russias-relationship-with-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/

**Russia’s intervention in MENA is not new**. In fact, involvement in MENA has been prevalent throughout Russia’s history, and its exit during the late-Soviet era was the ​exception, not the rule​. In the 18th Century, Russia began creating ties with Middle Eastern countries to gain access to warm water ports, and in the 19th Century, Russia protected Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. After World War II, Russia courted new Arab states and provided them with arms. In fact, Russia has consistently sold arms to MENA countries and is now the ​second largest global arms exporter​. Before scaling back ties with MENA countries in the 1980s and 1990s — due to military failures such as the ​First Chechen War​— Soviet involvement in the region was pervasive. In the 1970s, Russia had access to Egyptian support bases and “friendship agreements” with Cairo and Damascus, as outlined in this ​EUISS report​. Today, Russia has returned their focus on MENA. Although their presence can be found in Israel and the Persian Gulf Arab states, the most notable intervention is in Syria. Carengie Senior Fellow Eugene Rumer writes that **Russia has “​emerged​ as a** key power broker and military actor**” in MENA countries**.

#### Relations are high – driven by US abandonment

Stephen Norris ’20, is the Walter E. Havighurst Professor of Russian History and the Director of the Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies, “Russia and the South: Five Things to Know about Russia’s Relationship with the Middle East and North Africa”, Havighurst Center, 5/15/20, https://blogs.miamioh.edu/havighurst/2020/05/15/russia-and-the-south-five-things-to-know-about-russias-relationship-with-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/

In its efforts to establish a role as peace-broker in the MENA region, Russia will need to capitalize on its ties with Syria, as well as the opportunities for secure diplomatic opportunities in the region. Until now, the Kremlin has assumed that order will emerge spontaneously ​as strong military and political leaders network over shared interests. ​However, in order to achieve the goal of being a strong peace-broker, Russia will need to consolidate a strategy of active diplomacy oriented toward diversifying relationships, presenting a non-ideological approach, and showing long-term investment in Syria. **While the U.S. has traditionally been interested in inspiring and sustaining Western liberal values such as democracy, Russia is more pragmatic** — **aiming instead at security and stability**. ​U.S. failures in MENA​, especially in the Syrian Civil War provide an opportunity for Russia to contrast itself with the U.S. in the eyes of both the European Union and Syrian allies. **Russia has strengthened its relationship with the Assad regime at the expense of the U.S.** This will continue to be the case as long as Trump is in office. The U.S. abandonment of its Kurdish allies has created a vacuum that Russia will likely continue to fill.

#### Russia-MENA ties are strong – influence is spreading through Africa

Imran Bayoumi ‘21, is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy where he focuses on security. He holds a B.A. in Political Studies from Queen’s University., “Russia’s Return to Africa”, The International Affairs Review, 3/9/21, https://iar-gwu.org/blog/russias-return-to-africa

Russia’s announcement that it plans to open a naval base in Sudan marks a clear return of Russia to the African continent amid a push to expand its power. **Since the mid-2010s, Russia has sought to reassert itself via a mix of having an official state presence on the continent and the use of** private military contractors (**PMCs**). Thus, while former President Trump disparaged African nations as “shit-hole countries” in 2018 and later fired then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson while he was on a tour of Africa, Russia was steadily increasing its presence via diplomatic and military means. In the face of a rising Russian presence, this article will propose policy recommendations that allow the Biden administration to counter Russian influence while building strong bilateral relations with African states. During his term, President Trump never made a single visit to Africa and only received a few African heads of state. In comparison, Russia received 10 African heads of states between 2017 and 2019. The most significant diplomatic event during this period was the Russia-Africa Summit, which brought representatives from all 54 African states, including 43 heads of state. **Diplomatic ties between Russia and Africa are important**—**the 54 African nations represent the largest voting bloc at the UN and often vote together, and Russia is eager to court this influence**. In addition to general members, African countries hold three of the 10 seats on the Security Council, known as the A3. **In a further attempt to strengthen Russian-African ties, Russia has often backed the goals of the A3 at the Security Council, including blocking human rights and democratic governance initiatives**. Moscow also seeks to increase its access to natural resources across Africa. One such area is in energy, where Russia seeks to develop the capacity of African nations via its state owned enterprises. Simultaneously, Russia is also increasing its soft power push, through the creation of regional Russian language centers that promote the Russian language and culture and partnerships between Russian and African universities. **Beyond diplomatic channels, Russia has sought to deepen its ties to Africa via military means**. Russia’s naval base deal with Sudan is for at least 25 years, with an option to renew for another 10. The land for a Russian naval base is provided free of charge, and Russia has full autonomy over the transfer of military equipment into the country. Once fully developed, the base is expected to hold up to four naval vessels and 300 people. The signing of the naval base deal in Sudan is not Russia’s only military foray in Africa. In December 2020, Russia dispatched 300 soldiers to the Central African Republic (CAR) because of ongoing civil unrest, playing a vital role in securing a peace deal between government troops and rebels in 2019. Building on the close ties between Moscow and Bangui, the Kremlin is reportedly interested in opening a military base in the CAR as it presents an attractive gateway for extending Russian power into Central Africa, including the natural resource-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo.

### 2NC – UQ – Algeria

#### Algeria’s decision to suspend a friendship treaty with its longtime ally Spain, proves that Algeria is increasingly aligning itself towards Russia, away from the West.

Reuters, 6/13

(Reuters, Algeria is increasingly aligned with Russia, Spanish minister says, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/algeria-is-increasingly-aligned-with-russia-spanish-economy-minister-says-2022-06-13/)

MADRID, June 13 (Reuters) - **Algeria's decision to suspend a friendship treaty with Spain last week was not surprising because Algiers is increasingly aligning itself with Russia,** Spanish Economy Minister Nadia Calvino said on Monday. Calvino said she had noticed a **growing rapprochement between Algeria and Russia** at the spring meeting of the International Monetary Fund in April. "**I saw back then that Algeria was more and more aligned with Russia, so this (decision to suspend the treaty) didn't surprise me**," Calvino said in an interview with Radio Catalunya. The diplomatic row between the two countries followed a change of stance by Spain over Western Sahara, a territory Morocco claims while Algeria supports a group that seeks its independence. Spain is also a member of the European Union and the NATO military alliance, both in the forefront of international opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. After Algeria's decision, Madrid has tried to convince the North African country to backtrack. "I hope that Algeria will reconsider its position and the statements it has made," Calvino told reporters in Barcelona. Algeria is one of Spain's main suppliers of gas and Spain has said it will firmly defend its national interests and those of its citizens and companies. Calvino reiterated on Monday that the gas supplies continue normally and was confident there would be no disruption.

#### Internal Documents Prove

Algeria Invest, 6/9

(Digital platform dedicated to financial investment in Nigeria, Algeria-Russia: the **strong bilateral relations** mentioned, <https://algeriainvest.com/news/algeria-russia-the-strong-bilateral-relations-mentioned>)

Minister of Finance, Abderrahmane Raouya, received on Wednesday **in Algiers Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Algeria,** Igor Beliaev, who came to visit him at the end of his mission in Algeria, said a statement of the ministry. During the meeting, held at the Ministry's headquarters, Mr. Raouya and his interlocutor **highlighted "the strong ties that have always characterized the relations between the two countries and which constitute an important pledge for the development of deep and diversified economic relations**", the same source explains. Minister of Finance congratulates the Russian diplomat for the efforts he made during his mission in Algeria. The interview was also used to **review the current state of bilateral economic and financial cooperation and the ways and means to further develop and strengthen it.**

#### Algeria is pursuing an independent foreign policy strategy, striking a balance between cooperation Russia and the West.

Fenton-Harvey, 5-25

[Jonathan; journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa; 5-25-2022; Algeria's conundrum over tensions between Russia and the West; https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/algerias-conundrum-over-russias-tensions-west]

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drags on, North African countries have been hit by rising prices of staple goods, creating a new consumer crisis. Yet as a hydrocarbon-rich nation, Algeria could be presented with new economic opportunities as European countries look to replace Russian energy sources. Algeria is also trying to adopt a **careful balancing act** between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states which have imposed economic sanctions on Moscow. Retaining **ties with Europe is important** for Algiers to acquire potential energy exports, while **Russia** has been an **invaluable security and strategic partner**. Thus, Algeria will hope to continue its **independent foreign policy** where it can **balance between both Europe and Russia.** On 11 April, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi struck a deal for Algiers to supply gas to Rome. Per the deal between Algeria’s Sonatrach and Italy’s Eni, Algiers will send 9 billion cubic meters of gas to Rome by next year and in 2024. “Right after the invasion, I announced that Italy will move with speed to reduce dependence on Russian gas. This agreement is a significant response to that strategic objective. There will be others,” Draghi said after the meeting. In March, Sonatrach and Eni announced finding a “significant” oil and gas field in the Algerian desert, which both companies will jointly explore. Following this, on 10 May, Russian Foreign Minister met with Algerian President Tebboune, with the aim of **enhancing bilateral ties** in various sectors, from military to humanitarian areas. Following the meeting, Lavrov referred to the two countries’ **“military and technical cooperation**” while praising “the confidence placed in us (by Algeria) in this domain”. **Military partnership** Both Algeria and Russia have adopted a similar stance of flexibility in the Middle East and North Africa. Regarding various disputes in the region, Algeria is more aligned with Russia’s position and seeks to uphold positive ties with most actors - even though its media often invokes anti-imperialist sentiment, which explains the historic amicability between Algiers and Moscow. Although Algiers was a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, it still established **close ties** to the Soviet Union. Many of its political and military leaders trained there. And during the Cold War period, the Soviet Union and Algiers struck several arms agreements. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin sought to further strengthen ties between the two countries after visiting Algiers in 2006. That year, both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concerning the Russian and Algerian gas companies Gazprom and Sonatrach. While causing some alarm to EU observers, the MoU entailed that Gazprom would help Algeria develop its natural gas reserves. Further demonstrating its determination to be a reliable ally of Algiers, Moscow has forgiven billions of dollars of Algerian debt, while Algeria sought Moscow’s assistance in 2019 against the mass anti-government protests, which forced former long-standing president Abdelaziz Bouteflika to resign. For Algeria, regional tensions have driven it towards Moscow and have propelled its desire to increase its [arms imports](https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/shifting-geopolitics-and-algerias-new-military-doctrine). Currently, Algeria is Moscow’s **third-largest arms customer** after India and China, and Algiers’ purchases account for around half of Russia’s arms exports to Africa. Russia is also Algiers’ largest arms partner. And showcasing its wishes to **maintain ties with Moscow despite** the war in **Ukraine**, Algeria agreed with Moscow on 5 April to carry out joint military exercises on the border of Morocco – with whom Algiers has sour relations. The exercises will include training for tactical moves to search for, detect, and destroy illegal armed groups. About 80 soldiers from the southern military region will participate and will take place at the Hammaguir base in southern Algeria. The manoeuvres are scheduled for November 2022. Such exercises are a continuation of similar activities, such as in October 2021 when both armies [trained](https://atalayar.com/en/content/russia-and-algeria-conduct-military-exercises-border-morocco) in the North Ossetia region, aiming to increase their effectiveness and further their counter-terrorism cooperation. Moscow’s support for Algeria helps it over the Western Sahara dispute, in which the US supports Morocco’s stance, having recognised Rabat’s sovereignty over the territory. Thus, given Russia’s supportive stance towards Algeria over military partnerships, and how much of a vital ally it is, US pressure on Algeria would be unlikely to deter it from scaling down its ties with Moscow. Yet amid the Ukraine war, Washington has already attempted this. In late March, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged Algeria to limit ties with Russia. Blinken also urged Algeria to repair its fraught ties with Morocco, particularly regarding the dispute over Western Sahara, over which Washington has still upheld recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty. Such a move would therefore be unlikely to sway Algeria into moving away from Moscow.

### 2NC – AT: Ukraine

#### Russia is still invested in North Africa ­despite Ukraine.

Cafiero and Milliken 4/15 [Giorgio Cafiero, Emily Milliken; CEO and founder of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project; 4-15-2022; Russians unlikely to leave Libya, despite Ukraine war; Al Jazeera; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/15/russians-unlikely-leave-libya-despite-ukraine-war; 7-8-2022; SK]

Russia’s Wagner Group, a shadowy paramilitary organisation tied to the Kremlin, has played a significant role in Libya, supporting renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) in the country’s civil war.

Western observers had begun wondering in recent weeks whether Wagner forces would be withdrawing from Libya to instead focus on supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Although Moscow might need to adjust and reconfigure its mission in Libya, there is good reason to expect the Russians to continue their campaign, which has served to shape the security architecture of Libya’s east, where Haftar is based, and entrench itself.

“Before February 24 [when the Russian invasion of Ukraine began], there was no indication that the clandestine Russian mission [in Libya] was withdrawing, shrinking, or anything of the sort,” Jalel Harchaoui, a researcher specialising in Libya, told Al Jazeera.

“It was rather quiet. The Libyans who live near [Russian] bases got used to seeing some Russians at the grocery store. Some camps, bases, and air bases are known to be fully controlled by Russians,” Harchaoui added. “In those particular cases, even the LNA itself sometimes needs to get permission before entering the base.”

While there are some unconfirmed reports that Russian mercenaries have been withdrawn from the country to fight in Ukraine, the majority have remained.

“The number of [Russian] fighters who made their way to Ukraine would probably be tiny as the Kremlin wants to have a stake in Libya’s future and needs these foreign mercenaries to maintain their hold on the country,” said Ferhat Polat, a Libya researcher at the TRT World Research Centre.

Sustaining a military presence in Libya is key to Russia’s agendas elsewhere on the African continent, especially in the Sahel region.

In late 2021 and early 2022, for example, Russian planes transported armed personnel and arms from Syria to Mali via an airbase near Benghazi.

“You clearly have reliance on the perennial and permanent character of the Russian footprint in Libya. It wasn’t about to shrink,” said Harchaoui. “Even the reduction, the modest drawdown of probably 300 or 400 individuals is not the end of the mission. It doesn’t presage, announce, or augur capitulation.”

It is important to take stock of the extent to which Russia’s role in eastern Libya has become important not only to Haftar and those Libyans aligned with him, such as parliament-appointed Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha, but also other external actors with stakes in the North African country’s uncertain future.

The Russians have built up a presence in Libya that makes Haftar structurally unable to detach himself from Moscow.

The complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the country would throw off the balance of power that has protected Haftar’s longevity in the east. With at least three airbases, military camps, and spies on the ground, the Russians retain vast amounts of leverage in Libya that no meaningful power appears to be eager to seriously diminish.

“There’s no NATO plan to remove Russia [from Libya],” explained Harchaoui. “The reason is, because Haftar is the only security architecture for huge parts of Libya — the eastern half mainly. Haftar is someone that you cannot preserve if you go after the Russians. If you forcefully remove the Russians, you will automatically and inevitably weaken Haftar.”

#### **The Ukraine invasion proves Africa’s strong relationship with Russia because of weak US commitments.**

Obadare 3/4 [Ebenezer Obadare; ; 3-4-2022; Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine May Drive a Wedge Between the West and Africa; Council on Foreign Relations; https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-invasion-ukraine-may-drive-wedge-between-west-and-africa; 7-17-2022; SK]

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine May Drive a Wedge Between the West and Africa

The West needs to pay close attention to how they react to African countries' silence on the Russian invasion of Ukraine and avoid seeming patronizing and dismissive to neutral African nations.

The apparent reluctance of many African countries to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has caught many Western governments, diplomatic experts, and observers of Africa’s international relations by surprise.

Although twenty-eight African countries voted in favor of the March 2, 2022, UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution demanding that Russia “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders,” notably, seventeen African nations abstained while no votes were recorded from another eight.

Unsurprisingly, Eritrea, whose leader Isaias Afwerki enjoys a close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and who has long staked out an anti-Western diplomatic stance, joined Belarus, North Korea, Russia, and Syria in voting against the resolution. In total, 141 (out of 194) UN member states endorsed the resolution.

Africa in Transition

Except for the speech by Kenya’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Martin Kimani vigorously affirming the sanctity of international borders and rejecting “irredentism and expansionism on any basis,” African diplomats have largely maintained a studied silence, and, significantly, none of the twenty-eight supporters of the resolution, including regional powerhouse Nigeria, has come out to elaborate on its position. Nigeria only condemned the reported ill treatment of Nigerians and other African nationals seeking to leave Ukraine and promptly turned to arrangements for repatriating back home an estimated 5,000 Nigerian students caught up in the conflict.

By contrast, most of the talking is being done by the leaders of countries which either opposed UN censure of Russia or abstained. Among the latter, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has alluded to Western “double standards” on the Ukraine conflict and spoken of his personal preference for Chinese diplomacy, which, he claims, steers clear of others’ domestic affairs. Museveni has also spoken out in the past against Western interference in Africa.

Museveni’s son and heir apparent Lt. General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who also leads the country’s elite Special Forces Command, was less diplomatic, tweeting:

The majority of mankind (that are non-white) support Russia’s stand in Ukraine. Putin is absolutely right! When the USSR parked nuclear armed missiles in Cuba in 1962 the West was ready to blow up the world over it. Now when NATO does the same they expect Russia to do differently?

Last year, following a complaint to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by lawyers acting on behalf of victims, the European Union (EU) Parliament recommended “sanctions against individuals and organizations responsible for human rights violations in Uganda.” Kainerugaba and other senior Ugandan military commanders were named in the ICC complaint.

Museveni, who has held power for thirty-six years after toppling Tito Okello in 1986 and was re-elected for an unprecedented sixth term in January 2021, recently signed a $10 billion oil extraction and pipeline deal with France’s TotalEnergies and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation.

Ploughing the same furrow, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has criticized NATO’s expansion into Ukraine and continues to echo Russian official position that it perceived “a national existential threat” from NATO.

While South Africa is less economically dependent on Russia than other African countries, the South African political class perhaps feels indebted to Russia because of the former Soviet Union’s support for the African National Congress during the Apartheid era.

Clearly caught off guard by the African response (African countries accounted for roughly half of the thirty-five abstentions), both the United States and EU countries have scrambled to engage with a cross section of the dissenting countries.

Given the considerable risk of confirming the very prejudices that those countries have been pointing to, how the West goes about it is extremely important.

#### Ukraine has decreased Western focus on Africa.

Seldin 7/15 [Jeff Seldin; ; 7-15-2022; Europe Warns of Russian Pressure From Africa; VOA; https://www.voanews.com/a/europe-warns-of-russian-pressure-from-africa/6660246.html; 7-16-2022; SK]

And nowhere are concerns growing as fast as they are in the Sahel, the semiarid stretch of land spanning northern and western Africa from Senegal to Sudan.

“By sending a couple of thousand Wagner paramilitaries, the Russians are taking over there,” Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren told an audience in Washington Thursday. “We cannot accept that.”

Ollongren is not alone in voicing concerns about the Russian threat from Ukraine, in the east, overshadowing the threat from Africa.

"One of the worst effects this will have on the Western side in my view is that it focused attention of the European member states on the eastern front, lowering the already low level of attention on the south," Lieutenant General Giovanni Manione, the deputy director general of the European Union Military Staff, warned a forum in Washington last month.

"It is a tragic effect. It is a huge mistake," Manione added. "We are keeping resources [in Europe] just in case something happens, forgetting completely that actions should be taken now in another theater."

Manione went even further, suggesting that Putin, as much as he may want to conquer Ukraine, is also adroitly using the fight there as a distraction.

"I'm not sure this is the main target of the Russians," Manione said of Ukraine. "The main target of the Russians could be having people focused on there [Ukraine], forgetting their actions elsewhere."

Russian paramilitary groups in Africa

Other European countries are also sounding alarms.

An Austrian Federal Intelligence Service report issued late last month warned of a “belt of instability” reaching across Africa, from the Sahara Desert and the Sahel region all the way to Somalia and the Arabian Sea.

“This instability is exacerbated by the rise of a grass-roots anti-West movement in the Sahel region and the withdrawal of European armed forces from Mali,” the report said. “Ostensibly private actors on the ground, such as the Russian Wagner Group, also play an important role here.”

Many Western officials view Wagner, a paramilitary company run by Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, as a proxy force for Putin, helping Moscow secure access to natural resources with no regard for human rights.

So far, U.S. military officials have reported the presence of Wagner mercenaries in more than a dozen African countries over the past several years. With recent deployments to Mali sparking renewed concerns, especially after Wagner forces were tied to the slaughter of 300 civilians this past March.

Wagner has also been tied to January’s coup in Burkina Faso, though U.S. officials have not confirmed the allegations.

Like their European counterparts, U.S. officials agree Russia’s involvement in Africa, and in the Sahel in particular, is worrisome, warning the payoff for countries turning to Russia, and to Wagner, often fails to deliver on Moscow’s promises.

“We've seen the impact and destabilizing effect that Wagner brings to Africa and elsewhere, and I think countries that have experienced Wagner Group deployments within their borders found themselves to be a little bit poorer, a little bit weaker, a little bit less secure,” U.S. Deputy Commanding General for Africa Major General Andrew Rohling told reporters last month.

But U.S. military and intelligence officials, while concerned, question whether Russian forces are capable of threatening Europe from the south.

“There’s not necessarily a concrete and cohesive plan,” one U.S. official told VOA, speaking on the condition of anonymity in order to discuss intelligence.

"They're not a very effective organization, except for extorting money and resources,” the official added, comparing Russia’s strategy in Africa to “placing a bunch of bets on a roulette table."

Indirect threat

NATO, in its recently adopted, updated strategic concept, also sees the threat from Russia in Africa as indirect.

“NATO’s southern neighborhood, particularly the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel regions, faces interconnected security, demographic, economic and political challenges,” the alliance document said, adding it “enables destabilizing and coercive interference by strategic competitors.”

Some experts warn it would a mistake, however, to view Russia’s actions as incoherent.

“Russia is pursuing several strategic objectives on the continent,” Joseph Siegle, director of research at the National Defense University's Africa Center for Strategic Studies, told U.S. lawmakers Thursday.

While much of Moscow’s effort is designed to “displace and discredit Western influence,” Siegle said that is just the start.

“Russia is trying to gain control over strategic territory in North Africa, most vividly seen in Libya. This would provide Moscow with an enduring security presence on NATO’s southern border,” he said.

#### Western sanctions in response to Ukraine are causing Russia to step up its influence in North Africa, diplomatically and economically.

Aris, 6/12

(Ben, German reporter for BNE NTELLINEWS, Russia preparing for second Africa Summit to build closer ties as it pivots away from the West, https://www.intellinews.com/russia-preparing-for-second-africa-summit-to-build-closer-ties-as-it-pivots-away-from-the-west-247188/)

Russia is preparing for the second Russia-Africa summit, scheduled for October-November 2022 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as it steps up its campaign to move closer to the African countries and pivot away from the West due to the latter's extreme sanctions imposed after the start of the war in Ukraine. Russia was already heavily invested in Africa as part of President Vladimir Putin’s policy of fostering ties with the non-aligned nations of the developing world ever since relations with the West soured following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. But the need to develop deep trade and investment ties in Africa has been given a new urgency since the West has broken off almost all business ties with Russia this year. Better relations with Africa are commercially important as Russia starts searching for new customers to buy its energy, grain and other commodities. But there is also an important political dimension as well as Putin seeks to undermine US hegemony and to gain international recognition of his regime. With a cornucopia of commodities and technology in some sectors such as nuclear power on offer, many African countries are willing partners. The details of the summit will be decided in talks between the African Union, Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko said at a meeting with the Speaker of Mozambique’s Assembly (parliament), Esperanca Bias, during an official visit to Maputo from May 30 to June 1. "We are already preparing the next summit. Its dates will be determined jointly with the African Union," Matviyenko said reports Tass, adding that Russia saw Mozambique as a "reliable and time-tested" partner in Africa."Russia has always provided assistance to Mozambique and it keeps doing so. We are pleased to see your success in economic and social development. We note with satisfaction the steady development of the political dialogue," Matviyenko added. Russia has deep business ties with Mozambique, but as bne IntelliNews has reported, the business relations do not always run smoothly. Russia's VTB bank was a key participant raising $2bn for a project that should have transformed Mozambique's economy, but the project collapsed and became the subject of a legal battle that has sullied the country’s reputation. The Russia-Africa Summit has been an important platform for promoting Russian interests on the continent and leaders from 48 of Africa’s 54 countries attended the first summit held in the Russian resort city of Sochi in October 2019. It was co-chaired by the presidents of Russia and Egypt, Vladimir Putin and Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Egypt is a key Russian partner in North Africa, which imports 80% of its grain from Russia and Ukraine. The event was supposed to be held annually, but was delayed following the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020. It is now back on for this autumn. This year’s summit will be even more important as Russia looks for new markets and to expand existing ones after the West imposed extreme sanction on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine at the end of February. For its part Africa is keen to keep relations civil, as many countries on the continent depend on Russian grain imports. The AU head, Senegalese President Macky Sall, met Putin in Sochi on June 3 in a bid to offset an impending food crisis due to the war in Ukraine and secure grain imports for his members. Sall has also highlighted that the decision to expel Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system could hurt food supplies to the continent, RFI reported. African nations have been among Russia’s most loyal supporters since the conflict in Ukraine started. In a UN vote to condemn Russia’s invasion about half the African countries chose to abstain from condemning Russia, as they sought to maintain good relations with the West, but signal to Moscow they still see Russia as an important partner. As bne IntelliNews reported, the voting patterns in the UN votes concerning the war in Ukraine paint a very clear picture of which African countries support Russia. Matviyenko’s trip to Mozambique was part of preparing the ground for this year’s summit. Bias said that Matviyenko’s visit showed that "Russia is always with Mozambique and Mozambique is always with Russia. Our relationship dates back to the period when Mozambique was fighting for independence. Even after we gained independence, Russia has always been by our side. These relations are obvious in different areas," Bias stressed. A co-ordination council has been established under the aegis of the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum (RAPF). According to Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister, “Concrete proposals for consolidating Russian-African co-operation are being worked out by three councils (co-ordinating, public and scientific ones) reporting to the Partnership Forum Secretariat. They represent ministries, agencies, business and public organisations engaged in the development of relations with the African continent.” Moscow is poised to build relations of strategic partnership with pan-African organisations and regional integration associations, Lavrov added. Lavrov said that the two most important goals of the summit will be to sign off on a “memorandum of understanding between the government of the Russian Federation and the African Union on basic principles of relations and co-operation” and a “memorandum of understanding between the Eurasian Economic Commission and the African Union on economic co-operation. The Eurasian Economic Commission is the executive body of the Eurasia Economic Union (EEU), Russia’s answer to the European Union. It is a trade club that unites five former Soviet states, with several more in the region granted observer status. Russia hopes to extend the reach of the EEU down into Africa by co-ordinating with the AU more closely. At the upcoming summit a roadmap for this co-operation will be finalised in co-operation with the Southern African Development Community (SADS), Lavrov said. Progress on building up a North-South free trade area between the EEU and AU has already taken its first concrete step forward after the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) came into effect on January 1 this year. AfCFTA reduces to zero 95% of all previous intra-Africa tariffs that were imposed on cross-border trade. Only Eritrea has not yet signed up to the deal. With that previous tariff expense eliminated, sourcing for African products can now take place on a continental basis, thus expanding the potential for African supply chain development exponentially. The free trade regime in Africa will also allow Special Economic Zones (SEZ) to import machinery and parts to make African products such as machinery. These either be sold on the regional market (when import duties on the parts become due) or re-exported to markets like Russia (duty free). With almost all high-tech machinery exports to Russia now banned, using Africa as a production base, which is free to import machinery from Europe, may become a way for Russia to avoid sanctions and buy badly needed equipment it can no longer source from Europe. For example, the Russian automotive sector has almost entirely collapsed in the first months of the war, as it remains heavily dependent on imports of parts that it cannot make itself. Russia has already begun developing such SEZs in Africa, most notably in Egypt’s Port Said but also in Mozambique and Namibia. The importance of the upcoming summit has been bolstered by the booming trade between Russia and Africa, which has soared this year. Afreximbank president Benedict Oramah said in a recent interview with Tass that trade between African countries and Russia has seen considerable progress. “Just six years ago there were exports of some $8bn from Russia and imports to Russia from Africa of $2bn or less. Today we have Russian exports to Africa worth $14bn a year and imports of African products of about $5bn. That means bilateral trade is about $20bn”. This represents a doubling in Russian-African trade since 2015, or an average annual growth rate of 15%." North Africa currently dominates Russian trade, led by Egypt ($4.53bn), Algeria ($3bn) and Morocco ($1.2bn), with South Africa fourth with $1bn, reports Tass. Moreover, in nearly all African countries Russian trade and investment is increasing. Russia is in the process of establishing a $5bn ecommerce trade portal with African countries, has been targeting Nigeria as a growth market and has a naval base at Port Sudan. The EEU will sign off an agricultural trade deal with the AU, and Egypt is expected to sign off an EEU Free Trade Agreement at the summit. Russia is heavily involved in the African oil and gas industry, but has also been investing in infrastructure, with Russia providing railway equipment to Egypt and developing manufacturing facilities on a continental basis.

### 2NC – Link – T/L

#### Putin’s increased engagement with Africa so he can counter NATO.

Knickmever 3/12 [Ellen Knickmeyer; ; 3-12-2022; Russian footholds in Mideast, Africa raise threat to NATO; AP NEWS; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-business-syria-europe-aed781f59cc4c792f4c6ecdc2541b141; 7-17-2022; SK]

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine dominates world attention. **But with less global scrutiny, Putin is also busy advancing Russia’s presence in the Middle East and Africa** -- an expansion that military and civilian leaders view as another, if less immediate, threat to security in the West. **Putin’s strategy in** the Mideast and **Africa has been simple, and successful: He seeks out security alliances with autocrats, coup leaders, and others who have been spurned or neglected by the U.S. and Europe, either because of their bloody abuses or because of competing Western strategic interests**. — In Syria, Russia’s defense minister last month showed off nuclear-capable bombers and hypersonic missiles over the Mediterranean, part of a security partnership that now has the Kremlin threatening to send Syrian fighters to Ukraine. — In Sudan, a leader of a junta that’s seized power in that East African country has a new economic alliance with the Kremlin, reviving Russia’s dreams of a naval base on the Red Sea. — In Mali, the government is the latest of more than a dozen resource-rich African nations to forge security alliances with Kremlin-allied mercenaries, according to U.S. officials. Especially in the last five or six years, “what you’ve seen is a Russia that is much more expeditionary and casting its military power further and wider afield,” retired U.S. Gen. Philip M. Breedlove told The Associated Press. “Russia is trying to show itself as a great power, as at the seat in world affairs, as driving international situations,” said Breedlove, the top NATO commander from 2013 through 2016, and now a distinguished chair at the Middle East Institute think tank in Washington. But with Putin’s hands already full battling the fierce resistance from a much weaker Ukrainian military, experts view his expansionist goals in the Middle East and Africa as a potential long-term threat, not a present danger to Europe or the NATO alliance. **“It’s threatening NATO from below**,” Kristina Kausch, a European security expert at the German Marshall Fund think-tank, said of the leverage Russia is gaining. “**The Russians have felt encircled by NATO** – **and now they want to encircle NATO**,” she said. To achieve its strategic aims, Russia provides conventional military or Kremlin-allied mercenaries to protect the regimes of often outcast leaders. In return, these leaders pay back Russia in several ways: cash or natural resources, influence in their affairs, and staging grounds for Russian fighters. **These alliances help advance Putin’s ambitions of returning Russia’s influence to its old Cold War boundaries.** Russia’s new security partnerships also aid it diplomatically. When the U.N. General Assembly condemned Putin’s Ukraine invasion this month, Syria joined Russia in voting against, and many of the African governments that have signed security deals with Russian mercenaries abstained. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Friday that Russia would bring recruits from Syria to fight in Ukraine. The threat was seen primarily as an intimidation tactic and U.S. officials say there’s been no sign of Syrian recruits in Ukraine. Some security experts say Russian mercenaries are using Mali as a staging ground for deployment to Ukraine, but U.S. officials have not confirmed these reports. Regardless of how imminent the threat is, U.S. and European leaders are paying increasing attention to Putin’s moves in the Middle East and Africa — and Russia’s growing alliance with China — as it formulates plans to protect the West from future aggression. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said in mid-February that the West could no longer ignore the competition for influence across Africa, where China spends billions on infrastructure projects to secure mineral rights, and Russia provides security through Kremlin-allied mercenaries. “We see and realize that if we withdraw from this competition as liberal democracies, then others are going to fill these gaps,” Baerbock said as Western diplomats huddled on the Ukraine crisis, in the last days before Russia’s invasion. Perhaps the boldest example of Russia flexing its global reach was when it sent defense minister Sergei Shoigu last month to Damascus to oversee Russia’s largest military drills in the Mediterranean since the Cold War, just as Russia’s military made final preparations for its assault on Ukraine. The drills, involving 15 warships and about 30 aircraft, appeared choreographed to showcase the Russian military’s capability to threaten the U.S. carrier strike group in the Mediterranean. Russia’s Hmeimeem air base on Syria’s Mediterranean coast has served as its main outpost for launching attacks in Syria since September 2015. Russia’s attacks in Syria, which leveled ancient cities and sent millions of refugees to Europe, allowed President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal government to reclaim control over most of the country after a devastating civil war. “Hmeimeem base is now an integral part of Russia’s defense strategy not just in the Middle East but all the world,′′ said Ibrahim Hamidi, a Syrian journalist and senior diplomatic editor for Syrian affairs at the London-based Asharq al-Awsat newspaper. In Africa, too, Russia is open to working with leaders known for anti-democratic actions and abuses of human rights. On the eve of Russia’s invasion with Ukraine, Kremlin officials met in Moscow with an officer of a military junta that seized power in Sudan. Isolated by the West, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo warmly responded to Russia’s overture of a new economic-focused alliance. Upon returning home, Gen. Dagolo announced that Sudan would be open to allowing Russia to build its long hoped-for naval base at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. It’s far from certain that Russia would be able to take advantage anytime soon. The Ukraine invasion is straining its military and financial resources and showing Russia’s military weaknesses, and international sanctions are crippling its economy. But longer-term, a Red Sea port could help give it a greater role in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, increase Russian access in the Suez Canal and other high-traffic shipping lanes, and allow Russia to project force in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. “They certainly could create enough havoc to cause problems,” said Breedlove, the former NATO commander. **Russia’s expanding alliances aren’t just about its conventional military.** From 2015 to 2021, Russian mercenary security outfits increased their presence around the world seven-fold, with operations in 27 countries as of last year, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The most prominent is the Wagner Group, which the U.S. and EU consider to be a surrogate of the Russian military, but which the Kremlin denies even exists. **From Libya to Madagascar, security contracts granted to Wagner Group and others give Russia access to mineral resources, staging grounds for deployments and substantial footholds** challenging Western nations’ influence there.

#### Increased cohesion isolates Russia from Libya. Past efforts have failed due to disunity.

Maggi 2/25 [Roberta Maggi; ; 2-25-2022; Building security: How Europeans can help reform Libya; ECFR; https://ecfr.eu/publication/building-security-how-europeans-can-help-reform-libya/; 7-17-2022; SK] \*SSR = Security Sector Reform

European security assistance

The hybrid nature of Libya’s security sector, characterised by many armed groups operating outside state control, has created significant legal and procedural obstacles for EU agencies. Libyan leaders’ lack of support for SSR has been a significant reason why bilateral and multilateral European support initiatives never developed beyond poorly executed train-and-equip exercises. Worse still, a lack of conditions attached to European equipment deliveries sometimes allowed the Libyan government to integrate militiamen into the formal security sector before they had received training.

Years of failed security partnerships also reflect Europe’s incoherent policy on Libya. European leaders, like their Libyan counterparts, have had no vision for SSR. This has undermined European initiatives in Libya in the long term, with policymakers focused on transient solutions to the problems of the day.

France was one of the first Western countries to back Haftar’s burgeoning military autocracy in Cyrenaica, including through training and arms provisions. Paris couched this support in a narrative of law and order, and opposition to terrorism and Islamism. However, French forces and the LAAF did not participate in Libya’s biggest counter-terrorism operation of recent years – which removed the Islamic State group from Sirte in 2016, and which was spearheaded by Misratan groups with American, British, and Italian backing. This operation involved logistical and material support, initiatives to build local operational capacity, the deployment of special forces, airstrikes, and initiatives to help construct a cohesive counter-terrorism force. It proved to be more successful and well-contained than the LAAF counter-terrorism campaign, which has become a political and economic behemoth that exploits civilians in the areas under its control.

France, in contrast, appeared to prioritise its partnership with Haftar and regional partners such as the UAE above a common European position. The approach was designed to strengthen the French position in Libya and the Sahel more broadly, but it disregarded Haftar’s human rights abuses. This directly weakened international accountability mechanisms, established precedents of impunity for other Libyan actors, and allowed Haftar to remain a troublesome political actor following his military defeat. It also helped Russia and Turkey become kingmakers in Libya, while fuelling Franco-Turkish geopolitical tension, including in the eastern Mediterranean.

Italy’s efforts to compete with France in Libya have had a similar effect, resulting in overt Italian backing for groups in western Libya. The rivalry between Italy and France persists, despite the 2021 Quirinale accord, due to the fundamental divergence of their interests in Libya. For Rome, Libya has always been a national foreign policy priority – so, it is disdainful of what it sees as France playing fast and loose with Italian national security. Despite its criticism of the French approach, however, Italy has also adopted a destructive approach to security partnerships, as seen in the €32.6m it has spent since 2017 on the Libyan coastguard – whose units have abused migrants and refugees.

This policy helped strengthen predatory and often criminal local militias at the expense of initiatives to build structural government capacity and sustainable migration partnerships. Although it helped block refugees’ attempts to cross the Mediterranean at the time, the policy has come back to haunt Italy. Human rights atrocities carried out by Italian-funded militias are not only embarrassing for Rome but could result in legal action. Worse still, the GNU now seeks to expand the Italian policy into a model for extorting European states without addressing migration issues effectively.

The French and Italian cases illustrate why Europeans have lost influence in Libya since 2011, despite their many high-profile attempts at engagement with the Libyan authorities. Not strategic enough bilaterally yet not cohesive enough to form a powerful policy bloc, Europeans have been unable to compete with regional actors that are more single-minded in their aim for a political transition and face fewer domestic obstacles to their policies. Additionally, the pressing political imperatives behind Europeans’ migration and counter-terrorism policies have resulted in expedient solutions and poor vetting of their partners in Libya.

Although there is still space for Europeans to help stabilise Libya, be it in a technical or political capacity, they have yet to articulate how they would achieve this – let alone seize the opportunity to do so. They need to avoid the short-term policies based on perceived security imperatives that have damaged their reputation among Libyans. France’s and Italy’s self-serving policies have shaped public perceptions of all Europeans. Accordingly, Libyans no longer regard individual European states as reliable partners, despite the amount of funding these countries have poured into development assistance, notably on border management, counter-migration, and counter-terrorism.

The EU’s contributions to multilateral capacity building efforts through its missions and some international organisations were insufficient and ineffectual, partly due to disunity between key member states. They neither countered the negative impact of Italian and French ventures in Libya nor matched the financial and political commitments of actors such as Russia, Turkey, Egypt, and the UAE.

While many lower-level contributions to SSR have been funded through European countries’ development assistance budgets, these initiatives were often siloed and were broadly undermined by Europe’s lack of strategic cohesion. Germany was more successful in its diplomatic approach, notably through the Berlin Process and its attempts to unify Europeans on Libya. This political initiative paved the way for progress on SSR. The JMC, despite its failings, demonstrates that Europeans can have a meaningful role in international security policies when they work together.

Inadequate European strategy and leadership have hampered multilateral mechanisms that could have coordinated security assistance in the long term. Moreover, mechanisms for coordination between European missions remain rudimentary and largely informal, as they are reluctant to share information on security issues. Nevertheless, the situation has improved somewhat recently. During Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli, European states produced a joint report on their role in Libya, which was written by heads of missions and which referred to SSR as an issue for cooperation between them and UNSMIL. Shared recognition of the threat the offensive posed to European interests helped break down traditional barriers to information sharing. It prompted European states to take stock of their existing initiatives and limit duplication where possible.

France, Germany, and Italy are finally improving their cooperation on Libya. This could be seen in a joint visit to Libya by their foreign ministers in early 2021. More substantively, France took the lead in the Berlin Process in November 2021, holding a conference in Paris to try to salvage Libya’s election. And Italy now seeks to continue developing the process. This has boosted European diplomacy in Libya in ways that should lead to more cohesive European security policies in the country.

Policy recommendations

For Europeans to compete effectively with their geopolitical rivals in Libya, they will need a shared high-level strategy and joint operational principles. Given their limited room for manoeuvre in Libya, they should develop a medium- to long-term plan for security sector assistance. They should begin by establishing a Libyan-owned SSR body, endowing it with some political influence, and supporting its attempts to reorganise Libya’s security sector. The aim should be to create an institution that can outlast the country’s current political struggles and crises, as well as to support local initiatives and partners who can engage in shorter-term SSR programmes.

Step 1: Shape a coherent European approach

As discussed, the political anxieties and short-termism of European and Libyan leaders remain the primary obstacle to the comprehensive reform of security institutions. Germany, France, and Italy should take the lead in laying out the priorities, boundaries, and operational principles of a shared EU approach to SSR in Libya. Without a unified strategy and policy, Europeans will be unable to end the inertia generated by their rivals in Libya and will squander their greatest assets: the technical expertise and resources of organisations such as NATO and the EU.

A coherent European strategy for SSR could encourage member states such as Spain, the Netherlands, and Denmark to maximise the impact of their support for Libya as part of an EU-wide approach. This effort should begin with an objective needs assessment of Libya’s security sector that maps all SSR initiatives in the country. This process would improve the technical support that Europeans provide to Libya and identify areas in which it would be most effective to work bilaterally, in partnerships, or through multilateral institutions. Brussels should implement a coordinated, long-term European plan for Libyan SSR that includes mechanisms for cooperation and knowledge transfer between Europeans.

Identifying and mapping out a European SSR support strategy in this way could also facilitate enhanced multilateral cooperation with key partners such as the UK, the US, and NATO. Russia’s growing presence in Libya, close to NATO installations in Sicily, only adds to the urgency of these efforts. The 2003 Berlin Plus arrangement between NATO and the EU creates avenues for joint programming and could enhance organisational and capacity building projects in Libya. NATO has stated that it will provide capacity building support if the Libyan government requests this.

Should Europeans reach a consensus on the scope of SSR cooperation with NATO, this could also help repair the Europe-Turkey relationship in Libya. Working through NATO would diminish Turkey’s concerns about being marginalised in Libya, while providing Europeans with a platform on which to reduce Turkish influence on the Libyan security sector. Such cooperation would not induce Ankara to abandon its controversial agreement with the Libyan government on maritime boundaries, but it could help Europeans discourage Turkey from weaponising Libyan politics, gas reserves, or migration to extract concessions from the EU. This could build confidence between Europe and Turkey at a time when their relationship is fraught. It would also reduce the chances of a Turkish-Russian partnership taking control in Libya. Given Russia’s growing influence in sub-Saharan Africa, a united front with Turkey could have geopolitical benefits beyond Libya – by helping Europeans regain influence over Russia’s expansion in Africa.

Step 2: Empower a Libyan-owned Joint Security Commission

Any credible, practical European strategy for SSR in Libya will require a Libyan vehicle to own and implement the process. Again, recent developments have created opportunities for this. Through UNSMIL, Europe should initiate the establishment of a Joint Security Commission (JSC) as a second phase of the JMC that focuses on SSR, while the JMC nominally continues to handle interim security arrangements. The JSC would have different priorities from the JMC and, to meet the political requirements of SSR, would be under civilian leadership.

The use of JMC branding would associate this new body with UN recognition and avoid some of the bureaucratic challenges of creating an entirely new mechanism, thereby increasing its legitimacy among Libyans and Libya’s international partners. As a civilian-led body, the JSC would be more acceptable to the many armed and political forces that fought against Haftar or Qaddafi – which are especially prevalent in western Libya, and which fear a return to military dictatorship. The evolution of the JMC represented by the JSC could also capitalise on the changing views of members of the Libyan security services, many of whom have in the past year rejected division as a means to stabilise Libya and grown increasingly eager to protect their country’s sovereignty. By bringing in key commanders as part of its membership, the JSC could formalise assistance for the Haddad-Nathouri initiative and local SSR efforts. The body could gain the recognition and nominal support from Haftar it needs by ensuring that he has representatives among the civilian leadership. To avoid being hijacked as the JMC was, the JSC should combine political representation with technocrats from the security sector.

Nevertheless, as Haftar and other Libyan political elites could try to undermine the JSC, Europeans should push them not to do so through offers of enhanced partnerships and threats of sanctions against those who spoil the JSC’s work. Sustained pressure, close support for the JSC, and attempts to find common cause with other international actors in Libya would be key to the body’s success.

The JSC’s priority should be to articulate a Libyan-owned vision for SSR that Europeans can support and that has effective oversight mechanisms. To sustain the new body’s influence, Europeans should promote inclusive dialogue on the security needs of the Libyan population and consultations with armed groups from the start.

As a next step, Europeans should provide technical assistance to the JSC as it plans how to surmount the main obstacles to SSR. This could be channelled and coordinated through the International Follow-up Committee on Libya. In this setup, the JSC would act as a vehicle for Europeans and Libyans to create mutually beneficial policies on issues where their interests converge, such as the departure of foreign mercenaries. As the JMC already engages with this issue under interim security arrangements, it would be a useful area in which to ensure the two bodies complement each other.

Meanwhile, European technical support could help strengthen the rule of law in ways that protect ordinary Libyans. Libyan elites may not make optimal use of such assistance, but it would contribute to a cultural shift towards sustainable, systematic solutions to security problems.

Another key challenge for the JSC would be planning for the unification of Libya’s police and armed forces, which is the first step towards the development of professional security services that could eventually degrade and neutralise the influence of criminal and ideological militias. This process could be important in formulating comprehensive DDR strategies and increasing European support for Libya’s security sector. It would allow Europeans to target funding more effectively and address key operational issues – including local capacity to conduct arrest and seizure operations across Libya, which are important to migration and counter-terrorism policy. The professionalisation of the security services would also help Libya create comprehensive security and judicial policies to combat smuggling and process migrants and refugees – making it much easier for European states to implement their own migration policies. Similarly, the reform of Libya’s Ministry of Defence would allow Europe to channel significant funds from the European Peace Facility to the country’s security sector.

The unification of Libya’s police and armed forces will also require operational changes such as the standardisation of rules of engagement across the country. This would enable other Libyan institutions to set up oversight mechanisms for demobilisation and professionalisation in the security sector.

Another promising avenue of SSR involves internationally sponsored initiatives such as the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and future consensus generating mechanisms and consultative programmes (such as the National Conference Process consultations of 2018). It is important to include security sector personnel in political programmes given armed groups’ influence on Libyan politics and policy. On a national scale, most of Libya’s armed groups are highly localised in their command structures, interpersonal relationships, and self-perception as guardians of specific communities. It would be wise to consult with them in political discussions to win their support for national SSR policies. This approach would also help the authorities understand armed groups and thereby build more successful DDR programmes. Indeed, a critical mass of support from some armed groups could counteract the obstructive behaviour of criminal, ideological, or politicised militias. To this end, in the lead-up to an election, the JSC should create mechanisms for armed groups to engage with the political process constructively and in ways that can survive a change of government. Some foreign powers have already provided these groups with ways to engage with the political process – including through the creation of new leadership, as well as institutional and local-level initiatives – but more needs to be done to ensure that such efforts fit within a coherent SSR strategy.

Step 3: Deter spoilers

It will be vital for Europeans to deter domestic and international spoilers. This will initially require Europe to build a broad base of international support for its SSR strategy. Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE are all influential among different constituencies in Libya and, after years of competition, are now exploring ways to cooperate with one another. All three have an interest in stabilising Libya, which will require the creation of a functional security service. France, Germany, and Italy should try to persuade them that the European SSR strategy is the only way forward, before giving them responsibility for certain aspects of the strategy to ensure that they are invested in it. Europeans will also need to deter them from using their proxies to sabotage these efforts at reform.

Russia is likely to remain Libya’s spoiler-in-chief. Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, uses its Libyan partners to disrupt the political process and unification efforts while exploiting the resulting anarchy to secure military bases and key oil production sites. The firm will likely be difficult to brush aside. But, by working with or deterring other potential spoilers, Europe could help isolate Russia and limit its capacity to counter the European SSR strategy. This approach should also look to take advantage of many Libyans’ resentment of Russian attacks on Libya’s sovereignty and political transition. If it becomes possible to develop a partnership with Russia, Europe could use a security working group under the Berlin Process to launch a truly multilateral approach to SSR.

#### **A more cohesive NATO strategy would reshape security cooperation with Africa.**

Tardy ’22 [Thierry Tardy; director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College in Rome and visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges; February 2022; German Marshall Fund of the United States; https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Tardy%20-%20NATO%20MENA%20-%20brief.pdf; 7-17-2022; SK]

The Way Forward There is a consensus on the fact that the security challenges in the Middle East and North Africa can create instability in NATO member states, which therefore ought to do something about it. Whether there exists a consensus on what to do and whether NATO should be a central component of the response is less obvious. With these reservations in mind, below are three steps that NATO ought to take were it be willing to shape the security environment in the MENA. Strategy The ongoing Ukraine crisis has given NATO a new direction in the sense that it has provided it with a relatively straightforward task: to deter and defend against Russia on the eastern flank. The alliance has adopted doctrinal documents and taken measures aimed at operationalizing this agenda. Nothing like this really exists with regard to the southern flank.23 Policy documents like the Framework for the South or the Package for the South are not strategic texts nor do they define a level of ambition for NATO in the region. This is partly a sign that the allies want to concentrate on the eastern flank (and maybe then on China) and that the attention and energy that they are ready to dedicate to the MENA is limited as a consequence. **If, on the contrary, NATO wishes to upgrade its presence and impact in the MENA, then a significant effort is to be made at the strategic level**. The alliance could not by itself address the root causes of instability in the region, which is clearly beyond its remit, but it could at least give more purposefulness to what it has done so far. This first implies a comprehensive analysis of the security situation in the MENA and of the issues that are likely to spill over into NATO in the near future. This does not need to be carried out by NATO itself. It could rely on national input or a mix of open-source and classified information. On this basis, a strategic reflection and document, as part of the current Strategic Concept process, defining the objectives, methods, and resources of NATO’s presence in the region is of the essence. **A dedicated document or a section in the Strategic Concept would not only give visibility to a policy that has suffered from a lack of strategy, it would also clarify the level of ambition of the allies**. A strategic narrative laying down a “renewed cooperative security” ambition for the region would also help articulate such ambition with NATO’s deterrence and defense agenda. Resources and political commitment would have to follow suit and be sustained over time. No quick fix will do. Furthermore, a “renewed cooperative security” plan should be accompanied by strategic communication (in English, French, and Arabic) on what NATO intends to do, how, and why it matters to the recipient entities. Any strategic-communications or public-diplomacy effort should also include a counter-disinformation component. Ideally such communication would be paired with a similar exercise carried out by the EU. Realistically, the chance that such a strategic framework will be adopted is not high; conversely, the chance that NATO would achieve anything meaningful in the region absent a strategic vision is equally low. Division of Tasks and Concentration of Efforts Second, any purposeful NATO presence in the MENA will have to be the result of a well thought-through partnership with the EU. The two institutions must capitalize on what they do best and refrain from developing activities that are better covered by the other. This also applies to cooperation with the UN and its development and humanitarian agencies. The typology of security issues in the region presented above is useful in this respect. Distinguishing between conflicts, terrorism, or organized crime; between state fragility, bad governance, or the porosity of borders; and the more diffuse human-security issues makes it possible to identify areas where a military alliance can add value and others where it most likely will not. NATO can play a role in response to open conflicts or terrorism, and it can contribute to the strengthening of military and security institutions, but it is unlikely to be able to bring anything tangible in human-security domains. This prioritization matters to the definition of where the alliance should go, but it also calls for partnerships insofar as any NATO activity on a narrow segment will only produce an effect if complemented by parallel actions on the other (economic, political, etc.) segments, by other entities. With this logic in mind, if NATO and the EU are engaged in capacity-building and training in the region, NATO must concentrate on the defense segment for which it offers the best know-how or resources. **This includes tasks such as defense-sector reform, capacity-building on operations in high-temperature environments, military counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, assisting in building interoperability between allies and partner countries, and handling improvised explosive devices**.25 But NATO should probably refrain from investing in security areas where the EU or the UN are better placed or only embrace these tasks in places where the others cannot go. Focus on the defense segment suggests that NATO alone is unlikely to play a strategic role, in the sense that its limited presence will in most cases be insufficient to be transformative. Hence the importance of inter-institutional cooperation. **Beyond cooperative security, NATO must retain the capacity to conduct military operations in a crisis-management mode in the region**. This goes against the current post-Afghanistan mood, yet the nature of the environment makes it impossible to rule out a major military operation one day. (There was similar intervention fatigue in 2010 while NATO was drafting its Strategic Concept and a year later it got involved in Libya.) This carries implications for NATO planning and exercises as well as for the projection capabilities of European states, at a time when the collective-defense agenda tends to concentrate on territorial defense.

#### Relations between Russia and North Africa are only possible because of US isolation

Isabelle Falcon ’17, Deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, “Russia’s quest for influence in North Africa and the Middle East”, Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, 4/11/17, https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/en/8.pdf

**This confirms that Russia’s regional politics remain above all an instrument working towards the realisation of larger ambitions in its foreign policy and security agenda**. This is shown perhaps by what is left of its, still modest, economic footprint. The regional powers are aware of this whilst taking into account the calculations of a strengthened Russia. Indeed, **said powers are often at the origin of such rapprochements**. Thus, **the heating up of links with Algeria would not have been possible if the Algerian regime had not needed international legitimisation** at the end of the period of violence that it emerged from at the end of the 1990s. **In the case of Egypt, the rapprochement can also be explained by Cairo’s** will to play Russia and America off against one another **so as to draw the greatest profits**. This is in a context where it is necessary to find a solution to the very reserved stance of Western countries towards President Sisi’s regime. Indeed, regional actors maintain their independence as, despite Russia’s new found political and military credibility, they are still seen as “strangers in the Middle East.”75 To explain this, several examples are cited by an expert including the constitutional project proposed by Moscow for Syria following the Astana76 format which is unpopular in the region (for example in Turkey). The same specialist also evokes the traces left in the region by Russia and their contribution to the creation of memories of “Russian wars against Islam” (Afghanistan, Chechnya and Aleppo).77 The multi-faceted game which Moscow employs – at times both a strength and a means of safeguarding its influence in a particularly unstable and conflictual area – contributes to the blurring of its image. In Syria, how should Russia develop relations with Tehran when the Gulf monarchies and especially Israel aim to extract concessions from Moscow in order to contain Iranian influence? There are many in Iran who believe, as put by the old spokesperson of the Iranian ex-president Mohamed Khatami, that Russians are untrustworthy and likely “to stab you in the back.”78 Many of these new regional relations, whether with Turkey or Saudi Arabia, lie on shaky foundations and are far from being based on complete trust. Success is not always straightforward or clear, a conclusion demonstrated by the mixed result of the Astana Conference held in March 2017. **An important parameter of the Russian growth in regional influence lies in the possibility that the region becomes the object of a “deal” between Moscow and the Trump administration**. This would be under the name of the struggle against international terrorism. As of March 2017, too many uncertain variables are in play to proffer a definitive answer to this question. For now, **political circumstances in Washington are preventing progress from being made, given Russia’s place at the heart of issues questioning the legitimacy of** Donald **Trump**. In any case, scepticism abounds in Moscow as Trump’s new security advisor, H. R. McMaster is not the zealous proponent of total war against radical Islam that Flynn was” and that “this limits room for détente.”79 The Trump administration’s position on Iran (the president will doubtless be keen to limit Iran’s influence in Syria) could complicate things, especially as Russia is attached to the JCPOA that Trump has criticised at several instances.80

### 2NC – Link – Western isolation

#### Drive by Western isolation – key to intervention in Libya

Eugene Rumer ’19, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, “Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10/31/19, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/31/russia-in-middle-east-jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none-pub-80233

**Russia’s return to North Africa too has to be considered against the backdrop of the United States’ disengagement from the region**. The relationship between Moscow and Cairo, interrupted in the 1970s with the latter’s pivot toward the United States, underwent a significant upgrade after the 2013 coup in Egypt and the rise of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to the presidency. Criticized in the West for his human rights abuses, **Sisi found in Putin a convenient partner to help shore up his domestic standing and leverage vis-à-vis Washington**. Egypt has emerged as an important customer for Russian arms. Russia and Egypt have partnered in supporting one of the factions in the Libyan civil war, the Libyan National Army, but the country remains too badly fractured for the LNA to score a decisive victory. **Moscow expects to have a say in negotiations about the conflict and to reestablish commercial opportunities derailed by** Muammar **Qaddafi’s demise**.

#### Distrust in the US is key

Youssef Cherif ’19, Deputy Director, Columbia Global Centers, Tunis, “The Interests of Putin’s Russia in the MENA Region in Historical Perspective”, EuroMesco, The Role of Russia in the Middle East and North Africa Region. Strategy or Opportunism?, April 2019, https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Joint-Policy-Study\_12\_The-role-of-Russia-in-the-MENA-region.pdf

**Russia’s return was also encouraged by America’s problems**. The US was stuck in the Iraqi whirlpool. Syria was participating in undermining America’s presence in Iraq. Iran, Russia’s partner, was expanding its reach in the Middle East (Iraq, Lebanon, Syria). **Washington**, which had plans to contain Iran**, was itself contained in Iraq between Syria and Iran**. It was that moment of weakness that Putin sought to exploit. On the other hand, **a general malaise was felt inside the Arab ruling elites in the 2000s vis-à-vis Washington**. Most Arab countries (as well as Iran and Turkey) opposed the US war on Iraq, and that included the most pro-American ones among them. They were therefore on the same line as Moscow. The Bush administration’s discourse about democracy and human rights, the destitution of Saddam Hussein and the introduction of democracy to Iraq, as well as the US-backed Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, all this had spread fear among the ruling autocrats. **In the Kremlin, where conspiracy theories about US-led revolutions are rife, the Arab leaders found a listening ear and repeated it constantly to their US counterparts**. 5 **This convergence in opinions created a synergy between Moscow and many Arabs that would blossom in the following decade**. Whether Putin meditated carefully on his current MENA strategy or if he is simply an opportunist will continue to be debated until more Russian archives are declassified. **What is certain is that Moscow managed to cultivate friends in all of the MENA countries and to prove indispensable for some**. By the end of the 2000s, Russia was an important player in the region, to be counted along with the US and the EU. It seems that Vladimir Putin has jumped on every single opportunity that presented itself, calculated the benefits Russia can make – be it economic or geopolitical – and threw the dice. So when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2010, he was in the right place. The moment was ripe to increase Russia’s presence in the region, which he did. Today, **Russia can engage with all sides, including sworn enemies who wage wars against each other, and is once again treated as a global power not to be neglected.**

#### Western abandonment is key to Russia-North Africa relations

Isabelle Falcon ’17, Deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, “Russia’s quest for influence in North Africa and the Middle East”, Fondation pour la Recherche Stategique, 4/11/17, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/programs/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/russias-quest-influence-north-africa-and-middle-east-2017

Beyond the military operations in Syria starting from September 2015, Russia surprised the international community through its capacity to talk with several major players about the Syrian issue, including non-state actors, such as the Kurds. **This significantly contributed to the fact that it managed to impose itself as a vital mediator**. **This approach reflects the strategy pursued more generally in the Northern Africa/Middle East region**. No relation is excluded, including those with Fatah or the Iraqi Kurds. Such an approach aims at widening Russian room for manoeuvre. If the legacy of the Soviet era favours the development of certain relations, it does not render them exclusive. Thus, from 2001, President Putin signed a strategic partnership agreement with his Algerian counterpart. However, this did not stop Moscow from engaging with Morocco with whom the Kremlin had always maintained relations, and conversely with Tunisia. In the Middle East, the partnership with Iran has reached an unprecedented level. In four years (2013 – 2017), Presidents Putin and Rouhani have met on eight separate occasions. The last meeting being the first bilateral meeting between the two men. Tehran has authorised Russia to temporarily use the base of Nojeh for its air strikes in Syria. This increased Russo-Iranian proximity has not stopped the links between Russia and Israel from becoming an important paradigm of the Kremlin’s regional policy. The demographic weight of Israeli citizens of Soviet origin undoubtedly contributed to this development. Communication between the two countries became particularly during the Russian military intervention in Syria. The Russian government is showing itself to be particularly attentive to Israel’s concerns regarding the presence of Hezbollah and the military influence of Iran in Syria. Considering that dialogue is preferable to tension and recriminations, Russia has actively sought to establish workable relations with Saudi Arabia. The two countries show themselves inclined to compartmentalise the issues that characterise their bilateral relations. **Thus Russia has shown itself to be faithful to a new foreign policy that seeks to diversify its relations in all regions**. In the region concerned, this effort must take into consideration the fact that the inherited networks of the Soviet era have been significantly eroded since the 1990s. Moreover, **the growing instability in the zone, especially since the Arab Spring, has forced the Kremlin to demonstrate its flexibility so as to not remove any options in the event that political relations were to evolve.** In this context, **Moscow has also managed to appreciate the opportunity that was presented by the perception spread at the regional level of a “confusion” of Western powers** (caused by such factors as the “abandonment” of Mubarak, red lines not followed in Syria and the United States’ regional disengagement). Thus, Moscow did not hesitate to manipulate the disappointments left by Western political leaders to its advantage. This partly explains the development of relations with Egypt, which, after the military coup d’état of 2013, is looking to establish a more independent foreign policy. **Despite the strong ambiguities that will lastingly encumber the Russo-Turkish relationship** (starting with the Kurdish question), **Turkey and Russia continue to share a strong disdain for the West**. After the coup attempt in Turkey, the immediate support offered by Moscow to the “legitimate authorities” help to repair the damage left by the crisis of the Su-24 shot down by Turkish forces. This marked a stark contrast with Western capitals which voiced their concerns about the repression carried out by the Turkish regime. Russia also knows that its link with Tehran indirectly benefits from the suspicion Iran harbours for the Western powers. The pragmatism observed in the Saudi Arabia/Russia relationship is tied to Riyadh’s desire to diversify its foreign policy in a context where its relationship with Washington has undergone a restructuring in recent years. The arms deals made with Iraq underline Baghdad’s desire to strengthen its political independence from Washington. **In the Maghreb, even the situation is less “severe” for the West, “the Russian project finds a favourable environment due to these countries’ belief in the** necessity for a better balanced, bipolar world” (against a highly fluid backdrop, a rapprochement with Moscow can now be used to put pressure on EU countries and the US ). **These circumstances have notably favoured the recent development of Russo-Moroccan relations and**, to a lesser extent, **Russo-Tunisian relations**. In general, Russia plays a sensitive game in the entirety of the region. This is demonstrated when Moscow states that its policy in the Middle East and North Africa will always be led on a basis of “respecting their [states’] sovereignty and territorial integrity and the right to self-determination without outside interference” (Foreign Policy Concept).

#### Coop is driven by Russia’s distance from the West

Samuel Ramani ‘20, is a DPhil candidate at the University of Oxford’s Department of Politics and International Relations, “Russia Takes its Syrian Model of Counterinsurgency to Africa”, Rusi, 9/9/20, https://rusi.org/commentary/russia-takes-its-syrian-model-counterinsurgency-africa

Although it remains unclear whether Moscow assisted Mali’s coup plotters, supporting an extra-legal turnover of power would severely undercut Russia’s aspirations to become a counterinsurgency leader in Africa. Since Russia embarked on its military intervention in support of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad in September 2015, **the Kremlin has advertised its ‘Syrian model’ of counterinsurgency to African countries struggling with political violence**. **This model emphasises state-to-state cooperation between Russia and African governments and presents authoritarian stability as the most effective antidote to extremism**. As the **unilateralism that underpins US counterterrorism efforts** in Somalia **and Washington’s frequent attachment of human rights conditions for military assistance have frustrated African leaders,** Russia’s alternative counterinsurgency model has become increasingly attractive in Africa**.** In April 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Somalia desired Russian equipment to aid its counterterrorism operations and Somalia subsequently requested Moscow’s assistance in upgrading its military preparedness. Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir praised Russia’s Syrian model of counterinsurgency more explicitly in November 2017 by stating that ‘if it were not for the Russian intervention in the situation in Syria, then this country would be lost’. More recently, US Secretary of Defense Mark **Esper’s wavering commitment to African security and France’s counterinsurgency struggles in the Sahel have increased the appeal of Russia’s counterterrorism model in West Africa**. Nigeria’s Ambassador to Russia Steve Ugbah argued in in October 2019 that ‘We’re sure that with Russian help we’ll manage to crush Boko Haram’ and cited Russia’s defeat of the Islamic State in Syria as proof for this statement. In November 2019, large-scale anti-French and anti-UN protests erupted in Mali’s capital Bamako calling for Russia to vanquish Islamists in Mali like it did in Syria.

#### Cooperation depends on anti-US sentiment

Samuel Ramani ‘20, is a DPhil candidate at the University of Oxford’s Department of Politics and International Relations, “Russia Takes its Syrian Model of Counterinsurgency to Africa”, Rusi, 9/9/20, https://rusi.org/commentary/russia-takes-its-syrian-model-counterinsurgency-africa

In spite of its military setbacks and cautious counterterrorism policy, **Russia has** capitalised on anti-Western sentiments **and effective branding of its Syrian model of counterinsurgency to secure arms deals and economic contracts**. Russia is the leading arms vendor to Africa, as it supplied 49% of North Africa’s weapons and 28% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s weapons between 2014–18, and numerous African states struggling with insurgencies have requested Russian weaponry. After human rights concerns prevented the US from selling advanced aircraft to Nigeria in 2014, Abuja struck a deal with Moscow to purchase Mi-35 and Mi-17 fighter jets. Nigeria’s reliance on Russian aircraft in its struggle against Boko Haram resulted in its agreement to purchase another 12 Mi-35 fighter jets from Russia in October 2019. **Russia has also supplied light weaponry to Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan, as all three countries grapple with varying degrees of isolation from international arms markets. Russia has also presented itself as a counterinsurgency partner in order to expand its access to the continent’s mineral deposits**. Russia’s PMC deployments in support of Central African Republic’s President Faustin-Archange Touadera against Seleka rebels are closely intertwined with its desire to profit from the country’s vast diamond reserves. Russia has spearheaded efforts to lift export restrictions on diamond sales from the Central African Republic and leveraged its counterinsurgency campaign to profit Lobaye Invest, a mining company with close ties to Yevgeny Prigozhin. **Russian media outlets and think tanks often assert that US and French counterterrorism campaigns in the Sahel are aimed at securing hegemony over the region’s vast uranium stockpiles**. However, Russia’s civilian nuclear energy giant Rosatom’s forays into Nigeria and aspirations to enter Niger’s uranium market are undoubtedly strengthened by the positive impact of counterinsurgency cooperation on Moscow’s bilateral relationships with West African countries.

## 2NC Impact Toolbox

### 2NC – Libya Impact – Russia Coop Key

#### Russia is the key regional broker for bringing peace to Libya and North Africa broadly

Marianna Belenkaya ’19, writes on the Middle East for the Russian daily Kommersant. An Arab studies scholar with almost 20 years of experience covering the Middle East, “Russia keeps plugging away at cooperation with North Africa”, Al-Monitor, 1/29/20, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/01/russia-north-africa-algeria-morocco-tunisia.html

Tunisia’s ambitions and abilities are more modest; nevertheless, the nation managed to spark interest in Russian entrepreneurs, who are also weighing the prospects of working in Libya. In any case, **Russia is obviously willing to develop its relations with Africa in general and with the northern part of the continent Africa particularly**. For instance, Moscow plans to organize a Russia-Africa summit in the fall. **North Africa's Arab nations are likely to provide much-needed help and support, considering that currently they are Russia’s main are** primary drivers of cooperation **between Russia and the African continent**. According to authors of the “Russia-Africa Shared Vision 2030” report who spoke with Al-Monitor, from 2010 to 2017 Russian exports to Africa basically tripled, increasing from $5.1 billion to $14.8 billion. It should be noted, however, that this amount almost exclusively consists of trade with North African countries; more precisely, Algeria and Egypt received 73% of such Russian exports in 2017. **Lavrov’s meetings in the Maghreb also touched upon the conflicts in Libya and Western Sahara**. In its view of the latter, Moscow tries to balance between Algeria and Morocco. As the Russian foreign minister moved from one country to another, he had to adjust his statements with utmost caution. However, **in regard to this conflict, as with many others, Russia formally advocates for compromise and dialogue**. Expressing his position on the situation in Libya, Lavrov objected to the arbitrary choice of election dates, emphasizing that the conflicting sides should reach a consensus first. He said Russia is willing to become a mediator for anyone interested in peace.

### 2NC – Libya Impact – AT: Not Russia’s Focus

#### Russia sees stability in North Africa as a core foreign policy goal as long as its stranded from the West

Mihai Chihaia ’18, is an Expert with the Romanian think tank Strategikon and a PhD Candidate in International Relations, “North Africa – A Gateway for Russia’s Involvement”, Global Policy, 3/7/20, https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/03/2018/north-africa-%E2%80%93-gateway-russia%E2%80%99s-involvement

**North Africa has long been an essential vector for Russian foreign policy, with multiple** political, diplomatic and military **resources dedicated to the presence in this region**. On the overall, **Russia looks to build up its presence in the area through establishing closer links in mutually beneficial areas** such as military, energy and nuclear energy in particular (developing nuclear reactors with local partners) **and also looks to boost strategic partnerships or explore new domains of cooperation** (establishing factories of Russian manufacturers in the region, developing new paths of economic cooperation in agriculture, technology, tourism etc.). The main aim is to display itself as a strong partner and develop economic ramifications that bring revenues and political influence. Strategically speaking, the Russian government aims to recognize the local economic and military needs in North Africa and enhance its regional presence. In this sense, wearing off debts under some form of agreement and attractive financial schemes are very effective tools. Russia also quantifies on the need of the regional actors to diversify their international partners, for instance when acquiring military equipment. What are the implications for the region? The North African countries are looking for economic stability and development, diplomatic support, and to ensure that their security needs are met. In other words, this indicates that the local governments are ready to cooperate with global and regional powers. Therefore, they generally welcome the Russian involvement, although they treat it with cautiousness. **On the long term it is rather difficult to assess developments but naturally, the EU and the US will search for ways to become more visible and enhance their credibility in the region, countering the Russian influence**. The extent of cooperation between Russia and the North African countries **In the context of the uncertainty of the relations with the US** (a traditional long-standing ally), **it is clear the need for Morocco to search to strengthen ties with other international powers and explore every option available.** Proof of this is the king’s visits to China and Russia, in spring 2016, in order to deepen strategic ties. Russia developed relations with Morocco on two directions, namely economic and security & defense. **Once again, Russia is seizing the opportunity to fill a gap and extend its influence by being ready to supply Morocco with military equipment and expand economic ties** (growing foreign investments, trade and expanding tourism opportunities – Morocco seems very appealing for Russian tourists). I would argue that in the case of Morocco, Russia is looking to establish itself as a strategic partner in multiple areas. The recent visit of the Russian Prime Minister in October 2017 confirms this, its scope being to explore new dimensions for furthering this partnership, the economic area being the most feasible way to do so (with emphasis on agriculture, trade, energy, tourism etc.) while also exploring cooperation in the military sphere. **The Russian Prime Minister’s tour also included Algeria**, highlights of the visit being discussions to further deliver military equipment (aircrafts and air defense systems) and to establish factories of Russian companies that make trucks, bulldozers etc. The Russians are looking to extend the economic cooperation and maintain Algeria as an important weapons buyer. Russia is the largest supplier of military equipment to Algeria and according to the data gathered by SIPRI, every year from 1999 to 2016 Algeria has signed deals to buy significant weaponry from Russia (a few examples in this sense are the acquisitions of multi-role fighters Su-30MKI(A) and Mi-28 attack helicopters). **Another point worth mentioning in the case of Algeria-Russia relations is that the Russian government agreed to erase the debt owed to the former Soviet Union and in exchange Algeria purchased Russian goods in the amount of the disregarded debt**. **This has been a practice in multiple cases in Africa**. **Cooperation in the energy field is very important, Russian companies being very involved in Algeria** – Gazprom and Sonatrach explored together the El Assel block and found oil and gas reserves with further exploration currently underway (Gazprom owns 49% of the project). Nuclear energy cooperation is also on top of the cooperation agenda between Russia and Algeria, the countries having signed an agreement to cooperate in 2014 and being currently in discussions to build Algeria’s first nuclear power plant. The deal concerning the nuclear energy area signed in 2016 with Tunisia is also relevant and involves cooperation in research and development of nuclear infrastructure including reactors and power plants. Furthermore, the rise of the Russian tourism in Tunisia in the past years is very important in the overall relations between the two countries. On military cooperation, it is noticeable the intention of the Russians to supply Tunisia with military equipment (helicopters, bullet-proof vests and night-vision goggles) with the aim of supporting Tunisian forces in the fight against terrorism. Russia goes the extra mile and brands itself as an important partner in fighting terrorism in the region by being ready to support with military equipment, sharing intelligence and expertise. **In the context of worsening relations with the US and rather stranded ones with the EU, Egypt has moved closer to Russia in the recent years**. The August 2017 visit of Egyptian Prime Minister to Russia and the meeting between Putin and Sisi in China at the BRICS summit in September are just the most recent examples of the strengthened relations between the two countries. The military equipment package deal (2014), the agreement to buy Russian attack helicopters (2016), cooperation in fighting terrorism in the region and joint military exercises are all part of the nexus of cooperation between Egypt and Russia. The agreement on the construction of the El-Dabaa power plant, a partnership between Rosatom and the Egyptian authorities, has been finalized during the September meeting with a very good financial scheme in place (a loan offered by the Russians that will cover 85% of the costs). **The relationship between the two countries is also important from a political standpoint, through the lens of regional issues where the two actors have common interests and support or can support each other such as in the case of Libya**. **Amidst the crisis in Libya, Russia is providing support to the** Libyan National Army (**LNA**) commander Khalifa Haftar, **and is present in the overall international negotiations** expecting to play a role in a future stable Libyan state**.**

### 2NC – Advanced Weaponry Mod

#### The race for high-tech military technology between Morocco and Algeria increases the risk of conflict in North Africa.

Helou 7/5 [Agnes Helou; writer for Breaking Defense; 7-5-2022; In North Africa, a fighter jet arms race, with Russia and the US on either side; Breaking Defense; https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/in-north-africa-a-fighter-jet-arms-race-with-russia-and-the-us-on-either-side/; 7-8-2022; SK]

BEIRUT: While it may not make the rounds in Washington as one of the big geopolitical rivalries of the era, tensions between Morocco and Algeria are real, and have escalated in recent years thanks to a dispute over the Western Sahara, which Morocco claims to be its own territory, while Algeria backs the Tindouf-based Polisario Front rebel group.

As a result, both nations have begun investing heavily in their militaries — and specifically in airborne systems that can counter one another.

Now, an aviation arms race may be escalated further by a need for Russia to find defense exports in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine, and subsequent sanctions pain. Algeria, a longstanding military client of Russia, could suddenly see cheaper rates for the Su-57, or even end up as the first export customer for the Su-75 Checkmate.

“At this point, as one of the biggest global customers of Russian weaponry, it’s likely that Algeria may eventually acquire Russia’s top-notch technology that Moscow seeks to export,” Samuel Bendett, a member of the Russia Studies Program at CNA and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, told Breaking Defense. “This may include Su-57 down the line, but it’s also likely that Algeria may start importing Su-75 Checkmate fighter, once it goes into production, considering how much Moscow is seeking to export its new military technology.”

In turn, Morocco is looking to bolster its own advanced air assets, spending heavily on American-made jets and helicopters.

“It appears that both countries seek to bolster their military capabilities with new technologies, including air force. Given the regional geography where both countries are located — large territory, long distances — air force capabilities are crucial for monitoring, ISR and combat,” Bendett said.

Mounting Tensions In The Region

Tensions between the two countries have simmered for years, but intensified in December 2020 after Morocco normalized ties with Israel and the US recognized the kingdom’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara.

In August 2021, Algeria cut diplomatic relations with Morocco, after what it called “hostile actions by its most populous neighbor with which it has had strained relations for decades.” Algerian Foreign Minister Ramdane Lamamra accused Morocco of using Pegasus spyware against its officials, supporting a separatist group and failing in bilateral commitments, including on the Western Sahara issue.

In the last few months, the verbal attacks between the two countries have increased. In January, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI declared the creation of a new “eastern military zone” along its border with Algeria, a move described in media reports as “a statement of intent meant to indicate Morocco’s readiness to confront any military provocations from its eastern neighbor.” And just weeks ago, Algeria suspended a two-decade old cooperation treaty with Spain, after Madrid backed the position of Morocco on the disputed Western Sahara.

With such defense deals and interests, is there an actual potential for an armed conflict between the two countries?

“Earlier I would have asserted that there is no such possibility, but after the Russian invasion to Ukraine with all its geostrategic implications and the escalated Algerian speech towards Morocco, the possibilities are high for such a conflict,” Abdel Hamid Harfi, a Moroccan military expert, told Breaking Defense.

#### Which draws in other powers.

Pars Today ’21 [Pars Today; Iranian News website; 11-6-2021; Israel considers selling Iron Dome missile system to Morocco for use against Algeria, says Report ; Pars Today; https://parstoday.com/en/news/west\_asia-i157056-israel\_considers\_selling\_iron\_dome\_missile\_system\_to\_morocco\_for\_use\_against\_algeria\_says\_report; 7-8-2022; SK]

Israel has reportedly reached out to Morocco over the possibility of selling Iron Dome missile system, nearly a year after the Tel Aviv regime and the North African country normalized diplomatic relations in a deal brokered by former US president Donald Trump.

According to a report published by French-language Moroccan newspaper Le Desk, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, which has developed the system, has expressed interest to supply the military hardware to Morocco.

The report asserted that Iron Dome missile system, designed to intercept and destroy short-range rockets and artillery shells, would ensure better protection of Morocco’s sensitive military sites.

Spanish daily newspaper La Razón reported on Thursday that Algeria had deployed missiles near its border with Morocco, after the killing of three Algerians in an airstrike earlier in the week that Algeria says Morocco carried out against the border area between Mauritania and the disputed territory of Western Sahara.

“On November 1… three Algerian nationals were subjected to a cowardly assassination in a barbaric bombing of their trucks while they were traveling between the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, and Ouargla,” the Algerian president’s office said in a statement on Wednesday.

“Several factors indicate that the Moroccan occupation forces in Western Sahara carried out this cowardly assassination with sophisticated weaponry,” it added, warning that the act “will not go unpunished.”

Morocco’s government has made no comment yet.

For decades, the relationship between Morocco and Algeria has been characterized by tension. The border between the two countries has been closed since 1994. Eighty percent of Western Sahara is controlled by Morocco, which regards the territory as its own. Algeria supports the Polisario Front, which seeks independence for the disputed region.

After an incident near the border crossing between Western Sahara and Mauritania last year, the Polisario declared a three-decade ceasefire against Morocco “null and void.”

Israel and Morocco agreed on December 10, 2020 to normalize relations in a deal brokered with the help of Trump’s administration, making the North African country the fourth Arab state last year to strike a normalization deal with the regime. The others were the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan.

### 2NC – Western Intervention Mod

#### **Western intervention in Africa fuels instability and leaves chaos in the wake of withdrawal – empirics prove.**

Face2Face Africa ’21 [Face2face Africa; ; 8-30-2021; Western military intervention is bad for Africa. A lesson from Afghanistan; Face2Face Africa; https://face2faceafrica.com/article/western-military-intervention-is-bad-for-africa-a-lesson-from-afghanistan; 7-16-2022; SK]

After two decades of war, the United States withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. Soon after the withdrawal of America-led NATO troops started, the Taliban launched an offensive against the Afghan government. The insurgents swept across the country in an unbelievably quick overtake, capturing all major cities in a matter of days, as Afghan security forces, trained and equipped by the US and its allies, melted away.

Like in Afghanistan and the Middle East, military intervention has been a common feature in post-colonial African history. Most African leaders view the US- and NATO – as the protector of democracy and a moral mediator of national conflicts. The United States even has a Mission to African Union to strengthen democratic institutions, promote peace and stability, etc. But with the US-induced chaos in Afghanistan, African countries should become wary of foreign military interference. Africa’s past is an indicator of this.

In 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 733 and UN Security Council Resolution 746 led to creating the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) to provide humanitarian relief and help restore order in Somalia after the dissolution of its central government. United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 was unanimously passed in December 1992, which approved a coalition of United Nations peacekeepers led by the United States. Forming the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the alliance was tasked with ensuring security until humanitarian efforts would be transferred to the UN.

In January 2021, the US troops completed their withdrawal from Somalia at a time when the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab extremist group was improving its bomb-making skills and continuing to attack military and civilian targets even in the capital, Mogadishu. The withdrawal came less than a month before Somalia was set to hold a national election. For three decades of foreign interference, Somalia has 500,000 fatalities to show and a legacy of being both a fragile and failed state. This timing of the withdrawal makes one wonder whether the United Nations Security Council worsened the heavy loss of life, destruction to property and threat to regional stability they set out to rectify in 1992.

On the other hand, is Libya that was invaded by a multi-state NATO-led coalition in 2011. The military intervention was to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 in response to the First Libyan Civil War events. American and British naval forces fired over 110 Tomahawk cruise missiles. At the same time, the French Air Force, British Royal Air Force, and Royal Canadian Air Force undertook sorties across Libya and a naval blockade by Coalition forces.

Fighting in Libya ended in October 2011 following the death of Muammar Gaddafi. Libya’s new government requested that the mission be extended to the end of the year, but the Security Council unanimously voted to end NATO’s mandate for military action. This withdrawal shows a pattern of US and NATO troops withdrawing from territories in a time of need. Since the end of the war, there has been violence involving various militias and the new state security forces, which have escalated into the Second Libyan Civil War. Libya is now arguably a failed state.

The result in Afghanistan has been a crisis marked by displacement within the country and abroad. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nearly 400,000 people have been forced from their homes since the beginning of the year. Now that the NATO troops have withdrawn and the Taliban is back, all that is left to show is an estimated 147,000 people killed in the Afghanistan war since 2001, with more than 38,000 civilians killed.

In all this, what is particularly alarming is that NATO had foreseen the return of the Taliban after their departure. According to a US intelligence report, the Afghan government would likely collapse within six months after NATO completed its withdrawal from the country. The Taliban seized power in Afghanistan two weeks before the US was set to complete its troop withdrawal. It is distressing to know that the US withdrew their troops fully aware that anarchy would soon follow.

Upon reflection on Afghanistan’s grim situation, it is more evident than ever that foreign military intervention in Africa is not a viable solution. These military campaigns are carried out under the guise of humanitarianism and saving the civilian population but ultimately worsen the situation. For this reason, foreign military interference in Africa should cease since it does more harm than good.

Furthermore, if the situation is so dire that foreign military interference is justified, the troops and mediators should be from fellow African countries. The reason is that Africans have a better understanding of African politics hence realistic strategies in resolving conflict and promoting democracy.

An excellent instance is the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) role in ending the South Sudan Civil War. In December 2013, a political power struggle broke out between President Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar, as the president accused Machar and ten others of attempting a coup d’état. Uganda deployed troops to fight along with the South Sudanese army, which ended in their triumph. Ultimately, the warring parties assented to a peace deal and formed a new unity government in February 2020. The agreement brought an end to the conflict that had killed about 400,000 people and displaced millions.

With contemporary history replete with the failure of foreign military powers to ensure peace in conflicted regions, it is time interventionism came to an end, especially in Africa.

#### Which causes nuclear war.

ABC ’20 [ABC News; ; 12-31-2020; Hot spots to watch: What crises could explode in 2021; ABC News; https://abcnews.go.com/International/hot-spots-watch-crises-explode-2021/story?id=74607383; 7-16-2022; SK]

Here are the top conflicts or issues that could burst into all-out crises in 2021.

Nuclear arms race: From rogue states to regional tensions

At the start of 2020, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists made a dramatic announcement -- its famed Doomsday Clock was the closest to midnight it's ever been, with the threats of nuclear war and climate change growing ever more acute.

"National leaders have ended or undermined several major arms control treaties and negotiations during the last year, creating an environment conducive to a renewed nuclear arms race, to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to lowered barriers to nuclear war," the group said in January.

Twelve months later, the last nuclear arms control pact between the U.S. and Russia is weeks from expiry, with no plans to extend it in sight. China continues to develop its nuclear arsenal, possibly even doubling it in the next decade, according to the Pentagon. It's also clashed high in the Himalayas with its nuclear-armed neighbor India, which in turn spilled blood with nuclear-armed rival Pakistan over the disputed territory Kashmir.

As the global infrastructure to constrain nuclear weapons wanes, any one of these could turn into a flashpoint next year, and that's without even mentioning the rogue nuclear power states North Korea and Iran -- both of which are likely to test the incoming Biden administration.

After four years of President Donald Trump's policies, North Korea has more nuclear weapons and enhanced ballistic missile capability, which it may show off with a test launch early in President-elect Joe Biden's term to try to garner some attention and leverage, according to analysts. While the likelihood of a "fire and fury" response will diminish after Trump's departure, the risk of a skirmish spiraling into all-out war remains real, according to analysts.

Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons and says it won't pursue them, but it once again has a stockpile of enriched uranium and a host of spinning centrifuges that decrease its so-called "breakout time" to potentially develop the bomb, according to nuclear experts. Analysts expect its forces, under disguise or through proxies, could resume attacks in the Persian Gulf region to build leverage ahead of possible negotiations with Biden's team, risking conflict with U.S., Israeli, or Arab forces.

Terrorism threat expands, seizing instability across Africa

On the campaign trail, Trump and his senior advisers repeatedly celebrated the defeat of ISIS's so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria. But since then, the terror threat has dispersed, with fighters and weapons flowing out of shrinking ISIS territory to new pockets around the world.

Across Africa in particular, the world's youngest and fastest-growing continent, ISIS affiliates are now gaining strength, especially in Nigeria, Mozambique and the Congo -- although a few terrorism experts caution some claim to be more powerful than they are in reality.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, sub-Saharan Africa's largest country, the Allied Democratic Forces, a decades-old militant group, has traded claims of responsibility for deadly attacks with a local ISIS affiliate. The fighting compounds the deep hunger crisis there, with more than 19 million people in need, according to the International Rescue Committee, which reported that DRC now has "more people facing a severe hunger crisis... than has ever been recorded in any country."

In Mozambique, Islamist militants linked to ISIS have conducted brutal attacks in the northernmost province Cabo Delgado, including beheading more than 50 civilians in November and temporarily seizing control of a port in August. The deteriorating security situation has displaced more than half a million people, according to the U.N. refugee agency (UNHCR), with continued violence likely to bring more acute humanitarian need next year.

The situation is perhaps worst, however, in the Sahel, the semi-arid region that spans northern Africa just south of the Sahara Desert and that has seen a sharp rise in extremist groups and fighting. In Mali and Niger, the security situation is at best shaky, with a military junta trying to stabilize Mali amid inter-communal and jihadist violence and tense elections this week in Niger leaving the path ahead uncertain, but hopeful.

But Burkina Faso, the landlocked country twice the size of New York, has become the world's fastest growing crisis. Over 1 million people have been internally displaced in just two years, according to UNHCR, and there is no end in sight of fighting between the government, militia groups and terrorist organizations, boosting the risk of famine for its 20 million people.

Nigeria, the region's powerhouse and Africa's most populous country, is facing all the same trends, with even deeper implications for global security. Its northeastern corner has been a hotspot for over a decade, with jihadist group Boko Haram and criminal violence terrorizing and displacing millions of civilians. But Nigerian armed forces' response has been cast as failing, and the government also faced sharp criticism for its heavy crackdown on anti-police brutality protests -- signs that the state itself is increasingly unstable, which could create more chaos in 2021.

Peace efforts fail, crises worsen in Afghanistan, Yemen

Afghanistan and Yemen have been torn apart by conflict for years now, but 2021 could bring even deeper suffering for civilians in both countries.

In recent months, while Afghan government and Taliban delegations sit in luxury hotels in Doha, Qatar, for peace negotiations, there has been a spike in car bombings, rocket fire, targeted attacks on police and security forces, botched Afghan Air Force bombings, and assassinations of government officials, activists and journalists. Compounded by coronavirus, that has kept Afghanistan's already victimized civilian population in continued danger, even after decades of humanitarian need.

The peace negotiations were supposed to aim for a nationwide ceasefire as soon as possible, according to the U.S.-Taliban deal signed in February, but the militant group has resisted so far, using violence as leverage in talks. But if the violence is sustained into 2021, it could imperil negotiations and ignite into all-out conflict, just as U.S. troops draw down out of the country and the ISIS franchise claims more deadly attacks more frequently, according to Afghan officials and U.S. analysts.

Yemen has similarly faced years of stop-and-start peace efforts, but with coronavirus raging through the country with no health care system to track it, let alone treat it, the world's worst humanitarian crisis is expected to descend even deeper in 2021.

After five years of endless fighting, humanitarian funding is drying up, leaving approximately 80% of the population in need, according to aid groups. The U.N.-mediated effort has stalled, with the Saudi and Emirati-led coalition fighting in its own ranks as much as with the Iran-backed Houthi rebels, and neither side has shown real interest in protecting civilians, let alone peace talks.

One other near decade-old conflict to mention is Syria, where murderous strongman Bashar al Assad, backed by Russia and Iran, could test the incoming Biden administration by trying to finally seize control of the last pocket of rebels and jihadists in Idlib province, causing a bloodbath and pushing masses of packed Syrians fleeing into Turkey and beyond to Europe.

East Africa erupting as violence spills over borders

In the final few months of 2020, the greater Horn of Africa experienced a flash of violence, often spilling over borders and threatening to suck in the whole region in the coming months.

At the heart of it is Ethiopia, whose government went to war with well-armed political forces in its Tigray region, a conflict that continues to see sporadic fighting and claims of mass killings and that could worsen ahead of 2021 elections. It may also suck in neighboring Eritrea, long at war with Tigrayan leaders and now partnering with federal forces against them, leading to cross-border rocket fire and aerial bombardment.

Further endangering the region is the fact that the fighting sent tens of thousands of refugees scrambling into Sudan, itself on a rocky transitional road to democracy after decades of oppressive rule. The two neighbors are already locked in a dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and occasional clashes along the border could enflame into another frontline.

Elsewhere in East Africa, Kenya and Somalia have cut diplomatic ties over Kenya's support for breakaway region Somaliland, heightening regional tension further. The move also means Kenya will likely pull its peacekeeping troops in Somalia, just as U.S. forces withdraw, leaving Somalia more vulnerable to al-Shabab, a powerful al-Qaida affiliate that will continue to plot attacks and increasingly conduct them abroad.

In the midst of it all, the fragile semi-peace in South Sudan, the world's youngest country still emerging from civil war, faces "catastrophic levels of hunger," according to the U.N.

"If left unchecked much longer, a strategic region could devolve into war -- with itself and others -- imperiling U.S. interests from the Red Sea to Europe," warned Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Africa Center.

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – Ukraine Thump Libya Impact

#### **Ukraine war has caused de-escalation in Libya.**

Abdullah 4/20 [Bilal Abdullah; ; 4-20-2022; Russia-Ukraine War and the De-escalation in Libya; No Publication; https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/russia-ukraine-war-and-the-de-escalation-in-libya; 7-19-2022; SK]

Libya has been relatively calm since the Russian war on Ukraine started on February 24. Although this North African nation has long been viewed as a potential arena for settling scores between Russia and the West, the situation in Libya is currently moving in the opposite direction. Its political disputes have become less severe, and the flashpoints between the political rivals have decreased.

This analysis touches on three main areas of conflict between Russia and the West in Libya in the post-February 24 period – oil, the UN mission’s future, and military deployment. The analysis also examines the impact of these points of contention on the local dispute and any local party’s ability to seize the transitional authority or manage any settlement.

The Oil Factor

The dispute over oil revenues has been at the heart of the larger conflict in Libya. Controlling oil wealth creates a balance between the two sides of the conflict. The eastern camp militarily controls the oil facilities, i.e., production and export, while the western camp controls the revenue distribution because the central bank is located in the capital, Tripoli.

Considering this conflict, the international community tried to protect the independence of the National Oil Corporation and moved, for months, toward withholding export revenues from the Libyan Foreign Bank. Also, a conflict over the powers between the Minister of Oil in the government of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, Muhammad Aoun, and the head of the National Oil Corporation, Mustafa Sanalla, deepened the Corporation’s impartiality, which was usually affiliated with the western Libya camp.

Oil is now more critical for the western part of the country. Crude oil is a critical tool in new Western policies designed to besiege Moscow and undermine it economically and militarily by reducing Western countries’ dependence on Russian oil and gas. The idea is to deprive Russia of a significant financing source. Therefore, the United States, the architect of sanctions against Russia, is actively seeking to ensure a stable oil supply from Libya.

Indeed, the West has taken the following steps in this regard:

The embassies of the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and Italy in Libya issued a joint statement urging all actors in Libya to respect the unity and independence of the National Oil Corporation. They were urged not to politicize it or engage in any actions that would undermine the stability of this institution. Remarkably, this statement was issued on February 24, the same day the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. [1]

UN Adviser Stephanie Williams tweeted, stressing the need to preserve the independence and impartiality of the National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank, and the Libyan Investment Authority and not subject them to arbitrary pressures to employ them for the benefit of one party over another. The US and British embassies retweeted that tweet, emphasizing the same position. [2] This became clear about a month after the Western embassies’ statement referred to this position. It also coincides with growing uncertainty in the oil market against the backdrop of the Western-Russian conflict.

On March 17, the United States ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, announced a proposal to introduce a short-term mechanism for managing Libyan oil revenues that build on the previous arrangement, i.e., depositing oil revenues in the Libyan Foreign Bank. The new mechanism assumes that the various parties publish transparent data on expenditures and revenues, and the oil revenue distribution is limited to salaries, subsidies, fuel production, and major imported goods such as food and medicine. [3]

In early March, the National Oil Corporation announced that it had agreed with British Petroleum to carry out exploration activities in the Ghadames and Sirte basins. The agreement came about 10 days after the British oil giant announced that it had quit its partnership with the Russian oil company Rosneft following the Ukraine war. [4] Kate English, Deputy British Ambassador to Libya, met Mustafa Sanalla, head of the National Oil Corporation, on March 21 and discussed expanding cooperation between British energy companies and the Libyan Corporation. [5]

UN Mission

The appointment of a UN envoy to Libya is likely to turn into a contentious issue between Russia and Western countries. The UN Security Council’s mandate is scheduled to expire at the end of April, and the Council will have to consider renewing it. There have been some key developments related to this issue, including the following:

The UN mission’s mandate was renewed on the last day of January 2022 for only three months without appointing a UN envoy. This British proposal offered a compromise between two American and Russian draft resolutions. The US decision called for renewing the mission’s mandate until mid-September without appointing a UN envoy. However, the resolution stipulated that Stephanie Williams, an American, would assume the actual tasks of the UN envoy as an adviser to the Secretary-General on Libyan affairs, a position she assumed on December 6, 2021. The goal is that Secretary-General Antonio Guterres will not have to seek the Security Council’s approval for the appointment. However, the Russian draft resolution called for the mission’s renewal until the end of April only, with the appointment of a UN envoy by the Security Council without delay.

With the date of the decision on renewing the mission’s mandate approaching, i.e., the end of April, and against the backdrop of a raging US-Russian conflict, it is expected that the dispute over the mission’s future will return to the fore again, especially concerning the issue of appointing a UN envoy.

In a direction opposite to the expected West-Russia escalation over the mission’s future, and specifically on the UN envoy job, some African countries with considerable clout in the African Union cling to the demand of appointing an African diplomat to the position of UN envoy following the resignation of former envoy Ghassan Salame in March 2020. Re-introducing this demand in the coming period may be the best way to shield the mission’s mandate against the repercussions of international escalation. Even the parties to the conflict seem willing to maintain the ceasefire and reduce escalation to preserve the gains achieved.

Military Deployment

There are many indications about how the Russia-Ukraine war will affect Russia and its allies’ military deployment in Libya. A large-scale military escalation is unlikely in Libya during the next stage for several reasons:

Russian President Vladimir Putin has agreed to bring in fighters from the Middle East to participate in military operations in Ukraine. On March 11, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that 16,000 fighters from the Middle East were ready to volunteer for the war. [6]

On March 20, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced that Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar had sent fighters to fight alongside the Russian forces, among the forces announced by the Russian Defense Minister. Wagner would supervise the transfer of fighters. [7] However, the General Command in Libya officially denied these statements. [8]

The British Ministry of Defense announced that the fighters of the Russian company Wagner were deployed in eastern Ukraine, which came at the expense of the company’s operations in Africa and Syria. [9]

The “Syrians for Truth and Justice” organization has published a report confirming that Russia has transferred Syrian fighters fighting in Libya alongside Haftar forces to fight in Ukraine. The report was based on testimonies from Syrian fighters and records of flights from Benghazi and Damascus to Russia. [10]

British Ambassador to Libya Caroline Harrondale met Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar at the General Command headquarters in Benghazi on March 27. The ambassador said that the meeting focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the importance of withdrawing all mercenaries from Libya, and the need to avoid war returning to the country. [11]

These indicators suggest a plan to reduce the support provided by Russia to Haftar’s forces at the level of human resources and prioritize the war in Ukraine, which naturally means that there will be no large-scale military escalation in Libya. However, in light of the escalation of the conflict between Russia and the West led by the United States and the increase in pressures on Russia, the Russian-Western conflict will possibly not remain confined to Ukraine but rather erupt in other flashpoints including Libya.

Therefore, foreign fighters wholly loyal to Russia are expected to remain in Libya, given that Russia controls the oil negotiating card in Libya.

Impact on the Political Track

The Russo-Ukrainian War had impacts on Libya’s political process as follows:

1. Fathi Bashagha as the New Prime Minister: The project to install Fathi Bashagha as the new prime minister is no longer enjoying significant momentum, despite the man’s alliance with the Russian-backed parties in eastern Libya. Moscow was among the few capitals that openly called for Bashagha to be able to exercise his new position in the capital, Tripoli. On March 13, a group of residents of the cities of the so-called Libya Oil Crescent threatened to shut down oil facilities in the region and stop the export of oil if the UN mission continued to support the Dbeibeh government, demanding that Fathi Bashagha be able to take power in the capital. [12] This threat was already put into practice in mid-April. The use of the oil card in support of Bashagha sends negative messages to Western countries regarding attempts by the eastern Libyan camp to justify Western concerns about oil management in Libya and Russia’s support for Bashagha taking power.

Contrary to expectations, on March 2, Bashagha publicly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and met the Ukrainian ambassador to Libya on March 26, stressing his position in support of Ukraine. [13] On the other hand, Bashagha is aware of the sensitivity of using the oil card for political influence at this stage and that the United States would reject this. Bashagha openly announced his refusal to use the oil card to enable him to take power in Tripoli [14], which reflects his commitment to keeping a distance from Moscow to avoid the political price he might pay in his relationship with Western powers. He is also keen to settle for a local alliance with the eastern Libyan camp. At the same time, the control of its headquarters in the eastern and southern regions has mounted pressure on the Dbeibeh government.

If the situation escalates around the Oil Crescent region within a US-Russia conflict, and if Moscow decides to make Libya an arena for settling accounts with the West, this would become the main challenge for Bashagha. Part of the forces loyal to him is located in the country’s center, in an area separating the forces loyal to Haftar and those affiliated with the Dbeibeh government in the western region. Thus, in this case, Bashagha may find himself compelled to break up the political partnership with the eastern Libyan camp, especially if the conflict escalates in a way that undermines his chances of becoming prime minister.

The only case that would make Bashagha accept a military escalation is for his forces to storm Tripoli by force. On the other hand, he is unlikely to accept that his forces will be involved in any confrontation between Haftar’s forces and the camp in western Libya, against the backdrop of the US-Russia conflict.

2. The Drawing Up of a New Constitutional Rule: Due to the new military balance, primarily temporary, owing to the decrease in the number of foreign fighters supporting Haftar, Moscow’s Ukraine preoccupation, and the decline in the chances of Bashagha being appointed prime minister, the UN adviser could work on a draft constitutional rule. It was achieved through a consensus between the House of Representatives and the State Council, based on which the elections might be held next June.

UN Adviser Stephanie Williams seeks to achieve a fundamental breakthrough to break the political deadlock, thus preventing the eastern Libyan camp from installing Bashagha for a new transitional period. The objective is to prevent Dbeibeh from achieving his goal of staying in power for a more extended period, as was the case with the Fayez al-Sarraj government. Williams is under the pressure of the time factor, whether the vote on the mission’s mandate takes place at the end of April or the end of the roadmap term comes at the end of June.

The House of Representatives is aware of the current international balances following Western sanctions against Russia and the latter’s failure to provide sufficient support to the eastern Libyan camp. This explains the Parliament’s attempt to play on the time factor and not respond to Stephanie’s efforts to thwart and wait for a new international order. Until then, the Parliament will continue to adhere to the roadmap it adopted, which calls for the appointment of Bashagha as prime minister.

On the other hand, Dbeibeh seeks to sabotage Stephanie’s plans. He declared that he was committed to his plan “to return the trust to the people,” based on which he formed a committee to draft an election law to hold the vote during June. However, the chances of this plan becoming a reality are almost non-existent. Dbeibeh wants to stay in power for a more extended period, especially when Libya is no longer an urgent priority on the international community’s agenda.

Conclusions

Although the crisis between Russia and the West is poised for further escalation, it is unlikely to see the conflict spill over to Libya due to differences over oil management and military deployment. Still, the two sides might clash over the appointment of a new UN envoy. The Libyan parties are seeking pragmatically to exploit the current international situation to avoid any political losses regarding the conflict over the transitional authority or the future of the settlement process. In this context, the main actors are working, in various ways, to thwart the efforts of the UN adviser to hold elections before the middle of this year and to buy more time in anticipation of any new developments.

### 2AC – Internal Link Turn

#### Russia only intervenes in North Africa to further its interests. Russia supports autocratic, corrupt leaders which is destabilizing and detrimental to African People

Siegle, PhD, 2/22

(Joseph, leads the Africa Center’s research program, which produces security briefs and research papers with the aim of generating policy relevant analyses that contribute to addressing Africa’s security challenges. He has written widely for leading policy journals and newspapers and is a regular media analyst, The future of Russia-Africa relations, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/02/the-future-of-russia-africa-relations/)

Russia has been aggressively pursuing its strategic objectives in Africa in recent years—securing a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, gaining naval port access in the Red Sea, expanding natural resource extraction opportunities, displacing Western influence, and promoting alternatives to democracy as a regional norm. Africa, thus, is a “theater” for Russia’s geostrategic interests rather than a destination itself—a perspective reflected in the means that Russia employs. Unlike most major external partners, Russia is not investing significantly in conventional statecraft in Africa—e.g., economic investment, trade, and security assistance. Rather, Russia relies on a series of asymmetric (and often extralegal) measures for influence—mercenaries, arms-for-resource deals, opaque contracts, election interference, and disinformation. PARTNERSHIP WITH WHOM? Russia’s Africa-focused initiatives are typically concentrated on propping up an embattled incumbent or close ally: Khalifa Haftar in Libya, Faustin Archange Touadéra in the Central African Republic (CAR), and coup leaders Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali and Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Sudan, among others. To assess the future of Russia-Africa relations, therefore, it is necessary to be clear that the “partnerships” that Russia seeks in Africa are not state- but elite-based. By helping these often illegitimate and unpopular leaders to retain power, Russia is cementing Africa’s indebtedness to Moscow. This strategy works for Russia and the respective leaders who gain international diplomatic cover, resources to consolidate power domestically, a mercenary force, arms, and revenues from resource deals. However, Russia’s opaque engagements are inherently destabilizing for the citizens of the targeted countries, resulting in stunted economic development, human rights abuses, disenfranchisement of African citizens, the perpetuation of illegitimate governments, and social polarization. Through this model, Russia has been able to advance its objectives with limited financial and political costs. Accordingly, we can expect to see Moscow continuing to expand its influence on the continent in 2022. FOCAL POINTS FOR AFRICA-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN 2022 Libya. Russia retains Wagner mercenary forces (former Russian defense intelligence troops) and military assets on the ground in support of its proxy, warlord Khalifa Haftar. Russia can be expected to try and steer the outcome of the postponed presidential and legislative elections with the aim of emerging as the principal powerbroker in this geo-strategically important territory—with access to oil reserves and deep-water ports in the eastern Mediterranean and a permanent presence on NATO’s southern flank. Sudan. Russia has been striving to gain naval port access in the Red Sea, especially Port Sudan. It also has longstanding ties to the Sudanese military, elements of the ousted Bashir regime, and gold trafficking networks in the west. Continuation of the military government in Khartoum provides a ready entry point for expanded Russian influence. Mali. The military coup in Mali has provided Russia an opportunity to become a pivotal actor in the Sahel. We can expect Moscow to provide political cover to the junta of Assimi Goïta as it seeks to avoid a transition back to a democratic government. Indications are that Wagner mercenaries have already been deployed in support of the junta. Guinea. Russia has long been a patron of former president Alpha Condé, who had been a strong supporter of Russia’s extensive mining (bauxite) interests in Guinea. Following Condé’s ouster in a coup in September 2021, Moscow can be expected to refocus its diplomatic efforts on propping up the military junta of Colonel Mamady Doumbouya in return for Moscow’s continued political sway and unencumbered access in the mining sector. Gulf of Guinea. Having consolidated its position in the CAR in 2021, Russia is set to expand its influence in nearby Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Gabon in 2022. Moscow has been cultivating ties with leaders of all three countries with an eye on becoming a more significant player in the lucrative oil and mineral networks of Central Africa. Angola. President João Lourenço is contending for a second term in office in 2022 amid a long recession, criticisms for increasing authoritarianism, and divisions within his ruling party. Russia’s opportunistic strategy of coming to the aid of isolated leaders as a means of enhancing Moscow’s leverage makes Lourenço an attractive target. His military academy training in the USSR, Russia’s extensive Cold War era ties to Angola, and Angola’s vast diamond, oil, gold, and mineral resources will all factor into increased Russian attention on Lourenço in 2022. CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT AND SCRUTINY Since Russia’s engagements in Africa are typically predicated on co-opting leaders facing limited checks and balances, they are nearly always detrimental to African citizens who must endure deepened institutionalized corruption, diverted public revenues, unaccountable leaders, and instability. Reform, therefore, will not come from these leaders but from African citizens, which will entail greater civil society engagement, enhanced transparency around contracts, and higher levels of scrutiny of any deals struck with Russia. Building more mutually beneficial Africa-Russia relations depends on changes in both substance and process. Such a shift would require Russia to establish more conventional bilateral engagements with African institutions and not just individuals. These initiatives would focus on strengthening trade, investment, technology transfer, and educational exchanges. If transparently negotiated and equitably implemented, such Russian initiatives would be welcomed by many Africans.

#### Russia seeks to further its strategic interests in Africa, propping up authoritarian leaders, undermining democracy, and destroying African sovereignty.

Morford, 3/9

[Joseph; leads the Africa Center’s research program, which produces security briefs and research papers with the aim of generating policy relevant analyses that contribute to addressing Africa’s security challenges. He has written widely for leading policy journals and newspapers and is a regular media analyst; Ukraine war: fresh warning that Africa needs to be vigilant against Russia’s destabilising influence; https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence-178785]

It’s commonly held that Russian president Vladimir Putin’s objective [for invading Ukraine](https://theconversation.com/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-178512) is to install a **puppet** **regime** that is pliable to Moscow’s interests. If so, this would be consistent with the approach Russia has taken with its forays into Africa in recent years. Drawing from its Syria playbook, Russia has **propped up proxies** in Libya, Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan. Moscow also has its sights on another half dozen African leaders facing varying degrees of vulnerability. In the process, African citizen and sovereign interests have given way to Russian priorities. This **elite cooption strategy**effectively serves Russia’s strategic objectives in Africa. These include, first, to gain a foothold in the southern Mediterranean and Red Sea, putting Russia in a position to threaten NATO’s southern flank and international shipping chokeholds. Second, to demonstrate Russia’s Great Power status whose interests must be considered in every region of the world. And third, to displace western influence in Africa while **undermining support for democracy.** Russia has often used **extralegal tools** to pursue its objectives on the continent. It has deployed **mercenaries**, run **disinformation campaigns**, **interfered in elections** and **bartered arms for resources**. This low-cost, high yield approach has enabled Moscow to expand its influence in Africa more rapidly, arguably, than any other external actor since 2018 when Russia ramped up its Africa engagements. Regrettably for African citizens, these **tactics are all inherently destabilising**. Moreover, the result is disenfranchisement and **diminished African sovereignty**. Russia’s expanding influence portends a **bleak vision for Africa**. In effect, Russia is attempting to export its governance model – of an **authoritarian, kleptocratic, and transactional regime**– onto Africa. This is especially problematic since there are at least a handful of African leaders who are more than happy to go down this path. Never mind that this **diverges wildly from the democratic aspirations held by** the vast majority of **African** citizen**s**. The United Nations’ vote on Russia’s invasion in Ukraine provides a useful prism to understand relationships between Moscow and particular African countries. It reveals a spectrum of governance norms and visions for Africa. It is through these lenses and interests that groups of African countries can be expected to engage with Russia moving forward – with far-reaching consequences for democracy, security and sovereignty on the continent. Puppets, patrons and pushback The UN General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian aggression garnered only one dissenting African vote – Eritrea. This was accompanied by strong denunciations of the Russian attack on Ukraine by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States. The current chair of the AU, Senegal’s President Macky Sall, and AU Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat also criticised Russia’s unprovoked war. In total, 28 of Africa’s 54 countries voted to condemn the Russian invasion, 16 abstained and 9 did not vote. All in all, the vote was a remarkable rebuke of Moscow from a continent where many African leaders’ worldviews are shaped by a posture of non-alignment, raw legacies from the Cold War, African diplomatic politesse, and a desire to remain neutral in Great Power rivalries. The vote also revealed a [widening segmentation of governance norms in Africa](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Africa-Year-in-Review-2021.pdf#page=16). And it shows that African relations with Russia from here on in will not be uniform – nor abruptly reversed. The African countries that abstained, or did not vote, did so for a variety of reasons. The most obvious category of country unwilling to condemn Russia was those with African leaders who have been co-opted by Moscow. These included Faustin-Archange Touadéra in the Central African Republic, Lt. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Sudan, and Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali. These leaders lack legitimacy domestically. They depend on Moscow’s political and mercenary support to hold onto power. A second category among the countries that abstained or did not vote is those with leaders who have patronage ties with Russia. Those in power in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe benefit from Russian arms, disinformation or political cover. These leaders, moreover, have no interest in democratic processes that may threaten their hold on power. Others who abstained or did not vote likely did so for ideological reasons rooted in their traditions of non-alignment. These included Morocco, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa. While they may maintain ties to Moscow, they are appalled by Russia’s imperialistic actions. By and large, they support the upholding of international law to maintain peace and security. Those who voted to condemn the invasion included leading African democracies and democratisers. These comprised Botswana, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Seychelles, Sierra Leone and Zambia. They represent a mix of motivations. But I calculated that the median Global Freedom score for this group of 28 countries based on Freedom House’s annual (0-100) ratings is 20 points higher than those that did not vote to condemn. The [powerful speech by Kenya’s ambassador to the United Nations](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZxZlaiuicYM), Martin Kimani, in defence of respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity, and resolving differences through non-violent means, epitomises the views of this group and its support for a rules-based order. Many have also taken the lead in condemning the surge in coups and [third termism on the continent](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438721000296?via%3Dihub). Priorities for action If the past is any indication, Russia can be expected to **escalate its influence campaign in Africa** in reaction to its international isolation following the Ukraine invasion.

#### Russia has a history of torturing and killing African civilians.

Human Rights Watch, 5/3

[Human Rights Watch investigates and reports on worldwide human rights violations; 5-3-2022; Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/03/central-african-republic-abuses-russia-linked-forces]

(Nairobi) – Forces in the Central African Republic, whom witnesses identified as Russian, appear to have summarily **executed, tortured, and beaten civilians** since 2019, Human Rights Watch said today. National authorities, the country’s Special Criminal Court (SCC), or the International Criminal Court (ICC), should investigate these incidents as well as other credible allegations of abuse by Russia-linked forces with a view to criminal prosecution. Several Western governments, and United Nations experts and special rapporteurs have found evidence that the forces linked to Russia operating in the Central African Republic include a significant number of members of the Wagner Group, a Russian private military security contractor with apparent links to the Russian government. On April 15, the United Nations announced it would investigate the circumstances in which at least 10 people were killed in the northeast, with some initial reports alleging Russian forces may have been involved. “There is **compelling evidence** that Russian-identified forces supporting the Central African Republic’s government have committed **grave abuses against civilians** with **complete impunity**,” said Ida Sawyer, crisis and conflict director at Human Rights Watch. “The failure of the Central African Republic government and its partners to forcefully denounce these abuses, and to identify and prosecute those responsible, will most likely only fuel further crimes in Africa and beyond.” Between February 2019 and November 2021, Human Rights Watch interviewed 21 people in person and 19 others by phone, including 10 victims and 15 witnesses, about abuses they said were committed by men with white skin speaking Russian, a language the witnesses recognized. Witnesses said that the men were carrying military-grade weapons and wearing beige khaki clothes, scarves to cover their faces, military boots, gloves, and sunglasses. In August 2018 the Central African Republic and Russian authorities signed an agreement under which “primarily former military officers” from Russia, also called “specialists”, would train Central African Republic forces. Russia-linked forces in the Central African Republic do not wear a designated uniform with official insignia or other distinguishing features. Twelve people spoke about an incident on the morning of July 21, 2021, in which apparent Russian-speaking forces killed at least 12 unarmed men near the town of Bossangoa. Human Rights Watch obtained the names of those killed from the United Nations and others who knew the victims. Bossangoa officials said the Central African authorities concluded that 13 people were killed in the attack. Witnesses said that men speaking Russian set up a roadblock, stopped the men, **beat, and shot them dead,** and then put at least eight of the bodies in a shallow hole next to the road. On August 2 the government said that it would set up a special commission of inquiry to establish responsibility and take appropriate measures. On October 27, in a joint statement, 16 UN Working Group experts and special rapporteurs referred to the special commission finding earlier that month that “Russian instructors” had committed human rights and laws of war violations. However, the commission has not published its findings. Human Rights Watch also spoke with six men who said that Central African army forces accused them and fifteen other men of being rebels and unlawfully detained them for several days or weeks between June and August 2021 in inhuman conditions in an open hole at a national army base in Alindao, in Basse Kotto province, in the south. They said both national army and Russian-speaking forces beat five of the men and that both forces may have executed two who were rebel combatants. Human Rights Watch was unable to independently verify the allegations of extrajudicial executions. Human Rights Watch also documented cases of detention and torture by Russia-linked forces in Bambari in 2019.

### 2AC – AT: Libya Impact

#### Russia is not interested in stabilizing the Libyan Civil War. They’ve taken a clear side.

Kirkpatrick ’20 [David D. Kirkpatrick; investigative reporter for the New York Times, based in New York, and the author of “Into the Hands of the Soldiers: Freedom and Chaos in Egypt and the Middle East.” He was part of a team that won a Pulitzer Prize in 2020 for international reporting for coverage of covert Russian interference in the politics of other governments, in part by injecting mercenaries and spies into civil wars; 4-14-2020; The White House Blessed a War in Libya, but Russia Won It (Published 2020); No Publication; https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/world/middleeast/libya-russia-john-bolton.html?auth=linked-google1tap; 7-8-2022; SK]

Mr. Hifter did not want to talk peace.

A former Libyan Army general and onetime C.I.A. client, Mr. Hifter wanted a White House blessing for a surprise attack to seize Tripoli, the capital, before the peace talks commenced.

Mr. Bolton did not say no.

The attack, launched last April 4, backfired badly. Mr. Hifter failed to capture Tripoli, overextended his forces and restarted a civil war — killing thousands and displacing hundreds of thousands more. The fighting has cut off the flow of Libyan oil, injected new volatility into the region and severely diminished Washington’s influence.

But one apparent winner has emerged: the Kremlin. Russia has operated with cold-eyed cynicism, taking advantage of three years of muddled messages from the Trump administration to become a critical kingmaker in Libya, a geopolitical prize with vast energy reserves and a strategic location on the Mediterranean.

Mr. Bolton’s call with Mr. Hifter — described by a former senior administration official as well as three Western diplomats briefed by both Mr. Hifter and American officials — appears to have played into the Russian machinations.

Days before the call, private Russian operatives in Libya reported to Moscow that Mr. Hifter was a flawed and outmatched military leader sure to fail if he ever tried to conquer the capital, according to secret Russian documents seized in Tripoli and viewed by The New York Times. The operatives saw opportunity in his weakness and suggested that Russia could win leverage over Mr. Hifter if it sent mercenaries to bolster his so-called Libyan National Army.

“Russia will maintain a loyal and strong ally in the structure of the LNA,” the operatives argued, “which Hifter will have to contend with.”

Washington’s inconsistent position on Libya — officially supporting the peace process even as the White House has signaled that President Trump favors Mr. Hifter — has played a major role in prolonging the chaos. The absence of a strong American policy has opened the door to interference from competing American partners, including Turkey, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

Yet it is Russia that is now best positioned to dominate Libya.

An arm of the Kremlin controls dozens of social media accounts promoting Mr. Hifter and other favored clients, including the eldest son of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, Libya’s former dictator, according to the operatives’ report. The same Kremlin operation has acquired an ownership stake in a pro-Qaddafi Libyan satellite network and advised a pro-Hifter network as well, the operatives wrote.

At the same time, the Russian military has worked behind the scenes to surround Mr. Hifter with many of its old partners from the Qaddafi-era security forces, encouraging Qaddafi henchmen to return from exile. The Kremlin also has built ties to a potential governing party-in-waiting, the documents show.

And the Kremlin followed the operatives’ prescient advice. When Mr. Hifter’s assault stalled, Moscow propped up his sagging advance with thousands of trained mercenaries who continue to operate in Libya.

Representatives for the White House and Mr. Bolton declined to comment.

But alarmed American lawmakers have begun asking how the White House appears to have ended up backing the same side as Moscow.

During a recent Senate hearing on Libya, lawmakers wondered how the United States could fault Russia for propping up a client when the White House appeared to like him as well. The president sounded “inclined to support Hifter” even as the State Department seemed to oppose him, said Senator Mitt Romney, the Utah Republican.

“Is there consistency?” Mr. Romney asked.

“I can say unequivocally,” David Schenker, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, insisted with exasperation, “We do not support the Hifter offensive.”

Courting the President

A campaign to get the White House behind Mr. Hifter started almost as soon as Mr. Trump was elected.

Mr. Hifter’s most important patron, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates, pitched Mr. Hifter to members of Mr. Trump’s foreign policy team at a secret meeting in New York in December 2016, according to a person with knowledge of the meeting.

President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, whom Mr. Trump has jokingly called “my favorite dictator,” also took up the Hifter cause five months later when he visited the White House.

“Hifter was a core talking point in every meeting with the Egyptians and Emiratis,” said Andrew Miller, a former member of the National Security Council staff and now a researcher at the Project on Middle East Democracy, a Washington-based nonprofit.

Libya had foundered in chaos since a NATO air campaign helped oust Colonel Qaddafi during the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. Extortionist militias, militant extremists and migrant traffickers ran amok as the country was divided into fiefs. Officially, the United States recognized only the United Nations-sponsored provisional government in Tripoli.

But Crown Prince Mohammed and Mr. el-Sisi told Mr. Trump that the provisional government was hopelessly weak and riddled with Islamists. They argued that only Mr. Hifter could prevent Islamists from taking power in Tripoli, which the Arab leaders said would create a domino effect across the region, according to two former senior administration officials.

Mr. Hifter had vowed since 2014 to eradicate political Islam and take power as Libya’s new military ruler. Yet he had quietly formed an alliance with a rival faction of extremists, Saudi-style ultraconservatives known as Salafis.

As they lobbied Mr. Trump, Crown Prince Mohammed and Mr. el-Sisi overlooked that contradiction. They were also simultaneously working closely with Russia. Egypt had opened a secret Russian base to supply Mr. Hifter’s forces, to the alarm of Western officials worried about Moscow’s expanding influence.

The two Arab leaders, though, found a sympathetic ear in Mr. Bolton, who became national security adviser in the spring of 2018 and had previously led a far-right think tank known for sweeping attacks on political Islam.

The Bolton-Hifter phone call last spring came at a critical moment. Even as the peace talks were approaching, Mr. Hifter had moved his forces into a strategic oasis town south of Tripoli and was poised for a surprise attack.

When Mr. Hifter asked for consent, Mr. Bolton’s answer was “a yellow light,” not a green or a red one, the former senior administration official said. Yet three Western diplomats briefed on the call by both Mr. Hifter and senior American officials described Mr. Bolton as less equivocal: If you are going to attack, do it quickly, he told Mr. Hifter, according to all three diplomats.

Mr. Hifter counted that as an explicit assent, all three diplomats said.

The April 4 attack stunned the world. The United Nations secretary general, António Guterres, had just landed in Tripoli for the peace talks. He urged Mr. Hifter to pull back, a message endorsed by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. American military forces hurriedly left the city.

But as the fighting was underway, Mr. Hifter’s powerful allies were lobbying Mr. Trump to show his support, White House officials said. Mr. el-Sisi pressed the president in person last year on April 9, and Crown Prince Mohammed over the phone on April 18.

The next day, the White House said in a statement that the president had called Mr. Hifter to commend his “significant role in fighting terrorism.” A day after the call, Mr. Hifter’s forces began shelling civilian neighborhoods of Tripoli.

“It seemed as if the Americans were switching sides in a way that didn’t make sense,” said Peter Millett, the British ambassador to Libya until 2018, noting that the Tripoli government had been the main Libyan partner to the United States military in counterterrorism.

“There was confusion and massive surprise in the international community,” he said.

Col. Ahmed Mismari, a spokesman for Mr. Hifter, declined to comment on the call with Mr. Bolton but said the Libyan commander appreciated the president’s support.

Russian Hedging

Even before the assault on Tripoli began, the Russians had concluded it would be a disaster for Mr. Hifter.

The Russian operatives in Libya worked for an obscure research center linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of the Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin. Mr. Prigozhin is also described by American officials as the leader of a Kremlin-linked private security company, the Wagner Group. Their teams of mercenaries have overseen Russian efforts to meddle in the politics of Ukraine, Syria and several African countries.

The leader of the Libyan team, Maxim Shugaley, had been identified in news reports in 2018 trying to pay bribes and spread disinformation to turn elections in Madagascar. Tipped off by American intelligence, according to a person involved, a militia allied with the Tripoli provisional government eventually detained Mr. Shugaley and his interpreter. A third operative eluded capture, Libyan officials said.

After detaining Mr. Shugaley, the security agents found a report in his hotel room that his team had sent to Moscow in March of last year, shortly before the Hifter-Bolton call. Dossier, a London research center critical of Mr. Putin, obtained a copy of the seized report and provided portions to The New York Times. Senior Libyan officials authenticated the text independently.

For several years, Russia had provided military supplies to Mr. Hifter and printed millions of dollars in newly minted Libyan currency for him to distribute.

But the secret report showed that the operatives were much more skeptical of Mr. Hifter than were the Arab rulers advising the White House.

Mr. Hifter, now 76, had recurring health problems. He won few military victories and had instead gained territory by “buying off local tribal groups for the right to place the flag,” so that he could “raise his significance in the eyes of internal and external players,” the report stated.

Not only did the operatives conclude that any advance on Tripoli was almost certain to fail, as did an offensive in 2014, they also warned that Mr. Hifter was stubborn and had become increasingly “difficult” to his Russian advisers.

“Hifter is using Russian help to increase his significance,” the operatives wrote, but “there is a serious basis to suggest that in the event of his military victory, Hifter will not be loyal to Russian interests.”

The operatives recommended the Kremlin hedge its bets on Mr. Hifter by allying with Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi, the eldest son of the former dictator. The operatives said their “company” had acquired a stake in a pro-Qaddafi satellite network and revitalized its broadcasts.

A longtime partner to Russia under his father, Mr. Qaddafi, now 47, was imprisoned in Libya in 2011 before somehow regaining his freedom. Now he is at large and plotting a comeback, according to Libyans close to him and Western diplomats familiar with intelligence reports on his movements.

But the Russians also identified a new opening with Mr. Hifter: The Kremlin should insert paid mercenaries loyal to Russia into his faltering military. Sudanese paramilitary forces were ready to do the job, the operatives insisted, and could give Moscow crucial leverage.

Game Changer

The contingents of mercenaries from the Wagner Group began arriving via Sudan last September, according to Western diplomats tracking their movements.

“That was the big game changer,” Ambassador Richard Norland, the American envoy to Libya, said at a recent briefing. “It’s clear the Russians see strategic advantage now in Libya — low risk and high gain.”

To deepen its influence, the Kremlin has also organized secret meetings in Moscow between Mr. Hifter’s supporters and former officers in the Qaddafi-era military and security services, according to Western diplomats and other analysts who have spoken to Libyan participants.

Musa Ibrahim, a former Qaddafi spokesman, declined to comment on specific meetings in Moscow but acknowledged that Russia had been “bringing together” the Hifter and Qaddafi officers, especially since the assault on Tripoli.

This month, on the anniversary of Mr. Hifter’s attack, the United Nations urged a halt to the fighting to respond to the coronavirus pandemic now spreading in Libya.

But Mr. Hifter has continued shelling Tripoli, even targeting a major hospital. And the Russian mercenaries have given Russia a de facto veto over any end to the conflict.

“This has been Russia’s dream since World War II,” said Fathi Bashagha, the interior minister of the Tripoli government, quoting Winston Churchill’s wartime statement that Moscow saw Libya as the “soft underbelly” of Europe.

“To get Russian feet on Libyan soil.”

#### **Recent actions by Libya’s parliament have opened a new road to stability.**

Bruno 3/3 [Alessandro Bruno; ; 3-3-2022; Could Libya Finally Have a Chance at Lasting Stability?; Inside Arabia; https://insidearabia.com/could-libya-finally-have-a-chance-at-lasting-stability/; 7-19-2022; SK]

Bachagha’s Appointment Has the Potential for Stability

Days before the scheduled – and already compromised elections – on December 24, Bachagha went to Benghazi where he met Haftar, head of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) on December 21, 2021. This meeting ­– at Haftar’s invitation no less – was remarkable. Its remarkability can only be explained by noting that in April 2019, Haftar launched the “Flood of Dignity” campaign to liberate Tripoli from the militias and Brotherhood-dominated Government of National Accord (GNA) — the original internationally supported transitional Libyan government — arresting all members of the Muslim Brotherhood and dissolving the political movement.

That same December, Turkey’s ambassador to Tripoli met Aqila Saleh of the House of Representatives, the Haftar-affiliated Libyan parliament in Tobruk. Around the same time, a delegation of GNA members from Tripoli flew to Turkey and met President Erdogan himself. This series of unlikely meetings suggests that Turkey and Haftar have reached a tactical agreement to soften their differences in order to stabilize Libya.

Evidently, Turkey has decided to change its game: it is no longer interested in staying in – and outright controlling – Libya. Erdogan calculated that Turkey’s continued presence in Libya created a problem for fellow NATO allies (Italy, France, and the US) which are eager to increase stability in North Africa, halt the flow of migrants, and secure important energy sources.

This situation parallels that of Tunisia, where Erdogan maintained ties to Rachid Ghannouchi and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Ennahda, and where the political cards have also been shuffled with the dismissal of parliament by President Kais Saied. Therefore, a shift in relations between Ankara and the Muslim Brotherhood has occurred in the Mediterranean. And without Turkey’s backing, the movement and its political representatives have been weakened.

Was it a Coup?

Technically, Bachagha’s appointment does not represent a coup. Indeed, as in all democracies, the executive governs with the trust of the parliament. And the “institution” in Tobruk that appointed Bachagha is Libya’s official parliament, elected by the people in 2014. That said, the militias in 2014 were affiliated with Bachagha, implying that any objectives the new prime minister sets toward stability should be easier to achieve.

Meanwhile, following the indefinite postponement of the elections, Turkey and Russia – until then rivals over Libyan matters — moved closer, building a common front and incubating the alliance of former enemies Haftar and Bachagha. This is especially impressive given that Bachagha fought against Haftar two years ago. Despite this ideal situation – for what could be more conducive to peace than a mutually beneficial alliance between two former enemies – there is an unlikely obstacle: the United Nations. Indeed, the UN has made it known that it does not recognize Bachagha and will continue to recognize Dbeibah.

In the current circumstances, which could lead Libya out of its darkness, the UN’s position represents a real and counterproductive interference in Libya’s internal affairs. Until recently, the government in Tripoli had the support of the UN, but not of the parliament. Today, the situation is that of one UN-backed prime minister and another prime minister who enjoys the support of the Libyan parliament. If the Misrata militia close to Bachagha has allied itself with Haftar’s LNA – the two single most powerful armed organizations in the country – the intensity and amount of fighting may also decrease drastically.

As for elections? They may or may not happen this year – or even the next. But there’s no denying the fact that perhaps for the first time since 2011, Libyans have more or less come together. Bachagha is in an unprecedented position to build a unified Libya, and the current scenario is one of renewed diplomacy. If the UN and the West care about elections and democracy, they should welcome these new arrangements as they will lead to more stability and only then, encourage a vote.

Bachagha has the potential to unite the country, even if some suspect him to be Haftar’s Trojan horse. The UN could be more productive and save face by encouraging a scenario that supports the Libyan parliament’s decision to back Bachagha while keeping Haftar at bay.

#### Russia and Turkey are pulling out.

Klapper ’21 [Rebecca Klapper; ; 6-23-2021; Russia, Turkey reach agreement to remove troops from Libya, U.S. official says; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/russia-turkey-reach-agreement-remove-troops-libya-us-official-says-1603508; 7-19-2022; SK]

A senior U.S. official said Russia and Turkey have tentatively reached an agreement to begin the process of withdrawing foreign troops from Libya in agreement with Germany's Foreign Minister pledging to remove foreign forces from Libya.

The official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the Associated Press that the deal is not yet done, but each country is prepared to discuss an incremental withdrawal of about 300 troops by both sides.

"We will not let up, and we will not rest, until the last foreign forces have left Libya ... wherever they come from," German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said.

Maas said that Russia and Turkey have been heavily involved on opposite sides, but acknowledged that a withdrawal would have to be taken "step by step" while also maintaining balance so one side doesn't gain an advantage over the other.

Libya's transitional government underlined its commitment to holding elections on Dec. 24 at a conference Wednesday with powers that have interests in the North African country, while the German hosts vowed to keep up pressure until all foreign forces have been withdrawn from Libya.

Germany and the United Nations brought together 17 countries at the conference in Berlin. Libya's transitional leadership was joined by foreign ministers from Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, France and Italy, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and senior officials from Russia, the United Arab Emirates and others.

The meeting followed up on a January 2020 conference where leaders agreed to respect an arms embargo and to push the country's warring parties to reach a full cease-fire. Germany has tried to act as an intermediary.

Maas said the meeting "marked a new phase" and that "we are no longer only talking about Libya, but above all with Libya."

Participants welcomed progress since the process was launched. An October cease-fire agreement including a demand that all foreign fighters and mercenaries leave Libya within 90 days led to a deal on the elections in December and the transitional government that took office in February.

Libyan Foreign Minister Najla Mangoush said the transitional government came "with a vision of how best to re-establish stability in our country and pave the way for free, inclusive and safe elections on Dec. 24."

Wednesday's conference saw powers involved in Libya recommit to refraining from interfering in the country's internal affairs and stating that foreign forces and mercenaries need to be withdrawn "without delay" — something on which there has been little progress.

Asked what guarantees the countries involved are giving to withdraw foreign fighters, Maas pointed to the fact that they had gathered for the conference.

Mangoush said there was "progress" regarding mercenaries, "so hopefully within the coming days mercenaries from both sides are going to be withdrawn," creating more trust and leading to further steps.

A further challenge will be to start bringing all armed groups in Libya under a joint military command.

Speaking earlier Wednesday ahead of the conference, Blinken said that "we share the goal of a sovereign, stable, unified, secure Libya free from foreign interference — it's what the people of Libya deserve, it's critical to regional security as well."

"For that to happen, national elections need to go forward in December and that means urgent agreement is needed on constitutional and legal issues that would undergird those elections," he said. "And the Oct. 23 cease-fire agreement has to be fully implemented, including by withdrawing all foreign forces from Libya."

Conference participants supported efforts toward a reconciliation process and committed to helping Libyan authorities "in developing a comprehensive approach to addressing migration," including the closure of detention centers.

#### Russia’s presence in Lybia breeds instability and civilian casualties.

Gaouette & Browne, 19

[Nicole & Ryan; journalists for CNN; 11-26-2019; US says Russian troops are destabilizing Libya; https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/26/politics/us-russia-destabilizing-libya/index.html]

Russia has deployed military forces to Libya that are “**de-stabilizing**” the North African country, a top State Department official warned Tuesday. David Schenker, the State Department’s assistant secretary for near eastern affairs, told reporters that Russia is deploying troops in **“significant” numbers** to support Libyan Gen. Khalifa Haftar, whose Libyan National Army launched an April offensive to seize Tripoli from the UN-backed Government of National Accord. US officials have previously told CNN that they believe hundreds of Russian mercenaries affiliated with the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization with ties to the Kremlin, have been in Libya for some time, working on behalf of Moscow and helping Haftar in his bid to capture Tripoli, however Schenker said that Russia is now deploying regular uniformed personnel there as well. “Russian regulars are being deployed in significant numbers to support the LNA,” Schenker said, describing their presence as “incredibly destabilizing.” The presence of the Russian troops “raises the specter of **large-scale casualties among the civilian population**,” Schenker said. His comments come days after a senior US delegation met with Haftar on Sunday to “discuss steps to **achieve** a suspension of hostilities and a political resolution to the Libyan conflict,” according to a State Department statement issued Monday.

### 2AC – Impact Turn

#### Russia increases African instability.

Siegle ’22 [Joseph Siegle; ; 2-2-2022; The future of Russia-Africa relations; Brookings; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/02/the-future-of-russia-africa-relations/; 7-16-2022; SK]

Russia has been aggressively pursuing its strategic objectives in Africa in recent years—securing a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, gaining naval port access in the Red Sea, expanding natural resource extraction opportunities, displacing Western influence, and promoting alternatives to democracy as a regional norm.

Africa, thus, is a “theater” for Russia’s geostrategic interests rather than a destination itself—a perspective reflected in the means that Russia employs. Unlike most major external partners, Russia is not investing significantly in conventional statecraft in Africa—e.g., economic investment, trade, and security assistance. Rather, Russia relies on a series of asymmetric (and often extralegal) measures for influence—mercenaries, arms-for-resource deals, opaque contracts, election interference, and disinformation.

PARTNERSHIP WITH WHOM?

Russia’s Africa-focused initiatives are typically concentrated on propping up an embattled incumbent or close ally: Khalifa Haftar in Libya, Faustin Archange Touadéra in the Central African Republic (CAR), and coup leaders Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali and Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Sudan, among others.

To assess the future of Russia-Africa relations, therefore, it is necessary to be clear that the “partnerships” that Russia seeks in Africa are not state- but elite-based. By helping these often illegitimate and unpopular leaders to retain power, Russia is cementing Africa’s indebtedness to Moscow.

This strategy works for Russia and the respective leaders who gain international diplomatic cover, resources to consolidate power domestically, a mercenary force, arms, and revenues from resource deals. However, Russia’s opaque engagements are inherently destabilizing for the citizens of the targeted countries, resulting in stunted economic development, human rights abuses, disenfranchisement of African citizens, the perpetuation of illegitimate governments, and social polarization.

Through this model, Russia has been able to advance its objectives with limited financial and political costs. Accordingly, we can expect to see Moscow continuing to expand its influence on the continent in 2022.

FOCAL POINTS FOR AFRICA-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN 2022

Libya. Russia retains Wagner mercenary forces (former Russian defense intelligence troops) and military assets on the ground in support of its proxy, warlord Khalifa Haftar. Russia can be expected to try and steer the outcome of the postponed presidential and legislative elections with the aim of emerging as the principal powerbroker in this geo-strategically important territory—with access to oil reserves and deep-water ports in the eastern Mediterranean and a permanent presence on NATO’s southern flank.

Sudan. Russia has been striving to gain naval port access in the Red Sea, especially Port Sudan. It also has longstanding ties to the Sudanese military, elements of the ousted Bashir regime, and gold trafficking networks in the west. Continuation of the military government in Khartoum provides a ready entry point for expanded Russian influence.

Mali. The military coup in Mali has provided Russia an opportunity to become a pivotal actor in the Sahel. We can expect Moscow to provide political cover to the junta of Assimi Goïta as it seeks to avoid a transition back to a democratic government. Indications are that Wagner mercenaries have already been deployed in support of the junta.

Guinea. Russia has long been a patron of former president Alpha Condé, who had been a strong supporter of Russia’s extensive mining (bauxite) interests in Guinea. Following Condé’s ouster in a coup in September 2021, Moscow can be expected to refocus its diplomatic efforts on propping up the military junta of Colonel Mamady Doumbouya in return for Moscow’s continued political sway and unencumbered access in the mining sector.

Gulf of Guinea. Having consolidated its position in the CAR in 2021, Russia is set to expand its influence in nearby Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Gabon in 2022. Moscow has been cultivating ties with leaders of all three countries with an eye on becoming a more significant player in the lucrative oil and mineral networks of Central Africa.

Angola. President João Lourenço is contending for a second term in office in 2022 amid a long recession, criticisms for increasing authoritarianism, and divisions within his ruling party. Russia’s opportunistic strategy of coming to the aid of isolated leaders as a means of enhancing Moscow’s leverage makes Lourenço an attractive target. His military academy training in the USSR, Russia’s extensive Cold War era ties to Angola, and Angola’s vast diamond, oil, gold, and mineral resources will all factor into increased Russian attention on Lourenço in 2022.

CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT AND SCRUTINY

Since Russia’s engagements in Africa are typically predicated on co-opting leaders facing limited checks and balances, they are nearly always detrimental to African citizens who must endure deepened institutionalized corruption, diverted public revenues, unaccountable leaders, and instability. Reform, therefore, will not come from these leaders but from African citizens, which will entail greater civil society engagement, enhanced transparency around contracts, and higher levels of scrutiny of any deals struck with Russia.

# Turkey-Russia Relations

## Note

#### \*\*INCLUDES STUFF FROM WAVE 1 IN THE COGNITIVE BIOTECHNOLOGY NEG\*\*

## 1NC – Turkey Relations [Insert Impact]

### 1NC

#### Turkey-Russia relations are high now

Gaber 22 (Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a Ukrainian foreign-policy expert, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University where she is currently teaching a course on Black Sea regional security, June 22, 2022, Turkey’s wartime bridge to the West is collapsing, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkeys-wartime-bridge-to-the-west-is-collapsing//RM)

For the first time in a while, Turkey was not only acting in line with transatlantic allies but also taking a lead in the region in a way that has bolstered its importance as a key NATO member. US officials have gone as far as to suggest that Turkey transfer its S-400 missile-defense systems to Ukraine in a bid to finally solve the problem of Russian air defense systems stationed in a NATO member state and the consequent Western sanctions imposed on Ankara. Turkey has bluntly rejected that proposal. Instead, it has slowly allowed domestic problems, regional geopolitics, and pragmatism to dictate its approach to the war. As a result, Turkish leadership once again appears eager to continue business as usual with an increasingly isolated Russia. Shifting winds Though only obliged to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits for the naval ships of states at war under Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, Ankara has denied access to non-littoral NATO states as well. Turkey’s fears of losing out to the West in its ambitions for a kind of regional ownership of the Black Sea prevailed over the security threats posed by Russia. Turkey’s desire to limit the presence of NATO vessels in the Black Sea, which might lead to further escalation with Russia, is understandable—even if not in line with the Alliance’s objectives. It is harder to justify the statements of Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar wondering whether mines discovered in the Black Sea had been laid there deliberately to create an excuse for NATO minesweepers to enter those waters. Turkey is also blocking the quick addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO, trying to use the situation to solve its own problems and voice its own security concerns. It is highly unlikely that Turkish leadership will block the membership of the two Nordic countries in the long term. Nevertheless, its current diplomatic bargaining has revealed major differences in threat perceptions as seen from Ankara and other capitals. While for most of the European states, the major threat on NATO’s eastern borders is a revisionist Russia, for Turkey it is Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) fighters operating in Syria and allegedly finding a safe haven in Finland and Sweden. Obviously, skyrocketing anti-American sentiments in Turkey and a traditional mistrust for the West limit the possibilities for cooperation on Ukraine. Whereas the majority of Turks support Ukraine in this war, polls show that more than 48 percent blame the United States or NATO for the conflict while only 34 percent hold Russia responsible. There is a widespread belief in Turkish society that the war in Ukraine is just another regional conflict instigated by Western powers after Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and others. Russia’s invasions and aggression in in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, and more recently in Ukraine and Syria don’t evoke a similar response among Turks. Populist rhetoric, burgeoning ahead of next year’s elections, as well as massive anti-Western propaganda on Turkish media mostly featuring retired generals, nationalist pundits, and (pro-)Russian experts with a strong Eurasianist agenda, do not help either. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s economic and strategic agendas also depend on close coordination with Moscow. Russia supplies almost half of Turkish domestic gas demand, provides technology for the country’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, and serves as the source of more than five million tourists annually. The Kremlin’s support is also vital for Turkey to maintain its presence in the South Caucasus and Middle East. The recent meeting of Çavuşoğlu with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in Ankara clearly showed that Turkey is keen to stick to mechanisms for cooperation with Russia, like the Astana Platform in Syria or the 3+3 format in the South Caucuses (which also involves Iran, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). Instead of using this crisis as a chance to decrease its strategic dependence on Russia, Turkey seems eager to bind itself even more to Moscow within new formats. Money matters Ukraine has so far largely respected Turkey’s sensitivities and not pushed too hard on sanctions, instead focusing on arms supplies and Ankara’s mediator role. However, that dynamic is coming under stress with Russian oligarchs using Turkey as a safe haven to bypass European Union restrictions. According to Lavrov’s recent statements, Russia-Turkey bilateral trade doubled in the first quarter of 2022, and there are now ongoing talks on expanding the use of Russia’s MIR payments system in Turkey. In March, Erdoğan suggested to Putin that their countries switch to national currencies or gold in commercial deals instead of the dollar or euro. Izzet Ekmekcibashi, the head of the Turkish-Russian Business Council (DEIK), said that more than one thousand new Russian companies opened in Turkey in March alone. Most recently, a well-connected Turkish journalist reported on a Russian-Turkish agreement to move the European headquarters of forty-three leading Russian companies including Gazprom to Turkey. Turkish-Russian cooperation in tourism has also quickly developed. Turkish media outlets have reported that Turkish carriers are operating 438 flights per week to Russia this summer at a time when sanctions have made it difficult for Moscow to arrange flights. According to the pro-government Sabah newspaper, Turkish Airlines has signed a deal to bring 1.5 million Russian tourists over in 2022. The newspaper’s report suggests that Ankara also plans to issue loans under state guarantees to support Turkish travel companies working with Russian tourists and back a new airline with the specific mandate of transporting Russian tourists to Turkey. Ankara, which earlier called on Moscow to end its blockade of Ukrainian ports so grain exports could restart, is now taking a more pro-Russia position, advocating for the international community to help unblock not only Ukraine’s but also Russia’s trade in grain and fertilizers through safe logistics, ship insurance, and a return of Russian banks to the SWIFT system. During Lavrov’s recent visit to Turkey, Çavuşoğlu said that Turkey considered Moscow’s demands “reasonable” and “feasible” and backed easing Western sanctions against Russia. There is also ample evidence of Ankara’s involvement in the illegal shipment and trade of Ukrainian grain stolen by Russian forces to the Middle East via the Turkish ports of Samsun, Derince, Bandırma, and Iskenderun. So far, despite strong evidence of Russian crimes and official appeals from Ukraine, Turkish authorities have remained silent on these cases. These moves by Turkey don’t just undermine its credibility as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia but also raise questions about Ankara’s geopolitical choices in a broader regional and transatlantic framework. As it leans toward Russia in a bid for stability at home, Turkey risks finding itself estranged from the West and aligned with a pariah state on the international arena. The Ukrainian case will become a major test for Turkey. Whether Ankara prefers to use it to bridge the gaps with the West or to burn the bridges remains to be seen.

#### Anti-western sentiment ties Russia and Turkey together–NATO recentralization wrecks this relationship

Dalay 5-20 (Galip Dalay is a CATS Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at SWP. (5-20-2022). Deciphering Turkey's geopolitical balancing and anti-westernism in its&nbsp;relations with Russia. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/deciphering-turkeys-geopolitical-balancing-and-anti-westernism-in-its-relations-with-russia//BVN SC)

The war in Ukraine is set to increase the pressure on Turkey’s balancing policy, shed light on the role of anti-Westernism in Ankara-Moscow relations, and reshape Tur­key’s relations with Russia and the West. The balancing policy will face a less permissive environment. However, a rupture in Turkey-Russia relations is not to be expected. Given the prohibitive cost of a breakdown, Ankara will strive to maintain functional bilateral relations with Moscow. More broadly, despite the changed con­text, Turkey will continue to seek autonomy in its foreign and security policy. This quest precedes the balancing policy and was not driven solely by discontent with the West. It was also informed by Turkey’s reading of the global order becoming more multipolar and less Western-centric. In spite of similarities in their narratives, the Turkish and Russian anti-Westernisms manifest themselves differently in policy terms. Finally, Russia’s geopolitical revisionism is set to drive Turkey and the West relatively closer together in matters geopolitical and strategic, provided that Turkey’s current blockage of Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership bid is resolved in the not too distant future. The pace and depth of developments in Turkish-Russian relations since 2016 has been intriguing. Discontent with the West has been a major driver for rapidly improv­ing ties. In fact, one could argue that it was anti-Westernism that created Turkey’s geo­political balancing policy between Russia and the West, coupled with the understand­ing that a multipolar global order was in the making. The close relationship with Russia has led to further rifts between Tur­key and the West. However, despite their shared discontent with the West, Russian and Turkish anti-Westernism differ in nature, origin and manifestation. Turkish anti-Westernism tends to be selective and policy-focused, whereas the Russian version is more structural and encompassing. For instance, Russian For­eign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke of ending US and western dominance of the inter­national system as the core goal of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Unlike Russia, Turkey also benefits from the Western-centric inter­national system it criticises. These differences carry major policy implications. The invasion of Ukraine has also injected a whole set of new dynamics into the Turkey-Russia-West triangle. Ankara’s geopolitical balancing policy is now entering difficult terrain, if not becoming unfeasible, as NATO and the West treat Russia explicitly as an enemy. The cost of such a policy is likely to increase. But even if balancing became unfeasible, Ankara would still strive to maintain some form of function­ing bilateral relationship with Moscow. Geopolitical Balancing Policy and Functional Bilateral Relations The major difference between Turkey’s geopolitical balancing policy and its quest to maintain functional bilateral relations with Russia is the scope of cooperation. A functional bilateral relationship meant cultivating economic, energy and political ties, but did not extend into the strategic realms of geopolitical and defence industry cooperation. Geopolitical balancing in­volves strategic cooperation, military pro­curement (purchasing the Russian S‑400 air defence system), and geopolitical engagement in conflict zones in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. The balancing policy is driven by discontent with the West and rests on a particular reading of global poli­tics, which Ankara sees becoming increas­ingly multipolar and less Western-centric (if not post-Western). It has also been informed by Ankara’s assessment that the West lacks internal cohesion, seeing signs of fragmentation between Europe and the United States (especially during the Trump presidency) and within Europe post-Brexit.

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## 1NC – Syrian War Impact

### 1NC

#### Turkey-Russia relations allow peace in Syria–Turkey just needs to stop working with the US

Goff Taylor 17 (Moira Goff-Taylor, Moira Goff-Taylor has worked as a foreign policy analyst in the US Government since 2000. Her research focuses on crosscutting political and socioeconomic trends in Europe and the Middle East, including European nations’ relations with the Middle East, September 17, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-turkey-needs-russia//RM)

Turkish security concerns also played a major role in Ankara’s rapprochement with Moscow. The Turkish Government had grown increasingly frustrated with the United States and the West’s Syria policy. The United States’ unwillingness to directly confront Syrian regime forces, its focus on countering ISIS, and western collaboration with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) through the Syrian Defense Forces aggravated Erdogan. Ankara views the YPG and the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) as off-shoots of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In 2016, as the PYD expanded control along the Turkish-Syrian border and the United States considered arming the YPG, the Turkish government grew alarmed, as it did not want to see the creation of an autonomous Syrian Kurdish region on its border nor a strengthened YPG or PKK.[vi] Erdogan knew that if he wanted to take action to counter PYD expansion in Syria he would need to work with Moscow. Turkey’s openness to working with Russia on the Syria crisis revealed a shift in Turkish priori-ties. Since the fall of 2011, Turkey and Russia had been on opposites sides of the Syria crisis; Ankara was focused on Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s ouster while Moscow supported the regime. Turkey’s fear over the growing strength of the PYD began to outweigh its aversion to the Asad regime and necessitated better cooperation between Ankara and Moscow. In August 2016, Turkey launched the Euphrates Shield offensive, supporting Turkish-backed Syrian opposition forces against ISIS, and succeeded in both taking back the town of Jarabulus and preventing Kurdish forces from gaining additional territory. Turkish plans for this offensive probably encouraged the restoration of Turkey’s bilateral ties with Russia. Ankara likely sought out Moscow’s acceptance of the military operation to avoid a confrontation with Russian and Syrian regime forces. Turkey also began to work closely with Russia to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Ankara worked with Moscow to facilitate a ceasefire in Aleppo and participated in Russian led peace talks in Astana. Russia likely welcomed Turkey’s new focus as it forced Ankara to be more flexible on Asad’s status in future Syrian governments and offered an opportunity for greater Russian influence over Turkey. Ankara’s security concerns over the potential for an autonomous Syrian Kurdish controlled region along the Turkish border and the strengthening of PKK forces motivates Turkey to work with Moscow, as well as Washington, on the Syria crisis. While unable to convince either Russia or the United States to adopt Turkey’s perspective on the YPG and PYD, the Turkish government will maintain dialogue with both in an attempt to protect its agenda. Erdogan sees Russia as a dominate force in the crisis and will continue to work with Moscow in the hope of influencing the future of Syria. Ankara will push to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria and limit the power and influence of Syrian Kurds. Erdogan has repeatedly stated that Turkey will never allow the establishment of a Syrian Kurdish state in northern Syria.[vii] Turkey is possibly working on a deal with Russia and Iran on Kurdish-controlled Afrin and the city of Idlib, with Ankara working to get groups it backs to retreat from Idlib in exchange for Turkey having more leeway to take action against YPG forces in the Afrin region.[viii]

#### Syrian conflict causes nuclear war

Alex Lantier 19, PhD at the University of Geneva and writings appeared on Global Research, Countercurrents, "Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria," 10/14/2019, https://countercurrents.org/2019/10/syrian-army-iran-threaten-counterattack-against-turkish-invasion-of-syria, /\

The war unleashed by Turkey’s invasion of Syria, targeting formerly US-backed Kurdish forces, escalated out of control this weekend as the Syrian army and Iran moved to counterattack. With Turkish troops and allied Al Qaeda militias advancing deep into Kurdish-held territory in Syria, the Middle East is only days away from an all-out war between the major regional powers that could trigger a global conflict between nuclear-armed world powers. UN reports show that 130,000 Syrians have fled their homes in the region amid the Turkish offensive, and Turkish officials claim they had “neutralized” at least 415 Kurdish fighters. Turkish troops seized the cities of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, amid heavy fighting including ongoing Turkish air raids, and seized a road crossing that cut off US and Kurdish troops in Kobani. Turkish troops also fired artillery at US troops near Kobani in what former US envoy Brett McGurk said was “not a mistake,” although Turkish officials later denied this. Turkey’s Syrian “rebel” allies, the Islamist Syrian National Army (SNA, formerly the Free Syrian Army), are executing Kurdish civilians in areas they hold, according to multiple reports. Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf was executed; her bullet-riddled car appeared in a video surrounded by SNA fighters. Beyond Al Qaeda-linked calls to destroy infidels, the British Daily Telegraph noted, the SNA’s main outlook “is sectarian: they are anti-Kurdish and they are Arab chauvinists.” Yesterday evening, the Syrian army announced it would march on the area. The official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported: “Syrian Arab Army units began moving north to confront Turkish aggression on Syrian territory... The movement comes to confront the ongoing Turkish aggression on towns and areas in the north of Hasaka and Raqqa provinces, where the Turkish forces committed massacres against locals, occupied some areas and destroyed infrastructure.” The Syrian army has reportedly reached an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) militia, whose alliance with the United States was broken by Washington a week ago. Under this agreement, Syrian army troops would reach the city of Kobani near the Syrian-Turkish border in 48 hours. On Saturday, President Donald Trump had authorized the remaining 1,000 US troops in Kobani to withdraw, and US forces were in full retreat across northern Syria this weekend to avoid being cut off by advancing Turkish troops. Iran, which has deployed tens of thousands of troops as well as drones to Syria in recent years to back the Syrian regime against a NATO-led proxy war, indicated it would support the Syrian army. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Advisor for International Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati met with Syrian Ambassador to Iran Adnan Mahmoud yesterday in Tehran. He gave Iran’s “full support to Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, calling for the withdrawal of the Turkish forces,” SANA reported. Velayati added, “The principled policy of Iran is based on supporting the people and government of Syria and defending their righteous stances in a way that entails continuing joint cooperation until terrorism and terrorist organizations are completely eliminated.” At the same time, military tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are surging amid mutual attacks on tankers carrying Persian Gulf oil supplies that are critical to the world economy. Last month, the US and Saudi governments blamed a September 14 missile attack on Saudi oil facilities that caused a sharp rise in world oil prices on Iran, without providing any evidence. Then on October 11, two missiles hit the Iranian tanker Sabiti off Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, said yesterday that Iran would retaliate against unnamed targets for the attack on the Sabiti. “A special committee has been set up to investigate the attack on Sabiti... Its report will soon be submitted to the authorities for decision,” Shamkhani told Fars News. “Piracy and mischief on international waterways aimed at making commercial shipping insecure will not go unanswered.” Saudi officials declined to comment on the Sabiti attack, and officials with the US Fifth Fleet in the Gulf sheikdom of Bahrain claimed to have no information on it. But there is widespread speculation in the international media that the attack was carried out by Saudi Arabia or with its support. The conflicts erupting between the different capitalist regimes in the Middle East pose an imminent threat not only to the population of the region, but to the entire world. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers. The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a Third World War. The Kurdish-led SDF militias in Syria, vastly outgunned by Turkish forces and vulnerable to air strikes, warned US officials in talks leaked by CNN that they would appeal for Russia to attack Turkey and protect SDF and Syrian army forces. As Turkey is legally a NATO ally of Washington and the European powers, such an attack could compel the United States and its European allies to either break the 70-year-old NATO alliance or go to war with Russia to protect Turkey. “You are leaving us to be slaughtered,” SDF General Mazloum Kobani Abdi told US officials in a meeting last Thursday. “You are not willing to protect the people, but you do not want another force to come and protect us. You have sold us.” Mazloum dismissed US officials when they replied by demanding that the SDF not cut a deal with Russia, but instead keep taking huge casualties from Turkish air raids. He said, “I need to know if you are capable of protecting my people, of stopping these bombs falling on us or not. I need to know, because if you’re not, I need to make a deal with Russia and the regime now and invite their planes to protect this region.” US forces across Syria were in full retreat, however, and US Defense Secretary Mark Esper told US television news yesterday that the Turkish-Kurdish conflict “gets worse by the hour.” Given the attempts by the Kurds to work out an alliance with Syria and Russia, he added, Trump “directed that we begin a deliberate withdrawal of forces from northern Syria.” Esper said he would “not place American service members in the middle of a longstanding conflict between the Turks and the Kurds. This is not why we are in Syria.” Esper said the Turkish army was rejecting the Pentagon’s appeals for a ceasefire with the Kurds and instead expanding its war aims inside Syria. “In the last 24 hours, we learned that they likely intend to expand their attack further south than originally planned, and to the west,” he said. Esper added that “all the exact things” US officials warned their Turkish counterparts would likely happen if they invaded Syria were now taking place, including the release of tens of thousands of Islamic State (ISIS) fighters held in prison camps by Washington’s former Kurdish allies.

## 1NC – Turkish Economy Impact

### 1NC

#### Russia-Turkey relations are key to Turkish economy–the ties are deepening now BUT investment in NATO leaves Turkey in its most vulnerable state

Wheeldon 22 (03/31/2022 | Tom Wheeldon | ‘Turkey juggles relationships with Russia, Ukraine amid economic crisis’ | https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20220331-turkey-juggles-relationships-with-russia-ukraine-amid-economic-crisis | DOA: 7/6/2022 | SAoki)

‘Extremely vulnerable’ Turkey’s “economic crisis” is the “most important factor in its calculations”, Howard Eissenstat, a Turkey expert at St. Lawrence University in New York state and the Middle East Institute in Washington DC, put it to FRANCE 24. The Turkish lira lost 47 percent of its value over the past year, as prices soared by over 54 percent. This 20-year inflation high marked a new nadir in the currency crisis wracking Turkey since 2018, a crisis experts blame on Erdogan’s belief – contrary to all economic evidence – that higher interest rates cause inflation. Turkey does not want to “antagonise Russia”, Eissenstat noted, because it is “extremely vulnerable to a loss of Russian wheat, gas and oil”. Russia is in effect a vital trading partner for the beleaguered Turkish economy, providing 45 percent of its natural gas and a colossal 70 percent of its wheat. The latter is an especially high-priority import, seeing as escalating bread prices are a major source of discontent in Turkey. Russia is also Turkey’s biggest source of tourists, with its 4.7 million visitors accounting for 19 percent of all travellers to the country in 2021. ‘Competitive co-operation’ Historically, Turkey and Russia have a track record of antagonising each other, most notably when the clashing geostrategic manoeuvrings of Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire saw them fight on more than 10 occasions from the sixteenth century to the twentieth century. At the outset of the Cold War, Kemalist Turkey’s axiomatic anti-communism and pro-Western ethos prompted it to join NATO and host US nuclear missiles, a major source of Soviet vexation until they were removed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The most recent Russo-Turkish diplomatic crisis flared in 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian jet near the Syrian border. But a formal apology from Erdogan soon ended Moscow’s retaliatory sanctions – inaugurating a rapid thaw in relations that weathered Russia and Turkey backing opposing sides in the Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh wars. This recent paradigm in Russo-Turkish relations is best described as “competitive co-operation”, the German Marshall Fund’s Unluhisarcikli said, in which supporting rival forces abroad “doesn’t prevent them from cooperating in the fields of energy and trade”. A year on from that swiftly resolved spat with Russia, a dramatic coup attempt sparked a pervasive crackdown as Ankara held responsible Islamic cleric Fetullah Gulen and his movement. Erdogan’s government felt the West was not supportive enough after this would-be putsch. Thus the failed coup set the stage for Turkey-Russia ties to deepen, explained Reilly Barry, a Turkey researcher at Harvard University. Following the putsch attempt, Russian President Vladimir Putin “successfully sowed more seeds of doubt into Erdogan’s mind that the West is not his ultimate protector and security assurance, and achieved his desired effect to create a wedge among NATO allies when Turkey purchased the S-400 missile system from Russia, a major red line for a NATO country to cross", Barry told FRANCE 24. “So, the Turkish government has formulated a stance on seeing Russia as a potential major power protector in cases when Western relations and alliances do not suit Turkey’s best interests.” In this context, “having been close with Russia and Putin lately more so than at any other time in recent history, it would make Turkey extremely vulnerable to be condemning Russia in the language that the US and Western European countries are”, Barry continued. “It is also important to remember the US and other countries do not share a sea with Russia and are not only separated by one other country [Georgia],” she added.

#### Turkish recession spills over globally–failed states, terror, prolif, and extinction

Kemp 10 (Geoffrey Kemp | *The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East*, p. 233-234 | DOA: 7/6/2022 | SAoki)

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

## 1NC – Ukraine Diplomacy Impact

### 1NC

#### Russia-Turkey relations key to Ukraine diplomacy and de-escalating tensions

ORUÇ 2-23 (MERVE ŞEBNEM ORUÇ, A political commentator, columnist, and a TV host mostly focusing on the Syrian civil war, Middle East, Turkish-American relations, and Turkish foreign politics as well, 2/23/33, “Turkey to preserve ties with Russia, Ukraine to de-escalate tensions”, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-to-preserve-ties-with-russia-ukraine-to-de-escalate-tensions//RM)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan highlighted the necessity of maintaining calm and will maintain relations with both countries amid ongoing tensions between Russia and Ukraine as Moscow recognized the sovereignty of the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR). Speaking to reporters on his way back from Senegal on Wednesday, Erdoğan said Turkey cooperates with both Russia and Ukraine and will not halt relations or plan to impose sanctions against Moscow. “We have political, military and economic relations with Russia. Same with Ukraine. We cannot give this up if you ask me because our country has high interests in this regard,” Erdoğan said. He noted that Turkey aims to resolve the issue without harming relations and will conduct talks with the Turkish delegation as soon as he returns home. Careful calculations need to be made to figure out the pros and cons of actions to be taken against Russia, Erdoğan said, noting that steps need to be taken in a delicate manner. “Some say the conflict will boost the costs of natural gas while others discuss turning off the valves. We need to take our steps with this sensitivity in mind,” he said, adding that Turkish officials are currently in contact with Russian counterparts to arrange a meeting. “We will continue phone diplomacy and I hope we achieve favorable results,” Erdoğan said. The president noted that he highlighted Turkey's stance regarding Ukraine's territorial integrity to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a recent phone call and that Turkey does not accept any actions violating the Minsk agreements. "I told him that we are ready to undertake the responsibility to ensure that the crisis is solved through diplomacy and dialogue," he said, adding that the ongoing tensions pose a threat to security in the Black Sea. "Our hope is for our Black Sea neighbors Russia and Ukraine to immediately return to the negotiation table," he added. Erdoğan continued by saying that he believes the planned NATO summit is quite important in this regard, as countries will discuss measures to be taken in light of Russia’s actions. He noted that he would hold another meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin following the NATO summit. He criticized Western leaders for their ineffective talks with Putin. “As you know, Macron came to Moscow and you see the picture. Scholz followed him and you see that picture too,” Erdoğan said, adding that Biden was also supposed to speak with Putin, but no concrete results have been achieved so far. He noted that NATO was the only instrument left to display a common stance. “In this videoconference meeting, NATO needs to decide on its stance and do whatever necessary,” Erdoğan said, adding that no troops have been sent to Ukraine so far, but Russia has amassed soldiers near the Ukrainian border. “Of course, you don’t need to be an oracle to know what’s coming in the face of this picture,” Erdoğan said, adding that Turkey will display its final stance regarding the issue after the meeting. However, the president highlighted that Turkey has already sided with Ukraine regarding Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Putin’s recent recognition by rejecting it for violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity. NATO member Turkey, which shares a maritime border with both Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea, has good ties with both its neighbors and has offered to mediate the crisis, while warning Moscow against invading Ukraine. Turkey has been closely following the developments and is in close contact with both Kyiv and Moscow. While forging cooperation on defense and energy, Turkey has opposed Moscow’s policies in Syria and Libya, as well as its annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. It has also sold sophisticated drones to Ukraine, angering Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday signed decrees to recognize the sovereignty of Luhansk and Donetsk, known as the Donbass, at a televised event in which he delivered a fiery speech questioning Ukraine's right to statehood. Putin also instructed Moscow's Foreign Ministry to establish formal diplomatic relations with the two areas held by pro-Russia rebels, which are part of the Donbass region and belong to Ukraine under international law.

#### Ukraine war escalation goes nuclear

Brookes 3/31 (Peter Brookes, Senior Research Fellow, Center for National Defense, Peter researches and develops Heritage’s policy on weapons of mass destruction and counter proliferation, Mar 31st, 2022, How Russia Might Deploy Nukes in Ukraine War, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/how-russia-might-deploy-nukes-ukraine-war//RM)

With Russian forces struggling mightily to subjugate Ukraine in the face of incredible resistance from both the Ukrainian army and ordinary citizens, observers are concerned about the Kremlin escalating the war with the use of nuclear weapons. At this point, it’s arguably “low risk,” but it’s not “no risk.” Moscow could certainly decide to move the war from conventional to nuclear at any time. As such, we must take the threat of the use of Russian nuclear weapons very seriously, surveil it intensely, and prepare for the possibility of a nuclear event. But under what circumstances might Russia use a nuke against Ukraine—or as part of the Ukraine conflict? Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and current deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, outlined Moscow’s policy on using nuclear weapons in an interview Saturday, according to The Guardian: Number one is the situation when Russia is struck by a nuclear missile. The second case is any use of other nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies. The third is an attack on a critical infrastructure that will have paralyzed our nuclear deterrent forces, and the fourth case is when an act of aggression is committed against Russia and its allies, which jeopardized the existence of the country itself, even without the use of nuclear weapons, that is, with the use of conventional weapons. That’s relatively clear, but that’s not all. Russia also has a secretive “escalate to deescalate” doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that Medvedev didn’t mention—unsurprisingly—in that list of four conditions. This unspoken possibility is perhaps the most likely scenario of all. Let’s face it: The war isn’t going well for Vladimir Putin & Co. What the Kremlin thought would be a three-day dash to Kyiv has turned into a monthlong slog, which has seen Russian forces losing general officers, troops, and equipment at an alarming rate. The outcome—once thought to overwhelmingly favor Moscow—is up for grabs. That state of affairs doesn’t bode well for the Kremlin and its cronies. Even authoritarian leaders care about public opinion at home and the effect it might have on the regime’s control over the country. Losing the war in Ukraine would have repercussions on Russia internationally, too, including significant reputational costs, likely diplomatic pariah status, punishing economic costs, and a demoralized, depleted military. In other words, losing in Ukraine will be plenty painful for Putin and his pals—and this is when, unfortunately, the use of nuclear weapons potentially comes into play for the Russians. Indeed, Putin might use a nuke (or more) in an (as yet unproven) “escalate to deescalate” plan for advancing Russia’s unjust goals in Ukraine. Although there is debate about the effectiveness of using a nuke on the battlefield in Ukraine, alternatively Russia could pop off a low-yield, tactical (aka battlefield) nuke over an unpopulated area, or even the Arctic Ocean. The point would be to send a clear signal to the U.S., NATO, and others who are supporting the Ukrainian political and military resistance that their backing must end—immediately. If they choose otherwise, the risk would be that Moscow might escalate from a single, low-yield battlefield nuke over an unpopulated territory to high-yield theater or intercontinental-range nukes targeting populated areas in these countries. The Kremlin might calculate that Ukraine’s supporters (e.g., NATO) don’t have the political will to risk a wider conflict or chance a move up the nuclear-escalation ladder. Ukraine’s backers—and Ukraine itself—would have to make some fateful choices. Using the “escalate to deescalate” nuclear stratagem, Moscow potentially could force any number of advantageous political and military outcomes to the war in Ukraine, including a victory that avoids the unpleasantries of a loss. Of course, the use of a nuclear weapon in war for the first time since World War II is a troubling idea to contemplate. But we must understand that the Russian political and military playbook includes pages on the use of nukes. Consequently, we must consider Russia’s use of nuclear weapons a real possibility, monitor the movement of Russian nuclear forces with vigor, and prepare for making the tough choices that the possibility of a nuclear event would bring.

#### Nuclear war causes extinction

Starr 15 (Steven Starr, Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology; he also maintains the website Nuclear Darkness. Starr also teaches a class on the Environmental, Health and Social Effects of nuclear weapons at the University of Missouri, October 14, 2015, “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction”, <https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/>/RM)

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.] The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment? It is, of course, debatable whether or not nuclear winter could cause human extinction. There is essentially no way to truly “know” without fighting a strategic nuclear war. Yet while it is crucial that we all understand the mortal peril that we face, it is not necessary to engage in an unwinnable academic debate as to whether any humans will survive. What is of the utmost importance is that this entire subject –the catastrophic environmental consequences of nuclear war – has been effectively dropped from the global discussion of nuclear weaponry. The focus is instead upon “nuclear terrorism”, a subject that fits official narratives and centers upon the danger of one nuclear weapon being detonated – yet the scientifically predicted consequences of nuclear war are never publically acknowledged or discussed. Why has the existential threat of nuclear war been effectively omitted from public debate? Perhaps the leaders of the nuclear weapon states do not want the public to understand that their nuclear arsenals represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race? Such an understanding could lead to a demand that nuclear weapons be banned and abolished. Consequently, the nuclear weapon states continue to maintain and modernize their nuclear arsenals, as their leaders remain silent about the ultimate threat that nuclear war poses to the human species.

## 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox

### 2NC – UQ – Turkey-West/NATO Coop

#### Russia-Turkey relations are high now–BUT they are on the brink

**The European Institute for International Law and International Relations, 7-5**-20**22**, "How do Russia and Turkey manage to maintain a privileged relationship despite their differences on many issues?," European Institute for International Law and International Relations, https://www.eiir.eu/international-relations/europe/how-do-russia-and-turkey-manage-to-maintain-a-privileged-relationship-despite-their-differences-on-many-issues///DS

First of all, the good personal chemistry between the two presidents plays its role. Putin and Erdogan are both adepts of speaking frankly, and they present this as an asset in inter-state relations, making it possible to overcome differences and blockages. In fact, each time the different stands they have on Syria, Armenia, NATO, Libya… threatened to reach the point of crisis, the two heads of state met or spoke to each other, finding an agreement to overcome it while acknowledging the persistent disagreements. Erdogan and Putin also agree on the way they treat opposition in their respective countries, which is brutal to say the least. They both also agree on the strongman image they intend to project, both internally and on the international scene. A turning point in the closeness between the two presidents was Putin’s expressed support for Erdogan after the failed coup in 2016, while Western countries, for their part, criticized the massive repression that followed that event in Turkey. What role does the West play in the current convergence between Moscow and Ankara? This is another major point of convergence between the two countries. Wether one sees it negatively or positively, and with obviously very different historical contexts, both countries consider that the West has refused their will of cooperation and integration. They also believe that their Western partners have ignored their security interests as they see them. For example, on the Kurdish question for Turkey, the enlargement of NATO for Russia. Turkey, like Russia, is interested in the idea of a less Western-centric multipolar world, in which regional powers see their role enhanced. But the anti-Western posture is clearly more structural in the case of Russia (which sees itself as a global power) than in the case of Turkey (who wants to extend its influence but on different regional scales). Thus, for Russia we are dealing with questions of principle, of world vision. For Turkey we are probably dealing with something more situational, more fluid because it is more negotiable, and this can constitute a fragility in the bilateral relationship. This is perhaps why the Russians have been keen, over the last decade, to involve Turkey in economic cooperations that have a strategic scope, creating long-term dependence (nuclear, energy…). The rejection of Western policies is ultimately a common objective. Syria, Libya, the Caucasus – topics where the interests of Ankara and Moscow are far from fully converging. But the one objective of marginalizing Western countries, and showing the decline of their authority on the international scene reconcile them. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020, the Minsk group (of which France and the United States are co-chairs with Russia) was not very active and the ceasefire agreement was steered exclusively by Russia and consultations with Turkey. Considering the tensions with the Europeans in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey sees it as useful to be able to display a capacity for coordination with Russia. As for Moscow, it likes to emphasize the spirit of cooperation that governs its relations with Ankara in the Black Sea. Turkey has positioned itself in the Black Sea as a littoral power tending to oppose the plans of Alliance members who are pushing for a stronger NATO presence. This, of course, suits Russia. Turkey has developed its relations with Kiev, affirming its support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, condemning the annexation of Crimea and developing Ukrainian-Turkish arms projects. What impact does the war in Ukraine have on relations between Russia and Turkey? Before the war, Russian officials have repeatedly denounced the arms cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine. Turkey also participated in the first summit of the “Crimea Platform”, initiated by Ukraine August 2021, in Kiev. As long as this policy is not explicitly part of a NATO strategy towards Ukraine, Moscow can accept the development of Ukrainian-Turkish ties. But when Russia complained, before the war in Ukraine, about the development of cooperation between the latter and the Nato countries, and if it was mainly aimed at the role of the Americans or the British, it also had in mind the Turkish drones. For the moment, Turkey gives the impression of remaining in its posture of Russia-West balance : it condemns the invasion, it closes the straits to warships, but it does not take sanctions against Russia, continues to work with it in the economic field, and seeks to pose as a mediator. Everything depends on what Turkey wants to do with the opportunity that the war in Ukraine potentially represents for it: continue its game of balance between the West and the Russians as in recent years; or repair its relations with its NATO allies? It seems that the first option prevails at this stage – let’s not forget that Turkey is very dependent on Russia economically (energy, tourism…). It seems to want to make its usefulness known to the various players in the context of this war, which is upsetting many balances, and to gain an additional regional and international aura from it (and to make people forget its economic crisis?). To what extent does the desire to expand their respective influences constitute limits to their political and economic cooperation? So far, the two actors are playing in the same arena, sometimes with more or less serious friction. But their order of priorities is different. For Turkey, it is the Middle East and the Mediterranean, while Russia’s foreign policy remains focused on maintaining its weight in the ex-Soviet space. This could change if Turkey were to become more enterprising in this space that Russia claims as its sphere of influence. Moscow is keeping a tight rein on Ankara’s desire to develop its presence in Central Asia in the name of historical, linguistic and cultural kinship. Above all, with the war in Ukraine, one wonders if Turkey, a member of NATO, will be able to continue for long on its line of a transactional attitude in which it plays the Russian card in its negotiations with its Western partners, and the anti-Western card in its power relations with Moscow. Correct relations with Turkey are perceived in Moscow as an asset in relation to several major strategic issues. The impression has often been given that Turkey is more or less leading the game. Meaning, on the international stage, and in particular in its relations with Western countries and some of its neighbors, Russia has not exactly shown flexibility lately, with an often offensive, if not aggressive, behaviour. In this context, the manifest effort of Russian diplomacy to find points of agreement with a Turkey that does not hesitate to impose its pace and its interests offers a striking contrast! This is because correct relations with Turkey are perceived in Moscow as an asset in relation to several major strategic issues. The Black Sea-Mediterranean stage is a key issue. Russia proceeds by priorities : Turkey is not a convenient partner in Syria (where it tends to take advantage, at present, of the Russian withdrawal linked to the war in Ukraine), but this is acceptable, as long as it remains on the right line in the Black Sea, an arch-strategic zone for Moscow. However, one of the major objectives of Russian foreign policy in recent years has been to divide by all means the NATO alliance, which it sees as strong militarily but weak politically. Hence the efforts to quickly complete the contract for the sale of the S-400 anti-aircraft system. One of the reasons why Ankara worked to improve its relationship with Moscow was probably its perception that its Western allies would not necessarily be of much help in the event of a problem with Russia, and that it was therefore necessary to manage and stabilize this relationship as best as possible in autonomy. Regardless the extremely controversial democratic system reigning in Turkey, this is more “looking out for themselves” behaviour than “challenging NATO” behaviour.

#### Turkey will not break away from NATO

Yegin 19 (Mehmet Yegin is a Visiting Fellow at the Americas Research Division at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin. He works on American politics and Turkish Foreign Policy. He studied on American Politics in his MA studies at the University of Cincinnati in Ohio, USA. He obtained his Ph.D. from Political Science Department of Bilkent University with a thesis title of “Why Turkey Join or Avoid Joining U.S.-led Military Coalitions?” Engaged in research at Ankara based think tank USAK (International Strategic Research Organization) since 2008, Yegin served as the Director of the organization’s Center for American Studies from 2012 to 2016, June 2019, “Turkey between NATO and Russia: The Failed Balance”, SWP, <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63534/ssoar-2019-yegin-Turkey_between_NATO_and_Russia.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2019-yegin-Turkey_between_NATO_and_Russia.pdf.%20accessed%206-20-2022//BVN> SC)

Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 air defense missile system has raised questions concerning Turkey’s alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the country’s future intentions. Nonetheless, a break with NATO is unlikely, as alliance dependence is still applicable for both Turkey and other members. Turkish government circles have cast the recent purchase as a means to gain more autonomy from and/or better bargaining power with Western allies. However, the purchase of S-400s will not bring about the desired outcomes. Instead, it will generate a dual dependency characterized by vulnerability to Russia and an increased need for assurances from NATO. Turkey also seems to have reached the limits of its bargaining power, as the United States is placing more weight on punitive measures. The only explanation left for the purchase is the possibility that President Tayyip Erdoğan may be seeking a domestic rally effect via a confrontation with the United States to prevent possible challengers to his leadership from gaining momentum.

### 2NC – UQ – AT: Not United

#### Turkey and Russia are collaborating now–they met in Iran to solidify a deal on exports and Syria

Dixon et. al. 7-19 (Robyn Dixon is a foreign correspondent on her third stint in Russia, after almost a decade reporting there beginning in the early 1990s. In November 2019 she joined The Washington Post as Moscow bureau chief, Kareem Fahim has served as the Istanbul bureau chief and a Middle East correspondent for The Washington Post since September 2016. Previously, he worked for 11 years as a staff reporter for the New York Times, with assignments on the metro desk and as a Cairo-based foreign correspondent reporting on the Arab uprisings and their aftermath, Karina Tsui is a reporting intern on The Washington Post’s Foreign desk. Before The Post, she was a Toni Stabile fellow for investigative reporting at Columbia Journalism School, 7-19-22, “Putin makes rare international trip to Iran amid isolation from the West”, The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/19/putin-iran-ukraine-war-erdogan//BVN> SC)

The presence of Erdogan, who has tried to position himself as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv, raised hopes that he could help build on progress made last week in Turkey, when Russia and Ukraine agreed to preliminary steps that would allow grain shipments to resume from Ukrainian ports. Russia is blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea shipping routes, including the major port of Odessa, contributing to a global food crisis as the price of bread, cooking oil and fertilizer soars. More than 100 ships laden with grain are estimated to be stuck at port or at sea. U.N. officials, who are also helping to broker the grain agreement between Ukraine and Russia, said more work needed to be done. During a news briefing Monday, Farhan Haq, a spokesman for the U.N. secretary general, said that “we don’t have any particular expectations” that a grain deal will emerge from the three-way meeting in Iran. Since the talks in Istanbul last week, he added, “we feel that incrementally, there’s been a little bit more progress made, but there’s nothing to announce at this stage.” Putin sounded a similar note at the outset of his meeting with Erdogan, saying, “It’s true that not all issues have been resolved yet, but the fact that there is movement is already good.” The leaders were also discussing Turkey’s plans for a military incursion into northern Syria, targeting a U.S.-allied Kurdish-led militia. Ankara says the planned operation is aimed at pushing back fighters affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which it regards as a terrorist group. But any military operation could put Turkey in conflict with Iran and Russia, which are allies of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and have maintained military forces in the country. Khamenei appeared to signal his displeasure during a meeting with Erdogan on Tuesday, saying that a military attack was “definitely to the detriment of Syria, Turkey and the region.” An aide to Putin, Yuri Ushakov, said before the Tehran meetings that Russia opposed any action that violated Syria’s territorial integrity. But as the leaders gathered late Tuesday to address the media, Erdogan brushed off Russia’s and Iran’s opposition to his military plans: “I hear from you, my dear friends, that you understand Turkey’s security concerns. I am grateful for this. However, words alone are no cure for wounds.” Erdogan also criticized attacks on civilians in rebel-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria, carried out by Russia or the Syrian government, saying they “undermine our efforts for a political solution.” Putin’s visit comes just days after President Biden visited Saudi Arabia and Israel, where he spoke of fears that China and Russia were seeking to fill a power vacuum in the Middle East. “We can’t let that happen,” he said Friday in Tel Aviv. “There is a reality in the region with Russia in the center of it,” said Vali Nasr, professor of Middle Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. “This has countered the United States’ belief that the dynamic [in the region] is about Israel and Arabs getting together against Iran. The Putin-Erdogan-Raisi meetings show that there are other players and dynamics beyond those in Riyadh last week.”

#### Turkey is siding with Russia now

Paul T. Levin 19, is docent in International Relations and the founding director of the Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies, “What’s Driving Turkey’s Foreign Policy?,” 10/24/19, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-turkeys-foreign-policy//BVN SC

At the risk of oversimplification, it may be useful to talk of an emerging global struggle between two forms of governance: liberal democracy and oligarchical authoritarianism. There are still meaningful differences between the West on the one side, and Russia and other oligarchical authoritarian states on the other — despite the emergence of Trump and other conservative-nationalist populists in power in countries like Hungary. Thus, while it may be misleading to speak of a new Cold War, there does appear to be a new ideological divide emerging between Russia and the West that has a clear national security dimension. If this continues over the coming decade, Turkey will face the same question as during the Cold War: Which side is it on? In light of the transformations that have occurred in the Turkish foreign policy elite, it seems much more likely for Turkey to side with Russia this time around. There are strong affinities between the Russian and Turkish models of governance today, and leaders in both countries share a desire to be liberated from the interference of Western governments, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions concerned with internal matters such as human rights and freedoms. They both have ambitions to be more than leaders of mere subservient states on the periphery of Western institutions. Russia wants respect as a world power,111 Turkey as a formidable regional power. And there are also significant push factors in Turkey’s relations with the West. Unless there is a regime transformation in Turkey, it is likely to continue to diverge from its traditional Western allies.

#### Turkey-Russia relations are growing.

TASS 7/19, Russian news agency, 7/19/2022, “Relations between Russia and Turkey are developing, Putin says,” <https://tass.com/politics/1482069>, RES

TEHRAN, July 19. /TASS/. Relations between Moscow and Ankara are developing, and the bilateral trade turnover is growing at a swift rate, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday at the meeting with President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the Astana Format Trilateral Summit in Tehran. Relations between the two countries are developing; "against all odds, the trade turnover is growing, interestingly, at a very significant rate," the Russian leader said. Putin also expressed satisfaction that the two presidents have the opportunity to hold the bilateral meeting on the summit sidelines.

#### Even the Turkish public favors cooperation with Russia

Kirişci 6-27 (Kemal Kirişci is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe's Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies. From 2013 until 2020, he was TÜSİAD senior fellow at Brookings and director of the Turkey Project. Kirişci is a regular contributor to the Order from Chaos blog at Brookings, 6-27-22, “Erdoğan’s problem is not with Sweden and Finland but with Turkey’s Western vocation”, Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/27/erdogans-problem-is-not-with-sweden-and-finland-but-with-turkeys-western-vocation//BVN> SC)

NATO has became another target of Erdoğan’s vitriol as he blames the West for Turkey’s growing economic ills and political isolation. This goes back to the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, when members of parliament from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) alleged NATO involvement without presenting a shred of evidence, even calling it a “terror organization.” This allegation has been periodically nurtured by the government even if Erdoğan has personally avoided it. Yet, Erdoğan’s close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, decision to purchase S-400 missiles from Russia, and a relentless diplomatic battle over them with Washington has deeply damaged the reliability of Turkey as a NATO ally. Skepticism about Turkey’s place in the alliance was further aggravated by Erdoğan’s threat to expel 10 Western ambassadors, seven of them from allies, for asking him to implement a European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruling and release Kavala. Instead, Erdoğan chose to categorically dismiss the ECHR decision as well as the Council of Europe’s initiation of disciplinary action against Turkey. This persistent anti-Western and anti-U.S. narrative has found a receptive mood in a Turkish citizenry deprived of access to alternative discourses. Not surprisingly, the Turkish public in recent years has perceived a greater security threat from the United States than from Russia (see slides 81-83 here). According to Metropoll, a public opinion research company, 65% of respondents in April 2022 did not trust NATO; in January, 39.4% preferred closer relations with China and Russia compared with 37.5% preferring closer relations with the EU and U.S.

### 2NC – UQ – AT: Russia Isolated

#### Russia not isolated–space program proves

Reuters 4-12 (Reuters is an international news agency owned by Thomson Reuters. It employs around 2,500 journalists and 600 photojournalists in about 200 locations worldwide. Reuters is one of the largest news agencies in the world. The agency was established in London in 1851 by the German-born Paul Reuter, 4-12-22, “Impossible to isolate Russia, or hold it back: Putin warns the West”, Business Standard, <https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/putin-warns-the-west-russia-cannot-be-isolated-or-held-back-122041200700_1.html//BVN> SC)

President Vladimir Putin warned the West on Tuesday that attempts to isolate Moscow would fail, citing the success of the Soviet space programme as evidence that Russia could achieve spectacular leaps forward in tough conditions. Russia says it will never again depend on the West after the United States and its allies imposed crippling sanctions on it to punish Putin for his Feb. 24 order for what he called a "special military operation" in Ukraine. Sixty one years to the day since the Soviet Union's Yuri Gagarin blasted off into the history books by becoming the first man in space, Putin travelled to the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia's Far East, 3,450 miles (5550 km) east of Moscow. "The sanctions were total, the isolation was complete but the Soviet Union was still first in space," Putin said, according to Russian state television. "We don't intend to be isolated," Putin said. "It is impossible to severely isolate anyone in the modern world - especially such a vast country as Russia." Russia's Cold War space successes such as Gagarin's flight and the 1957 launch of Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite from earth, have a particular pertinence for Russia: both events shocked the United States. The launch of Sputnik 1 prompted the United States to create NASA in a bid to catch up with Moscow. Putin says the "special military operation" in Ukraine is necessary because the United States was using Ukraine to threaten Russia - including via the NATO military alliance - and that Moscow had to defend Russian-speaking people in Ukraine from persecution. He said on Tuesday that the had no doubts Russia would achieve all of its objectives in Ukraine - a conflict he cast as both inevitable and essential to defend Russia in the long term. "Its goals are absolutely clear and noble," Putin said. "It's clear that we didn't have a choice. It was the right decision." Ukrainian forces have mounted stiff resistance and the West has imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia in an effort to force it to withdraw its forces. Russia's economy is on track to contract by more than 10% in 2022, the biggest fall in gross domestic product since the years following the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, former finance minister Alexei Kudrin said on Tuesday. Putin toured the space port in Russia's far east with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. "Why an earth are we getting so worried about these sanctions?" Lukashenko said, according to Russian state television. Lukashenko, who has a track record of sometimes saying things that appear to jar with his closest ally's stated positions on a range of issues, has insisted that Belarus must be involved in negotiations to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and has said that Belarus had been unfairly labelled "an accomplice of the aggressor".

#### Russia cannot be isolated from the rest of the world

Reuters 3-5 (Reuters is an international news agency owned by Thomson Reuters. It employs around 2,500 journalists and 600 photojournalists in about 200 locations worldwide. Reuters is one of the largest news agencies in the world. The agency was established in London in 1851 by the German-born Paul Reuter, 3-5-22, “"Russia Too Big To Be Isolated": Kremlin On Sanctions By US, Europe”, NDTV, <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/west-engaged-in-economic-banditry-russia-not-isolated-says-kremlin-2805444//BVN> SC)

London: The Kremlin said on Saturday that the West was behaving like bandits but that Russia was far too big to be isolated as the world was much larger than just the United States and Europe. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that the West was engaged in "economic banditry" against Russia and that Moscow would respond. He did not specify what response there would be but said it would be in line with Russian interests. "This does not mean Russia is isolated," Peskov told reporters. "The world is too big for Europe and America to isolate a country, and even more so a country as big as Russia. There are many more countries in the world." Peskov said that if the United States imposed sanctions on Russia's energy exports then it would give a considerable jolt to energy markets.

### 2NC – UQ – AT: NATO Moderates Turkey

#### NATO doesn’t de-escalate Turkey

HEISBOURGSENIOR 20 (FRANÇOIS HEISBOURGSENIOR is an ADVISER AT THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, “Judy Asks: Is NATO Paralyzed Over the Greece-Turkey Conflict?,” 9/3/20, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/82643//BVN> SC)

NATO’s purpose as an organization is to ensure the collective defense of its members on the basis of its founding Washington Treaty. It was never designed to adjudicate disputes between its members. It should therefore not come as a surprise that NATO is paralyzed over the current Greece-Turkey conflict. Similarly, in 1974, when Greece and Turkey were on the cusp of war over Cyprus, it wasn’t NATO as such which prevented hostilities but the involvement of its most powerful member, the United States of America. At the time, the United States leaned heavily on the contenders to avoid direct confrontation and basically imposed a ceasefire on Turkish forces operating in Cyprus. In 2020, the [US] United States has adopted a much lower profile and is operating without a clear sense of direction. This applies both to the Greek-Turkish nexus and to the broader multifaceted crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, which involves numerous local and external players.

### 2NC – Link – T/L

#### Turkey within NATO enables Russian aggression–cohesion makes Russia worse

MICHAEL RUBIN 19, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “It’s Not Us—It’s Him,” https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/12/03/its-not-us-its-him//BVN SC

Turkey’s recent turn toward Russia is a reflection of Erdoğan’s animosity toward America. To suggest Erdoğan pragmatically seeks to get the best deal for his country by forcing Washington and Moscow to bid for Turkey’s affection misses the point. First, the idea of NATO is collective defense in times of crisis, not an opportunity for members to launch bidding wars for cash, concessions, or contracts. Second, to apologize for Erdoğan’s tilt toward Russia ignores his embrace or promotion of pro-Russian aides and allies like military counselor Adnan Tanrıverdi or politician and activist Doğu Perinçek, a paramount influence among Turkey’s top brass, an unabashed critic of NATO, and a supporter of both Russia and a Eurasian alliance. After Israel intercepted the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish-owned ship seeking to run Israel’s blockade and support Hamas, killing nine Turks in the process, Erdoğan threatened to use every international forum to undercut Israel. Erdoğan now uses the same tactics against the United States and NATO: Rather than simply withdraw from an alliance that he appears to despise, Erdoğan seeks to cripple it from within. NATO is a consensus driven organization, so Turkey and its Russian backer gain more leverage from filibustering its processes than by simply leaving the alliance. That there is no mechanism within NATO to expel a member only strengthens Turkey’s leverage. Turkey may remain a member of NATO, but its strategic pivot toward Russia shifts the balance toward Moscow across the entire Black Sea region, allowing Russia to further solidify its strategic encroachment on Georgia and Ukraine.

#### Turkey-Russia diplomacy not high enough–Western cooperation prevents this

Mankoff 3-10 (Jeffrey Mankoff is a distinguished research fellow at the U.S. National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies specializing in Russian and Eurasian affairs and a nonresident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is the author of the forthcoming book, Empires of Eurasia: How Imperial Legacies Shape International Security, 3-10-22, “Turkey’s Balancing Act on Ukraine Is Becoming More Precarious”, Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/10/turkey-ukraine-russia-war-nato-erdogan//BVN> SC)

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended the geopolitical calculations of countries around the world. For Turkey, a NATO member that has performed a delicate balancing act between Kyiv and Moscow, the war is forcing some hard choices. Like his World War II-era predecessor Ismet Inonu, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seeks to keep Turkey out of today’s conflict as much as possible, while maximizing his own room to maneuver. Amid the escalating conflict and humanitarian disaster, however, Ankara faces growing pressure to pick sides. Turkey faces a range of vulnerabilities from either an emboldened or a desperate Russia. Erdogan’s strategy therefore centers on supporting Ukraine without jeopardizing ties with Moscow. Over the longer term, the course of the war itself will do much to determine how Ankara maintains this balancing act. Strong, unified NATO support for Ukraine, along with Russian military setbacks, would provide the best opportunity to reinforce Ankara’s commitment to Ukraine—and to the alliance. Russia and Turkey have for centuries been rivals across a wide geographic space encompassing the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Black Sea, and Central Asia. Vulnerability to Russian military power throughout these regions has encouraged Turkish leaders to seek allies: Britain and France in the Crimean War, Germany in World War I, and NATO in the Cold War. When the international environment has been less threatening, though, Turkey has looked to Russia (and the Soviet Union) for economic opportunities and as a partner for boosting its own strategic autonomy. The Soviet Union’s collapse created a series of buffer states (including Ukraine) that shielded Turkey from Russian military power, allowing Ankara to pursue a more forward-leaning policy in Eurasia. It also opened up new opportunities for Turkish companies in Russia, which became a major source of tourists to Turkey’s Mediterranean resorts as well as a lucrative market for exporters and construction companies (many with close ties to Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party). Turkey also turned to Russia for energy, at one point getting the majority of its natural gas from Russia, and signing a deal with Russia’s state-owned Rosatom to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant at Akkuyu. Ties with Russia also allowed Ankara to hedge against what it perceived to be excessive dependence on the West amid tensions over Washington’s role in the Syrian conflict. Erdogan’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system after he was unable to strike a deal with the United States for the Patriot system sent a message to Turkey’s NATO allies that Ankara had other options. Some voices in Turkish political and military circles would like to go further, seeing Russia’s pursuit of a non-Western security order in Eurasia as preferable to continued dependence on NATO. Improved relations with Moscow also reflected a growing closeness between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was the first foreign leader to call Erdogan after the failed 2016 coup attempt, and whose strongman rule contrasted with mounting U.S. and European criticism over Turkey’s democratic backsliding. Russia and Turkey nevertheless remain geopolitical rivals. Their forces and proxies have clashed repeatedly—in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus. In February 2020, Russian forces (or Russian-backed Syrian forces) bombed Turkish positions near Idlib, Syria, killing over 30 Turkish soldiers. Nor was Russia the only target of Turkey’s Eurasian outreach. Ukraine is also important to Turkey as both an economic and a geopolitical partner. Trade between the two countries has increased rapidly since Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity, reaching $7.4 billion in 2021. Ankara and Kyiv also signed a free trade agreement on the eve of the most recent Russian invasion. Since 2019, Turkey has also supplied Ukraine with military assistance, notably the Bayraktar TB2 armed drones that were instrumental in Azerbaijan’s victory over Russian ally Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh and that have inflicted significant casualties on Russian-backed forces in both Libya and the Donbass. During Erdogan’s visit to Kyiv at the start of February, the two countries agreed to set up a factory to produce drones inside Ukraine. Turkey’s security is much better served by an independent Ukraine than a Ukraine under Russian military-political domination. Further territorial changes at Ukraine’s expense would allow Moscow to bolster its naval presence along the northern Black Sea coast. (Russia’s post-2014 militarization of Crimea has already tipped the balance of power in the Black Sea against Turkey.) While the bulk of refugees fleeing Ukraine have so far gone westward, a longer conflict could also send refugee flows to Turkey, a country still struggling with the effects of large-scale migration from Middle Eastern conflicts. Turkey also remains susceptible to Russian retaliation. Despite some diversification in recent years and new offshore discoveries, Turkey is dependent on Russia for the bulk of its gas and a significant percentage of its oil. With Turkey’s inflation likely to be above 40 percent for the year, turbulence in energy markets could have damaging effects not just on Turkey’s economy but on Erdogan’s political fortunes ahead of elections next year. Even with its military tied down in Ukraine, Russia retains the capacity to hit back at Turkish interests. Idlib remains a particular liability, packed as it is with refugees and a motley collection of rebels who would likely flee for the Turkish border in the event of an offensive on the city. Because of all this, and because its relationship with Moscow is important to Erdogan’s larger geopolitical ambitions, Turkish support for Ukraine has been real—but cautious. On the first day of the conflict, Erdogan characterized the Russian attack as “unacceptable” and “contrary to international law.” Turkey has since reiterated long-standing commitments to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (including Crimea, the annexation of which Ankara has insisted it will never recognize). Yet many Turkish statements during the first week or so of the conflict lacked the moral clarity of those from its Western counterparts, instead calling on both Russia and Ukraine to find a diplomatic solution. With the conflict worsening and Western unity holding, Ankara grew slightly bolder. In a March 6 telephone call with Putin, Erdogan called for a cease-fire, the opening of a humanitarian corridor, and a peace agreement. Turkey has also continued to supply both humanitarian assistance and military equipment to Ukraine. Perhaps its most visible contribution has been continuing to supply drones to Ukraine—deflecting Russian criticism with the disingenuous claim that such sales are purely private transactions. At Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s request, Turkey also agreed to invoke the 1936 Montreux Convention, which allows Ankara to regulate the passage of warships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits—the first time since World War II it has done so. The decision required a formal determination that the Russia-Ukraine conflict qualified as a war—thereby rejecting Putin’s description of a “special military operation.” Effectively, the decision to invoke Montreux means that Turkey can prevent Russia from reinforcing its naval forces already present in the Black Sea with ships based outside the Black Sea. (The bulk of Russia’s navy remains engaged in the Eastern Mediterranean off Syria.) Particularly if the conflict drags on, closure of the straits could degrade Moscow’s naval and amphibious capabilities. Still, Turkey’s rhetoric remains cautious, and it continues its policy of engagement with Moscow. Erdogan has spoken with Putin on multiple occasions since the start of the war, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is set to attend the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Turkey later this week, where he plans to meet his Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba.

### 2NC – AT: Swindland

#### Swinland was a one-off–Turkey still sides with Russia over the West

Kirişci 22 (Kemal Kirişci is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe's Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies, June 27, 2022, “Erdoğan’s problem is not with Sweden and Finland but with Turkey’s Western vocation”, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/27/erdogans-problem-is-not-with-sweden-and-finland-but-with-turkeys-western-vocation//RM)

Erdoğan first announced that he **did not view the NATO membership bids of either Finland or Sweden** favorably, on the grounds that they had **become “safe houses” for terrorists**. This was a reference to the presence and activities of individuals and organizations with ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as well as Gülenists, widely recognized to be the perpetrators of the coup attempt against him in July 2016. The announcement came on May 13 and may initially have been an attempt to divert attention from two events around that time: a political ban of opposition politician Canan Kaftancıoğlu, widely credited for engineering the defeat of Erdoğan’s preferred candidate in Istanbul’s 2019 mayoral elections, and the violent intervention by Israeli police during the funeral of the slain Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, over which Erdoğan chose to remain uncharacteristically silent. He subsequently intensified his objections by adding that “all forms of arms embargoes,” especially by Sweden, against Turkey’s defense industry go against “the spirit of military partnership under the NATO umbrella.” Erdoğan has since made it clear that he will not easily relinquish his veto unless these objections are addressed. A flurry of diplomatic activities followed to address what Stoltenberg on numerous occasions defined as Turkey’s “legitimate” concerns, without concrete results. The deadlock appears to result from different definitions of “terrorism” and Erdoğan’s insistence on the extradition of persons including Swedish nationals and a member of the Swedish parliament. It goes without saying that direct material support, as highlighted by several experts and former Turkish diplomats, provided to the PKK — recognized by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union as a terrorist organization — is indeed problematic and needs to be resolved. The complication arises from a definition of terrorism in Turkish law that goes beyond criminalizing participation in violent acts and infringes on basic freedom of speech. This loose and often aggressive framing of the terms terrorist and terrorism is regularly used by Erdoğan and members of his government to silence and repress their critics and opponents. Erdoğan’s uncompromising stance contrasts with the earlier years of his leadership of Turkey, when he seemed to be committed to liberal democratic values and when Ankara — with considerable U.S., Finnish, and Swedish support — started its accession process towards EU membership. Turkey achieved its greatest integration with the trans-Atlantic community, and shared peacekeeping responsibilities on behalf of NATO in its neighborhood, and persistently supported NATO’s enlargement including the “open door” policy. **Erdoğan** has since **transformed Turkey’s parliamentary system** to a presidential one with practically **no checks and balances on his power**. Growing authoritarianism and repression of critics and opponents has become a defining face of the country, with the sentencing of civil society activist Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtaş, former leader of the main Kurdish political party, together with the likelihood that Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu, who enjoys higher poll ratings than Erdoğan, may well face a political ban too. **NATO** has became another **target** of Erdoğan’s vitriol as he blames the West for Turkey’s growing economic ills and political isolation. This goes back to the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, when members of parliament from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) alleged NATO involvement without presenting a shred of evidence, even calling it a “terror organization.” This allegation has been periodically nurtured by the government even if Erdoğan has personally avoided it. Yet, Erdoğan’s close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, decision to purchase S-400 missiles from Russia, and a relentless diplomatic battle over them with Washington has deeply damaged the reliability of Turkey as a NATO ally. Skepticism about Turkey’s place in the alliance was further aggravated by Erdoğan’s threat to expel 10 Western ambassadors, seven of them from allies, for asking him to implement a European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruling and release Kavala. Instead, Erdoğan chose to categorically dismiss the ECHR decision as well as the Council of Europe’s initiation of disciplinary action against Turkey. This **persistent anti-Western** and anti-U.S. narrative has found a **receptive** mood in a Turkish citizenry deprived of access to alternative discourses. Not surprisingly, the Turkish public in recent years has perceived a **greater security threat from the United States** than from Russia (see slides 81-83 here). According to Metropoll, a public opinion research company, 65% of respondents in April 2022 did not trust NATO; in January, 39.4% preferred closer relations with China and Russia compared with 37.5% preferring closer relations with the EU and U.S.

### 2NC – AT: Ukraine

#### Turkey and Russia are tied together through their anti-West ideologies–key to maintaining their relations despite ALL other divisions

Bardakçı 21 (Mehmet Bardakçı, 12-6-21, “Is a Strategic Partnership Between Turkey and Russia Feasible at the Expense of Turkey’s Relations with the EU and NATO?”, Comparative Southeast European Studies, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2021-0001/html?lang=en//BVN SC)

The article mainly contends that since the real and expected benefits from the European Union (EU) and NATO were not delivered sufficiently from Turkey’s perspective, Turkey looked for alternatives and collaborated with Russia more intensely in recent years. Turkey’s cooperation with Russia was also facilitated by several global, political, economic, conjectural, security-related, and individual-level factors. Another argument of the study is that despite Turkey’s intensive collaboration with Russia, it is not feasible for Turkey to build a strategic partnership with it in the short- and medium-term at the expense of its relations with NATO and the EU. The main reasons for this are, in addition to the institutional and social shortcomings, geostrategic divergences, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the pitfalls of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, NATO’s continuing importance for Turkey’s security needs, and the incompatibility of Russia’s and Turkey’s political systems. Keywords: EU; NATO; Russia; strategic partnership; Turkish foreign policy Introduction The arrival of the Russian S-400 air defence system in Turkey in July 2019 was welcomed enthusiastically by many in Turkey. This breakthrough event was even described by some in Turkey as the “country’s liberation from the West” (Tol and Taşpınar 2019, 107). Almost a decade ago, the question started to be asked as to whether Turkey was drifting away from the West, especially since it had approached Iran and voted against sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well as clashed with Israel over the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. This time, however, this question is more pronounced and the likelihood of a strategic shift became more tangible with the arrival of a weapon system from a country that has been confronting the West recently. Given that Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union (EU) have been at a nadir in recent years, many regarded the acquisition of the Russian weapon system as a precursor of Turkey’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Alliance (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO) and the EU. In addition to many other factors, Moscow’s and Ankara’s bitter relations with the West are a major reason why the two countries have closed ranks in recent years. A milestone for Moscow’s relationship with the West was its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 while the coup plot against the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government in Turkey in July 2016 marked a watershed in Ankara’s relations with the West. Russia had to confront a series of economic sanctions from the West after 2014 while Turkey was deeply disappointed with its Western allies for their slow and reluctant condemnation of the coup attempt. Ankara has even aired doubts that the West might have been behind the coup attempt. These events have helped peak the two countries’ deeply-ingrained sense of distrust towards the West. As one observer put, “Despite their obvious differences and even antagonisms, Russia and Turkey are united by one thing—the fact that they are two great powers connected historically, culturally, and geographically to a Europe that never fully accepted them as one of their own” (Lukyanov, People with Big Ambitions, The Moscow Times, 19 July 2016). A major objective of this article is to unpack the puzzle of whether Russia could replace the EU and NATO as a strategic partner for Turkey. The article contends that in addition to some factors facilitating the Russo–Turkish rapprochement, Turkey searched for alternatives, collaborating with Russia owing to the decline in the real and expected benefits from the EU and NATO from the Turkish perspective. Another major contention of this article is that despite the close collaboration between Moscow and Ankara, in particular after the coup attempt against the Turkish Government in July 2016, it is hard for Turkey to forge a strategic partnership with Russia because of significant divergent geostrategic interests, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the downsides of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, the continuing importance of NATO for Turkey’s security as well as the incompatibility of Turkey’s and Russia’s political systems. Moreover, the absence of a solid social basis and the lack of institutionalization in their relations further make it infeasible for Turkey to switch from the Transatlantic Alliance to Russia. The study is divided into three sections. The first part concerns the motives that brought Moscow and Ankara together, including, first and foremost, their strained relationship with the West, economic interests, conjectural factors such as the Syrian conflict, transformation of the global governance system, and similarity of their political culture based on security and personal harmony between the leaders. The second part draws attention to the limitations in the relationship, and the third part explains why a strategic partnership between Turkey and Ankara and at the expense of Turkey’s partnership with the EU and NATO is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Finally, the conclusion wraps up the article.

#### Only anti-western foreign policy can mitigate the rising tensions between Turkey and Russia

Mankoff 22 (Jeffrey Mankoff, Jeffrey Mankoff is senior associate with the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. His areas of expertise include international security, Russian foreign policy, regional security in the Caucasus and Central Asia, ethnic conflict, and energy security, January 20, 2022, “Regional Competition and the Future of Russia-Turkey Relations”, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/regional-competition-and-future-russia-turkey-relations>, RM)

Western observers are increasingly worried and puzzled by the apparent rapprochement between Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey, which is taking place despite an escalating Russo-Turkish competition for influence extending from North Africa through southeastern Europe and the Caucasus to Central Asia. A shared **aspiration to legitimate** the idea of regional powers policing their respective neighborhoods and building regional orders **outside the framework of Western**-led multilateral **institutions** and based on hierarchy, limited sovereignty, and the disruption of smaller states’ territorial integrity provides a **basis for Russo-Turkish cooperation**. Yet by inserting themselves more directly into their neighbors’ disputes and conflicts, **Russia and Turkey** have **multiplied** the number of **friction points** between them. This combination of deepening political-economic relations alongside escalating confrontation throughout their shared periphery rests on unstable foundations. Which of these tendencies wins out—a **shared interest** in moving toward a **less Western-centric global order** based on post-imperial spheres of influence, or competition over defining the nature and extent of those spheres—will be a **critical determinant** of the future course of **Russo-Turkish relations**.

#### Relations are durable

Arab News 3/20, 3/20/2022, “Turkey says Russia and Ukraine nearing agreement on ‘critical’ issues,” <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2046171/world>, RES

NATO member Turkey shares a maritime border with Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea, has good relations with both and has offered to mediate between them.

It has voiced support for Ukraine, but has also opposed far-reaching Western sanctions imposed on Moscow over the invasion.

While forging close ties with Russia on energy, defense and trade and relying heavily on Russian tourists, Turkey has sold drones to Ukraine, angering Moscow.

Turkey also opposes Russian policies in Syria and Libya, as well as Moscow’s annexation of Crimea.

President Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly said Turkey will not abandon its relations with Russia or Ukraine, saying Ankara’s ability to speak to both sides was an asset.

## 2NC Impact Toolbox

### 2NC – Relations Solve Syria

#### Turkey-Russia cooperation is high now in Syria

Asharq Al-Awsat 6-17 (Asharq Al-Awsat is an Arabic international newspaper headquartered in London. A pioneer of the "off-shore" model in the Arabic press, the paper is often noted for its distinctive green-tinted pages. The New York Times in 2005 called Asharq Al-Awsat "one of the oldest and most influential in the region,” 6-17-22, “Russia, Turkey, Iran Agree to Ease Tensions in Northern Syria”, <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3708796/russia-turkey-iran-agree-ease-tensions-northern-syria//BVN> SC)

Russia, Turkey and Iran agreed to calm the situation in northern Syria by implementing relevant agreements, Reuters reported on Thursday. In a joint statement following talks in Kazakhstan, the three countries announced that they decided to deploy more efforts to ensure the stability of the situation in the de-escalation zone in Syria’s Idlib. According to Reuters, the three countries “highlighted the necessity to maintain calm on the ground by fully implementing all agreements on Idlib”, without specifying what that meant for Turkey’s plans to carry out a military operation against the Kurdush-led People's Protection Units (YPG) there. Several agreements have been concluded between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including the Sochi Memorandum of 2019, in which Turkey committed to stop its military operation dubbed the “Peace Spring.” It also included the establishment of a demilitarized zone and deployment of joint Russian-Turkish patrols ensure a ceasefire.

#### Turkey-Russia cooperating on Syria

RFE/RL 17 (RFE/RL journalists report the news in 27 languages in 23 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established. We provide what many people cannot get locally: uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate, 9-29-17, “Putin, Erdogan Pledge To Closely Cooperate On Syria, Increase Trade”, RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-erdogan-syria-iraq-talks-ankara/28761044.html//BVN> SC)

Following talks in Ankara, the Turkish and Russian presidents said they agreed to closely cooperate on ending Syria’s civil war. Russian President Vladimir Putin said in the Turkish capital on September 28 that Moscow and Ankara will work to "deepen coordination" on ending the six-year-old war, adding the "necessary conditions" now existed for the conflict to end. Putin spoke at a joint press conference with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who said that Turkey “will continue close cooperation with Russia for reaching a political solution to the crisis in Syria." Erdogan said that the pair agreed to "pursue more intensely" the creation of a “de-escalation zone” in Idlib Province, in comments echoed by his Russian counterpart. "Readiness was confirmed to comply with the final agreements on creating four de-escalation zones, including the biggest of them in Idlib Province," Putin said. Moscow and Ankara support different sides in Syria’s war. Russia and Iran are backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the conflict, while Turkey and the United States are supporting various rebel groups opposed to Assad’s rule. But Russia, Turkey, and Iran earlier this month agreed to create a "de-escalation zone" in Idlib, an area under the control of opposition forces in northern regions. Three other "de-escalation zones" have come into effect in different parts of Syria since July. Islamic State (IS) fighters, who captured large swathes of Syrian territory in 2014, are opposed by all sides and are being driven from most of their strongholds by the separate government and rebel campaigns. Putin's one-day working visit to Ankara comes three days after the two leaders spoke by telephone in a call that included a discussion of the controversial independence referendum in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region. Erdogan said after meeting Putin on September 28 that Ankara and Moscow agree that the territorial integrity of both Iraq and neighboring Syria must be preserved. He added that the September 25 nonbinding referendum in Iraq’s Kurdish region had no legitimacy and that the regional leaders must be prevented from making "bigger mistakes." Election authorities in the Kurdistan region say the independence referendum passed with 92 percent support. Ankara sees the vote, which was also fiercely opposed by the Baghdad government and much of the international community, as a threat to its national security and fears it will inflame separatism among its own Kurdish population. However, the Kremlin has not explicitly condemned the referendum, stressing instead the importance of maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity. On economic matters, the two presidents said they wanted to see progress in two major projects: the TurkStream gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant being built in Turkey with Russian collaboration. "We place great importance on the realization of these projects swiftly," Erdogan said. "We have observed during our talks that there are some disruptions. We will fix them quickly." Erdogan said the two states aim to increase their trade turnover to $100 billion a year. Putin said Russia and Turkey will continue to lower trade barriers both countries erected during a period of soured relations last year after a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane on the Syrian border in late 2015. He said Russia has already lifted most of its restrictions on Turkish agricultural products, resulting in a 58.7 percent surge in imports of Turkish fruits, vegetables, and other farm products in the first half of 2017. Another sector that has rebounded is tourism, with the number of Russians taking vacations in Turkey increasing elevenfold so far this year to 2.5 million people, Putin said. Putin said that when the trade restrictions were in place last year, overall trade fell by 32 percent. But with the lifting of many restrictions, so far this year trade has rebounded by 31.5 percent, he said. The two leaders didn't mention a deal announced earlier this month for Turkey to buy Russia's most advanced air defense missile system, the S-400, in its first major weapons purchase from Moscow. The deal, Turkey’s most significant weapons purchase from a non-NATO supplier, has raised concerns in the West over technical compatibility with NATO equipment. Both Moscow and Ankara have brushed off those concerns, with Erdogan saying on September 12 that Turkey “makes the decisions about our own independence ourselves.”

### 2NC – Turkey Stabilizes ME

#### Turkey and Russia collaborate heavily in Syria–NATO division creates a unique situation to create cooperation

Daniel 21 (Rémi Daniel is a PhD candidate in the International Relations Department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a Neubauer Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), working on Turkish current foreign policy, and an Azrieli Fellow, 6-15-21, “Turkish-Russian Relations: A Puzzle that Shakes the Middle East”, <https://dayan.org/content/turkish-russian-relations-puzzle-shakes-middle-east//BVN> SC)

Since 2016, there has been increased engagement between Turkey and Moscow, which has become crucially important in various theaters of war and because of its significance for regional and global balances of power. Researchers have tried to assess it on numerous occasions. However, Turkish-Russian relations remain a puzzle for many. They have not led to a complete realignment of the two countries, as some of their most enthusiastic supporters and their most worried critics had foreseen, but on the other hand, they overcame crises that many observers at the time predicted would sever the relationship altogether. Onlookers used variety of expressions to qualify these relations and show the difficulty of defining them and their profound ambiguity, among others: “uneasy alliance,”[2] “fragile friendship,”[3] “partnership of convenience,”[4] “adversarial cooperation,”[5] “cooperative competition,”[6] and “brutal entente.”[7] Moreover, just in the last few months, a series of events occurred that impact, directly or indirectly, Turkish-Russian ties:[8] the implementation of the ceasefire in Nagorno Karabakh, new developments in Libya, the tensions surrounding Idlib, the election of Joe Biden, and changes in the Ukrainian conflict, as well as with Belarus. Each of these parts has emphasized some of the determining factors involved in the links between Moscow and Ankara. This article is an attempt to assess Turkish-Russian relations based on what emerged during these recent events. Converging interests Since the dismantling of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia have developed relations in different fields. Trade has been an important one of them[9] and Russia is one of Turkey’s top providers.[10] Energy occupies a central position in the exchanges between the two countries. Turkey relies heavily on Russia for natural gas, and at the same time it would like to serve as an energy hub between Western consumers and Eastern providers. Together with Russia’s attempts to create new streams for its production, this has served as a basis for common projects between the two countries, the latest of which being the Turkstream pipeline running from Russia to Turkey through the Black Sea.[11] Moscow also succeeded in being a partner in Turkey’s efforts to diversify its energy sources by building a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu.[12] Other significant fields of exchange between Turkey and Russia include tourism, with an important flow of Russian tourists to enjoy Turkish resorts, and construction. Beyond these long-term economic factors, the last few years have seen a new series of common political interests emerging between the two countries, or more precisely between their presidents. Erdoğan’s growing authoritarian tendencies have echoed Putin’s own political system.[13] The Russian president also played his cards very smartly when Turkey felt insufficiently supported by the West while facing of international and domestic threats, following, paradoxically, the downing of a Russian jet by the Turkish army in 2015 and in the context of the 2016 failed coup in Turkey. While, in both cases, Western leaders were hesitant in expressing support for Erdoğan, Putin saw an opportunity in the coup attempt and was among the first to call the Turkish president following the event.[14] Both leaders’ suspicion towards the US and European countries brought them closer to each other and these developments created a wider, more personal, basis for Turkish-Russian cooperation. Common successes While the economic relations between Russia and Turkey continued to grow slowly, Putin and Erdoğan developed a strong personal relationship. Starting in 2016, the two leaders met on a regular basis, which led to a new partnership between the two countries. This partnership found its most striking expression in Syria, where Moscow and Ankara understood that they had common interests. Russian support for Assad, Turkish worries that the Kurdish YPG, considered by many to be the Syrian branch of the PKK, could establish permanent control over a zone bordering Turkey led both countries to feel that the West, and more particularly the US, was retreating from Syria, which gave both Russia and Turkey the opportunity to coordinate some of their actions in the Syrian conflict. While, together with Iran, Turkey and Russia created their own platform to manage the Syrian civil war, the Astana process,[15] both countries also transformed the situation on the ground. Russian support enabled Assad to make important victories over insurgents and to restore his control over a large part of Syria. Turkey supported Islamist groups that fought the Kurdish militias and launched direct military interventions to create a buffer zone at its border. On the diplomatic scene, Putin and Erdoğan reached a series of ad hoc agreements to try and solve their different problems in Syria. Facing tensions in Idlib, where Turkey supports Islamist rebels, both as part of its strategy in Northern Syria and to avoid a new wave of Syrian refugees to its territory, whereas Russia supports Assad’s efforts to take over the city, the two leaders decided to turn the city into a “de-escalation zone” in 2018.[16] Similarly, Turkey’s advances in North-East Syria were inscribed in the Sochi agreement reached in October 2019 between Erdoğan and Putin.[17] It created a “safe zone” without Kurdish fighters and controlled by Syrian and Russian forces, while Turkish troops remained in the territories they had seized. Following the agreement, Turkish-Russian joint patrols started in the buffer zone, which embodied both countries’ cooperation in Syria. All this was made without consideration for Western positions on the conflict and was considered as a success for Erdoğan and Putin, who, by “putting boots on the ground” and creating faits accomplis, imposed their own agendas in Syria based on national interests and hard power,[18] against the more liberal Western plans for the country. Another important mutually beneficial move was the decision by the Turkish government to buy Russian S-400 missiles.[19] This was a way for Turkey to express its disappointment towards Washington and an attempt to free itself from its dependence on Western providers for its defense. For Putin, the sale was a blow to NATO. The introduction of Russian material into a NATO member’s military system, contrary to the alliance’s rules, created tensions between Turkey and its allies and weakened the organization’s internal cohesion.

#### Erdogan and Putin work together on the Astana resolution–Turkey bolsters Moscow’s presence in the region

YILDIZ 21 (Güney Yildiz is a researcher and journalist based in London with a focus on Turkey, Syria and the Kurds in the Middle East, 3-24-21, “Turkish-Russian Adversarial Collaboration in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh”, SWP Comment, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2021C22//BVN> SC)

Until 2016, among the two backers of Syria's Bashar al-Assad regime, Iran had the upper hand over Russia and exerted more influence on the regime apparatus and the ruling Assad family. Iran was the first country to come to Damascus' help by providing weapons, financial support, advisors, and proxies to fight the armed rebellion. When Turkey doubled down on its involvement in Syria starting in late 2015, the Assad regime could not turn to Tehran for protection, since Iran lacked the capacity to deliver. As the Turkish threat was combined with the possibility of imminent and crippling Western air strikes, the Assad regime had little choice but to become more reliable upon Russia. In that way, Turkey's presence allowed Moscow to dominate the Syrian regime and reduce Iran's influence. Turkey became the dominant backer of the opposition, as the armed groups realized they could not survive without Turkey due to Russia's intervention. Regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia gradually lost influence on the ground. Western diplomatic and political influence over the Syrian opposition also eroded - to Ankara's benefit. In December 2016, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan envisaged Astana, Kazakhstan's capital, as a new venue for carrying on the Syria peace talks. In doing so, they also set in motion a game plan through which Moscow and Ankara controlled the warring parties in Syria and took control of the conflict. The Astana Process removed international mediation mechanisms set up in Vienna and Geneva from the center of attention. The Turkish-Russian cooperation also further curbed Iran's influence, since tensions between the Turkey-backed rebels and proxies and the Assad regime had been resolved through bilateral Ankara-Moscow talks rather than in Astana. Ankara's successful pressure campaign on Washington in 2019 to reduce the amount of help it was giving to the Syrian Kurds was of benefit to Moscow, which saw the presence of the United States and the partnership in eastern Syria to be much more challenging than Turkey's presence in north-west Syria. In 2016, Russia had given the green light for the Turkish incursion into Syria. In return, Ankara, in effect, facilitated the regime takeover of Aleppo, the most important city under rebel control.

### 2NC – Relations Solve Turkish Economy

#### Turkey-Russia relations do help the Turkish economy–no Turkish sanctions on Russia prove

Büyük 3-14 (Hamdi Fırat Büyük currently works as a Political Analyst and a Journalist at the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) in Sarajevo. He was a visiting Research Fellow at the University of Sarajevo’s Faculty of Political Science in the academic year of 2017-2018. His main academic interests are the Balkan studies, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey-Balkan relations. Büyük worked as political analyst at Turkey’s prestigious think-tank International Strategic Research Organisation (USAK) for 3 years and he was also the editor-in-chief of USAK’s leading news and opinion page on International Politics, the Journal of Turkish Weekly (JTW), 3-14-22, “Turkey Rules Out Sanctioning Russia, Citing Risk to Economy”, Balkan Insight, https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/14/turkey-rules-out-sanctioning-russia-citing-risk-to-economy//BVN SC)

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Sunday on the margins of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum that Ankara will not join Western sanctions against Russia. “We did not join sanctions as a matter of principle and have no intention of joining [them],” Cavusoglu told a press conference. Cavusoglu said sanctions will not resolve problems and will damage the Turkish economy. “Our counterparts ask whether we will join these sanctions, and we explain to them how these sanctions will affect our economy and [business] sectors,” he said. Turkey continues to follow an ambiguous policy towards Russia following its February 24 invasion of Ukraine. It has condemned the Russian invasion and continues to have ties with Ukraine, but will not sanction Moscow or close its airpsace to Russian planes. Ankara helped to equip the Ukrainian army, most prominently with armed drones, which have resulted in heavy Russian casualties recently. Turkey hosted the first first high-level meeting between Russia and Ukraine last week in Antalya. The talks, attended by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, did not result in any breakthroughs but the two sides agreed to continue talks. “There is nothing to replace the negotiation process,” Lavrov told reporters after the meeting. The invasion of Ukraine started on February 24. However, the success of the Russian military is being questioned and the Ukrainian army and people have resisted more than was expected. Russia is meanwhile being hit by record-heavy Western sanctions, which aim to cripple its economy and businesses. According to the UN, more than 2.3 million Ukrainians have fled the country, seeking shelter in neighbouring countries, as Russia pounds major Ukrainian cities, including the capital, Kyiv, the second-largest city, Kharkiv and the port of Mariupol.

### 2NC – Yes Turkish Economy Impact

#### Turkish economic decline spills over to other European banks

Arbaa & Varon 19 (Ofer Arbaa: Department of Economics and Management, Ruppin Academic Center, Emek Hefer, Israel, Eva Varon: Graduate of Masters in Finance, London Business School, London, UK, December 2019, “Turkish currency crisis – Spillover effects on European banks”, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845018304010#!//BVN> SC)

In this paper, we aim to analyze the impact of the Turkish lira currency shock on the stock returns of 29 major banks in Europe. Literature after the global economic crisis of 2008, deals mostly with the financial spillovers of shocks in the US or Europe to emerging markets rather than vice versa and on a macro level (Stracca, 2014; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2015; Chen, Filardo and Zhu, 2016; Fadejava, Feldkircher, & Reininger, 2017; Fratzscher, Duca and Straub, 2016). As a result, we look at data on some of the largest banks in Europe from both high and low risk economies. Our results illustrate the investors' sentiment of how resilient banks would be to possible bank defaults with spillover effects. The stocks of the overall banking sample react negatively to the crisis in Turkey and results indicate that banks that recently increased their leverage or experienced a decrease in liquidity or profitability have also been subject to higher abnormal losses on the event day and a day after the event, where the losses in general were the most severe. Nevertheless, leverage, liquidity and performance ratios are by themselves not sufficient to assess the financial soundness of banks, since the risk is more related to the quality than the quantity of the assets they carry. Across countries, we find Greece, Italy and Spain, the three economies of PIIGS analyzed in this paper, to be significantly related to the Turkish currency shock. Banks of Greece show the highest abnormal losses, which indicates that geographical proximity can be a factor in speculative attacks and/or crisis spillovers. Moreover, banks located in countries with lower systematic risk such as Germany, Netherlands and France react strongly to the Turkish lira crisis. Therefore, investors do not appear sensitive to whether a bank is operating in a less or more healthy banking system. In addition, losses of banks are not necessarily proportionate to the size of their exposures, with the exception of Turkish banks, which have been the most vulnerable. Spanish and Italian banks, which carry the largest amount of loans extended to Turkey do not seem to display the highest abnormal losses among the European banks. German banks, on the other hand, have no subsidiaries in Turkey and their claims are small relative to their capital (2.4%) and yet they disclose significant abnormal losses. In fact, the underlying risk resulting from banks' exposures to Turkey is difficult to assess, as there are many indirect factors that might influence the operation of banks such as other country and industry-specific risks. German, Dutch and French banks could be vulnerable to the extent that their economies will support the ailing financial system in other EU areas. UK and Switzerland, which are considered as outsiders of the EU financial system (the former in the process) appear to be immune to these pressures and therefore their banks are found relatively stable. We conclude that foreign banks' lending practices may be a source of instability in their financial markets even when a shock originates in a relatively small economy to which the banks have direct or indirect exposure. The role of banks in transmitting disturbances from emerging markets across borders is of increasing relevance with the presence of international banks and emerging markets with greater openness in their ﬁnancial sectors. To better understand this phenomenon, further research would be useful that analyzes the response of individual bank balance sheets and lending decisions to such shocks from the emerging economies.

#### Turkey spills over to the US–empirics prove, happened in 2018

Reuters 18 (Reuters is an international news agency owned by Thomson Reuters. It employs around 2,500 journalists and 600 photojournalists in about 200 locations worldwide. Reuters is one of the largest news agencies in the world. The agency was established in London in 1851 by the German-born Paul Reuter, 8-10-18, “US STOCKS-Turkey turmoil spills over to Wall St, shaves 200 pts off Dow”, <https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-stocks-idCNL4N1V14VI//BVN> SC)

Aug 10 (Reuters) - The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than 200 points on Friday amid a widespread selloff in global stocks as the Turkish lira tumbled due to concerns over the country’s economy and a deepening rift with the United States. President Donald Trump doubled tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from Turkey, deepening the currency’s losses and raising concerns that the crisis could weigh on other economies. “Problems in emerging markets are more important than ever because of the global growth engine that emerging markets have become,” Peter Cecchini, chief market strategist at Cantor Fitzgerald in New York, wrote in a note. “This will eventually matter greatly to U.S. markets.” Investors fled to safe-haven assets, with the dollar rising to a 13-month high and U.S. bond yields slipping to a three-week low. Ten of the 11 major S&P sectors were lower, with bank stocks taking the biggest hit. “Banks are leverage plays on the global economy. Anytime there’s a sniff of contagion they will be weak,” said Michael Antonelli, managing director, institutional sales trading at Robert W. Baird in Milwaukee. JPMorgan, Wells Fargo and Bank of America fell more than 1 percent, weighing the most on the benchmark S&P 500. At 9:48 a.m. EDT the Dow Jones Industrial Average was down 158.88 points, or 0.62 percent, at 25,350.35, the S&P 500 was down 13.35 points, or 0.47 percent, at 2,840.23 and the Nasdaq Composite was down 31.69 points, or 0.40 percent, at 7,860.09. S&P technology sector’s 0.42 percent fall was led by chipmakers. Intel dropped 2.6 percent after Goldman Sachs downgraded the stock to “sell”. Micron also fell 1.1 percent. Microchip’s shares fell 10.5 percent, the biggest decliner on the S&P, after it forecast disappointing second-quarter revenue. Data on Friday showed U.S. consumer prices rose in July and the underlying trend continued to strengthen, pointing to a steady increase in inflation pressures. Declining issues outnumbered advancers for a 2.34-to-1 ratio on the NYSE. Declining issues outnumbered advancers for a 1.85-to-1 ratio on the Nasdaq. The S&P index recorded 4 new 52-week highs and 7 new lows, while the Nasdaq recorded 33 new highs and 45 new lows.

### 2NC – Turkey Mediates Ukraine

#### Turkey mediates the Ukraine conflict–even Russia agrees

Atlantic Council 22 (Atlantic Council IN TURKEY provides analysis and insight on Turkey and related developments with coverage from Turkish, regional, and international experts. This blog offers timely news and commentary on key issues related to transatlantic relations, energy, business, migration, and key players, February 25, 2022, “Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?”, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/experts-react-what-does-the-russia-ukraine-conflict-mean-for-turkey//BVN SC)

For several weeks, President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu have been offering Turkey as a potential mediator between Russia and Ukraine. President Zelenskyy consistently welcomed this offer as part of his increasingly desperate search for any way to derail President Putin’s planned invasion. While Kremlin spokesman Dmitriy Peskov (a Turkey specialist who began his diplomatic career in Ankara) initially rejected the offer, the Kremlin subsequently reversed course and said Turkey’s mediation might be useful if it resulted in Ukraine coming into compliance with the Minsk Protocol (despite Russia being in serious breach of the same agreement). Putin, however, clearly favored military escalation rather than mediation, consigning the Minsk agreement to the dustbin of failed European diplomacy. Unlike Germany and France, co-leaders of the Minsk process, however, Turkey has a centuries-old history of confronting and cooperating with Russia. Ankara has been an outspoken supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and a critic of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and developed a significant program of cooperation with Kyiv on military technology, while also retaining effective relations with Russia on energy, agricultural trade, and tourism as well as some key defense technologies (e.g., S-400 air defense systems). It is therefore possible Turkey could have a meaningful mediation role to play once Putin finishes his illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, which the Russian president will use to strengthen Russia’s position in the political negotiations that will come at the end of this war in Ukraine, as happens with all military conflicts.

#### Turkey-Russia relations are key to de-escalation of Ukraine

Cuhadar and Diaz-Prinz 22 (Esra Çuhadar, Ph.D.; Dr. Esra Çuhadar is a senior expert for dialogue and peace processes at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Juan Diaz-Prinz, Ph.D., Dr. Juan Diaz-Prinz is a senior expert on mediation and dialogue at the U.S. Institute of Peace, April 28, 2022, “To Sustain Hopes for Peace in Ukraine, Keep an Eye on Turkey”, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/sustain-hopes-peace-ukraine-keep-eye-turkey>//RM)

Russia’s atrocities against Ukrainian civilians and its escalated warfare in southeastern Ukraine have swept aside last month’s public discussion of peace options as the countries briefly held talks in Turkey. Yet even in the darkest moments, all sides in this war, including the United States and Europe, have strong interests in maintaining channels for negotiation that can be used when opportunity re-emerges. Protecting that interest means understanding and maintaining Turkey’s role in facilitating talks—and its potential to serve more actively as a mediator. By at least some norms of peace processes, Turkey is an atypical mediator—but policymakers would do well to note strengths, not widely recognized, that it can bring to this role. While analysts have suggested China, Israel, India and others as possible mediators—and while no options should be ignored—Turkey has emerged as the most immediately useful go-between. It is no accident that Turkey was Kyiv’s and Moscow’s preferred choice for their brief attempts at negotiations in March. By design, Turkey’s role in those talks was limited to facilitation, providing a secure space and even-handed treatment of Russian and Ukrainian negotiators, but without injecting Turkish observations or proposals. Particularly for Russia, Turkey can seem like an illogical choice as mediator. It is not neutral between the combatants, but rather is a member of NATO, which Russia’s government has declared an enemy. Turkey has supported Ukraine with humanitarian gestures, evacuating some 16,000 civilians from combat zones and receiving nearly 60,000 Ukrainian refugees so far. It has even sold Turkish-built, armed, aerial drones that Ukrainians have deployed against Russian ground offensives. Also, Russia and Turkey have had their own conflicts, both historically and in recent years. Yet part of Turkey’s utility as an interlocutor for Russia may be some of these very qualities. Any eventual Russian-Ukrainian agreement will need acceptance—and likely, reconstruction funds—from the United States and Europe. As a NATO member, Turkey can offer influence with its U.S. and European allies in securing that support. Turkey has built credibility by developing a specific capacity for mediation over recent decades, and by showing itself to Russia and Ukraine as an independent actor that, while a NATO member, is not unduly influenced by the United States or Europe. Even now, with heightened battlefield violence and accusatory rhetoric from both sides, Turkey is continuing its go-between role. Its diplomats are continuing meetings with both sides separately and keeping lines of communication open. This creates an asset for managing, and hopefully limiting, the conflict—one that policymakers should not ignore.

#### Turkey plays a key role in Ukraine

Dalay 22 (Galip Dalay, Galip Dalay is associate fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House. He specializes in Turkish politics and Middle Eastern affairs. The views expressed in this commentary are his own. Read more opinion on CNN, March 29, 2022, “Why Turkey is in a unique position to mediate”, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/29/opinions/turkey-mediator-russia-ukraine-dalay/index.html>//RM)

As Russian and Ukrainian delegations arrive Tuesday in Istanbul for peace talks, Turkey's unique political position is under the spotlight. Could the nation that straddles Europe and the Middle East emerge as peacemaker? As the war grinds on, a growing list of countries are exploring the possibility of mediating, stepping in to avert further bloodshed and the conflict spreading beyond Ukraine's borders. Earlier this month, Turkey hosted Ukrainian and Russian foreign ministers for a trilateral meeting in its southern city of Antalya. Afterward, the Turkish foreign minister visited both Moscow and Kyiv. Likewise, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett visited Moscow for the same purpose. And China has signaled readiness for mediation. Potentially other countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, India or South Africa, might get in line to broker some kind of resolution. Almost all countries that have vied for the mediation role have also engaged in a strategic balancing act between the West and Russia for some time. Serving an intermediary role is a way for them to prevent further catastrophe in the conflict, and project international stature. But it is also a way for them to avoid making difficult choices the war might force upon them, such as choosing or tilting toward one side more clearly. But the list of fence-sitters in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is not confined to mediators. Many more countries have chosen to remain "neutral," including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Morocco. The rationale for abstaining differs between countries, but some reasons cut across. The international system is changing. And the idea that the world is no longer Western-centric, and increasingly multipolar, is widespread in the non-Western world. It informs their policies toward Russia, and toward China as well. As long as the dominant narrative of this war is put in a West/NATO versus Russia dichotomy, it will have little resonance in the non-Western world. Plus, the fence-sitting approach is also a way of signaling discontent with the US/Western policy. It was illustrative that the rulers of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, who depend on the US for their security, refrained from taking calls from President Joe Biden earlier this month. This snub was meant to convey their displeasure with the United States for Washington's insufficient support for their botched Yemen campaign. From food and energy supplies to geopolitical vulnerabilities, many other factors also define their approach. For instance, in spite of its close military ties with the US, Egypt depends heavily on Moscow in terms of its food security. It also closely cooperates with Russia in Libya, with both supporting the warlord Khalifa Haftar. (Kyiv accuses Haftar of sending mercenaries to aid Russia in Ukraine.) Likewise India, in spite of needing the West as a countervailing force against China, has long maintained close ties with Moscow; has purchased the Russian-made S-400 missile systems; and has pursued a policy of balancing between Russia and the West. ut of all these countries sitting on the fence and trying to mediate, Turkey has a unique profile and position. It is a NATO member, an organization for which Russia and previously the Soviet Union served as raison d'être or the foundational threat. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been increasingly castigating the Western-centric international system. But as a member of many Western institutions, Turkey is also a beneficiary, and in a sense, part of the geopolitical West. Meanwhile, Turkey also has maritime borders with both Ukraine and Russia. Plus, Turkey is Russia's largest trade partner in the Middle East and North Africa region. And it has competed and cooperated with Russia through conflict zones in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh in recent years. Compared to other contenders for mediation, Turkey has the highest stakes in this conflict. The war is fundamentally changing the geopolitics and balance of power in the Black Sea region, and Turkey is a major Black Sea power. Turkey will probably play a humanitarian role soon, too, as the number of refugees -- already in the millions -- rises. French President Emanuel Macron's announcement that France, Turkey and Greece will undertake a joint evacuation mission in Mariupol is a harbinger of a humanitarian role that might become more salient in Erdogan's policy down the road. In spite of its policy of not provoking Russia, Turkey is simultaneously not pursuing a policy of equidistance. It sells armed drones to Ukraine, which are exacting significant losses on Russian targets, and has closed the Turkish straits to warships. In addition to Russia dominating the Black Sea, it has a sizable Mediterranean presence where it is deeply involved in conflicts spots in Syria and Libya. Turkey's sea closure will put pressure on Russian policy in these conflict zones if the war is prolonged. Yet unlike other NATO members, Turkey has neither joined the Western sanctions against Moscow nor closed its airspace to Russia. Doing so would have probably triggered a Russian veto against Turkey's quest for mediating the conflict. And there are an increasing number of anti-war Russian activists and pro-Kremlin figures heading to Turkey. Turkey is basically trying to be pro-Ukraine without becoming too aggressively anti-Russia. Its capital city, Ankara, is too deeply exposed to Russia both economically and geopolitically. Russia is Turkey's largest source of tourists, grain imports and gas. In any case, at this stage, there is not yet any sign of the West pushing Turkey more strongly in joining the sanction regime against Moscow. And despite Turkey's efforts, the conflict is not ripe for mediation yet, because Moscow still appears to be hellbent on the military option. This does not mean that efforts or talks will cease in this conflict; to the contrary, we are likely to see more. Russia wants to give the impression it is interested in diplomacy to buy time and prevent further Western sanctions, but to no avail. No breakthrough should be expected anytime soon. In spite of this, keeping the idea of a diplomatic process alive is still important. Plus, the mediation serves Turkey's interests well. It boosts its international stature; turns Turkey into one of the major centers of diplomacy in this conflict; and delays some of the difficult decisions that it might face down the road. hat said, as the war drags on, Turkey's previous strategic juggling act may no longer be feasible, particularly as Russia is now more openly treated as an enemy of NATO and European security. From imperial Ottoman times to the present, Turkey and Russia have fought each other 13 times, but they have also cooperated. In the past, grievances vis-à-vis the West, or even anti-Westernism, have usually driven them closer to each other. Now, Russia's geopolitical revisionism and Putin's dramatic shift in post-Soviet ambitions will drive an uneasy Turkey closer toward the West.

### 2NC – Yes Nuclear Ukraine

#### Ukraine goes nuclear

Bender 3-24 (Bryan Bender is a senior national correspondent for POLITICO, where he focuses on the Pentagon, NASA, and the defense and aerospace industries. He was previously the national security reporter for the Boston Globe, where he covered U.S. military operations in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and the Balkans. He also writes about terrorism and government secrecy. He is an adjunct professor at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism at Arizona State University and the author of “You Are Not Forgotten,“ the story of an Iraq War veteran’s search for a missing World War II fighter pilot in the South Pacific, 3-24-22, “How the Ukraine war could go nuclear”, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/24/how-ukraine-war-could-go-nuclear-00019899//BVN SC)

Not since the Cold War has the specter of nuclear war hung so heavily over a president’s crisis diplomacy. As President Joe Biden meets with fellow NATO leaders, calls for a ceasefire in Ukraine are growing more urgent than ever — to alleviate the widespread human suffering but also to dial back what veterans of nuclear planning consider an alarming potential for it to spiral into a clash of atomic superpowers. The nuclear brinkmanship from Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks is unprecedented: He ordered a snap nuclear war game before the invasion and days later put his nuclear forces on high alert. And the Kremlin has repeatedly signaled it could resort to nuclear weapons — an option explicitly reserved in Russian military doctrine — if it determines the West’s intervention in the conflict goes too far. Again on Tuesday, in an interview with CNN, Putin’s chief spokesperson refused to rule out the use of nuclear arms in the conflict. So far, Biden has sought to dial down the tensions. The Pentagon has not changed the alert status of U.S. nuclear forces and military leaders have publicly said they have not detected Russian actions suggesting they are preparing to use nuclear weapons. The Pentagon also took the unusual step early in the conflict of putting off a regularly scheduled test of an intercontinental ballistic missile to avoid fueling nuclear tensions. Yet as the conflict drags on, and Russia’s conventional forces suffer surprisingly heavy losses while its economy reels, the prospect that Putin might resort to using weapons of mass destruction is increasing. Moscow has already demonstrated that it’s willing to use hypersonic missiles for the first time in a war. State Department: 'Russia's forces are committing war crimes in Ukraine' SharePlay Video With limited contact between the Kremlin and Western capitals, the risk that Moscow’s intentions could be misread with catastrophic consequences will only grow more acute, according to numerous specialists. “There has always been a chance of mistakes, but I think the chances are much higher,” said former Sen. Sam Nunn, the longtime chair of the Armed Services Committee and now co-chair of the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative. “I think we are in a different era in terms of blunders.” It is a high-wire act confronting Biden as he tries to stiffen the spines of NATO countries for what is expected to be a long struggle. Allies are helping Ukraine fend off its bigger aggressor — including sending more arms and U.S. troops to defend NATO’s eastern borders — while not pushing Putin over the edge. Russia invaded Ukraine as cooperation between Washington and Moscow on nuclear arms control has been unraveling in recent years. The two countries have walked away from several treaties to control the deadliest weapons, including one that outlawed intermediate-range nuclear missiles that could threaten Europe. The only remaining nuclear pact between the two sides is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits deployed strategic weapons to 1,550 each. Biden and Putin agreed last year to extend it until 2026. But the treaty does not cover any of the thousands of smaller, or “battlefield,” nuclear weapons in their respective arsenals, including at least 2,000 in Russian stockpiles, according to public estimates. Gas prices, nuclear talks and hacking: What Russia sanctions mean in America SharePlay Video Two Defense Department officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, say they are vigilantly gathering intelligence on Russian military moves for any sign that it might be taking such weapons out of storage or preparing for deployment units trained in nuclear or chemical warfare. ‘Raising the ante’ Longtime observers of Russian nuclear policy have been startled at how reckless the Putin regime has been with its nuclear threats compared to leaders in Moscow during the Cold War. “The communist party of the Soviet Union was incredibly disciplined about this,” said Rose Gottemoeller, a former undersecretary of state for arms control who has negotiated treaties with Russians and served as NATO deputy secretary general from 2016 to 2019. “There were only a few Soviet leaders who were allowed to speak about nuclear doctrine and strategy, and they did so in a very carefully scripted way. MOST READ YYMMDD\_Template\_Producer.00\_02\_39\_17.Still015.jpg New Jan. 6 Trump documentary footage revealed U.S. military’s newest weapon against China and Russia: Hot air The Southwest is bone dry. Now, a key water source is at risk. Capitol Police say a Jan. 6 defendant’s demands could expose secret security features Shadow 2024 race: Newsom vs. DeSantis “We are in a more difficult crisis than anyone could have predicted with this constant nuclear saber-rattling that has been going on,” she added. “We have to take what [Putin’s] people say seriously, because he was serious about invading Ukraine when many of us hoped he would turn away at the last minute.” Vladimir Putin The nuclear brinkmanship from Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks is unprecedented: He ordered a snap nuclear war game before the invasion and days later put his nuclear forces on high alert. | Adam Berry/Getty Images The dearth of diplomacy and growing distrust only fuels the risk of “mushroom clouds appearing on the battlefield,” Izumi Nakamitsu, United Nations high representative for disarmament affairs, warned on Tuesday. She hearkened back to the numerous instances during the decades-long standoff between the United States and then-Soviet Union when the two sides nearly came to nuclear blows. But diplomacy — and a good bit of luck — prevailed. “We are all aware of the close calls and near-misses,” she said at an event hosted by The Stimson Center. “Unfortunately, I fear we have forgotten many of those difficult lessons. A simple glance at a headline today can point to how acute nuclear risks have become.” Those concerns are shared across the spectrum by advocates for nuclear disarmament and those who believe a more robust U.S. nuclear arsenal is needed to deter adversaries. “I really am worried here that the war is going so badly for Putin … it raises the possibility of Putin feeling like he needs to escalate to win his way out of this conflict,” said Tim Morrison, a former Trump White House nuclear policy adviser who is now a researcher at the Hudson Institute, a hawkish think tank. That, he continued, “is right in the wheelhouse of Russian [military] doctrine for a low-yield nuclear or even chemical [weapons] use.” Morrison added that he fears the situation could unravel to the point where Putin is “raising the ante, climbing the rungs of the escalation ladder to make the point to NATO ‘hey, you guys really need to knock it off with arming the Ukrainians, I will no longer tolerate this.’” Russia has already ratcheted up the war with its hypersonic missile launch in Ukraine last week, and it has also been accused of dropping phosphorus bombs, which are banned under the Geneva Convention (though using the chemical to obscure troop movements or illuminate targets is not). “A simple glance at a headline today can point to how acute nuclear risks have become.” Izumi Nakamitsu, United Nations high representative for disarmament affairs NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on Wednesday the alliance will be assisting Ukraine with specialized equipment in the event of a Russian attack with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Gottemoeller said she fears that Moscow’s use of a tactical nuclear weapon is a serious possibility. “Putin is capable of anything,” she said. “He could declare there is an existential threat from a NATO ally resupplying the Ukrainians.” ‘You’re not going to necessarily know’ Others worry less about Putin ordering a nuclear attack and more about a miscalculation leading to the use of nuclear weapons. Nunn has been sounding the alarm about the threat of an accidental nuclear exchange as a result of a cyber attack on nuclear command-and-control systems — including by malign actors not directly involved in the conflict who could be confused for a nuclear adversary. “Third parties, third countries, might interfere in terms of command-and-control or warning systems,” he said of potential hackers. “Interference in command-and-control could be taken in this kind of atmosphere as probably a deliberate act.” Nunn successfully lobbied Congress last year to require the Pentagon to conduct a “failsafe review” of the U.S. nuclear arsenal “to prevent cyber-related and other risks that could lead to the unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons as the result of an accident, misinterpretation, miscalculation, terrorism, unexpected technological breakthrough, or deliberate act.” Further complicating the task of U.S. and allied commanders to decipher Russian intentions, said Morrison, is the fact that so many Russian battlefield systems are also designed to unleash both conventional and nuclear or chemical warheads. In other words, it could be exceedingly difficult to know when the Russian military has decided to pursue a nuclear option. “One of the problems with Russian nuclear forces is how many of their systems are dual-capable,” Morrison said. “So you’re not going to necessarily know if the S-300 or that long-range [missile or artillery] battery is packing a conventional warhead or a nuclear one.” US Ambassador to UN: 'The world narrowly averted a nuclear catastrophe last night' SharePlay Video If U.S. military leaders detected Russian nuclear maneuvers, Nunn said, Biden may have no choice but to act more aggressively to deter Moscow, including putting American nuclear forces on alert. “If you’d seen bombers in the air, all sorts of activities in the nuclear forces, it would have been a different proposition,” Nunn said. “The risk of nuclear use is in my view higher through a mistake or blunder than through intent. But nevertheless blunders get more likely when nuclear weapons are put on alert.”

## Aff Answers

### 2AC – UQ – Russia Isolated

#### Russia has become both completely politically and economically isolated

Rochlitz 3/16 (Rochlitz , M. ,Michael Rochlitz is Professor for Economics with a focus on institutional change at Bremen University.(2022, March 16). Russia's slide into international isolation. Zentrum für Osteuropa- und internationale Studien (ZOiS). Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-spotlight/russias-slide-into-international-isolation//RM)

On 24 February 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. The decision was based on a series of fatally flawed situational assessments, including an overestimation of the fighting abilities of the Russian army, an underestimation of the determination of the Ukrainian army and people, and a faulty evaluation of the West’s willingness to impose serious economic sanctions. The massive sanctions that have since been imposed on Russia’s economy have led to a freeze on half of the central bank’s reserves, a fall in the value of the rouble of more than 40 per cent, and an exodus of most Western companies from Russia. Increasing political repression and a fear of border closures caused several hundred thousand Russians – a significant part of the country’s intellectual elite – to flee abroad. The economic consequences of these developments will be disastrous. At the moment, neither the Russian government nor most Russian people seem to realise the extent of the economic catastrophe that is already sure to happen. In the best scenario, Russia’s economy will shrink by 10 to 20 per cent this year, a somewhat worse decline than during the 2008 financial crisis. But if the war continues, and new war crimes lead to additional sanctions, the economic disaster might be comparable to that caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. A self-inflicted catastrophe There are few, if any, politicians in recent history who have inflicted such massive harm on their own country in such a short time as Putin has done in the last 20 days. Three weeks ago, Russia was a middle-income country well integrated into the global economy, with a large part of its population enjoying a standard of living comparable to that of some European states. Russians could choose from a similar range of consumer goods to people elsewhere in the world, occasionally travel abroad for a holiday, and expect to lead a relatively stable and peaceful life. Today, Russia has become an almost completely isolated pariah state. Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, and Syria were the only countries that voted against a UN resolution condemning the Russian war in Ukraine. According to a list compiled by researchers at Yale University, by 13 March, 350 foreign companies had ceased or curtailed their operations in Russia, with only 34 overseas firms continuing to operate normally. As both Airbus and Boeing are no longer servicing Russian planes, Russia’s airlines were forced to stop international flights and might soon be forced to stop domestic flights as well. Travel within the country will be pushed back to where it was in the early twentieth century. It is unlikely that any of these companies will return to Russia if the current situation continues or deteriorates. As a consequence, the country will be deprived of many of the high-technology and consumer goods it has been importing until now. As Russia produces very few hi-tech goods, this will seriously affect the Russian economy, disrupting supply chains and making the country’s situation similar to that of Iran during the last 30 years. A similarly heavy blow will be the brain drain caused by the recent wave of repression. Most of the hundreds of thousands of people who have fled Russia in recent weeks are highly qualified specialists and researchers who are difficult to replace. The remaining scientists in Russia will be cut off from international networks, as worldwide academic institutions have cut all ties with Russian universities. The consequences for science, research, and innovation in Russia will be devastating. Dark prospects for the future Even in the best possible scenario of immediate peace, it would take several years to repair the damage already caused. Such a scenario would probably require the fall of the Putin regime, and a new government that ends the war and takes responsibility for Russia’s actions, to open up the possibility of bringing the country back into the international community. Even in this highly unlikely scenario, however, Russia’s population will have suffered substantial economic harm, and the horrors already committed in Ukraine will leave deep scars for Ukrainians and Russians alike. In what is unfortunately a more likely scenario, the war will drag on for a considerable time, potentially leading to a complete end of Western oil and gas imports from Russia. Although China might be willing to jump in, Russia will not be able to significantly increase its oil and gas exports in the near future, as the existing infrastructure in the Far East is already operating at full capacity. Moscow will thus have to rely on Chinese loans to import Chinese consumer goods. As a result, Russia might turn into some large-scale version of North Korea: economically dependent on China and with a government that through tight control of travel and information will try to prevent its population from finding out the true reasons for the disaster that has befallen it.

#### Russia is isolated due to the Ukraine war–Turkey relations are impossible

Kim 5/11 (Kim, L. Kim was born in Charleston, Illinois. He earned a bachelor’s degree in geography and foreign languages from Clark University, studied journalism at the University of California at Berkeley and graduated from Central European University in Budapest with a master’s degree in nationalism studies.(2022, May 11). Russia isolated in its postimperial phantasm. Wilson Center. Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russia-isolated-its-postimperial-phantasm//RM)

From a strategic point of view, Putin’s attack on Ukraine has thrown back Russia to its weakest position since World War II. Ukrainians have shown they are ready to fight and die, and that they will never accept a Russian puppet regime. In a best-case scenario for the Kremlin, Russia ends up controlling swaths of eastern Ukraine, including a land corridor from Russia to Crimea, allowing Russian forces to continue threatening Ukraine’s Black Sea coastline and the country’s center. Yet even this state of play would hardly improve the Kremlin’s hand compared to what it was before the February invasion, when Russia already occupied Crimea and had the Ukrainians tied down in a low-level war in the eastern part of the country. Strategically speaking, the status quo ante was favorable to Russia, since the simmering conflict was draining Ukraine’s scarce resources and hobbling its aspirations to join the EU and NATO. Germany and France, signatories to the stalled Minsk peace process, were uninterested in inflaming tensions with Russia over Ukraine—as was the United States. After taking office, President Biden tried to patch up relations with Moscow so that he could focus on his main foreign policy priority, China. Biden held a summit with Putin, refused to give Ukraine any clearer guidance on NATO membership, and ignored calls to sanction Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In the leadup to the attack, Putin, the eternal tactician, may have been under the impression that he was on a roll in Russia’s “near abroad.” In 2020, when mass protests broke out in Belarus, wedged between Poland, the Baltic region, and Russia, Putin offered dictator Alexander Lukashenko financial support and riot police. After a flare-up in a bitter territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that same year, the Kremlin inserted itself into the fight by dispatching Russian peacekeepers to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. In January the Kremlin briefly deployed a Russian rapid-reaction force to Kazakhstan to help a friendly regime shore up its authority amid antigovernment demonstrations and violence. Though all are dependent on Russia, none of the beneficiaries of recent Kremlin support has returned the favor by actively backing the war against Ukraine. Russia’s Isolation To varying degrees, Putin’s attack on Ukraine sent shocks through every former Soviet republic as Russia showed itself to be an unpredictable, revanchist power. Russia’s isolation in its own neighborhood has nothing to do with NATO; its lack of true allies is a strategic disaster entirely of Putin’s own making. In light of their history as Soviet vassals, the desire of former Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO was understandable and, in view of what’s happening in Ukraine, completely sensible. On emerging from behind the Iron Curtain three decades ago, these countries didn’t have the luxury to wait and see whether their former overlord would first develop into a peace-loving, democratic neighbor. That the Russian establishment even before Putin was opposed to NATO expansion is also understandable, given Russia’s past domination over Central and Eastern Europe. The irony is that NATO membership for the region’s small, insecure nations made Russia’s western border the most stable it has ever been. Although Putin fulminated about U.S. missile defense installations in Romania and Poland, it was unclear how they were supposed to neutralize Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, the largest in the world. In fact, before Russia launched its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the United States was drawing down its military presence in Europe and attempting to pivot to Asia. The case of Ukraine is the most egregious example of how Russia’s postimperial phantom pains have clouded the Kremlin’s strategic thinking. Ukraine, with its close cultural, linguistic, economic, and religious ties to Russia, should have been a natural ally. While most Ukrainians were proud of their distinct identity, they were generally well-disposed toward Russia and deeply ambivalent about NATO before 2014. The Alliance itself was divided over Ukraine’s membership precisely because of the country’s deep connections to Russia. Even as Putin’s attack on Ukraine eight years ago spurred the United States, Britain, Canada, and Germany to send troops to NATO allies in Eastern Europe, it did not solidify support for Ukrainian membership within the Alliance. When Putin ordered a full-scale invasion in February, Ukraine was not significantly closer to joining NATO than it had been in 2008, when the issue was hotly debated, together with Putin, at the annual NATO summit. What has changed since 2014 is that a majority of Ukrainians support NATO membership and have no doubts that Russia has become their mortal enemy. As for NATO, member states such as the United States and Britain began arming and training the Ukrainian military. Putin’s fears of an increased U.S. presence in Ukraine—and Eastern Europe more broadly—became a self-fulfilling prophesy. The reputational damage to Russia that Putin’s belligerence has caused is staggering. Finland and Sweden are considering NATO membership, and even Switzerland has ended its traditional neutrality and adopted EU sanctions against Russia. Germany, once Russia’s most faithful partner in Western Europe, is determined to stop relying on Siberian natural gas, ending an energy relationship that began during the Cold War. Trust and economic synergies that took decades to build have been sacrificed for Putin’s delusional war. The Kremlin may retort that it has friends in other parts of the world. But even in the United Nations, Russia has been ostracized, with a large majority of countries calling on Moscow to end its offensive in Ukraine. Putin received explicit support only from Belarus, Syria, Eritrea, and North Korea, with China and India abstaining. The isolation of Putin’s Russia is linked to the country’s inability to articulate an attractive message about what it stands for beyond being the self-proclaimed antipode to the United States. At least during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the bearer of a powerful ideology that found adherents around the world. During his two decades in power, Putin has squandered the possibilities of Russian soft power. With a tiny fraction of Russia’s oil windfall, he could have established a global network of institutes, like Germany’s Goethe-Institut or Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, to tap into widespread interest in Russian culture. Instead he focused on Russian hard power, turning the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II into the regime’s ideological foundation. The untold human sacrifice in World War II was the source of the Soviet Union’s legitimacy as a UN Security Council member and worthy rival to the United States. With his unprovoked war against Ukraine, Putin has surrendered the last piece of moral high ground Russia, as the successor state of the Soviet Union, held as a leading member of the coalition that defeated Hitler. Putin’s savage attack on Ukraine will taint and overshadow the memory of Russian heroism in World War II for generations to come. In May 2005, leaders from more than fifty countries, including the United States and Ukraine, attended the Victory Day celebrations marking the sixtieth anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat. The number of foreign guests has since decreased inversely to Putin’s mounting aggression. Last year, only the leader of Tajikistan paid Putin the honor of attending his parade. This May 9, in a striking symbol of Russia’s isolation, no foreign guests came at all.

### 2AC – UQ – Turkey-Russia Relations Low

#### Turkey and Russia often align against each other

Got 20 (Antoine Got is based in Europe and works on security and defense issues. The views expressed in this article are his own, and do not reflect the views or positions of any organization with which he is affiliated, 11-19-20, “TURKEY’S CRISIS WITH THE WEST: HOW A NEW LOW IN RELATIONS RISKS PARALYZING NATO”, War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato//BVN> SC)

Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion.

### 2AC – UQ – Turkey-West Coop Now

#### Turkey is focusing on reconnecting with the West

Bekdil 6/6 (Bekdil, B. E, Burak Ege Bekdil is a Turkey correspondent for Defense News. He has written for Hurriyet Daily News, and worked as Ankara bureau chief for Dow Jones Newswires and CNBC-e television. He is also a fellow at the Middle East Forum and regularly writes for the Middle East Quarterly and Gatestone Institute (2022, June 6). Turkey seeks to repair ties with Western Procurement Club. Defense News. Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/06/06/turkey-seeks-to-repair-ties-with-western-procurement-club//RM)

“Turkey is a NATO ally and will remain one. The war between our two partners Russia and Ukraine has created a new understanding in favor of strengthening procurement ties with our NATO allies,” a presidential aide told Defense News, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss Ankara’s diplomatic tightrope walk. The war has once again put Turkey in a pivotal broker position within NATO. Ankara has cultivated ties with both Russia and Ukraine that officials hope will provide dividends in future negotiations. Turkey’s approval is also needed to advance Sweden’s and Finland’s respective NATO membership applications, which grew out of their fear that Russia would work to permanently isolate them from the alliance. But there is some history to overcome. In 2020, Turkey paid $2.5 billion for the Russian S-400 air defense system. But fearing further isolation and sanctions from its allies, Turkey decided against making the system operational. In response to the acquisition, the U.S. suspended Turkey’s membership in the multinational consortium that builds the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jet. Turkey’s down payment of $1.5 billion for a first batch of the stealth aircraft, which Ankara never received, remains to be reimbursed. In March of this year, a senior Turkish diplomat who deals with NATO and security affairs told Defense News that the Russo-Ukrainian war has practically killed all potential Turkish-Russian deals related to strategic weapon systems. With Russia off the table as a military supplier, Turkish leaders are back to surveying the Western market. A senior Turkish procurement official said earlier this spring that the Eurofighter Typhoon is one option, involving the sale of about 80 aircraft — a purchase that would give Turkish industry an edge as it builds the country’s indigenous fighter jet in the making, the TF-X. The Typhoon was originally designed as an air superiority fighter. It is manufactured by a consortium made up of Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo, which conducts the majority of the aircraft project through a joint holding company, Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH. The NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency, representing the U.K., Germany, Italy and Spain, manages the project and is the prime customer. Turkey also has moved to acquire 40 F-16 Block 70 aircraft and upgrade kits for its 80 older F-16s. The Turkish request went to Congress in April. Earlier in May, the Biden administration asked the House of Representatives to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet. A potential deal may include high-tech missiles, radar systems and electronic warfare suites for the planes. In addition, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed hope in March that the trilateral talks between Turkey, France and Italy to co-produce the European air and anti-missile defense system SAMP/T, built by Eurosam, would resume after the French elections in April. In similar optimism, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said in late March that Italy and France were thinking “more seriously” now on co-producing the SAMP/T systems in Turkey. Meanwhile, Britain took steps to ease Turkey’s return to the Western procurement system. Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Faruk Kaymakcı said in February that Britain had lifted a ban on arms sales to Turkey, imposed after a unilateral Turkish offensive in northern Syria in 2019. The ease in trade restrictions was kept secret from the public, and some observers say Canada might follow suit. But most Western restrictions remain in effect. For instance, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden imposed full arms embargoes on Turkey since 2019 over its military interventions in Syria. France has placed restrictions on an array of defense and aviation subsystems, and Italy has barred the sale of certain products. Germany has suspended plans to sell engines to power the Altay, Turkey’s first indigenous main battle tank in the making. “Turkey’s careful balancing act between its NATO allies and Russia has generally been recognized in the West, sometimes with much praise. How Turkey will maneuver between clashing Western and Russian interests in the near future will shape Western appetite for Turkey’s return to their procurement system,” said Ozgur Eksi, a defense analyst in Ankara. Some Western diplomats think Erdoğan may try to use Turkey’s veto power in NATO for a reset in procurement ties with the West. He said May 13 that his country is “not favorable” toward Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, indicating Turkey could use its membership to veto moves to admit the two countries. The issue was unresolved at press time. “The Turks appear to be preparing for a tough bargaining process, which may include the transfer of certain weapons system,” said a U.S. diplomat in Ankara. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine prompted Finland and Sweden to reconsider their traditions of military nonalignment. Eksi said that because of the war in Ukraine, Turkey would unlikely consider touching major arms deal with Russia that were previously on the table. “That includes any Turkish intention to buy the Russian-made Su-35 or Su-57 aircraft,” he said. Erdoğan has previously said Turkey was interested in buying the Russian-made fighter jets.

#### Turkey is turning away from Russia in support of the US–the Strategic Concept thumps and shows Erdogan’s commitment to Western values

Outzen 7-1 (Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of US government service both in uniform and as a civilian. 7-1-22, TURKEYSource, “Experts react: What the NATO summit breakthrough means for Turkey and the Alliance”, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/experts-react-what-the-nato-summit-breakthrough-means-for-turkey-and-the-alliance//BVN SC)

This week at their Madrid summit, NATO allies formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance. It was the latest step in a whirlwind process initiated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and delayed by Turkey—home to the second-largest military in the Alliance, after the United States—which argued that the Nordic countries did not sufficiently address Turkey’s national-security concerns. After weeks of tough negotiations, Turkey, Finland, and Sweden agreed to a breakthrough trilateral declaration on Tuesday. Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts for their take on the implications of the summit and the trilateral declaration. Jump to an expert reaction Mehmet Fatih Ceylan: A victory for NATO unity and cohesion Ian Brzezinski: Erdogan recognizes NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia Rich Outzen: The summit brings Turkey’s security concerns to the fore A victory for NATO unity and cohesion The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014 has entirely changed the security landscape, not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but globally. It has fundamentally altered threat perceptions beyond the Alliance, leading Finland and Sweden to officially apply for membership in NATO. These two countries have indeed crossed the Rubicon and deserted their neutrality in response to persistent Russian belligerence in the middle of Europe. Their decision to combine their efforts and assets with the Alliance against Russian aggression is natural and legitimate. Hence the need to incorporate Finland and Sweden into the Alliance family. The trilateral memorandum signed among Turkey, Finland, and Sweden on June 28 is a welcome development designed to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and unity, and further strengthen the Alliance. It is commonplace in NATO to consult on and negotiate over any dispute among allies and would-be allies to find a common ground. That is how NATO plays its role, and at the end a solution accommodating such concerns is found by consensus. It is also true that once new members accede to NATO, they are bound by the decisions previously taken by the Alliance on a wide range of subjects. In NATO there exists a robust set of decisions and practices in fighting terrorism, beginning with the intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, there is already an agreement comprising all sorts of conceptual work and practices in different geographical theaters on combatting terrorism, developed within NATO and binding on all members. The newly adopted Strategic Concept (SC) clearly identifies Russia and “terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations” as the primary sources of threats in a 360-degree manner and across all three core tasks of NATO: collective deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Given that terrorism is “the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity,” as defined in the SC, it makes sense both for Finland and Sweden to cooperate with Turkey in combatting terrorism as one of the primary sources of threats against Alliance interests. In a nutshell, collective deterrence and defense against actual and potential adversaries, nipping crises in the bud, and expanding the web of networks with partners under challenging circumstances are the main tasks of NATO in the next decade. The main center of gravity for NATO is its solidarity, unity, and cohesion, including all allies and those set to become allies. The summit decisions in their entirety will help NATO to navigate the troubled waters ahead over the long term. —Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is the president of Ankara Policy Center and previously served as permanent representative of Turkey to NATO. Erdogan recognizes NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia At their summit in Madrid, NATO leaders decided to “invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO, and agreed to sign the accession protocols.” This was an important breakthrough. Until now, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had held up the protocols on the grounds that the two Nordic nations had embargoed his nation from defense sales and refused to extradite alleged Kurdish terrorists. Consensus was facilitated by a meeting between US President Joe Biden and Erdogan—a bilateral long sought by the Turkish leader—and memorialized via a trilateral Turkey-Sweden-Finland memorandum in which the latter two agreed to lift the embargoes, condemn the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization, “address” Turkey’s pending extradition requests, and support Turkey’s involvement in European Union defense initiatives. The breakthrough underscored the influence and leadership of the United States in NATO. There is no way Erdogan would have lifted his veto solely due to European pressure. It also reflects Erdogan’s recognition that NATO brings Turkey far more geopolitical value than Russia, which would savor seeing this Nordic bid for NATO membership fail. Consensus on Finland and Sweden’s applications also demonstrated the Alliance’s unity in the face of Russia’s aggression and the difficulty Moscow still has when it comes to fully peeling Erdogan away from the transatlantic community. Once again, Putin’s strongest relationship in the Black Sea region has proven to be far more transactional than strategic. With that said, Turkey, like all the other NATO allies, still has to ratify these accession protocols. There remains ample opportunity for Erdogan to introduce additional negotiations with the rest of NATO. I am optimistic that Sweden and Finland will become NATO members, but it is still too early to say this round of NATO enlargement is a done deal. —Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy. The summit brings Turkey’s security concerns to the fore The summit was a great success for Ankara for three distinct reasons. The first is the content of the trilateral memorandum signed with Sweden and Finland: No arms embargo on Turkey, an affirmed commitment to address Turkish security concerns, no aid to the PKK or (significantly) the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Gulen movement mentioned as a terror concern, collaboration on the defense industry, working groups to follow—it’s hard to see what they missed. Of course, these are statements of principle, and execution or a final commitment will play out over time. But that is as true for Ankara approving accession as it is for the specified cooperation. The second reason is the ringing endorsement from the White House not only for the trilateral memorandum, but for the strengthening of Turkish air power and specifically a commitment to press Congress to approve F-16 fighter jet sales and upgrades. Notably, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has already weighed in with a strong endorsement of the deal. The in-person meeting of presidents Biden and Erdogan was notable, too. The third reason is more subtle: the inclusion in the new, slimmed-down Strategic Concept of language on countering terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations.” This language, and the prominence given both terror concerns and the Russian military threat, address Turkish concerns and highlight the value Turkey adds to the Alliance.

### 2AC – UQ – Turkey-NATO Coop Now

#### Turkey and NATO have a common interest in stopping enemy encroachment–that serves as a motivator within the alliance

**Congressional Research Service 21** (Congressional Research Service, December-30-2021, accessed on 1-3-2022, Congressional Research Service, "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44000.pdf//BVN SC)

Turkey’s location near several global hotspots has made the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-3). From Turkey’s perspective, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about encroachment by neighbors, as was the case with the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing. Some similar Turkish concerns—though somewhat less pronounced—may stem from Russia’s ongoing regional involvement in places such as Syria and Ukraine, and may partly motivate recent Turkish military operations to frustrate some Russian objectives in various conflict arenas.86 As a result of growing tensions between Turkey and Western countries, and questions about the safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.87 Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, Jordan and Romania might be connected with concerns about Turkey.88 Additionally, Turkish actions in opposition to the interests of other U.S. allies and partners in the Eastern Mediterranean (see “Cyprus, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas” below)— particularly over the past two years—have led U.S. officials to encourage cooperation among those allies and partners.89 In 2020, the Trump Administration waived restrictions on the U.S. sale of non-lethal defense articles and services to the Republic of Cyprus, effectively ending a U.S. arms embargo that had dated back to 1987, and attracting criticism from Turkish officials.90 Turkey’s influence in the Black Sea littoral region and its relationships with European countries bordering Russia make its actions in this sphere important for U.S. interests. Ongoing Turkish defense cooperation with or arms sales to Ukraine, Poland, Georgia, and Azerbaijan may present opportunities to make renewed common cause between the United States and Turkey to counter Russia.91 Alternatively, Turkey’s interactions with these other countries could possibly check both U.S. and Russian ambitions, or increase regional tensions potentially leading toward conflict.92 A case in point will be how Turkey regulates and controls other countries’ maritime access to and from the Black Sea—a limited privilege granted to Turkey in the Montreux Convention of 1936 (with provisions to give Turkey greater control when at war).93

#### Turkey does what is in their self-interest–they have no real allegiance towards either the West OR Russia

Ash 6-28 (Timothy Ash Senior Sovereign Strategist at BlueBay Asset Management in London, 6-28-22, “ASH: Turkey playing a delicate balancing act between Ukraine, Russia and Nato”, <https://bne.eu/ash-turkey-playing-a-delicate-balancing-act-between-ukraine-russia-and-nato-248887///BVN> SC)

Turks are rightly proud of the success of Bayraktar drones in the conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine has also celebrated the success of Bayraktar drones against Russian armour, particularly in turning the tide in the first few weeks in the Battle of Kyiv – with songs even produced and sung by Ukrainians soldiers to acclaim the battlefield changing nature of this high-end Turkish technology. Turks like to view this as a great example of the country’s new-found technological and military prowess, but also their willingness to show support for Ukraine despite obvious risks to damaging valuable relations with Russia. Ukrainians are, though, beginning to doubt Turkey’s commitment to their cause, notwithstanding the undoubted success of Bayraktar. Turkey’s stance on peace talks in Antalya in March and again over trying to broker a deal to break the grain blockade of Ukrainian ports has left a distinct impression in Kyiv that Ankara is too keen to toe the Russian line and force a Russian friendly peace deal down their throats. In Antalya the Turkish side were confident a deal was to be done, and even sold a deal as in the offing, but this seemed to be close to terms being offered by Moscow, with little effort to accept or even understand the Ukrainian position. Predictably the Antalya peace process eventually collapsed. The fact that Ankara seems tone deaf to Ukraine’s position was also evident on talks on-going over breaking the grain blockade, with Ankara negotiating directly with Moscow and seemingly little effort being made to involve the Ukrainian side – even though any plan involves decisions about unblocking Ukrainian ports. On the ports issue, Turkey seemed unable to comprehend the Ukrainian position that getting agreement to de-mine ports was worthless unless there were also security guarantees to ensure that Russian forces did not use this as an opportunity to launch amphibious landings against Odesa, Mikolaiv, et al. Turkey appeared naïve in both the Antalya talks and the talks over ending the grain blockade. The Turkish side appeared to be adopting a peace deal at any (to Ukraine) cost strategy, but with zero effort to understand the Ukrainian position. But key to understanding the Turkish position on the war in Ukraine, and its seemingly blinkered effort to bring peace at almost any cost (to Ukraine), is that the Erdogan administration views all of this through its very narrow electoral lens. And therein it faces difficult elections within the next year, with opinion polls not looking good for either Erdogan or his ruling AKP, while the economy is in a desperately weak position. A degree of desperation and wishful thinking is hence evident in Turkey’s approach to the war in Ukraine. On the latter, over the past decade, under Erdogan’s failed monetary policy mantra that “high interest rates cause inflation,” the economy has been in an almost constant state of balance of payments crisis. Erdogan continually prioritises growth over inflation and exchange rate stability, as in the past credit growth has delivered real GDP growth, jobs and votes. But this has meant the economy has been run too hot, the price of which has been wide current account deficits, large external financing requirements and constant pressure on the lira to weaken. An orthodox response would be to tighten monetary and/or fiscal policy to slow domestic demand, lower import demand and with it the trade and current account deficits, thereby alleviating pressure on the lira. But Erdogan’s interest rate ideology has removed this option for the CBRT, meaning that the lira has had to take the strain, which has in turn fuelled inflation. Turks are unhappy with inflation and a constantly weakening lira. They feel poorer, which explains Erdogan’s lowly popularity. But Erdogan still thinks he can win the election by pulling a few more rabbits out of the hat – including the recent exchange rate protected deposit scheme, and more recently restrictions on corporates borrowing in lira if they have large FX deposits. Erdogan thinks that this can buy him some time, helping slow dollarisation, anchor the lira enough for him to push the growth agenda just one more time to win the next election. In normal times it would be touch and go whether this strategy could hold things stable enough to get through to elections by June 2023 and deliver Erdogan a win. But the war in Ukraine has just made the maths here even more difficult – higher energy and food import costs and the threat of the loss of key Ukrainian and Russian tourism receipts (one quarter of the total) are pushing the current account deficit wider and putting even more pressure on the lira. Erdogan needs this war to end and soon, otherwise he risks getting rolled over in an extreme balance of payments crisis which would scupper any remaining popularity he has. So, Erdogan has been happy to allow Bayraktar drones to go to Ukraine – they advertise Turkish engineering prowess and generate important export earnings. But beyond that Turkey has done little to help Ukraine’s cause. And, as noted, if anything the Antalya peace talks and the talks over unblocking grain deliveries from Ukraine have undermined Kyiv’s position. Turkey has also failed to join Western sanctions on Russia – arguing that it simply cannot afford to, given its challenging balance of payments position. If relations with the West were better, it might have hoped for financial support to offset losses from sanctions and the war in Ukraine. But this option is constrained by broader Western concern about policy choices made by Erdogan, including over monetary policy. Some close to the Erdogan administration have even argued that Turkey could benefit from sanctions by acting as a middle-man similar to its position on Iranian sanctions. Some think that Turkey could benefit as Russian companies look to reflag to avoid sanctions, as Russian capital and business look to exit and evade sanctions, and also by being a conduit for Russian capital – tourism, the latter being the scenario where Russians seek to holiday in Turkey but using this as an opportunity to park capital by opening Turkish bank accounts and buying property. To some extent facilitating capital flight from Russia is a benefit for the West in heaping the economic pressure on Russia, but there is a fine dividing line for Turkey here from being seen to profit from the conflict, and concern that some of the activity might be on the edge of actual sanctions breaking. A recent visit by US Treasury officials to Turkey likely was meant to draw clear lines as to what is and is not acceptable. And then there is the whole furore around Turkey’s stalling on Finland and Sweden’s bid to join Nato. As Nato allies have highlighted, Turkey does have understandable security concerns over Scandinavian support for various Kurdish groups. It has leverage now to force Sweden and Finland to rein these in. And playing hardball on this issue will play very well with the domestic nationalist constituency in Turkey before elections. It's potentially a win-win for Turkey. But the risk is that Erdogan overplays his hand and permanently damages relations with the West. He needs to realise that for the US and the rest of its Nato allies, Russia is the priority and is seen as a clear and present danger, and an existential threat to Ukraine and the West. Finnish and Swedish Nato entry is a huge win for the West, for Ukraine, and a major snub to Putin. If Erdogan now blocks this at the Nato summit in Madrid later this month, relations with the West will, I think, be permanently soured. And likely the West will adopt an openly hostile, as opposed to largely neutral, approach to Erdogan’s re-election by June 2023. Blocking Swedish and Finnish membership would also stall rising hopes of a deal over Turkey’s compensation for leaving the F35 project, through purchase of additional F16s and upgrade kits. This would damage Turkey’s defence capability. Now playing hardball to the end of this could turn the next election in Erdogan’s favour, and I think he will have to balance this off against the risk of a major balance of payments crisis if he plays hardball too long. And with the West angered, he would have few tools to allay any such BOP crisis – he does not want to hike policy rates or go to the IMF, capital controls are counterproductive and will damage business, the CBRT has limited reserves and FX adjustment just leads to more inflation. If he faces a BOP crisis after vetoing Finnish and Swedish Nato membership, I think the West would stand on the sidelines as a full balance of payments crisis washes over Erdogan. And likely Erdogan would lose the next election. Logic would suggest that Erdogan would play very hardball to the Madrid summit – get deals over Kurdish groups in Sweden and Finland, easing of arms sanctions, and new agreements over new arms purchases like the F16. He can tell electors at home that he played hardball and won concessions. He will hope the West is grateful enough to keep capital markets open to allow him to finance his external borrowing needs. All this feels pretty binary. But I think in all this, Erdogan needs to realise that for the West the crisis in Ukraine is a defining moment, a definitive challenge they face, and it’s a time to ask if allies are with the West or against it. Erdogan has tried staying on the fence, to some extent trying to play one side off against the other. I think time for such an approach is fast running out. Madrid will likely be the moment when Erdogan has to decide whose side he is on. An important week is in store for Nato and Turkey.

### 2AC – Swindland Thumper

#### Erdogan has yet to vote for Swindland–he has gone back on his word

Moore 7-18 (Mark Moore is a political editor at the New York Daily Posts, 7-18-22, “Turkey’s Erdogan renews threat to block Finland and Sweden from NATO”, New York Post, <https://nypost.com/2022/07/18/turkeys-erdogan-renews-threat-to-block-finland-and-sweden-from-nato/#//BVN> SC)

Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday renewed his threat to “freeze” NATO membership for Sweden and Finland unless they stick to their pledges to crack down on terrorist groups. “I want to reiterate once again that we will freeze the process if these countries do not take the necessary steps to fulfil our conditions,” Erdogan told reporters. “We particularly note that Sweden does not have a good image on this issue,” ​the Turkish strongman continued. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, Finland and Sweden set aside decades of neutrality during wartime and asked to join the 30-member alliance. But Erdogan balked, saying the two countries were too lax in their stand against terrorists because they hosted Kurdish militants. At June’s NATO summit in Madrid, which was attended by President Biden, the three countries reached a deal on deporting or extraditing groups considered to be security threats, including members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and lift arms restrictions imposed after Turkey’s 2019 military incursion into northern Syria. But on Monday, Erdogan once again raised the threat of blocking their entrance into NATO unless they make good on the promises they made. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan renewed his threat to "freeze" NATO membership for Finland and Sweden.

### 2AC – Ukraine Thumper

#### Turkey sides with Ukraine–thumps the link

Cook 3-3 (Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook is the author of False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East; The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square, which won the 2012 gold medal from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey. Oxford University Press is publishing his next book, The End Of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East in 2022, 3/3/2022, “Where Turkey Stands on the Russia-Ukraine War”, Council On Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/where-turkey-stands-russia-ukraine-war//BVN SC)

The Turkish government has designated the Russian invasion as a “war,” giving it the right under the 1936 Montreux Convention to close the Bosporus Strait—which leads to the Black Sea—to warships. Although this action applies to any naval vessel, it is clearly aimed at Russia’s fleet in case Moscow seeks to reinforce the firepower it already has there. Turkey’s decision is, at least, an important symbolic one in support of Ukraine. A Russian submarine surfaces in the Bosporus with Istanbul in the background A Russian submarine sails in the Bosporus on its way to the Black Sea. Despite the restrictions on warships in the Bosporus, it seems clear that Turkey—like other countries including Israel—has sought a strategically defensible but morally questionable middle ground. Though Turkey voted for a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia, it has not sanctioned Russia or closed its airspace to Russian aircraft. Some observers have been quick to highlight the differences between Turkish policy and the definitive pro-Ukraine approaches of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), implying that Ankara is trying to have it both ways—remaining rhetorically committed to Ukraine’s independence and offering to mediate the conflict while tilting toward Russia. There is some logic to this, especially after the purchase of the Russian-made air defense system known as the S-400. However, it is less a tilt than a recognition that Turkey’s interests are intertwined with Russia in critical areas, most importantly Syria. There, Turkey wants to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state and maintain pressure on the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a group linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the United States and Turkey have designated a terrorist organization. To accomplish these goals, Turkish officials have to consider Russian sensibilities, as Moscow is the most important external actor in Syria and can thus complicate Turkey’s military operations there and frustrate its diplomatic efforts. In recent years, Turkey has pursued what can best be described as foreign policy independence. As an important power in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Caucusus, Ankara has sought a multifaceted foreign policy that has, at times, conflicted with its NATO allies. For example, in 2017, Turkey decided to purchase S-400s. This step coincided with a growing dialogue between Ankara and Moscow that included moves to upgrade economic ties and discussions about deepening diplomatic and even military relations. At the same time, Turkey and Russia have found themselves on opposite ends of major regional conflicts, including in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, a region over which Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a recent war. Even while they were supporting different sides in these places, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin maintained a dialogue. What about Ukraine? Turkey has generally supported Ukrainian independence and the country’s territorial integrity. Erdogan denounced Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and has advocated on behalf of Crimean Tatars (a Turkic ethnic group) who have suffered under Russian rule. Turkey sold armed drones to Ukraine ahead of Russia’s most recent invasion, though some reports indicate that only about twelve to twenty were delivered. Still, in whatever number, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones are lethal and have been deployed to great effect in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. How is this war likely to affect Turkey’s interests in the region? Turkey has sought to expand its trade and commercial relations with both Russia and Ukraine. It is also a destination for Russian tourists and an importer of oil and gas. To the extent that this war affects these ties and drives up energy prices, the Turkish economy—which is already experiencing upwards of 50 percent inflation—will feel the repercussions.

### 2AC – No Link–NATO Over Russia

#### Even *if* Turkey and Russia are tied together, Russia will never replace NATO in Turkey’s eyes

Bardakçı 21 (Mehmet Bardakçı, 12-6-21, “Is a Strategic Partnership Between Turkey and Russia Feasible at the Expense of Turkey’s Relations with the EU and NATO?”, Comparative Southeast European Studies, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2021-0001/html?lang=en//BVN SC)

The article mainly contends that since the real and expected benefits from the European Union (EU) and NATO were not delivered sufficiently from Turkey’s perspective, Turkey looked for alternatives and collaborated with Russia more intensely in recent years. Turkey’s cooperation with Russia was also facilitated by several global, political, economic, conjectural, security-related, and individual-level factors. Another argument of the study is that despite Turkey’s intensive collaboration with Russia, it is not feasible for Turkey to build a strategic partnership with it in the short- and medium-term at the expense of its relations with NATO and the EU. The main reasons for this are, in addition to the institutional and social shortcomings, geostrategic divergences, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the pitfalls of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, NATO’s continuing importance for Turkey’s security needs, and the incompatibility of Russia’s and Turkey’s political systems. Keywords: EU; NATO; Russia; strategic partnership; Turkish foreign policy Introduction The arrival of the Russian S-400 air defence system in Turkey in July 2019 was welcomed enthusiastically by many in Turkey. This breakthrough event was even described by some in Turkey as the “country’s liberation from the West” (Tol and Taşpınar 2019, 107). Almost a decade ago, the question started to be asked as to whether Turkey was drifting away from the West, especially since it had approached Iran and voted against sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well as clashed with Israel over the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. This time, however, this question is more pronounced and the likelihood of a strategic shift became more tangible with the arrival of a weapon system from a country that has been confronting the West recently. Given that Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union (EU) have been at a nadir in recent years, many regarded the acquisition of the Russian weapon system as a precursor of Turkey’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Alliance (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO) and the EU. In addition to many other factors, Moscow’s and Ankara’s bitter relations with the West are a major reason why the two countries have closed ranks in recent years. A milestone for Moscow’s relationship with the West was its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 while the coup plot against the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government in Turkey in July 2016 marked a watershed in Ankara’s relations with the West. Russia had to confront a series of economic sanctions from the West after 2014 while Turkey was deeply disappointed with its Western allies for their slow and reluctant condemnation of the coup attempt. Ankara has even aired doubts that the West might have been behind the coup attempt. These events have helped peak the two countries’ deeply-ingrained sense of distrust towards the West. As one observer put, “Despite their obvious differences and even antagonisms, Russia and Turkey are united by one thing—the fact that they are two great powers connected historically, culturally, and geographically to a Europe that never fully accepted them as one of their own” (Lukyanov, People with Big Ambitions, The Moscow Times, 19 July 2016). A major objective of this article is to unpack the puzzle of whether Russia could replace the EU and NATO as a strategic partner for Turkey. The article contends that in addition to some factors facilitating the Russo–Turkish rapprochement, Turkey searched for alternatives, collaborating with Russia owing to the decline in the real and expected benefits from the EU and NATO from the Turkish perspective. Another major contention of this article is that despite the close collaboration between Moscow and Ankara, in particular after the coup attempt against the Turkish Government in July 2016, it is hard for Turkey to forge a strategic partnership with Russia because of significant divergent geostrategic interests, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the downsides of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, the continuing importance of NATO for Turkey’s security as well as the incompatibility of Turkey’s and Russia’s political systems. Moreover, the absence of a solid social basis and the lack of institutionalization in their relations further make it infeasible for Turkey to switch from the Transatlantic Alliance to Russia. The study is divided into three sections. The first part concerns the motives that brought Moscow and Ankara together, including, first and foremost, their strained relationship with the West, economic interests, conjectural factors such as the Syrian conflict, transformation of the global governance system, and similarity of their political culture based on security and personal harmony between the leaders. The second part draws attention to the limitations in the relationship, and the third part explains why a strategic partnership between Turkey and Ankara and at the expense of Turkey’s partnership with the EU and NATO is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Finally, the conclusion wraps up the article.

### 2AC – No Link–Turkey Does Both

#### Turkey can work with both sides

Kusa 6/13 (Iliya Kusa, Iliya Kusa is a Kyiv-based author and analyst of international relations with the Ukrainian Institute for the Future. For the past six years he has been writing about Middle East, Ukrainian foreign policy after 2014, and European politics. A special focus of his expertise is dedicated to the Middle East and North Africa, June, 13, 2022, “Turkey’s Goals in the Russia-Ukraine War”, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/turkeys-goals-russia-ukraine-war>//RM)

Of the many countries struggling to find a proper approach to the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey seems to have landed on the most controversial yet comfortable one. Ankara has managed to preserve its relationship with both Moscow and Kyiv without endangering its own geostrategic calculations in the region while at the same time avoiding joining ranks with Western countries in imposing crippling sanctions on Russia. The role of a key mediator, which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was so eager to take on, has allowed Turkey to conveniently position itself in the middle of the fight—and not just in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine but more broadly in the struggle between Russia and the West, and even globally between the West and the numerous non-Western countries that have preferred to strike a more cautious and balanced approach to the war. The overall political and ideological polarization incited by the war in Ukraine has threatened many countries that have worked for years to build a balanced, pragmatic, multivector foreign policy. Now many of them find themselves having to make a hard choice. Western countries under U.S. guidance are urging them to make common cause against Russia, which often means abandoning their balancing act between major powers. As the war has shown, in a highly tense international environment, a posture of neutrality and balancing on the part of countries struggling not to choose sides is not welcome by the conflicting parties, which strive to mobilize support for their own efforts. Turkey in particular has had to carve a path that does not lethally threaten relations with either Russia or the EU. The war in Ukraine has presented Ankara with both opportunities and risks. After the 2015 centralization of political power in the hands of Recep Erdoğan, the president moved his personal ambitions and goals to the forefront of Turkey’s foreign policy. In particular, he has sought to make Turkey a regional Muslim superpower capable of designing and guiding a new “post-Western” security architecture in greater Eurasia and one of the first non-Western powers to shape the new multipolar world order. To preserve this course, Turkey has had to find an appropriate way to deal with the Ukraine challenge. In essence, two global objectives became a priority for Turkey when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24: to preserve its global and regional positions, which Turkey has managed to consolidate and enhance after 2016; as well as to reinforce Ankara’s influence and amplify earlier achievements to ensure further expansion. Objective 1: Preserving Turkey’s Global and Regional Positions The first global objective is reflected in several developments that became essential in Ankara’s quest to hold its ground. First, the war in Ukraine has threatened Turkey’s pragmatic multipolar approach underpinning its foreign policy. The political coalescence of NATO and EU countries against Russia could not have escaped Turkey’s attention. Nor could Ankara remain on the sidelines and refrain from getting involved, given its close ties with several Western countries and its NATO commitments. On the other hand, Turkey did not want to degrade its relations with Russia by joining the Western-led sanctions, in which Ankara has declined to participate since 2014. For Turkey, Russia has been an important trading partner ($32.5 billion as of 2021), a key source of foreign investment (more than $10 billion), a colossal source of tourists (Russians account for almost 5 million visits, or 1 percent of all foreign tourist visitation), a crucial energy supplier, and an important “frenemy” in several regional playgrounds where Turkey (though not without Russia) has been able to actually accomplish something, such as in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey has been able to maintain relations with Russia and the West, thereby sustaining its desired global position, by assuming the role of a key mediator between Russia and Ukraine. This formal role gives Ankara a good reason not to get involved in sanctioning Moscow. Second, the war in Ukraine, with its subsequent social, economic, political, and transnational repercussions, has endangered stability on a number of regional issues that are vital for Turkey’s security, reputation, and international self-reliance. For years, Turkey’s regional policy was built on a situational partnership with Moscow. The possible weakening of Russia as a result of the war in Ukraine could throw the regional balance in the South Caucasus, the Black Sea region, and the Levant into disarray, strengthening, for instance, Iran in Syria—and Iran is one of Turkey’s less preferred competitors. Regional destabilization is not in Ankara’s interests, especially in light of the substantial financial and economic difficulties Turkey has been struggling with since last autumn. Objective 2: Reinforcing Ankara’s Influence The second global objective has to do with furthering Turkey’s political, economic, trade, and geopolitical expansion. By shaping the dynamics of the current crisis, Turkey is trying to “ride the tide” and use it to its advantage. Its tactics to achieve this goal include taking the place of Western companies on the Russian market, accruing tourist and financial flows from Russia, thereby bypassing sanctions, and gaining political ground in regional affairs by taking on a mediation role, forcing the conflicting parties to consult with and through Ankara on issues of war, peace, maritime trade, the demining of the Black Sea, and the restoration of essential Ukrainian wheat exports. In addition, many Russians, fearing Western sanctions, have moved to Turkey, investing millions in the local real estate market and registering businesses there, which is also a lucrative deal for Ankara. (Ankara offers citizenship for a $400,000 investment.) Finally, Turkey sees an opportunity to achieve its long-sought goal of becoming the major gas transit hub for Europe. With the European allies determined more than ever to reduce their dependence on Russian gas imports, Turkey is offering its services and lobbying for realization of a long-discussed new subsea pipeline between Israel and Turkey, one that would allow eastern Mediterranean gas to reach Europe through Turkey. Even more important for Ankara in this context is exploiting the momentum to strengthen its own standing in the world. As Western partners search for support in containing the Russian threat and dealing with an array of war-related consequences, Ankara sees the time is ripe to make the West drop sanctions against the Turkish defense industry and embrace Turkey as an equal partner. It is with this logic in mind that Turkey’s leadership unexpectedly jumped on NATO’s expansion process with bold demands as to what Sweden, Finland, and NATO member states should do to obtain Ankara’s consent. And it is this tactic of getting the most out of concessions from all parties that drove Erdoğan to announce a new military operation in northern Syria against the Western-backed Kurds, thereby endangering the regional positions of both Russia and the United States. All in all, Ankara’s predominant stance on the Russia-Ukraine war is not about Russia or Ukraine at all. It is about ensuring that any future postwar settlement in the region and the world will necessarily include Turkey’s interests, and ideally establish Turkey as a stakeholder in the process. Turkey’s serious economic problems, however, mean these plans may have to be adjusted. The key aspect of the Russia-Ukraine war for Erdoğan and his government remains not so much support for Ukraine or Russia as an opportunity for Erdoğan to strengthen his position on the international stage at the expense of either country’s interests by proactively practicing diplomacy amid the developing crisis.

### 2AC – Link Turn –Turkey-West Increasing

#### L/T–Russian revisionism pushes Turkey towards the West

Dalay 5-20 (Galip Dalay is a CATS Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at SWP. (5-20-2022). Deciphering Turkey's geopolitical balancing and anti-westernism in its&nbsp;relations with Russia. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/deciphering-turkeys-geopolitical-balancing-and-anti-westernism-in-its-relations-with-russia//BVN SC)

While discontent with the West and anti-Westernism have facilitated cordial and cooperative relations between Moscow and Ankara, Russian geopolitical revisionism has almost invariably pushed Turkey closer to the West. The logic here is straightforward. First, Russian revisionism poses direct security threats to Turkey. Historically, the centre of gravity of Turkish-Russian rivalry has been the Black Sea. From the Turkish perspective, Russia’s actions – from the war in Georgia to annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine – all decisively tilt the balance of power in this region in Russia’s favour. Although Russia’s policy in each of these cases might have specifics and con­textual nuances, taken together they point to one unmistakable outcome: Russian revisionism in the post-Soviet space and an aspiration to turn the region into a sphere of domination. This will only aggravate the Turkish threat perception vis-à-vis Moscow. Second, the post-Soviet space is also Tur­key’s immediate neighbourhood. If success­ful, the Russian policy will restrict Ankara’s geopolitical room for manoeuvre in this region, and undermine its standing from the Black Sea to the Balkans and the South Caucasus to Central Asia. Additionally, Turk­ish and Western interests are in broad align­ment in these regions, so Moscow’s geo­political revisionism is likely to bring Tur­key and the West relatively closer together.

### 2AC – Link Turn –Key To Black Sea

#### Turkey provides Black Sea support for NATO

**Aydogan, 21** (Merve Aydogan, 06-14-2021, accessed on 1-3-2022, Aa.com, "Turkey remains as indispensable member of NATO for 69 years", <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-remains-as-indispensable-member-of-nato-for-69-years/2273488/BVN> SC)

NATO forces in Aegean, Black Sea Turkey provides permanent naval assistance to NATO missions in the Aegean Sea, presenting surveillance, reconnaissance, and monitoring activities to prevent illegal crossings. Turkey also supports Standing NATO Maritime Groups' (SNMG) activities in the Black Sea and Aegean, which is included as part of NATO obligations. Moreover, Turkey also hosts LANDCOM, NATO's land command, in the Aegean coastal province of Izmir. The NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – one of nine NATO land forces headquarters with high readiness level – is also stationed in Istanbul. Turkey also took command of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in 2021. "Built around Turkey's 66th Mechanised Infantry Brigade of around 4,200 troops, a total of around 6,400 soldiers will serve on the VJTF," according to NATO. Turkey's latest armed vehicles, anti-tank missiles and howitzers have been allocated to the task force.

#### Turkey acts as a geopolitical powerhouse to defend the Black Sea

**Ellehuus, 19** (Ellehuus, Rachel. “Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving.” Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 Dec. 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving.) [Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.//BVN SC]

Yet these foundational factors remain valid: Turkey’s geopolitical position at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa still provides NATO with needed political and operational reach, and Turkey continues to benefit from the collective military power of NATO. With the relationship close to (if not at) its nadir, Turkey and NATO, with the support of the EU, need to take active measures to anchor it for the future, while avoiding steps that could destroy the relationship entirely. Assuming that Turkey is in fact interested in rebuilding the relationship with its NATO allies, there are several active measures NATO and Turkey can take now to create a foothold for the future. The key is to focus on areas of mutual interest where NATO involvement is critical to Turkish strategic interests and where Turkey has a unique role to play in NATO. The first of these is the Black Sea, where Turkey, as well as fellow NATO Black Sea littoral states Romania and Bulgaria, are trying to balance an increasing Russian military presence. While previously resistant to a greater NATO role in the Black Sea for fear it would dilute its own influence in the region, Turkey now sees the dangers of leaving Russian influence and presence in [the] Black Sea unchecked. With its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and entry into the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has significantly increased its presence and combat capabilities in both the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. NATO now faces an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble that restricts allies’ freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea, with Russia capable of attacking from both land and sea. To effectively counter this, NATO should establish a more continuous presence in the Black Sea, revive the idea of a permanent NATO maritime fleet in the Black Sea, and consider basing more counter-A2/AD capabilities in Turkey and Romania. Importantly, Turkey holds unique power to control access to the Black Sea thanks to the 1936 Montreux Convention, which governs naval passage through the Turkish Straits, limiting the number of foreign vessels that can enter the Black Sea via the Straits and how long these vessels can stay. This access is important to both Russia and NATO. Whereas Turkey has proven to be an impartial and reliable enforcer of the treaty, Russia has pushed the boundaries of Montreux repeatedly since the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and, more recently, impeded the course of NATO vessels that have entered and departed the Black Sea in compliance with the treaty. More behavior along these lines, or a Russian attempt to leverage its new, closer relationship with Turkey to secure more favorable access to the Black Sea, would likely increase Turkey’s unease and lead it to rely more on NATO as a counterbalance. For its part, the European Union should closely watch Turkey’s proposed construction of the Istanbul Canal to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara (and, as such, the Aegean and Mediterranean seas), which is reportedly drawing interest from Chinese as well as Russian investors. As the canal would allow ships to sail between the Mediterranean and Black Sea without transiting the Turkish Straits, and thus abiding by the restrictions of Montreux, the European Union and United States should consider investing in this infrastructure project to ensure they are in a position to work with Turkey to ensure free and fair transit through the canal.

### 2AC – Link Turn –Key To ME

#### NATO and Turkey are key to mitigating Middle Eastern conflict

**Cammack & Dunne 18**(Perry Cammack was a nonresident fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on long-term regional trends and their implications for American foreign policy., Michele Dunne is a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, where her research focuses on political and economic change in Arab countries, particularly Egypt, as well as U.S. policy in the Middle East., ND, “Fueling Middle East conflict—or Dousing The Flame”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/23/fueling-middle-east-conflicts-or-dousing-flames-pub-77548//BVN SC)

In comparison with almost every other geographical region, the Middle East suffers from a lack of both regional dispute resolution mechanisms and diplomatic protocols that might reduce the scope for regional conflict. While the Cold War was defined by the antagonism between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both sides increasingly felt the need for inclusive institutions and mechanisms to reduce tensions. Every U.S. president during the Cold War, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to George H. W. Bush, met with his Soviet counterpart. During the tensest moments, high-level U.S.-Soviet channels of communications were especially important. Over time, a number of confidence-building institutions and transparency-enhancing measures were created, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), successive arms control agreements, and later the Treaty on Open Skies, which allows for unarmed surveillance flights over signatory countries to promote military and nuclear weapons openness. In the Middle East, however, the absence of any similar mechanisms or organizations, particularly amid proliferating military conflicts, feeds security dilemmas across multiple vectors, so that steps justified by one state as necessary to its security—military intervention, arms procurement, alliance formation, and so on—are perceived by its rivals as threatening. During the Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts of the 1990s, there were attempts to build mechanisms for regional communication and cooperation. Participants at the 1991 Madrid Conference set up five multilateral working groups to address regional challenges, each involving Israel and a range of Arab states. The centerpiece was the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group, which marked the first bid to create a formal multilateral framework for regional security issues. Six ACRS plenary sessions, co-hosted by the United States and Russia, were held and a series of regional confidence-building measures were outlined before the working group slowly broke down by 1995 under the weight of regional animosities and implementation challenges. While all of the working groups have long been defunct, one tangible result survives: the Middle East Desalination Research Center in Oman, created in 1995. The center conducts transboundary water research and development projects, and its membership includes Israel, Jordan, Oman, Palestine, and Qatar as well as several Western nations.

#### Turkey is an essential member to NATO’s defense in the Middle East

Üzümcü et al 20 (Ahmet Üzümcü is the Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is a Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir is a Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006, 12-16-20, “Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat”, European Leadership Network, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/turkey-and-nato-resolving-the-s-400-spat//BVN> SC)

But the critics do not stop there. There is the wider accusation of Turkish unreliability. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has been a reliable member of NATO for the past seven decades. It contributed significantly to the Alliance’s collective defence and deterrence in the Cold War. By tying up a large portion of Soviet troops in its region, it considerably reduced the pressure on Central Europe. Ironically, the Western European countries were able to build their Union gradually in a secure and stable environment ensured by NATO, with Turkey shouldering a heavy military burden. With the end of the Cold War, alone among the existing allies, Turkey’s security situation worsened. Turkey found itself increasingly exposed in a region of turmoil engulfed by several armed conflicts. The new and emerging security risks, including terrorism, have impacted Turkey as much, if not more, than any other Ally. Turkey feels itself on a new front line. But throughout this period, Turkey has remained an island of stability in a volatile region. Even though instability and disorder are on our doorstep, Turkey has fulfilled all its NATO obligations and provided security and stability rather than consuming them. Turkey has stood solid behind every key NATO decision. NATO invoked Article V of the Treaty for the first time following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan had become a haven for international terrorism. As a staunch ally, Turkey has played a significant role in NATO’s stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. It has deployed troops and other military assets in harm’s way alongside other allies and partners. Turkey has never deviated from the NATO policy “in together-adjust together-out together“. Moreover, Turkey’s especially close and long-standing ties with Afghanistan has enabled the Alliance as a whole to benefit from its knowledge, expertise and political weight in that country. Moreover, the fight against ISIS, a serious concern for the whole world, would not have been so successful without Turkey’s participation and assistance. Turkey has become an essential partner in this struggle by joining the coalition against ISIS. It made three air bases, including Incirlik, available for the Allies, enabling decisively effective military operations. Elsewhere, in the Balkans and Iraq, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s stabilization efforts. In terms of NATO’s priority core task, collective defence, successive governments in Turkey have never wavered in their commitment to the Alliance. Turkey’s current contribution cannot be overstated. It currently hosts a range of NATO commands and and assets, essential to NATO’s collective defence, including Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir and the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) in Istanbul. Significantly, Turkey will be the lead nationin 2021 in command of the ‘Spearhead Force’ of NATO (VJTF). This force can be deployed at short notice to any allied country considered under threat.

#### NATO and Turkey are aligned in the Middle East–they can collaborate

**Ellehuus 19** (Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving.” Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 Dec. 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving.//BVN SC)

A second area where Turkey’s immediate security concerns intersect with the majority of other NATO members is stability in the Middle East, most immediately in Syria. To be sure, Turkey’s anger over United States’ partnership with the YPG in the fight against the Islamic State—appnd NATO’s anger at Turkey for its unilateral incursion into northern Syria—will make progress difficult. But ultimately, the two sides share a mutual interest in seeing stability and pluralistic governance in Syria. This entails constraining Syrian president Bashar al-Assad; preventing the return of the Islamic State and Europe-based Islamic State fighters; and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and refugee return. More broadly, both sides also share an interest in limiting Russian and Iranian influence in the region. With the Russian military presence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Crimea now supplemented by the Russian naval base at Tartus, airbases at Kobani and Khmeimim, and helicopter base[s] at Qamishli, Turkey is effectively encircled by Russia. It is in this context that German minister of defence Kramp-Karrenbauer’s suggestion of an internationally-controlled security zone along the Turkey-Syria border, possibly NATO-led and backed by the United Nations in loose partnership with Russia, makes sense. It would address a situation that immediately and directly affects the security of Europe and Turkey and demonstrate that the NATO is invested in addressing Turkey’s security concerns. Should NATO and Turkey move to restore some level of trust by taking these first steps, it will be important to avoid unnecessarily escalating tensions. For Turkey, this means abiding by the terms of the Syria ceasefire, not pursuing additional purchases of Russian military equipment, and doing its part to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State in the region or return of Islamic State foreign fighters to Europe. For the United States and Europe, the trick will be to apply the required sanctions and arms embargoes in a discriminate way. For example, whereas imposing sanctions in accordance with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and withholding delivery of Turkey’s F-35s due to its purchase of the Russian S-400 makes good policy sense, imposing additional blanket sanctions could do more harm than good, affecting the Turkish people more than their leadership and giving Erdogan another opportunity to blame the West for Turkey’s economic problems. A smarter approach might involve going after corrupt actors using the Global Magnitsky Act. Similarly, a total arms embargo by the United States and the European Union will only drive Turkey to procure more Russian or non-NATO interoperable military equipment. Rather, the arms embargoes should be limited along the lines of the most recent House sanctions bill, which includes exemptions for items to be used in NATO-approved operations. Finally, as some of Turkey’s biggest export partners, the European Union and the United States can provide needed carrots along the way to incentivize constructive behavior by Ankara. Measures might include an eventual upgrade of Turkey’s customs union with the European Union or limited visa-free travel to EU countries for Turkish citizens. For the United States, President Trump’s offer of a $100 billion trade deal will also be attractive to Erdogan in Turkey’s struggling economy. To be sure, repairing the trust that has been lost and returning Turkey to the path of Western integration will be a struggle, requiring sustained effort, and a setting aside of egos, on all sides. Yet on this occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary, Turkey and its NATO allies owe it to one another to pause for a moment and reflect not on their many disagreements but on what brought them together in the first instance and why that still matters.

### 2AC – Link Turn –Turkey-Russia k2 Emerging Tech

#### Turn–Turkey modernization good–allows for better Russian-Turkish cooperation

Starodubtsev 20 (Ivan Starodubtsev, December 10, 2020, “Can Russia and Turkey cooperate in cyberspace?”, <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/can-russia-and-turkey-cooperate-in-cyberspace>/RM)

It is clear that both **Russia and Turkey** today **think similarly** about **modern technologies**, including **AI and cybersecurity**. Russian companies and solutions, including Yandex with all the variety of its services, the Kaspersky cybersecurity company and social network and messenger software Telegram, are well known and in demand in Turkey. We may expect that Sberbank will soon enter the Turkish market with its solutions in the field of AI. Turkey-Russia cooperation At the end of this article, one may ask, can Russia and Turkey fully cooperate in the field of digital technologies? However, this question is no longer valid today as cooperation in the AI field has become a necessity. Russia and Turkey, which work together to ensure security in the region, including in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, should also cooperate in the field of digital technologies, primarily in AI and cybersecurity. Russia and Turkey both think in a similar way, stating that it is necessary to implement not only international regulation in digital space but also moral and ethical norms. The promotion of this idea to the world is another **potential mission of Russian-Turkish relations**. Achieving this task is not only about the prosperity of the two countries in the new technological order and economy of the future but also a **matter** of **peace and stability** of the region and the strengthening of neighborly relations.

### 2AC – AT: Syria I/L

#### Turkey and Russia are misaligned in Syria now–thumps the uniqueness AND the internal link

Tastekin 6-17 (Fehim Tastekin is a Turkish journalist and a columnist for Turkey Pulse who previously wrote for Radikal and Hurriyet. He has also been the host of the weekly program "SINIRSIZ," on IMC TV. As an analyst, Tastekin specializes in Turkish foreign policy and Caucasus, Middle East and EU affairs. He is the author of “Suriye: Yikil Git, Diren Kal,” “Rojava: Kurtlerin Zamani” and “Karanlık Coktugunde - ISID.” Tastekin is founding editor of the Agency Caucasus, 6-17-22, “Russia, Iran won't endorse Turkish military operation in Syria”, Al-Monitor, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/russia-iran-wont-endorse-turkish-military-operation-syria//BVN> SC)

Turkey failed to garner Russian and Iranian backing for a fresh military intervention against Syrian Kurdish forces at the meeting of the Astana platform this week. Senior diplomats from Turkey, Russia and Iran, the three guarantors of the platform, as well as representatives of Syria’s government and opposition, attended the June 15-16 meeting in Kazakhstan’s capital Nur-Sultan, known previously as Astana. While the official agenda included topics such as the return of Syrian refugees, the humanitarian and economic situation in Syria, the work of the constitutional committee in Geneva and confidence-boosting measures toward a political settlement, the main issue was Turkish threats to wrestle control of further territory held by the Kurds. President Recep Tayyip has openly named Tel Rifaat and Manbij as targets, vowing to rid them of “terrorists” as part of a plan to create a safe zone with a depth of 30 kilometers (about 20 miles) along the Turkish border. The groups in Ankara’s crosshairs are the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the backbone of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party. Ankara equates them with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the armed outfit designated as a terrorist group over its decades-long separatist campaign in Turkey. Speaking to reporters ahead of the meeting, Alexander Lavrentiev, the Kremlin’s special Syria envoy and head of the Russian delegation, called Turkey’s intervention plan an “illogical and irrational” prospect that threatens “an escalation of tension and a new military confrontation in those areas,” according to Syrian media. He dismissed speculation that Russia could turn a blind eye in return for Turkey blocking Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO. “There is no such thing. We are not bargaining. We are not giving up on our allies in the region,” he said. Ali Asghar Khaji, the head of the Iranian delegation, “underlined that Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are untouchable” in a meeting with the Turkish delegation, according to the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Ayman Sousan, who led the Syrian delegation, urged the United Nations “to rein in [Erdogan’s] aggressive policies” in a meeting with UN officials, Syrian media reported. In response, the UN officials cited statements by the UN secretary-general’s spokesperson in support of Syria’s sovereignty and against fresh escalatory moves in the country. In separate talks with the Russians, Sousan rejected Turkey’s pretexts for attacks on Syrian territory, charging that they were designed “to achieve its expansionist ideals” and that “the Syrian people are determined to defend their country [and] resist the occupation.” Lavrentiev, for his part, pledged Russia would do its best to prevent further escalation in Syria. In the final statement, the parties denounced “separatist agendas” in Syria in a nod to Turkey’s security concerns and a rebuke of the Kurdish groups leading the de facto self-rule in the north. They also reaffirmed commitment to Syria’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and a political settlement to the conflict, as they have done in all previous statements in the past six years. In Turkey’s view, its control of significant chunks of Syrian territory does not contradict that commitment. The parties also pledged to work together “to combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations.” The sixth point of the statement referred to Kurdish-held areas in northeast Syria, saying that lasting security and stability in the region can only be achieved by preserving Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The wording matched the arguments that Russia has put forward against Turkey’s attempts to expand its control in northern Syria. Simply put, Moscow argues that the best way to address Ankara’s security concerns is to ensure that the Syrian army returns all the way to the Turkish border as Ankara begins to cooperate with Damascus and discuss joint measures under the 1998 Adana accord on security cooperation between the two countries. The communique suggests that Ankara has toed Moscow’s line, at least on paper. In the same paragraph, the statement acknowledged Turkey’s concerns, saying that the parties reject “all attempts to create new realities on the ground, including illegitimate self-rule initiatives under the pretext of combating terrorism.” In a reference to the United States, the statement denounced “the illegal seizure and transfer of oil revenues that should belong to Syria” and “the actions of countries that support terrorist entities including illegitimate self-rule initiatives in the northeast of Syria.” Pledging continued cooperation to eliminate the Nusra Front, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and other UN-designated terrorist groups, the statement expressed “serious concern” with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which holds sway in Idlib and with which Turkey has tacitly cooperated on the ground. It stressed also the need to facilitate the return of refugees and support the UN-sponsored process of drafting a new constitution for Syria. The text, released by the Kazakh hosts of the meeting, did not explicitly mention the YPG or the PKK, but Turkey’s state-run Anatolia news agency said the final communique emphasized Turkey’s determination to “fight the PKK/YPG terrorist organization” and enact “any measures to protect our borders and prevent attacks on our people and security forces and innocent Syrian civilians.” Russia’s denunciation of “separatist agendas” — a reference to the Kurds’ autonomy drive and partnership with the United States — suggests that it is shifting to a position more pleasing to Turkey. This trend has been tangible in other statements in recent times. Moscow’s temperate policy on the Kurds appears to be wearing out amid rising Russian-US tensions over Ukraine, opening room for Ankara to maneuver. According to media reports on the talks, the Turkish side insisted that the YPG’s removal from Tel Rifaat and Manbij was a commitment that Russia failed to deliver under the 2019 Sochi deal, while the Russians recalled Turkey’s outstanding commitment to eliminate terrorist groups in Idlib and reopen the M4 motorway. Such exchanges between Turkey and Russia have recurred time and again as a tactic to balance or restrain each other. The talks in Nur-Sultan were significant in terms of clarifying Moscow’s attitude on Ankara’s intervention threat, for its initial reactions were softer and more ambivalent compared to similar tensions in the past, contrasting the firm objections of Tehran. Some Russian statements even sought to justify Turkey’s security concerns, fueling speculation that Turkish-Russian bargaining on issues related to NATO and Ukraine might extend to the conflict in Syria. Nevertheless, a marked difference was visible between Russia’s rhetoric and its actions on the ground. Russia took a number of steps signaling solidarity with the Syrian army, including joint military exercises in the south of Idlib on June 10. In a series of firsts, the Russians installed a Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft system at the Hasakah airport in the northeast; deployed tanks, armored vehicles, anti-aircraft weapons and missiles to the Abkar base in the same region; and dispatched eight helicopters to the Abu al-Duhur base in eastern Idlib. Russian planes and helicopters rumbled in the skies of northeastern cities such as Qamishli, Tel Tamir, Amuda, Darbasiyah and Ras al-Ayn. The Iranians, meanwhile, deployed reinforcements to the vicinity of Tel Rifaat and moved Shiite militia from Deir ez-Zor to the al-Nayrab base to the east of Aleppo. In other words, Russia and Iran were naysaying a Turkish intervention with their actions on the ground, and any expectation that they would step back in the talks in Nur-Sultan was unrealistic. Though the final statement touched prominently on Turkey’s concerns, the settlement path it outlined is dismissive of military intervention.

#### Turn–Turkey’s revisionist foreign policy destabilizes the Mediterranean AND the Middle East

Tziarras 21 (Zenonas Tziarras, researcher at Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre and a co-founder of Geopolitical Cyprus, and Jalel Harchaaoui, a senior fellow at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, a Swiss-based institute; “What Erdogan Really Wants in the Eastern Mediterranean”; Foreign Policy; 1/19/21; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/19/turkey-greece-what-erdogan-wants-eastern-mediterranean-sovereignty-natural-gas/BVN> SC)

In an episode that has tediously repeated itself several times since July, Turkey’s seismic-survey ships and navy vessels clash with Greek authorities while probing for hydrocarbons in waters off the small Greek island of Kastellorizo. Turkey and Greece—perennial foes—don’t see eye to eye on the Mediterranean’s maritime boundaries. Yet, each time they bicker, pundits are quick to reduce the Greek-Turkish standoff to a bilateral kerfuffle over natural resources. In reality, the dispute over Kastellorizo—and Turkey’s incursions in the Eastern Mediterranean more generally—are merely proximate symptoms of a deep-rooted conflict over sovereignty. That fight has been brewing for decades, and it was recently exacerbated by the abandonment of long-held Turkish foreign-policy principles based on caution and an aversion to adventurism. Nothing that happens in the Eastern Mediterranean is separable from the wider dynamics in a region where Europe, Asia, and Africa meet. The region has always been ground zero for great-power politics, but it has developed a new vulnerability in the aftermath of Washington’s ill-fated Iraq War, which prompted a reconfiguration of U.S. foreign-policy priorities around the world. Today, the United States is increasingly unwilling to intervene decisively abroad—making space for other actors to scramble in pursuit of their individual agendas, trying to carve out their own spheres of influence. Nowhere is this more evident than in Turkey’s environs, where Ankara has sought to capitalize on these changes to pursue what amounts to a revisionist geopolitical agenda. Domestically, this about-face has been buttressed by a move toward Islamic populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism—away from what some Washington policy wonks used to call the “Turkish model”: a perceived synthesis of economic liberalization, pro-Western democracy, and Islamic values that many believed could be a model for the Arab world. Now, rather than going for a clean and quick divorce, Ankara is leveraging its various institutional, economic, and security ties with the West to climb the power ladder of the regional system while embracing illiberalism at home. Since 2015, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has exuded historical revanchism in justifying Turkish interference in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia—his discourse peppered with flowery mentions of “geography in our heart” and “our spiritual borders.” But a nostalgic policy of neo-Ottomanism doesn’t begin to explain Ankara’s geopolitical reasoning under Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkey today seeks to become a great power able to negotiate on equal terms with the rest of the great powers and, wherever possible, impose its will by resorting to faits accomplis. In order to maximize its stature, then, Turkey has invested in its national security apparatus and military-projection capabilities while also ramping up its global soft power in everything including entertainment, religion, and commerce. All in all, Erdogan’s agenda encompasses much more than mere defense and survival. His ultimate goal is to alter the geopolitical status quo in ways he believes benefit Turkey. In this sense, Turkey is now a revisionist state: It embarks upon military interventions and seeks to control foreign territory, as in Syria and Iraq; challenges land borders and maritime boundaries, as with Cyprus and Greece; engages in demographic engineering and political interference, as in Syria and Northern Cyprus; maintains bases overseas, as in Somalia and Qatar; and galvanizes dependent proxies, as in Libya, northern Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. All this may be needlessly provocative and eventually prove counterproductive in bolstering Turkey’s stature vis-à-vis erstwhile allies. But it’s a vindictive path informed by Ankara’s current foreign policy, which is instilled with Turkey’s own brand of political Islam: Necmettin Erbakan’s Milli Gorus (National Outlook) movement of the 1970s. Chief among Milli Gorus’s tenets is that Turkey was—and continues to be—ripped off by the West.

### 2AC – AT: Ukraine I/L

#### Non-unique–Turkey is mediating between Russia and Ukraine now

Kirby 22 (Jen Kirby, Foreign and National Security Reporter, April 1, 2022, “What diplomatic solution might end the war in Ukraine?”, <https://www.vox.com/2022/4/1/23002085/peace-talks-ukraine-russia-war-turkey-neutrality>//RM)

The war in Ukraine has ground on for five weeks. For almost as long, Russian and Ukrainian officials have been attempting to negotiate. Those negotiations have yielded few firm results so far, especially as Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian cities. Still, the talking matters. Diplomacy is the only way this war will finally end, and the type of agreement that might end the fighting looks a lot clearer than it did even a month ago. In the early days of the war, the talks made little apparent progress. Ukraine appeared to be demanding an immediate ceasefire, and Russian withdrawal of troops. Russia, however, had pretty different ideas. It laid out some aggressive demands. Among them were: Ukraine’s neutrality and no membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); so-called “demilitarization and “denazification;” the protection of Russian language within Ukraine; and that Ukraine recognize Crimea as part of Russia and recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, the two regions in eastern Ukraine that Vladimir Putin had declared as independent on the eve of his full-scale invasion. In recent days, some glimmers of optimism have emerged. Ukraine has put forward serious proposals, which is centered around a commitment to permanent neutrality and an agreement not to seek NATO membership, in exchange for security guarantees. Russia has also reportedly eased up on some of its previous demands, including “denazification” — a likely ruse for regime change — and “demilitarization,” a sign that Ukraine’s battlefield successes so far have pushed the Kremlin to possibly reconsider some of its most maximalist demands. Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, who is helping to broker the talks, described the discussions earlier in the week as “the most meaningful progress since the start of negotiations.” But these really are just glimmers of progress — and they might not be so long lasting. Russia, this week, promised to “drastically reduce” military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv, in the name of “mutual trust,” though reports of shelling continued in those areas. Some, including US and NATO officials, have expressed skepticism that Moscow is sincere, and instead using talks to buy time, so it can regroup and refocus its offensive, potentially on areas in eastern and southern Ukraine. Since then, both Russia and Ukraine have downplayed the seriousness of the talks, even as negotiations resumed Friday. And huge gulfs remain. Perhaps the most intractable problem may be the future of the Crimean peninsula, which Russia annexed in 2014, and Donetsk and Luhansk, which Russia and Russia-backed militias control parts of. Ukraine is unlikely to agree to slice up its country. It is also hard to imagine Russia settling for less territory than it controlled the day before its invasion in February 2022. Other issues will emerge, and concessions and proposals may shift depending on developments in the battlefield. The prospect of a quick peace deal between Ukraine and Russia remains unlikely. Perhaps the best case short term is that both sides broker a ceasefire that includes a framework for an agreement, and then work the details out over time. But the war continues.

#### Turn–Russia is currently making advances in Ukraine–NATO tech support solves and throws them off

Dan **Lamothe and** Adela **Suliman**, **06-24-**20**22**, [(Dan Lamothe joined The Washington Post in 2014 to cover the U.S. military. He has written about the Armed Forces for more than 14 years, traveling extensively, embedding with each service and covering combat in Afghanistan numerous times.) "Ukraine retreats from Severodonetsk as Russia advances in the east," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/24/severodonetsk-troop-withdrawal-ukraine-lysychansk/]//DS

Russia claimed control Sunday over the key city of Lysychansk, the last major Ukrainian foothold in the Luhansk region — signaling a potential turning point in Moscow’s campaign to take all of eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials said their forces had withdrawn from Lysychansk after fierce fighting to preserve lives from the Russians’ relentless assault. The slow Russian advance across the region it has targeted since the invasion began in February has been facilitated by overwhelming artillery power that has leveled cities and towns and left a trail of wounded and dead prompting comparisons with the devastation of World War I in Europe. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in a statement that Russian troops and pro-Kremlin separatists of the self-declared Luhansk People’s Republic “have established full control” over Lysychansk “and a number of nearby settlements.” The Ukrainian military’s general staff said Sunday that Ukrainian forces were forced to withdraw from Lysychansk after waging a stiff but losing battle. Ukraine had tried to defend Lysychansk for weeks. The military said it decided to withdraw because remaining in the city would bring “fatal consequences,” given the Russian forces’ “overwhelming advantage” in “artillery, aviation, ammunition and personnel.” The decision was “made to save the lives of Ukrainian defenders,” according to a statement posted on Facebook. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky vowed to return. “If the command of our army withdraws people from certain points of the front where the enemy has the greatest fire superiority, in particular this applies to Lysychansk, it means only one thing: We will return thanks to our tactics, thanks to the increase in the supply of modern weapons,” Zelensky said in his nightly address Sunday. “Ukraine does not give anything up.” The city is a key target in Russia’s battle to capture the Donbas region, the heavily industrialized area bordering Russia that is partly controlled by separatists loyal to Moscow. In 2014, they unilaterally established two independent “republics” in the Donbas region. ‘They’re in hell’: Hail of Russian artillery tests Ukrainian morale Russian President Vladimir Putin cited false claims of Ukrainian “genocide” against Russian-speaking residents there as justification for his invasion. Russia’s latest advances in eastern Ukraine add to creeping doubts among U.S. lawmakers and observers of the war that the Ukrainian government can stop Putin from seizing territory. Optimism sparked by the defeat of his forces in the battle for Kyiv in the spring has faded as Russian artillery hammers Ukrainian forces and civilian targets. As Ukraine war bogs down, U.S. assessments face scrutiny President Biden said last week that U.S. support for Ukraine is unshakable and will continue “as long as it takes” to ensure a Russian defeat. “We continue to fight. Unfortunately, the steel willpower and patriotism are not enough to achieve success — we need the technical resources,” the Ukrainian military’s statement added. Why is Ukraine’s Donbas region a target for Russian forces? Ukrainian troops withdrew just over a week ago from Severodonetsk, a city across the Donets River to the east. Russia’s capture of Lysychansk, if confirmed, would be a major victory that gives its troops clear access to Donetsk, the other region that makes up Donbas. Biden administration officials say Putin’s gains have been uneven and have come at a significant cost, highlighting the steep death toll among Russian troops. But Ukrainian forces also are paying a heavy price, which U.S. military officials rarely acknowledge. Ukraine retreats from Severodonetsk as Russia advances in the east Control over Donbas is the primary goal of Moscow’s military operation in Ukraine, after it failed to capture the capital, Kyiv, and other areas in the initial weeks of the war. Russian troops and their allies have been making steady gains in the east, as officials in Kyiv say they are outgunned and running out of ammunition. Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesman Yuriy Sak told the BBC earlier Sunday that Ukraine controls other cities in Donetsk and argued that “the battle for the Donbas is not over yet.” Serhiy Haidai, governor of the Luhansk region, said earlier in the day that in attacking Lysychansk, Russian fighters used tactics even more brutal than in Severodonetsk to overcome resistance. Photos showed bombed-out residential buildings in Lysychansk early Sunday, amid a barrage reminiscent of the destruction of Severodonetsk. As recently as Saturday, a Russian-backed politician said Lysychansk was “completely surrounded,” but defense officials in Ukraine said they still had control of the city. Those counterclaims were probably “outdated or erroneous,” according to an analysis from the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) think tank. It cited unconfirmed videos showing Russian forces erecting a red “victory” flag in Lysychansk and “casually walking around” its neighborhoods. “Ukrainian forces likely conducted a deliberate withdrawal from Lysychansk, resulting in the Russian seizure of the city on July 2,” it said. As Russia issued its claim of control over Lysychansk on Sunday, Slovyansk, a town about 50 miles west in Donetsk, came under intense shelling that killed at least six people, local officials said. Mayor Vadym Lyakh said in a video on Telegram that “the biggest shelling of Slovyansk recently” had left “a large number of wounded and dead.” Tetyana Ignatchenko, a spokeswoman for the Donetsk region, told Ukrainian public broadcaster Suspilne News that at least six people were killed and 15 were injured in the shelling. She added that missiles hit the town of Kramatorsk, to the south of Slovyansk. In its assessment Saturday, the ISW said Russia was likely to fully take over the Luhansk region “in coming days” and would probably “then prioritize drives on Ukrainian positions in Siversk before turning to Slovyansk and Bakhmut,” in Donetsk. In other developments, Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey said Sunday that Turkish authorities have detained a Russian-flagged cargo ship loaded with stolen Ukrainian grain. Millions of metric tons of grain await export from Ukraine, blockaded by Russia’s control of Black Sea shipping lanes. The export blockades have resulted in global food shortages and rising prices, which have particularly affected poorer countries. Three people were killed in Russian strikes early Sunday in the Kharkiv region, Ukrainian officials said. Cities across Kharkiv were shelled Saturday and Sunday, according to regional governor Oleh Synyehubov. In one district, Russian forces “burned farm buildings, garages, and shelled open areas,” he added. Russian forces have recently intensified their attacks on Kharkiv, and some Ukrainians worry that Moscow is planning to renew its stalled attempt in March to seize Ukraine’s second-largest city.

### 2AC – AT: Econ I/L

#### Russia can’t help Turkey’s economy, they’re in a recession of their own

Carbonaro 6/30 (Giulia Carbonaro, US News Reporter, 6/30/22, “Russia's Economy is Collapsing, Data Reveals”, <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-economy-collapsing-data-reveals-1720532>//RM)

If Russia defaulting on its foreign debt for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution wasn't a clear enough sign of the impact Western sanctions are having on the Russian economy, a new report on the country's socio-economic situation leaves no margin for doubt that the Russian economy is gradually collapsing. New statistics on the state of the Russian economy, produced by the country's Federal State Statistics Service, show production has plunged in multiple sectors, from vehicles to domestic appliances, as has retail confidence. Overall, Russia's industrial production index—a monthly economic indicator measuring real output in the manufacturing, mining, electric, and gas industries—dropped by 1.7 percent in May compared to the same month in 2021. That's higher than the decline of 1.6 percent year-on-year reported in April. Mining dropped by 0.8 percentage points in May 2022 compared to May 2021, and manufacturing dropped by 3.2 percentage points. The overall numbers seem quite modest, but they reflect a downward trend that is more obvious in the staggering drops affecting the production of specific products. Above all, car production has suffered, and it's now down by 96.7 percent compared to 2021. Production of trucks plunged by 39.3 percent, that of diesel and gasoline engines by 57 percent, that of diesel locomotives by 63.2 percent and that of freight wagons by 51.8 percent. French automaker Renault, which controls Russia's largest carmaker AvtoVAZ, suspended operations at its Moscow plant in March, under pressure from Ukrainian leaders to act in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Renault later agreed to sell its Russian operations for a nominal payment. Air cargo is down by 86 percent year on year. Other products were also affected. The production of fridges is also down by 58.1 percent compared with 2021 levels, that of washing machines by 59.2 percent, that of AC electric motors by 49.9 percent. TV sets were down by 49.7 percentage points. Production of elevators is down by 34.7 percent and that of excavators was down by 60 percent. Curiously, cigarette production also dropped by 24.5 percent. Graphs show that retail turnover and retail confidence have also gone down compared to one year before and even from the beginning of 2022. Wholesale turnover has also plunged drastically, with consumer demand dropping in what is likely a reflection of lower wages amid high inflation in the country. Even more significantly for the Russian population, pensions have also fallen in real terms, decreasing by 8.2 percentage points year-on-year in May, while salaries dropped by 7.2 percentage points in April compared to a year prior. These data are a clear sign that the Russian economy is suffering, despite the fact that the rouble bounced back after collapsing in late February following the invasion of Ukraine and that the country has held up surprisingly better than expected after Western sanctions were imposed. The drop in industrial production is less than Western economists expected, but the economic contraction of the country is still undeniable. Even the Russian central bank said it expected a fall in GDP of 7.8 percent this year, almost in line with Western predictions but not quite, as Western experts estimate that the country's economy will shrink by 15 percent by the end of the year, according to the Institute of International Finance's (IIF). One piece of unexpected good news for Russia came from the jobs market, with a record-low unemployment rate of 3.9 percent reported in May. And yet, as high inflation continues to cripple wages in Russia, it's unlikely this high employment will turn into higher consumer demand able to turn the tide of Russia's likely incoming recession.

#### Turkey playing both sides to ensure their economy stays strong

Adar 22 (Sinem Adar, Dr. Sinem Adar is Associate at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at SWP ,April 6, 2022, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine”, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/perceptions-in-turkey-about-the-war-in-ukraine)

Ankara is carefully trying to not antagonize Russia while continuing to militarily support Ukraine. Besides the economic burden that an open confrontation with the Kremlin might inflict on Turkey, it could also lead to military retaliation in Syria and to a subsequent migration wave from Idlib to Turkey, which hosts the largest refugee population worldwide. At the same time, the increased Russian presence in Ukraine, particularly along the coastline in the south, further raises Turkey’s strategic vulnerabil­ity in the Black Sea, accentuating its Cold War threat perceptions. Ankara justifies its non-participation in the EU’s sanctions regime with these eco­nomic and security considerations. Turkish airspace also remains open to Russia. Still, Turkey is acting in close coordination with NATO and has repeated its firm commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty numerous times. Recognizing the violent conflict between the two coun­tries as “war,” in accordance with the Montreux Convention, Ankara closed the Straits to warships from any country, whether or not they border the Black Sea. Meanwhile, it is also acting as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia.

#### Turkey’s economy is low now–either should’ve already triggered the internal link or the link doesn’t overcome

Inman 7/4 (Phillip Inman, Phillip Inman is economics editor of the Observer and an economics writer for the Guardian, 7/4/22, “Turkey hit with soaring prices as inflation nears 80%”, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/jul/04/turkey-hit-with-soaring-prices-as-inflation-reaches-24-year-high-erdogan>/RM)

Turkey’s official inflation rate increased to almost 80% last month – the highest in 24 years – as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s unconventional economic policies continued to drive up the cost of living. The growth in annual prices rose from 73.5% in May to 78.6% in June, according to the Turkish statistics agency. However, opposition parties and economists said recent hikes in oil and gas prices meant the real rate of inflation was almost double the official figure. The minister of treasury and finance, Nureddin Nebati, has attempted to head off criticism of the government’s handling of the economy, saying last week that consumer prices would start dropping by the end of the year. “I promise to you and to the president, we will see a drop in inflation starting in December,” Nebati said. His comments came after the government announced its second increase in the minimum wage in six months, raising pay by 30%. The increase lifted the monthly salary of about 40% of the workforce from $254 (£209) to $328. Erdoğan has claimed that Turkey’s problem is not inflation. “We do not have an inflation problem. We have a cost of living problem,” he said last month. Economists said Turkey’s official data disguised a more disturbing trend of rising prices that had shown no sign of abating. A monthly report release by Turkey’s ENAG group of independent economists showed consumer prices had risen by 175% in June compared with a year earlier. ENAG said prices had risen by 71.4% since the start of 2022. The Istanbul chamber of commerce said inflation in Turkey‘s largest city had reached an annual rate of 94%. “No one actually believes official Turkish data any more,” said Timothy Ash, an economist at BlueBay Asset Management. “There is no expectation of anything like a credible policy response.” The growing dispute over the veracity of Turkey’s official data is expected to be a difficult political issue for Erdoğan’s government ahead of next year’s general election, which is widely viewed as the toughest of his two-decade rule. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the main opposition party, accused the state statistics agency of “lying”, urging it in a tweet to “stop committing crimes for the benefit of President Erdoğan.” A survey published by the Metropol polling agency on Friday showed 69% of respondents believed the unofficial ENAG figure and just 24% the one reported by the government. Turkey was hit hard by the fallout from the European debt crisis in 2012 and the threat of higher interest rates by the US Federal Reserve in 2013. Its currency tumble ever since. In 2013 the lira was worth 36p, compared with 4.9p on Monday. To arrest the decline, in 2018 Erdoğan embarked on what he called a “new economic model”, which meant setting aside rising inflation and cutting interest rates to boost economic growth. This was done against the advice of his central bank chief and caused the lira to plunge to a record low, pushing up costs in a country that is dependent on imported materials, especially energy. Inflation, which officially stood at 15% at the beginning of 2021, has now reached its highest level since a currency meltdown during the 1998 debt crisis that helped bring Erdoğan to power. Three central bank bosses have been fired by the president since 2018. The Turkish lira has plummeted 20% this year alone.

### 2AC – AT: Econ Decline

#### Turkish economic effects won’t spill over–no consensus in the literature

Samuelson 18 (Robert J. Samuelson wrote a twice-weekly economics column before he retired in September 2020. Both appeared online, and one usually ran in The Washington Post in print on Mondays. He was a columnist for Newsweek magazine from 1984 to 2011. He began his journalism career as a reporter on The Post business desk, from 1969 to 1973. From 1973 to 1976, he was a freelance writer. He was an economics reporter and columnist for National Journal magazine from 1976 to 1984 — when he joined Newsweek. He grew up in White Plains, N.Y., and attended Harvard College, 8-21-18, “Will Turkey’s economic woes spill over into other countries?”, <https://www.abqjournal.com/1211250/will-turkeys-economic-woes-spill-over-into-other-countries.html//BVN> SC)

WASHINGTON – The pertinent and unanswerable question about Turkey is whether the country’s present economic turmoil is an isolated event, mostly confined to Turkey itself, or whether it portends a larger economic convulsion that shakes markets around the world. Among economists and other experts, there’s no consensus. Some foresee contagion: Turkey’s problems will spread. Others envision a one-country economic blip. Which is it? The answer obviously matters. The global economy already faces obstacles to growth. American interest rates are rising as the Federal Reserve tries to prevent higher inflation. President Trump’s trade wars are threatening. If we now add a slowdown of “emerging market” economies – China, Brazil and similar “middle-income” nations – the global expansion might sputter or halt. Turkey’s experience is relevant. In recent months, its currency, the lira, has collapsed. At the start of 2018, it was trading at roughly 4 lira to the dollar; now that’s about 6 lira to the dollar. This makes it harder for Turkish businesses and consumers to repay debts, which – more than in many other countries – are often made in dollars. To repay these debts, Turkish companies need to earn more lira, which can be sold for dollars. The more lira go to repay dollar debts, the fewer lira are left over to buy other things. Economic growth slows. If debtors can’t raise the dollars to repay their loans, they default. Too many defaults, and growth stops. Turkey’s debt problems are undeniably daunting, notes economist Hung Tran of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), an industry research and advocacy group. Consider: Between now and the end of 2018, Turkey faces debt repayments – principal and interest – of about $120 billion; in 2019, the total is about $200 billion. By comparison, Turkey’s economy – gross domestic product – is about $850 billion. Some of these loans could be rolled over; how many is unclear. Many debts were incurred by banks or private firms, encouraged by easy-money policies. The government pumped up the economy in the wake of a failed military coup in 2016 and in anticipation of a new election. The election was held in June 2018 and won by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He was surely helped by the economic stimulus. Last year, Turkey’s GDP grew 7 percent, up from 3.2 percent in 2016. To complicate matters further, Turkey and the Trump administration are feuding over the Turks’ detention of Andrew Brunson, an American pastor accused of anti-state activities. Now comes the reckoning. Many observers believe that what happened in Turkey will stay in Turkey. Its economy is simply too small – about 1.4 percent of global GDP, according to some estimates – to influence the rest of the world. “It’s mainly a Turkish issue,” says economist C. Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute. He doesn’t expect large spillover effects, say a slowdown of growth in Europe or capital flight from other “emerging market” countries, such as Brazil or India. Not all economists are so hopeful. Writing in The Hill, Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute predicts that “Turkey will default on its debt and impose capital controls.” Capital controls are legal restrictions on money movements in and out of a country. He expects contagion – capital flight from heavily indebted countries – that will weaken the global recovery and hurt the U.S. economy. Economist Tran of the IIF thinks that emerging-market countries that have problems similar to Turkey’s – poor policies, maturing debts, sizable current account deficits – are the most vulnerable to capital flight. These include South Africa, Indonesia and Egypt. So far, the evidence is reassuring; the IIF’s most recent survey of capital movements didn’t detect any sizable money surges since the lira’s latest large drop. Crowd psychology could trigger a panic. If investors expect other investors to sell, there could be a stampede for the door. This story isn’t over yet. What’s uncontroversial, at least among many economists, is that Turkey will need to go to the IMF to end the present crisis. The IMF would provide a hefty loan – it’s doubtful anyone else would – and impose “tough austerity policies” designed to improve the economy’s performance, says Jacob Funk Kirkegaard of the Peterson Institute. By their nature, these policies would be unpopular, especially with Erdogan, because they “could weaken (his) hold on power,” as Kirkegaard puts it. It seems likely that he would resent and resist them as long as possible. That could change everything. Stay tuned.

#### Turkish economy resilient–hyperinflation is normal for the economy

Balcells 2-11 (Francesc Balcells is running the Global EM Debt Fund at FIM partners. Formerly at PIMCO for eight years, managing EM hard and local currency debt portfolios, 2-11-22, “Why Turkey’s economic resilience has defied worst fears”, Financial Times, <https://www.ft.com/content/1d8fd6dd-e951-49a1-bffa-b2c361c2d16a//BVN> SC)

The warnings back in 2011-2013 were ominous: “If the Turkish lira breaks through 2 against the dollar, the economy will implode.” Once the 2 was reached, the new implosion target moved to 3, then to 5, and here we are at 13. The economy is still standing. An economy with debt in dollars as high as Turkey’s should seemingly have imploded a long time ago under such currency volatility. The history of emerging markets is littered with balance of payments crises under similar foreign exchange depreciations. There might be several reasons for this resilience. For one, up until earlier this year, the Turkish authorities did what they always had done in the past when confronted with capital outflows and currency weakness: interest rate hikes, if only belatedly and often in an obfuscated manner. This boom-and-bust way of managing the economy kept the system going for quite some time. That time is what gave economic actors the chance to build buffers against an unbalanced economy. Banks, for example, kept balance sheets largely hedged on currency. By virtue of a build-up of dollar deposits and a low level of foreign currency loans made relative to them, banks also had excess dollars. So they kept lending dollars to obtain cheap lira funding, creating in the process another safety mechanism for themselves. But it hasn’t been only banks which have built resilience over time. As dollarisation progressed, households have continued to accumulate dollar assets but no foreign exchange liabilities. This is because banks were forbidden to lend foreign currency to households, making them a lot more resilient to currency risk. This was perhaps the regulators’ greatest foresight. The creditor profile of the country has also changed over time. Fickle portfolio flows have greatly reduced. Foreigners used to own nearly 30 per cent of the local debt market but this number is now less than 5 per cent (a mere $3bn in absolute terms). Meanwhile locals now own almost 50 per cent of the country’s sovereign Eurobonds. This has left Turkey more dependent on different types of external creditor — the syndicated loan market, trade finance, intra-corporate lending, or domestic lenders. These creditors are more patient, more long-term oriented than foreign portfolio investors. The passing of time has also allowed Turkish corporates, the weakest link in the country’s external balance sheet chain, to reduce debt levels somewhat while building a positive net short-term foreign exchange position. The problem, however, remains one of co-ordination. While on paper each economic sector has enough liquidity buffers of its own, they are all “joined at the hip”. One sector drawing on its foreign exchange assets has a ripple effect on the entire system, as those assets will be residing in someone else’s balance sheet. Against that, the country is tentatively turning its persistent current account deficit into a surplus by virtue of the very large lira depreciation which boosts exports and contracts imports. Whether this turn in the current account, if it materialises, is yet another boom-and-bust episode or a structural manifestation of a policy-driven rebalancing of the economy remains unclear. All in all, it’s been a surprisingly resilient journey, though longer than many of us would have anticipated. Turks also have suffered from high inflation and a squeeze in purchasing power in dollars. And the fact that Turkey hasn’t “broken” yet doesn’t mean it still can’t.

#### Turkish economy rebounding again

Anadolu Agency 5-24 (Anadolu Agency is a news agency headquartered in Ankara, Turkey, 5-24-22, “Turkey boasts ‘diversified, resilient’ economy: Moody’s executive”, Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkey-boasts-diversified-resilient-economy-moodys-executive)

Risks aside, Turkey boasts a large, diversified, resilient economy with a solid banking sector, an executive at Moody’s Investors Service, a sister company of the global ratings agency, said Monday. “They (Turkish banks) have had pretty good results. They are solid,” Kathrin Muehlbronner, senior vice president within Moody’s Investors Service Sovereign Risk Group, told Anadolu Agency (AA), citing “stabilizing factors.” “Exporters are benefiting clearly very much from the (Turkish lira’s) depreciation,” she said, praising the country’s “large diversified resilient economy.” She noted that Turkey may benefit from supply chain shifts in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. “Turkey can benefit massively from a nearshoring of production by European companies and (from its) Customs Union with the EU.” She said prospects for Turkish economic growth are optimistic, adding: “Exports are doing well. Lira depreciation helps. There are clear incentives such as credit stimulus for exporters and investments.” Muehlbronner welcomed steps by the Turkish government to shield the poorest households from inflation. Propelled by rising energy and commodity prices, Turkey’s annual inflation runs at a 20-year high of nearly 70% as of April, according to official data. Consumer prices have been increasing despite tax cuts on basic goods and government subsidies for utility bills to ease the burden on household budgets. After it took a hit from the pandemic like the rest of the world, Muehlbronner said she expects the Turkish tourism sector to have a good season. She underlined that the **Turkish economy may grow faster** than Moody’s forecast of 3% this year. On inflation, Muehlbronner said the upward trend stemmed from the weaker lira, especially through end-2021 and elevated commodity prices. “We think inflation will drop kind of mechanically at the end of the year because of a base effect,” Muehlbronner noted. Listing risks to the Turkish economy, she said high inflation, currency pressure and loose monetary policy create downside risks for the country. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) is expected to hold its key policy rate unchanged at 14% for the fifth straight month on Thursday, according to surveys. Inflation has surged since last autumn as the lira weakened after the central bank in September embarked on a 500-basis point-easing cycle. The government’s foreign exchange-protected lira deposits tool, she said, “was certainly a good step to stabilize the currency. And it has reduced dollarization of deposits by around 10 percentage points.” Muehlbronner was referring to the scheme that the government unveiled in December to boost lira deposits by protecting them against exchange rate volatility. Ankara has called on individuals and companies to convert their foreign exchange savings to lira to support the currency. “So, we’re back to the levels of share of deposits and dollars that we had before the latest currency crisis. So that’s certainly a positive step,” Muehlbronner added.

### 2AC – AT: Nuclear Ukraine

#### Putin won’t use nuclear weapons–NATO will retaliate if he does

Ullman 2/16 (Harlan Ullman, Harlan Ullman is an Atlantic Council senior advisor and UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, 2/16/22, “Why Putin won’t invade Ukraine”, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-putin-wont-invade-ukraine/>/RM

In regard to Ukraine, Putin also knows that an armed attack or aggressive use of force will make any chance of his achieving both his priorities even less likely than landing an astronaut on the sun. He also knows that the costs to Russia and to him personally will be high and possibly unaffordable. Sanctions and further isolation will hurt. Going to war, no matter the scope, or using cyber and influence operations to cripple Ukraine, will absolutely foreclose any chance for even part of Putin’s demands being considered by NATO. The Alliance’s response to a major attack will make the actions it took after Russia’s 2014 Crimean annexation appear anemic. It will expand its military capability and the number of forces stationed in Europe—exactly the opposite of Putin’s intent. NATO members will develop and deploy more advanced weapons, including new classes of missiles with low-yield nuclear warheads. NATO badly needs a new strategic framework (here, ironically, Putin is right for the wrong reasons). If war breaks out in Ukraine, the Alliance will certainly move to a new framework incorporating some of the actions mentioned above and announce it during the Madrid summit in June—another outcome Putin won’t like one bit. In an escalation, the West will impose sanctions more strictly and robustly than before. How much this will dent Russia’s economy or Putin’s inner circle is uncertain. But the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline will almost certainly be cancelled, denting Russia’s energy sector. Whatever credibility Putin may have gained will be lost given the “big lie” of his assurances that force would not be used in Ukraine. Of course, Russia will have accused the West of provoking violence requiring an “appropriate response.” If a subsequent occupation of Ukraine were required, even of just a portion of the country, body bags could be flowing back to Russia. And what is Putin’s exit strategy? No such plan following a Russian attack is obvious for Moscow other than a prolonged twenty-first century version of the Cold War, but one in which Moscow uses substantial force resulting in even greater isolation. And that could doom Putin’s rule in a way similar to how Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev got fired two years after the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. An advantageous stalemate The billion-ruble question is: How does this crisis end? Speculation over invasion scenarios has ranged from a massive, overwhelming air, sea, and land assault to a mix of cyber, special-forces, and influence-based non-kinetic operations. Should Putin not grasp the predicament he has imposed on himself, a limited move in the Donbas or seizing a land bridge into Crimea would seem to be the lowest-risk and lowest-cost option. He could then judge how NATO chooses to respond and wait. But Putin would almost certainly suffer the same consequences as if he took Kyiv and occupied much of the country. Assuming there is no military action, Putin has two choices. First, he can prolong the crisis and maintain the buildup on the Ukrainian border. That would be expensive and wear down his forces. Staying on constant alert takes a toll on people and pocketbooks. Or Putin could terminate the exercise with Belarus on February 20 as scheduled, draw his troops back from the Ukrainian border, claim victory, and continue to push for negotiations—arguing that as the West wrongly predicted an attack, it continues to fail to recognize Russian security interests and needs. Russia will no doubt continue political and psychological pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to make concessions, either to accept the Minsk 2 agreement (despite its grant of semi-autonomy to the Donbas) or to suspend any request for NATO membership. And Russian “active measures,” such as disinformation campaigns, will continue to target Ukraine with the aim of eroding Zelenskyy’s standing and NATO solidarity by claiming “hysteria” over an invasion that never occurred. This scenario suits Putin’s interests far better than an uncertain military adventure, which is why he will choose it—and not because of anything uttered from a White House podium, no matter how much credit the administration will take for deterring a war.

#### Russia won’t escalate to nuclear weapons–he loses China if they do

Corera 4/26 (Gordon Corera, Security correspondent, BBC News, April 26, 2022, “Ukraine war: Could Russia use tactical nuclear weapons?”, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60664169>//RM)

Putin claims Ukraine is part of Russia, so using nuclear weapons on its territory seems bizarre. Russia itself is close by and "the fallout could cross boundaries", warns Patricia Lewis. The only time nuclear weapons have been used in conflict was by the US at the end of World War Two against Japan. Would Putin want to become the first leader to break the taboo and use them? Some worry he has shown a willingness to do things others thought he would not do, whether invading Ukraine or using nerve agent in Salisbury. Dr Williams says there is a further reason why Russia might not use nuclear weapons - China. "Russia is heavily dependent on Chinese support, but China has a 'no first use' nuclear doctrine. So if Putin did use them, it would be incredibly difficult for China to stand by him. If he used them, he would probably lose China." Could it lead to nuclear war? No one knows quite where the use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead. It could escalate and Putin would not want nuclear war. But miscalculation is always a risk. "They would imagine everyone would capitulate," says Patricia Lewis. "What would happen is that Nato would have to come in and respond." The US says it is monitoring the situation closely. It has an extensive intelligence gathering machine to watch Russian nuclear activity - for instance whether tactical weapons are being moved out of storage, or if there is any change in behaviour at launch sites. So far, they say they have not seen any significant changes. How the US and Nato would respond to any nuclear use is hard to predict. They may not want to escalate the situation further and risk all-out nuclear war but they also might want to draw a line. This might mean a tough conventional rather than nuclear response. But what would Russia then do? "Once you have crossed the nuclear threshold, there is no obvious stopping point," says James Acton. "I don't think anyone can have any confidence of what that world would look like."